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The song that nerves a nation’s heart Is in
itself a deed.
Tennyson
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Preface
Chaiyo means victory, it means hurrah. It is a cheer, a ral-lying cry, coined by a king whose overall program of nation-
alism is the subject of the following pages. This book is devoted
to one basic aim: to examine Siamese nationalism during the
reign of King Vajiravudh as thoroughly and completely as my
talents and the sources—the Thai archives, printed works in
Thai and Western languages, and the memories of Thai
friends—permit. I have resisted temptations to digress into an
overall history of the reign or an examination of theories of na-
tionalism. Yet I hope, of course, that the work will contribute to
the general understanding of this period of Thai history and also
provide information for political theorists on the nationalistic
process.
The biases of an author who is not a polemicist are apt to be
what he is least aware of and least likely to admit. I have tried
to examine my biases in two areas of vulnerability: my views
on nationalism and my feelings toward Thailand. I regard na-
tionalism as far from an unalloyed blessing. Like any system of
loyalty, it has its virtues and its faults. Its good lies in its power
to unite; its bad lies in its power to divide. Perhaps the history
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of mankind is the story of the search for larger and larger loy-
alties. Just as King Vajiravudh saw the development of a family
spirit, a team spirit, a school spirit as the stepping stones to
a national spirit perhaps the development of a national spirit
is the necessary prelude to an international spirit. On Thailand
my views are less ambiguous and, for that very reason, more
likely to be subjective. In one of the most stimulating talks
given at the Association for Asian Studies in recent years, Pro-
fessor Herbert Phillips surveyed American research on Thailand
and concluded, with respect to the researchers, that, despite
their vast differences in field, background, and methodology, all
shared one attitude. That attitude was love for Thailand and the
Thai. Even writers “critical” of Thai institutions wrote their crit-
icisms in a spirit of affection. I write, then, as objectively as I
can, write truths as I see them, but the affection is there. As
a historian, further, I have often experienced personally, seen
the living reality of, the Thai view—indeed the Southeast Asian
view—of what history is, or should be. History to the Thai is
not the cold compilation of facts and analysis of events, the
piling up of stories, good and evil, with no aim except objective
truth. History’s aim is not to be, in Thucydides’ phrase, “an
exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of
the future,” but rather a setting forth of the moral good of the
past, of the virtues of the past, to serve as a moral guide to the
future. This view of the uses of history commands my respect as
those who expressed it to me in intimate conversation command
my respect. In the end, however, I remain a Western historian
of Siam, not a Siamese historian. My intellectual progenitor is
Thucydides.
The “assisted by” on the title page needs a word of expla-
nation. Dorothy B. Vella, my wife, played an extraordinary role
in the development of this book—as a researcher, a consultant,
and an editor. She did all the research in the English-language
newspapers. Every thought and idea, every draft and redraft,
was tested out on her. And the final editing was hers. Credit for
the book we share, but the blame for error I must assume alone.
For I wrote the words, and, in cases of conflict, I played the au-
tocrat.
To give proper acknowledgment of aid given me in this study
over the years is awesome. First of all, heartiest and fullest
thanks are due to those Thai who lived during the reign and
were willing to reminisce for my benefit: Netra Poonwiwat, Rian
Srichandr, and Charoon Sattamet, three members of the coup
party of 1912 who were willing to bare to a stranger painful pe-
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riods of their lives; Prince Dhani Nivat; Princess Poon Pismai
Diskul; Princess Charu-bhatra Abhakorn; Prince Sitthiporn Kri-
dakara; Phraya Harnklang-samuth; Sathitya Semanil; Phraya
Prichanusat; M. L. Pin Malakul; Phra Mahamontri; Phra Maha
Dhep Kasatarasanuha; Phraya Borihara Rajamanob; Phraya No-
radhebprida; Udom Kalyanamitra; Khunying Chalow
Anirutdeva; Nai Kuad Humphrae; M. R. Kukrit Pramoj; and
Princess Elisabeth Chakrabongse. Belonging to this list, but
meriting most particular thanks for answering my questions re-
peatedly in person and by letter, is Chamun Amorn Darunarak.
He and his wife Uthumporn have become more than correspon-
dents; they have become my very good friends.
Another category of acknowledgment is due the Thai
friends, librarians, teachers, and students who helped me in
such diverse ways as finding a needed book or helping me
puzzle out a poetic line: Vilaileka Buranasiri, Vina Sritanratana,
Dr. Kajorn Sukabanij, Sulak Sivaraksa, Captain and Mrs.
Bisdarn Chulasevok, Robert and Kanok Vil, Maenmas Chavalit,
Choosri Sawasdisongkram, Neon Snidvongs, Niramol
Kangsadara Pachinburavan, Phraya Bharataraja, Lt. Bhakorn
Subhajalasaya, Dr. Malai and Khunying Ubol Huvanandana,
Kamol T. Chaisuwan, and Vilai Grandstaff. Also in this category
of friend and helper is Ramphai Charumas, who did more than
any other individual to arrange introductions to people I wanted
to meet and to track down books and collections of books I
needed to read and who aided me in other ways too numerous
to recall.
Invaluable in providing much of the wherewithal for my
sabbatical year of research in Thailand in 1969–1970 was the
American Council of Learned Societies, which awarded me a
research grant. Thai institutional cooperation was also exceed-
ingly generous; particularly noteworthy in this regard were the
National Research Council, the National Archives, the National
Library, the Damrong Library, and the Siam Society.
Among the inspirers and facilitators of any work that arises
out of academe are countless people in one’s uni-
versity—colleagues, students, librarians, administrators, and
members of the secretarial staff. Colleagues venture ideas, stu-
dents react to notions. Complete attributions are impossible
here. But worthy of particular mention for indispensable aid
in searching and securing titles are two members of the Uni-
versity of Hawaii’s Asia Collection staff: Joyce Wright, head,
and Mrs. Lan Hiang Char, librarian. A researcher’s obligation to
his institution—in my case, the University of Hawaii—is immea-
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surable. I am grateful to the university for granting me the re-
search time and sabbatical leave that made this study possible
and for aiding me in countless other ways such as awarding
special funds for microfilming materials related to my research.
A final word of heartfelt thanks goes to the loyal and indefati-
gable band of secretary-typists at the university, particularly
Gayle Ing, Machiko Tsuruya, and Jo Ann Yamashita, who suc-
ceeded in translating the almost illegible scrawl of my first draft
into readable type and who thereafter faced mounds of retyping
with undiminished good cheer.
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Note
All Thai words except personal names are rendered in the so-
called general system outlined in the Journal of the Thailand Re-
search Society of March 1941. For personal names, the translit-
erations adopted by the Thai individuals themselves are used;
when a person’s preference is not known, however, the general
system is again followed.
In accordance with the official designations for the periods,
the term Siam is used for the name of the country during the
Vajiravudh years, Thailand for the country today. The adjective
Siamese is used when the reference is to the political entity of
the time, the adjective Thai when the reference is to things lin-
guistic, ethnic, or cultural, regardless of time.
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Introduction
The parade of the world’s leading propagandists for nation-alism is one of almost infinite variety. Led off by a little Cor-
sican drumbeater for liberty, equality, and brotherhood, the
march continues with romantic poets paired with red-shirted
revolutionaries, men in shabby dhotis striding side by side with
reincarnated Caesars. In this mixed company in which the
daring, the loud, the common outnumber the sedate, the re-
flective, the traditionalist, walks a figure more unusual than
most: a king of Siam, continuer of a 600-year-old monarchy, in-
heritor of the status of god-king, diffident, dignified, and soft
spoken.
Vajiravudh of Siam, absolute monarch of his country from
1910 to 1925 and sixth ruler of his dynasty, was a paradoxical
combination of traditional autocrat and modern nationalist. He
was indeed the founder of modern nationalism in his country.
His espousal of nationalism as an instrument of national
strength was as deliberate, as unrevolutionary as were the ac-
tions his predecessors had taken to ease Siam into the modern
world.
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The policy of making adjustments to the Western presence
and power by accepting Western “improvements” was deliber-
ately begun by King Mongkut, Vajiravudh’s grandfather, in the
1850s. This policy was continued by King Chulalongkorn. Both
these monarchs considered the policy of Westernization nec-
essary for Siam’s survival; they believed that it was necessary to
adopt Western techniques in order to preserve Siam’s political
independence, its society, its essential culture. But neither king
fully appreciated the underlying danger to Thai values in their
policy; neither realized that the adoption of Western techniques
would change the character of what they were trying to save. By
1910 many traditional Thai arts and crafts, for example, had dis-
appeared. Little had been done by Mongkut or Chulalongkorn to
stop this trend and, in the view of a long-time foreign resident in
Siam, “it is doubtful indeed if they desired it”; one of the “dom-
inating passions” of Chulalongkorn’s life was to “Europeanize
his country … and the fact that some of his reforms were quite
unsuited to the climate and habits of the people, never deterred
him from introducing them.”1
Vajiravudh was much better able to understand the force of
Western culture—partly because he came later in time, partly
because he had had a thorough schooling in things Western,
including nine years of study in England. Vajiravudh therefore
perceived that unthinking acceptance of Western ways of doing
things must endanger Thai ways of looking at things. Contin-
uance of Thai values, heretofore taken for granted, must be ac-
tively pursued if Thailand were to remain Thai. Yet how was
Thailand to become more Westernized and more Thai at the
same time? For “Westernization” and “Thaiification” worked at
cross-purposes: the more egalitarianism, the less hierarchy of
respect; the more science and technology, the less abstraction
from the material world.
Vajiravudh’s answer to the challenge of Westernization was
to embark on a program of nationalism for his country, a method
of fighting fire with fire that has won global acceptance. The
inspiration for Vajiravudh’s nationalist program was, first and
foremost, Great Britain, the Western nation that Vajiravudh
knew best, at this time a nation caught up in imperialist en-
thusiasm. Other influences on the King were emergent Japan,
whose defeat of Russia had made a strong impression on him,
and the rising nationalist groups in China, which had had an in-
fluence on the Chinese in Thailand. Sources for nationalist in-
spiration were not hard to find in the years immediately before,
during, and after World War I.
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Nationalism, to be worthy of the name, requires more than
an eloquent spokesman. Unless the leader has a mass following,
unless numbers of people are caught up in the “ism,” the nation-
alist proponent is merely a voice, and the ideology he espouses
remains inert, lifeless. Machiavelli in the sixteenth century
could call for the “valor of an Italian spirit,” could speak of
Italy’s being “ready and willing to follow any banner” that would
lead the battle for redemption from foreign occupation and
bring unification. But he spoke as a visionary whose message,
while undoubtedly attractive to Lorenzo Medici, his patron, had
little effect on the Italian population at large. Machiavelli may
have been a nationalist, but Italian nationalism was another 400
years in coming.
Was Vajiravudh a similar prenationalist voice, a propa-
gandist but not a leader of a new loyalty? This is hard to judge.
For he was the king, and his people perforce followed. The
crucial question is whether those who followed did so out of
obligation or out of conviction. Did Vajiravudh persuade the
Thai people to love their nation above all else, or did he merely
impose on them outward behavior that seemed to betoken na-
tionalism?
However the question be answered—and some answer will
be attempted—the position of Vajiravudh remains central.
Whether he was the leader of an emergent nationalist land or
an idealogue whose policies, later espoused by others, would
produce a people aware of their uniqueness as a nation, Vaji-
ravudh remains a key figure in the analysis of Thai nationalism.
The history of Thai nationalism must start with Vajiravudh.
An overview of the nationalism of King Vajiravudh of Siam
reveals many similarities with nationalistic expressions in other
times and other places. The enlistment of tradition, of history,
in the nationalistic cause is not new; nor is the empirical search
for sources of national strength; nor is the effort to contrast the
nation and national characteristics favorably with those of for-
eigners.
What is remarkable about Vajiravudh’s nationalism no doubt
owes much to the peculiar historical circumstances of Siam in
the early twentieth century. Siam had managed to maintain its
political independence, as a formality at least, in a century of
expanding colonialism. The upsurge of anticolonial nationalism
in the rest of Southeast Asia therefore bypassed Siam. the Thai
people had been lulled into a feeling of relative complacency.
Yet the Western-trained Vajiravudh saw that nationalism had a
utility beyond its role in the achievement of independence; it
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had a utility in state-building. And so this traditional monarch
worked assiduously to promote nationalism among a somewhat
reluctant people.
The difficulty of rousing nationalistic fervor in a country
whose people by and large were “too content with themselves”
was enormous. The difficulty was in no way diminished by the
fact that the task was undertaken by a national leader acting
very much on his own. “Be loyal to your king” may have been a
good nationalistic aim, but it undoubtedly raised some eyebrows
because it was pronounced by the King himself.
The injunction of the King to avoid imitating foreign ways
also rang a bit false. For there was no greater imitator of
Western ways in the Thailand of his day than the King himself.
In addition to a governmental program that was essentially one
of Westernization, Vajiravudh’s nationalism and even many of its
slogans (including the necessity for loyalty to nation, religion,
and king—analogues to the British “God, King, and Country”)
were Western imports. Vajiravudh’s strong stand against imi-
tation meant, in the last analysis, only that the delicate choice
of what should be introduced from the West was a choice that
the King felt he alone was capable of making. Vajiravudh here
was again the traditional monarch making the crucial decisions
for his people.
The nationalistic program of Vajiravudh was, all in all, mod-
erate, almost exclusively hortatory. Vajiravudh was no dema-
gogue. His most xenophobic comments were directed against
the Chinese, but even in these he did not descend into verbal
mire. He launched no pogroms; in fact, no anti-Chinese legis-
lation at all was issued during his reign.
The paradox of competing values in Thailand is nowhere
clearer than in the picture of King Vajiravudh introducing the
Western concept of nationalism to his people in the manner of a
tolerant moral exemplar in the finest tradition of the benevolent
autocracy of old Siam.
Introduction
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Prince to King
When Chulalongkorn died on October 23, 1910, he hadbeen king for forty-two years. Most of his subjects could
remember no other. The special royal word for the death of a
king (sawannakhot) felt strange on the lips to older courtiers; it
was meaningless to the young.
Despite the length of his rule—the longest in Thai
history—the King was not old; his death was totally unexpected.
Chulalongkorn had celebrated his fifty-seventh birthday a
month before his death. Although he had had periodic bouts
of illness over the years, he had not been ill for some time
before his fatal attack. The progress from the first complaint
of “stomach trouble” to coma and death was but a week. Not
even the highest princes in the court knew the seriousness of
the King’s condition. Less than forty-eight hours before he died
the First Queen had reported that “His Majesty has improved in
all respects.”1
Crown Prince Vajiravudh, whose residence at Saranrom
Palace put him some distance away from Dusit Palace, where
the King had been staying, was probably less well informed
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about his father’s illness than most. In fact, on the morning of
the King’s final day, Vajiravudh had had to be awakened to be
summoned to Dusit Palace.2
Certainly in the short view the practical and emotional
period of preparation of Vajiravudh for assuming the royal au-
thority was brief. In the long view, however, his preparation,
while not ideal, was better than that of most of his predecessors.
The first advantage he had was early assurance of becoming
king. In 1886 Chulalongkorn, in order to ensure a peaceful suc-
cession, had appointed his son Vajirunhis Crown Prince, the first
Crown Prince in Thai history. When Vajirunhis died in 1895,
Chulalongkorn named Vajiravudh, then his oldest son of the
highest princely rank, the new heir.3 In the following fifteen
years Vajiravudh, the royal family, and all the Thai people had
become thoroughly used to the prospect of Vajiravudh’s suc-
cession. The intention of Chulalongkorn in naming an heir was
entirely fullfilled on his death, and the indecision, deliberating,
politicking, and even open warfare that had characterized pe-
riods of change of rule in traditional times were completely
avoided. Vajiravudh stepped into his new role unchallenged.
Other advantages of the new monarch included his intelli-
gence, his age, his training, and his knowledge and experience.
Vajiravudh’s intelligence hardly requires proof. His mind was
agile, inquisitive, logical, and retentive. Vajiravudh acceded at
the age of twenty-nine, in the words of one Thai prince “a
splendid age to succeed to a throne.”4 While age alone is no
qualification, accession at too few years could be a distinct dis-
advantage, as Chulalongkorn himself had discovered when he
had become king at fifteen, full of royal dignity but powerless.
The training of Vajiravudh was certainly exceptional. He was
the first Siamese king to have been educated abroad, to have
traveled extensively, to have visited many foreign courts and
capitals. He left Siam for his education in England in 1893,
when he was twelve, and stayed for nine years. He acquired
a general education under a number of tutors and received
special military training at Sandhurst and through service with
several British infantry and artillery units. In 1900 he went up
to Oxford, where he studied history and law. His social edu-
cation was not neglected: he conversed with European royalty
(starting by taking tea with Queen Victoria in 1894), learned
horsemanship and lawn tennis, visited the London theater (he
was always fond of plays), and represented his father at various
Chaiyo!
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functions. Throughout the European years he visited France,
Belgium, Italy, Hungary, and Spain; on the way home, the
United States and Japan.
The training of Vajiravudh in Thai traditions did not entirely
lapse while he was abroad. Preceptors were periodically sent
to Europe to instruct him—and the other sons of Chulalongkorn
sent abroad for study—in the Thai language, in Buddhism, and
in Thai culture. Further, the King on occasion sent letters of
moral instruction to the young princes to help them keep their
Thai values intact.5 He advised his sons to write him regu-
larly—in Thai as well as in a European language. For knowledge
of Thai was indispensable. Chulalongkorn put this clearly in one
letter:
I would at this point impress upon you the fact that in sending
you abroad for a European education, it is not my object to have
you useful solely through your knowledge of foreign languages
and European methods of work. Your own language and literature
must ever be in constant use…. Knowledge of a foreign language
is merely the means of acquiring further learning.6
On his return to Siam in January 1903, Vajiravudh gained ad-
ditional experience. He became inspector general of the army,
commander of the royal guards, an army general, an assistant
private secretary to King Chulalongkorn, president of the Na-
tional Library, president of the Commission on Exhibitions,
chairman of a drafting committee for the military penal code,
and temporary head of the Ministry of Justice. The Prince also
on occasion accompanied the King to meetings of the Council of
Ministers and was shown drafts of key documents—both as part
of his preparation for eventual rule. The highest position the
Prince was entrusted with in the years before his accession was
that of head of the caretaker government, together with the Re-
gency Council and Council of Ministers, during Chulalongkorn’s
second trip to Europe (for his health) from March to November
1907.
All these experiences, including the last as “acting king,”
carried less responsibility than might appear. In no case was
Vajiravudh able to operate on his own. He was at the most a
contributor to the work of a council, at the least an observer,
expected to learn by seeing rather than by doing. During his
father’s absence in 1907, Vajiravudh fully filled the King’s func-
tions in only one role—that of performer of royal ceremonies
in the countless Brahmanic and Buddhist rites that made up a
Prince to King
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large part of the royal duties. In deliberations of the Regency
Council or the Council of Ministers, the Prince served as
chairman, but key problems were cabled to the King for de-
cision; and matters that required more immediate action were
decided on by the councils, who were instructed to rely on their
knowledge of Chulalongkorn’s earlier policies or, where such
knowledge was lacking, on their best estimates of the King’s
probable course of action. All that was done from March to No-
vember 1907 had a pro tem character to it and had to pass Chu-
lalongkorn’s scrutiny on his return.7
SARANROM PALACE
There was one area in which the Prince had considerable
freedom of action, and that was the governance of his own
household. It was the custom for young princes to leave the
king’s palace—where the considerable female royal entourage
also resided—at an early age. Vajiravudh followed this custom
late in 1904, taking up residence in Saranrom Palace. Here he
was to develop a style of life and some of the special interests
that he carried forward into his reign as king.
Saranrom Palace in the days when it served as residence of
the Crown Prince was quite a world to itself. Located in spa-
cious walled grounds east of the Grand Palace, the site even
today preserves remnants of its former splendor—a Chinese-
style pagoda tower, a Cambodian-style monument, various
Victorian-style buildings elaborate with wooden Hansel-and-
Gretel fretwork, walks and lanes that at one time bordered care-
fully laid out gardens and forested parks. This was Vajiravudh’s
domain for six years; this, his little empire, the setting of his
princely court, the stage for his enterprises.
Among the preferred activities at Saranrom were amateur
theatricals, classical dancing practice, war games, literary pro-
duction, and newspaper publishing. These activities were orga-
nized and managed by the Prince personally. For the classical
dance form called khon (“masked drama”), an amateur troupe
(Khon Samak Len) was established.8 Trained teachers and mu-
sicians were hired, but the troupe itself was made up of young
courtiers. The Crown Prince wrote the texts and directed the
troupe’s frequent performances. In the program notes for a per-
formance at the opening of the school of military cadets on
December 25, 1909, the Prince wrote that the wish of the vol-
unteer performers was only to give pleasure and to remind the
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Thai that the art of the dance was not exclusively Western, that
the Thai had traditional arts that ought not be allowed to fall
into ruin.9 This basic purpose was to underlie many aspects of
Vajiravudh’s nationalism after he became king. The Prince also
took keen interest in plays—production, writing, acting. At least
four of his full-length plays date from Saranrom times.10
Literary activities of all kinds had long interested the Prince.
Even during his days in England he had been productive,
turning out student publications and a historical thesis for
Oxford.11 Two earmarks of the writer—voracious reading habits
and the keeping of a diary—were among the earliest habits of
Vajiravudh.12 At Saranrom much of the literary work was di-
rected into the publication of a monthly journal entitled Thaw-
ipanya (Enhancement of Knowledge). The Prince was editor and
chief contributor to the journal, which printed poems and ar-
ticles with political and nationalistic overtones as well as purely
literary pieces. Aside from contributions to Thawipanya, Vaji-
ravudh also produced three travel accounts: one of a trip to
the North with his father in 1905;13 one of a trip to the South
in 1909;14 and, the most interesting, a long narrative account
of his trip in 1907 to the region of Thailand’s first capital
Sukhothai.15 The Sukhothai account, published in 1908, is a
remarkable journey into Thailand’s past, both in terms of the
physical journey by elephant and on foot through rough, often
uncleared jungle trails that had once been royal highways and
in terms of the intellectual encounter at sites of palaces and
temples of onetime grandeur. The Prince, in his preface to this
work, made his purpose clear. He hoped the work would be
of use to archaeologists and historians, but he also had other
hopes for it:
Perhaps it will make the Thai more aware that our Thai race is
not a new race and is not a race of jungle folk or, as the English
say, uncivilized …. We should feel ashamed today to compare our-
selves not only to other peoples but also to our own ancestors
…. The ancient Thai had the concepts and the diligence to make
structures that were large and beautiful and long-lasting. Thai
today do nothing but destroy the old things or let them decay be-
cause of their infatuation with new things in Western style. They
do not know how to choose what is appropriate for our country.16
Many of the preoccupations at Saranrom Palace have been
generally regarded as “games.” Some indeed were; the Prince
certainly took his moments of relaxation. He liked to tell stories
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to the young pages. One courtier particularly remembers the
ghost stories—the deliberately dimmed lights, the close huddle
round the Prince, the real fright of many, some of whom later
had trouble getting to sleep.17 Other popular amusements were
charades, riddles, and treasure hunts.18
Games in at least one category had, or were to develop, a se-
rious side; these were the war games and police games. The war
games apparently started in 1905 and were played in the en-
virons of Saranrom. They were elaborately staged. There were
two teams, each headed by a command staff which planned the
strategy to be carried out by the commissioned and noncommis-
sioned officers and the men. Each side wore a distinguishing
color, red or green, and the various grades of soldiers wore ap-
propriate insignia. Firecrackers were used to help produce re-
alism. The games were taken seriously, and the operations were
judged by referees. The Crown Prince usually served as the
principal referee, although on occasion he commanded one of
the combatant teams instead. A general strike of Chinese mer-
chants in Bangkok in June 1910 inspired a variation of the war
games: police action against “Chinese” strikers.
All the games, including the war games, took place at night
after dinner, beginning around 10 P.M. Ordinary games usually
lasted until 3 A.M., but the war games went on until 4 or 5 A.M.
The relaxed Prince and exhausted pages would be off to bed
with the sounds of the waking city—the sound of the reveille
bugle at the nearby military cadet school and the clatter of
streetcars bringing early workers to their jobs. It is obvious
that, when the war games were held, they absorbed the major
energies of the Prince and his courtiers. The fact that they were
held late at night and in the early morning hours was in keeping
with the traditional regimen in Thai court circles.
The war games were also conducted during the Prince’s va-
cation months away from Bangkok at his bungalow in Nakhο̨n
Pathom. There the games took place during the day; the uni-
forms were more elaborate; “artillery” units with teak-log
cannon were added; and the whole operation was even more
strenuous and serious, partly because local people—officials
and farmers—came to watch.19
A game of somewhat similar nature occupied the Prince and
young pages for a time at Parusakawan Palace. Here a model
municipality was built, consisting physically of a long, narrow
building, divided into rooms, with two pages to a room, and
ideationally of a self-governing community with its own gov-
ernment leaders, its own fire department, police, bank, news-
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paper, and town meetings. The fire department drilled by sprin-
kling the lawn and shrubbery; the bank received deposits the
pages were able to make from their small monthly stipends.20
An indispensable element in all the Prince’s activities in the
closed world within his own control was his attempt to build
a body of loyal and like-minded retainers and to develop a
spirit of camaraderie within it. One of his first acts at Saranrom
was to create a club called Thawipanya Samosο̨n, or the En-
hancement of Knowledge Club.21 Membership was drawn from
both courtiers and individuals outside the Saranrom court. By
Thai standards of the time, the Thawipanya Club was re-
markably egalitarian: commoners far outnumbered those of
princely rank, and all members were treated equally. The club
had its own officers; its principal officer was elected annually
(the Crown Prince always won), and he chose all the other of-
ficers.22 The club published the journal Thawipanya.
The club was much like a British club. Members used the
clubhouse, in the Saranrom Gardens, to lounge about and read
the foreign and domestic newspapers or to play billiards, ping
pong, chess, or card games. Outdoor sports included tennis,
cricket, croquet, and hockey. These games were all very new in
Thailand, and their popularity rapidly grew—no doubt in large
part because of the princely favor shown them. The membership
also held general meetings two or three times a week. These
meetings were usually devoted to formally organized debates on
topics such as “This group believes in ghosts” (the affirmative
won) or “Electric lights are better than lanterns” (the negative
won).23
The Thawipanya Club also sponsored amateur theatricals. A
small playhouse was built in the gardens, and frequent perfor-
mances were given. At times outside guests were invited. Even
Westerners, on occasion, were part of the audience, and one
foreign journalist recalled in later years “the happiest memories
of evenings in that theatre in the garden.”24
The Prince’s predilection for dramatics was not universally
appreciated. His mother was one outstanding critic. Queen
Saowapha came to one performance in which Vajiravudh had a
part, and after the performance Her Majesty remonstrated with
him. She said that she had enjoyed the play but could not get
over the feeling that it was not right for the Prince himself to
be on stage, interacting with other people in a way not suitable
for one of his rank and station. The Prince yielded nothing in
his reply: acting was an art; acting required one to play the
role of the character portrayed, not oneself; there was nothing
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unseemly in actions that were part of developing a character-
ization. In short, the Prince made it clear that he intended to
keep on acting.25 And he did so, even as king.
One other action by Vajiravudh as Crown Prince that was
indicative of his interests was the establishment of a special
school in 1907. Most of the pages went to school off the palace
grounds. For pages who had completed primary education but
had not yet entered government service or one of the military
academies, and for pages enrolled elsewhere but with some
free time, special classes were held at Saranrom in law, gov-
ernment, economics, military science, geography and history,
and English. The Prince designed the curriculum and was the
principal instructor.
In a sense, at Saranrom the Crown Prince himself was the
principal student. He was organizing; he was leading; he was
expressing ideas and carrying out notions. There are foreshad-
owings of many of his later state policies in his games, clubs,
and literary proclivities. But the view of Saranrom as a training
period for serious state ideas must not be carried too far.
Saranrom was also Vajiravudh’s place of relaxation, of play for
play’s sake. This was in no way unusual. Highborn princes were
expected to enjoy themselves. Chulalongkorn, for example, had
been established in his own separate residence at a much
earlier age; he had held many parties there, had become some-
thing of a collector, and had become a father by two of his
concubines—all before he reached the age of fifteen, when his
father died.
There were some aspects of Vajiravudh’s life at Saranrom
that stimulated criticism. His playacting was one, as has already
been mentioned. Even more important was the Prince’s failure
to marry. The entourage at Saranrom was entirely male. For a
prince to reach his late twenties without acquiring a concubine
was unusual and a disappointment to those anxious for the
future of the dynastic line. Here again his chief critic, the only
one to speak directly to him on the subject, was his mother. The
Queen’s personal physician reported that Vajiravudh’s refusal
to marry “was a source of continual distress and irritation to his
mother.” She argued; she pleaded; she reasoned; she tempted
him by putting some “charmingly dressed” cousins in his way.
All to no avail. The son remained an enigma to his mother. He
remained adamant, and she accepted defeat—although none too
graciously.26
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Another source of some criticism was the Prince’s extreme
loyalty to the retainers, courtiers, and pages immediately
around him. Some of the Prince’s closest attachments were
made within the circle of Saranrom, attachments that continued
throughout the period of his reign as king. It was to be expected
that some individuals outside this circle should resent their ex-
clusion. There is no evidence, however, that their criticisms had
any real effect upon the Prince or deflected him from pursuing
his own goals in his own way.
A VICTORIAN SIAMESE PRINCE
By October 23, 1910, Vajiravudh had been schooled, had been
cast in public roles, had developed a private style of life. He
had also fitted out the furnishings of his mind. His overall per-
ceptions as to what his small country, Siam, would need in
order to survive had been formed; he was already convinced
that Siam’s first requirement was the development of a national
esprit. Indeed, many of the specifics toward this goal had been
partly conceptualized.
The cast of thought of the Prince was a reflection of his up-
bringing and of his time. He was a Victorian Siamese prince.
The impact of England on the Prince had been profound.
His written and spoken English was excellent. He knew and
admired the manners of British gentlemen. In Europe he had
been au courant with the best restaurants (e.g., Claridge’s), the
best theaters. He could comment after viewing the ballet Sylvia
at the Theatre Marie in St. Petersburg that its prima ballerina
“danced very nicely. She has improved since last winter.”27
He read and enjoyed English periodicals, including Punch, The
Tattler, and Strand.
Aside from admiring and acquiring the elite manners of
Europe’s premier state, Vajiravudh had been impressed with
the ethos of Victorian society. England in the 1890s and early
1900s, the period of Vajiravudh’s stay there, was not merely
a powerful nation, it was the arbiter of Europe, the center of
world empire. And assumptions about the reasons for this pre-
miership surrounded Vajiravudh.
The Englishman of the late Victorian years was convinced
that he lived in man’s best times in man’s best land. The criteria
for evaluation were the technological proofs of progress: every-
thing was bigger and better, and England had the biggest and
best. In 1897, three years after Vajiravudh’s arrival, England
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celebrated Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee. Victoria’s record-
breaking reign “was symbolic, for England was also engaged in
record breaking—she held the records for Empire, for wealth,
for commerce, for sea-power, for the size of her metropolis, for
social prosperity.”28
Other proofs and symbols of England’s preeminence
abounded. In art the age of Wilde and Beardsley was seen as the
beginning of a new Renaissance; a renaissance had certainly
taken place in the theater with the plays of Jones, Pinero, and
Shaw. In sports England was supreme; “the idea that foreigners
could compete with Englishmen in any sort of athletic pursuit
would have been scouted as too absurd for words.”29 And in
the realm of imagination Kipling’s “ten-year British sodger”
brought the common man a hero who, by combining the disci-
pline of the barracks with love of the Queen, became world con-
queror. This loyalty of the Englishman, his belief in his great
and well-deserved destiny, his willingness to work for it, to make
any sacrifice to help the “team” win a soccer cup or to help
the Queen win the championship of the world, made a deep
and long-lasting impression on the young Siamese prince in
England.
Yet Vajiravudh did not become a converted Englishman. He
did not become an uncritical Anglophile. His earliest schooling
as a Siamese prince, reinforced by the princely life he resumed
after the English interlude, inevitably determined his outlook.
The outlook of the Siamese elite was not easily abandoned.
The privilege, even adulation, accorded Siamese royalty was a
deference that permeated the whole of the Thai social order
and depended philosophically on the Buddhist belief that one
was born to the existence he had earned in previous incarna-
tions. The hierarchy of deference reached its peak in members
of royalty and was expressed in forms beyond anything that
could be imagined in Victorian England. Vajiravudh’s place in
this system had been confirmed by numerous royal ceremonies
held for him from an early age—his establishment with his royal
name and title and own retinue at the age of eight, his tonsure
at the age of eleven, and his installation as Crown Prince at
the age of fourteen. The tonsure ceremony, for example, was a
week-long affair involving the construction of a forty-foot arti-
ficial “holy” mountain at the top of which King Chulalongkorn,
as the god Siva, apotheosized his son as the god Ganesa. A
onetime member of the Department of Royal Pages commented:
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However ignorant of the meaning of the complicated rites the
young prince may be, he must at least subconsciously realize that
this festival signifies a break with childhood days, that he must
begin to take life seriously, and that he is a person of great im-
portance on whom will eventually rest the responsibility for the
welfare of the people …. no finer training for a possible heir to
the throne in regal bearing and the duties that might later be re-
quired of him could possibly be conceived.30
There are abundant indications that Prince Vajiravudh fully
appreciated the dignity of his social position. The one adverse
report on record from his English tutor apparently arose from
the tutor’s lack of understanding of the social standing of the
Prince among his own people: Vajiravudh had apparently acted
imperiously toward two of his military aides, and the tutor re-
ported that he was afraid the disposition of the Prince had
turned sour. The Thai adults who investigated the matter saw
only the normal behavior of a Siamese prince toward his com-
moner servants.31
The shuttling between East and West—both physically and
ideologically—produced tensions and scars in Vajiravudh (and
in other princes of his generation). The attempt to create an
English club atmosphere at Saranrom Palace by authoritarian
means is a typical expression of his dilemma. On the personal
level, Vajiravudh’s shyness, his reluctance to establish close re-
lationships with members of his own family, his didacticism,
his love of children’s games, and his sensitivity to criticism all
bespeak a complicated man attempting to resolve his internal
confusions on his own, by his own lights. Vajiravudh’s reaction
to criticism is particularly revealing: instead of modifying his
behavior, Vajiravudh almost invariably retaliated with a devas-
tating criticism of the critic.
The insecurity that can be perceived in the Prince’s char-
acter undoubtedly had its psychological sources. The first
Crown Prince, Vajirunhis, who died at the age of sixteen, was
obviously much beloved by his parents; Vajiravudh must have
felt, at times at least, that he was only a “second choice.”
Moreover, there are strong indications that both of Vajiravudh’s
parents were fonder of his full brother Chakrabongs than of
Vajiravudh.32 These facts may well have had their impact. And
the insecurity of Siam itself may have affected his psyche. Just
thirty-eight days before the young Prince left for his studies in
England, French gunboats entered the Čhaophraya River and
anchored at Bangkok to underline demands for Siamese terri-
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torial concessions in favor of French Indochina. The Siamese
survived this most serious challenge to their sovereignty only by
making broad concessions. Vajiravudh, although young, could
not help but be moved by the near panic this French move of
1893 caused in court circles.33 King Chulalongkorn could not
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mask his fears. He secretly deposited a large sum of money in
England to take care of his son in case the worst should happen
and Vajiravudh should one day find that he had no country to
return to. And he informed the twelve-year-old Prince of what
he had done.34
Despite the thread of insecurity that was woven into his
character, the visible fabric of Vajiravudh’s personality showed
no weakness. However strong his father had been, however
great his contributions to his country, Vajiravudh on balance
was convinced that mistakes had been made and that he, thanks
to his broader knowledge of the outside world, would be able to
bring Siam the kind of rule and the vital policies it needed for
survival.
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The King Consecrated
Iwish no honor greater than that of being my father’s son who,having inherited the throne, walks in his footsteps in order to
help to complete the tasks necessary for the progress of the
country.1
The earliest speeches of Vajiravudh as king abound in declara-
tions of his intention of following in his father’s footsteps. And
his earliest actions were in no way disruptive of the past. In
fact, traditional Thai administrative practices worked against
rapid change of men or policies at the highest levels of gov-
ernment. For a monarch inherited the entire apparatus of his
predecessor’s government; the principal ministers were never
removed from their posts or power. Vajiravudh had no imme-
diate desire to disturb old officials who were inclined to regard
the edifice of state created by Chulalongkorn as embodying “all
that was absolute and right” and were “inclined instinctively to
regard any possible reversal or even modification of … policy
as a sort of sacrilege.”2 He recognized the hold of “antiquated
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traditions” and appraised his situation realistically: “Just at first
things are bound to move rather slowly, because of the many
difficulties I have to surmount.”3
Further, there was not much time in the early months of the
reign for important change. There were countless ceremonies
to be got through: the rites preliminary to the cremation of Chu-
lalongkorn; the coronation of Vajiravudh on November 11; and,
finally, the cremation of Chulalongkorn on March 16, 1911.
Yet Vajiravudh felt the need for something to signify that
new directions would be pursued, to impress on his own people
and the world outside that a new era had begun in Siam. The
something decided on was a second grand coronation to be
held at the end of 1911, well after the last obsequies for Chula-
longkorn would be over.4
The coronation of kings in Thailand is an elaborate Brah-
manic rite in which the royal name is inscribed on a golden
tablet and the king takes a purificatory bath, receives the
waters of consecration—eight waters brought from the eight di-
rections of the kingdom—while sitting on an octagonal throne
and facing in the appropriate direction, accepts the royal re-
galia (the crown is merely one of these), performs various kinds
of almsgiving, holds ceremonial audiences with princes and
ministers, and makes progresses around the capital by land and
water. The ceremonies signify, in ancient Brahmanic thought,
the king’s assumption of divinity. In Siam the king could not
claim the full powers and name of king until the key rite of
consecration had taken place. And so the coronation ceremony
was usually held within a week—in no case longer than a
month—after accession to power.
Such a ceremony was conducted in November. Meanwhile,
preparations were already going on for the second grand coro-
nation to take place a little over a year later.5
The decision to hold a second coronation must have been
made very early, possibly even before Vajiravudh acceded. For
the first coronation omitted the traditional, though not es-
sential, processions around the capital.6 The idea of holding a
European-style coronation celebration was undoubtedly stimu-
lated by Vajiravudh’s participation in the accession ceremonies
of Alfonso XIII of Spain in 1902 and in the coronation festivities
of Edward VII of England in the same year. For Siam to hold
a similar celebration, with Vajiravudh hosting representatives
of royal houses and ruling parties of the leading states of the
world, would give Siam unprecedented prominence and dignity.
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Some Thai were apprehensive, before the second coronation
took place, that the ceremony itself would be conducted on
Western lines.7 Such fears were unfounded. Vajiravudh had no
intention of having anything but a typical Thai coronation to
which would be added festivities for foreign guests and the Thai
population.
Vajiravudh’s reasons for respect for Brahmanic ritual, par-
ticularly in relation to Thai coronations, were made manifest
in one of his essays.8 He argued against those “modernists”
who would abandon old rituals in favor of Western models by
pointing out that Siam was not a Western country, that modern
Western notions should be adopted only when their utility was
unmistakable, and that abandonment of Siam’s past was to
bring Siam back to the jungle, to make the Thai a primitive folk
without a history or heritage. Insofar as the Brahmanic rites
were concerned, he argued that, although it was true that the
Thai were not Hindus but Buddhists, some aspects of life were
not the concern of Buddhism. Buddhist monks might chant at
coronations, for example, but the heart of the ceremony in Siam
had always been not Buddhist but Brahmanic. And so, if for no
other reason than to insure legitimacy in the installation of new
kings, Brahman priests should be retained and supported.
Other traditions were highlighted even before the grand
coronation. Among the most important were those associated
with auguries. Supernatural signs of favor were eagerly sought
at beginnings of reigns. Such signs were common throughout
Indianized Southeast Asia, and ranged from earthquakes to
showers of gemstones.9 Vajiravudh’s reign started with a suc-
cession of highly regarded portents: discoveries of some ancient
bronze pieces—first, a flag standard bearing designs of a
monkey and a garuda (a mythical bird); then, a bow and some
arrows. These ancient articles, it was speculated, were once
used in Brahmanic ceremonies. All these bronze pieces were
presented to the King, who had replicas made for use in sub-
sequent ceremonies. Also within the first months of the reign
an albino elephant was found and presented to the King. In
Siam and Burma the so-called white elephant was very highly
regarded, and the discovery and capture of one at the beginning
of a reign was considered very auspicious indeed.
Much was made of all these signs by high officials and the
King. Vajiravudh, for example, ordered Prince Damrong, head
of the Ministry of the Interior, to publicize the portentous ac-
quisitions by printing a letter by the King about them in the
journal of local government (Nangsu̓ thesaphiban); the King
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noted that all government servants would thereby be inspired to
work more industriously for the benefit of the country.10 One of-
ficial publicly stated that, by these omens of highest import, “we
are … convinced that Your Majesty was destined to be the great
leader of our race.”11 Vajiravudh drew special joy from these
“boons of supernatural power” and “objects of transcendent
virtue.”12 He recalled from history the story of an ancient king
who had found jewels and pearls on the shores of the sea and
was still famous for his meritorious rule. He took particular
pleasure in the bow and arrows, which he named “The Bow and
Arrows of Rama’s Strength,” deriving meaning from the sym-
bolism of these objects as weapons: “sure manifestations that
warriors have not yet ceased to exist in the Land of the Thai.”13
He made much of their presumed association with Rama, the
Hindu god whose name Vajiravudh was later to appropriate, and
of the fact that at the end of one of the arrows was a trident
(wachira, or vajira), a symbol Vajiravudh favored because it was
part of his name: “almost as if made for me, and so all the more
pleasing.”14
THE GRAND CORONATION
The coronation proper, with its key ceremony of consecration
on December 2, was essentially a repeat of the time-honored
ritual conducted a year earlier. This is not to say that the new
coronation was devoid of emotional impact. In a remarkably in-
timate letter to his younger brother Chakrabongs, written on
the evening of “this the greatest day of my life,” Vajiravudh con-
fided, “When the water of consecration fell first upon my head
this morning, my tears fell with it. They were tears of mingled
joy and sorrow.”15
The most significant changes in the coronation proper were
made in the concluding rites. For the first time, they were
held in the handsome hall called Dusit Maha Prasat. Ordinarily
this building was used for the long lying-in-state rituals and
therefore was unavailable for coronations. In 1911, however,
the hall was available, and Vajiravudh had the building reno-
vated, removing some interior pillars that obstructed the view.16
So the final ceremonies of accepting the royal regalia and con-
ducting audiences were held in this grand hall, in the presence
of many princes, officials, and foreign guests.
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In the eyes of the foreigners present, the “supreme moment”
was the crowning of the King by himself. The crown was a daz-
zling golden spire glittering with diamonds. When the crown
came to rest, a “loud peal of joy burst out. All the ancient
musical instruments were played with energy; the troops pre-
sented arms; the bands played the royal anthem; the four kinds
of cannons used in ceremonies were fired; and the sound was
taken up by the guns of the Army and the Navy firing a salute
of 101 guns. The bell at every temple throughout the Kingdom
was beaten seven times, and in every monastery the monks as-
sembled and prayed for a blessing on the King.”17
After the ceremonies inside Dusit Maha Prasat were com-
pleted, an unprecedented new spectacle was staged. Between
the entrances at the top of the parallel flights of stairs at the
north face of the hall is a high and magnificently carved and
heavily gilded balcony that faces a courtyard. On the balcony
is a spired, gilded throne. A grander setting for a ceremony
could hardly be imagined, and it was here that Vajiravudh held
the final audience of his coronation day—the audience for the
people. The princes and high officials had witnessed the cere-
monies within the hall; now Vajiravudh wanted to show himself
to the lower ranks and the general population, groups that
had never before been so intimately associated with a coro-
nation. These groups were represented by lesser civil and mil-
itary officials, who were assembled in the courtyard facing the
balcony. The crowd was large, larger than any that could have
been accommodated inside a royal hall. And Vajiravudh’s ap-
pearance before them was strikingly dramatic. All three sides of
the balcony were draped, concealing the throne from the view
of the crowd in the courtyard. The King entered by a rear door.
At a signal the drums were beaten, the music flared, the sol-
diers presented arms, and the drapes were drawn—suddenly
revealing the King seated on the throne, glittering in the sun
above the crowd.18
Starting with the evening of the coronation day, there fol-
lowed a round of parading and partying such as the old capital,
used as it was to royal merrymaking, had never before seen
crowded into such a short space of time. Vajiravudh’s purposes
in this grand display are clear. He wanted to draw into the mood
of joy as many of his people as he could, to bring them together,
have them share together, feel together the exhilaration of the
time. And he wanted to impress his Western guests with Siam’s
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Public Audience on Coronation Day (Mural in Anantasamakhom
Throne Hall).
progress, strength, and unity. The drums and bells, the fetes and
pageants signaled not only the start of a new reign but also the
bold entrance of nationalism as a state policy.
The most novel part of the coronation activities was the
involvement of foreigners. Not that the presence of foreigners
was entirely unprecedented. Chulalongkorn in 1873 and, before
him, Mongkut in 1851 had invited foreigners to their inaugural
rites.19 The foreign guests on those earlier occasions, however,
had been merely individuals who happened to be resident in
Bangkok at the time. Vajiravudh’s innovation was to adopt the
European fashion and send invitations directly to the capitals
of countries with whom Siam had treaty relations. The foreign
guests he aimed for, and by and large got, were thus in the cat-
egory of royal equals, of courtly “kin,” rather than the less dig-
nified status of local representatives of the diplomatic corps.
Who came? Although no reigning sovereign did—time and
distance in the age before jet, or even prop, travel prevented
that—the list of guests was impressive. Altogether there were
some twenty-five royal representatives and special represen-
tatives (plus their entourages) representing fourteen govern-
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ments. Ten of the guests were members of royal families. The
great powers—England, France, Russia, Germany, the United
States, and Japan—were all represented. The editorial writer of
a local English-language newspaper reflected the general view:
“Siam is feeling very proud and a little anxious. Never before
have there been gathered in this capital so many Princes of
foreign Reigning Families. Such a gathering of Royalties, the
guests of the Sovereign, is comparatively a rare thing in a Eu-
ropean capital, and is without precedent outside Europe.”20
The preparations for impressing this distinguished foreign
assembly were unstinting in labor and expense. As early as July
the press caught the “general expectation that previous records
in magnificence will be surpassed.”21 The whole capital was in-
volved in a face-lift. People living along procession routes were
ordered to paint their houses. Some 2,000 men were set to work
refurbishing the Grand Palace. One royal building was turned
into a museum to display “the priceless gold and silver vessels
of ancient Siamese design and the collection of old time in-
struments of war.” Another hall was extensively remodeled and
fitted with lavish appointments to serve as “Theatre Royal” for
the dramatic productions to be staged for the coronation festiv-
ities. And many palaces about town, including Saranrom, Am-
phο̨n, and the group in Dusit Park, were spruced up to serve
as residences for the foreign guests. In those which lacked
Western-style bathrooms, these facilities were installed. Some
750 tons of furniture were ordered from abroad as part of the
program to provide the guests with nothing but the best.22
Foreign guests began arriving at the end of November. They
were immediately caught up in a swirl of entertainments. Prince
Chakrabongs, who was the heir presumptive and had repre-
sented Siam at the coronation of George V in England just
five months before, was appointed the King’s official greeter.
He met the guests on arrival and saw them to their accom-
modations. On at least four occasions before the coronation,
the King himself met with groups of foreign guests. Foreigners
were admitted to all the important coronation ceremonies. And
luncheon and dinner parties, theatrical performances, illumina-
tions, troop displays and parades, trips to temple fairs, and ex-
cursions to the old capital at Ayutthaya and the palace at Bang
Pa-in were arranged. All high Thai royalty—including Queen
Mother Saowapha, Prince Chakrabongs, Prince Yugala, Prince
Paribatra, Prince Damrong, Prince Devawongse, and Prince
Chira—were involved as hosts, wining and dining the visitors.
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But the principal host was the King himself, who started the
postcoronation round of partying with a gala performance of the
Thai masked drama at the Theatre Royal on the evening of De-
cember 2. The King was also host of the Coronation Ball on De-
cember 6—not Siam’s first such fancy dress affair, but one that
“surpassed any that had gone before.”23 Throughout the days to
December 10, when the final banquet and last fireworks display
took place, Vajiravudh gave extraordinary personal attention to
the guests, overcoming, in the words of Swedish Prince William,
his “first shyness” to become a lively conversationalist.24
A GRAND SUCCESS
The products of this trouble were all that had been desired. The
foreign press and foreign guests were lavish and, presumably,
sincere in their praise. The local English-language press ed-
itorialized: “Siam does well to be proud of the position she
has attained, and of the sympathy and friendship shown her
by all the other nations with which she has relations.”25 The
coronation received wide and complimentary attention from
the overseas press, with photographs and feature articles ap-
pearing in such publications as The National Geographic26 and
the Daily Mirror.27 The American minister, in his birthday
greetings to the King on January 1 on behalf of the entire diplo-
matic corps, referred to the coronation as “graced by the ap-
proval of such a representation of the World’s Powers as never
before was seen in Siam,” as “successful beyond the expecta-
tions of her most ardent friends,” and as having “given this
People a new place among the World’s family of Nations.”28
Prince William, who stayed on a while after the other foreigners
had gone, was much impressed with the coronation, noting “I
have never seen a crowned head sustain his dignity better than
did Maha Vajiravudh on December 2, 1911”;29 he also wrote of
“the truly magnificent Oriental hospitality that was shown us by
our royal host.”30
The Siamese themselves thought they had done well. The
Minister of Local Government termed the coronation “an event
unparalleled in success and splendour in the history of our
nation.”31 Finally the King, who acknowledged that the
presence of so many high foreign dignitaries had at first filled
all with “grave anxiety” lest anything go wrong and bring Siam
worldwide criticism, noted with joy that the affair had achieved
success “beyond our most sanguine expectations.” He compli-
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mented everyone for helping “to bring about this satisfactory
issue,” which, he stated, “shows that we Siamese are yet far
from the path of decline as a nation, and have no reason to be
ashamed of ourselves before the nations who are ever watching
us.” Vajiravudh took special pride that of all Asian peoples “we
Siamese … are the first nation to have attempted, and accom-
plished with unqualified success, such a great undertaking” in-
volving “the great nations of the world.” The King was confident
that the coronation had won Siam the “good opinion” of the na-
tions and had “demonstrated to the world” the strength of Thai
national unity.32
The unity “demonstrated” by the participation of the pop-
ulace in the coronation festivities was in fact a deliberate goal
the King hoped the festivities would help realize. Never had so
many people from so many strata of society been as actively par-
ticipant in a coronation before. The route of the royal progress
by land on December 3 followed a long path through the city.
The procession stopped first at a large temporary pavilion es-
pecially constructed on the grounds of the city’s great square,
the Royal Plaza (sanam luang), where the King received an ad-
dress of welcome from the people. The procession also stopped
at another pavilion in the northern sector of town to exchange
courtesies with representatives of the European resident com-
munity. And it stopped at two temples en route. On December
4 the progress by water took place. On December 5 the King
returned to the pavilion at the Royal Plaza to address the stu-
dents. On the sixth, various regiments of the army were pre-
sented with colors at the same site. And on the next day, His
Majesty reviewed the troops. On the eighth, Vajiravudh drove to
the heart of the business district to receive the compliments of
the Chinese and Indian communities. The ninth and tenth were
devoted to the King’s special volunteer corps called the Wild
Tigers.
Every effort seems to have been made to attract as many
people as possible to most of these affairs. The line of march
was always dense with people. The students’ homage brought
an assembly of 10,000 children. The military displays involved
30,000 troops, including many brought in from distant
provinces.
The speeches given on the several occasions were full of
formal compliments and well-wishing on one side, grateful
thanks on the other. But there was more. The King was con-
veying an important message: in his remarks to his own
people—the general populace, the students, the military—he set
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forth for the first time before large public assemblies the need
for the unity of his people and, in brief form, some of his prin-
cipal notions of Thai nationalism. The address to the people is
typical. In it he pointed to the heritage of the Thai as a free
people, thanks to the “patriotic self-denial” and “great sacrifice,
even to the giving up of life” of the “noble ancestors of our
Race.” He said that Siam’s essential strength was derived from
the devotion of the people to their nation, to their religion, and
to their king. He pledged never to spare himself or his personal
comfort in pursuit of his sacred duty to preserve Siam’s ab-
solute independence. But, he stated, he could not discharge his
high mission unaided; he needed the “mutual help and accord”
of all. The people should perform their duties, obey the laws,
show “mutual consideration,” set aside “self-indulgence.” If the
Thai people were imbued with “patriotic intentions” and if they
strove in unison to further the best interests of the country,
Siam’s future existence “as a free and independent nation will
be absolutely assured.” He concluded:
Let no person of the Thai Race forget these high principles. Re-
member that we are born free and that our nation is known to the
world as the Nation of the Free. Help, therefore, each other with
your whole heart to maintain and uphold our precious indepen-
dence unto eternity.33
Signs of popular excitement during the festive coronation
days were not lacking. Most were undoubtedly expressions of
simple natural exuberance, a holiday mood. For, on top of every-
thing else, the time of the coronation coincided with that of
the usual winter carnival celebrations that the Thai, basically
an agricultural people, had traditionally enjoyed in the times
between harvest and new planting. In one surprising moment,
the King himself literally got carried away by the crowd. He
and his sister, Princess Walai, were returning from a late re-
ception given by the navy. They entered their carriage, and
before anyone knew what was happening a group of sailors
took up the carriage and pulled it out into the road “amid
the cheers of the guests and of the naval men.” The sailors
moved at a run. They approached the palace. “Here the enthu-
siasm became infectious and the large crowds who had been
watching the theatricals joined the procession. With an impetu-
osity that would not be denied, they rushed past the shocked
palace guards … and only halted when they had brought the
Sovereign to his Home. The King smiled his thanks and retired
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within the Palace.”34 This incident is remarkably similar to one
that occurred at Queen Victoria’s Jubilee in 1887, when a mob
of working men ran alongside the Queen’s carriage “shouting
with the full strength of their lungs, ‘Go it, Old Girl! You done
it well! You done it well!’” and the Queen responded “to the
‘Old Girl’ greeting with jolly nods and laughter that had in them
nothing of ceremony or stateliness.”35
A similar kind of infectious good feeling was evident on the
day the children presented their homage. The children had lis-
tened to the King’s call that they study hard and be a credit to
their nation; they had marched; they had sung songs, including
a special patriotic song composed by the King. When the King
was preparing to depart, they began to cheer him, and the
cheering “from the wide open mouths of healthy youngsters …
surprised everyone by its strength. The school flags, and hand-
kerchiefs were waved, hats thrown in the air, and the motions of
the bandsmen were the only signs that the National Anthem was
being played. The cheering continued long after His Majesty
had passed out of sight….” After the festivities the “highly ex-
cited” children were reluctant to go home; their parents had a
hard time rounding them up: “The moon was high before the
last batch got away and enthusiasm still ran high—so much so
that the lads went marching and singing through the streets to
their homes.”36
The efforts to bring about a wave of popular enthusiasm for
the King and his policies through the coronation celebration
seem to have been as successful as were the efforts to impress
the Western visitors. The local press was convinced that the
children, for example, had proved their ability to respond to the
King’s appeal to their sense of loyalty. “Most significant of all,”
the press editorialized, the coronation showed that “the enthu-
siasm of the people has been growing. They are become more
than ever proud of their King, and more than ever eager to co-
operate in the realisation of his ideals.”37 The King reached es-
sentially the same conclusion. In his annual birthday address
on January 1, 1912, he commended all his people for making
“the great national event” a success. The success that it was,
the lack of “a single disturbance of any kind,” constituted “un-
doubted proof that the people recognised that the event was
not merely a ceremony for the King alone but the supreme
demonstration and expression of the national independent exis-
tence….”38
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The equation of public fervor with national devotion was an
easy one to make for someone familiar with European thought
of the times. Certainly the causal pairing of joy and loyalty was
common in late nineteenth-century England. Tennyson summed
it all up in these lines in “On the Jubilee of Queen Victoria”:
You then joyfully, all of you,
Set the mountain aflame to-night,
Shoot your stars to the firmament,
Deck your houses, illuminate
All your towns for a festival,
And in each let a multitude
Loyal, each, to the heart of it,
One full voice of allegiance,
Hail the fair Ceremonial
Of this year of her Jubilee.39
None of this kind of loyal jubilation was part of Thai her-
itage. Most ceremonies, including coronations, had been private
affairs, terrible in their magic, performed by and for a god-king
to ensure the potency of his divine powers. In the end the cer-
emonies were for the benefit of the people, but that certainly
did not mean they should be staged for the people’s benefit.
Quite the contrary. The need to ensure ritual purification was
paramount. The defilement of ceremonies was not merely lèse
majesté, it struck back at the defiler by reducing royal potency
and thus adversely affected the whole kingdom. Even the royal
progresses by land and water at the coronation’s end were not
originally for the benefit of public observers but signified ritual
“possession” of the state. People were expected to stay indoors,
out of sight, so they would not be harmed by the awesome
power of His Majesty’s gaze.
Change in this attitude toward ceremonies had been started
by King Mongkut in the 1850s. Mongkut, who had spent twenty-
seven years before his accession as a Buddhist monk, deem-
phasized some Hinduist elements and added Buddhist elements
in court ritual, thus bringing the crown closer to the people.
Chulalongkorn continued this policy. In fact, Chulalongkorn ap-
parently wished for more Western-style public displays than his
people would dare to give him; he “hankered for a more spon-
taneous welcome from the people, for something nearer to that
which was accorded to European royalty when they went on
tour.” His officials tried to teach the people to “cheer and wave
their hats,” but these efforts failed: “to the country people the
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King was still a deity, someone to be feared”; they dared not
“take familiarities with the gods that they were not accustomed
to.”40 Vajiravudh, so much closer to the West than either of his
predecessors, and farther away than they from the ideal and
ethos of the god-king, wanted the public displays even more and
was willing to go to far greater lengths to get them.
Similarly with the desire to impress the West. The desire
was not new. Mongkut delighted in exhibiting his knowledge
of Western science, language, and culture. Chulalongkorn gave
lavish dinner parties, constructed extravagant marble palaces
in the Italian style. Vajiravudh built upon this public relations
approach to international affairs that, ephemeral and “unpro-
ductive” as it may have seemed, had proved to be effective in
convincing Westerners that Siam was truly becoming modern
and progressive.
The price for all the festivities and foreigners’ approbation
was high. The second coronation was an enormously expensive
affair. The costs totaled almost two million dollars, or nearly 8
percent of the national budget for 1911. The amount spent was
about ten times the amount initially allocated. In the view of
many commentators writing long after the event, such a huge
outlay of money for a showy spectacle was a waste, the kind
of waste of public money characteristic of Siam’s most extrav-
agant, most prodigal king. Although at the time the King did
not hear such criticisms—“for no one speaks out loudly enough
to reach my ears”—he was aware of their possible existence.
In his diary he wrote, “I admit we certainly did spend a lot of
money.” But he reasoned that, far from being a waste, corona-
tion expenses were a worthwhile investment. The state could be
compared to a business concern: capital had to be risked for a
business to thrive. “We Thai,” he wrote, “are too shortsighted to
be good businessmen … we are similarly shortsighted in state
affairs.” “My purpose,” said the King, “is to lead Thai thought
into broader and larger paths. And this ceremony was part of
that policy.”41
The money spent was certainly not all wasted. It is true that
Vajiravudh loved show. And perhaps he bought more show than
was really required. It is difficult, of course, to put a fair price
on “nationalism”; it is easier to estimate the cost of a dam, a
bridge, or a power plant. Perhaps Vajiravudh did unconsciously
spend some of the money for ego fulfillment, yet his conscious
aim was to use the coronation to further a program of nation
building by swelling his people’s awareness of nation. He re-
alized the limits of the coronation as a means of doing this. And
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he said so. In summing up the hectic coronation time, he re-
minded his people that they must not be carried away by ex-
ultation at the coronation’s success and “forget that there are
other duties that have to be performed.” He warned the Thai
that they must not let foreigners “look upon us as only fit to
make useless grand outward displays.” He concluded, however,
that the display would not prove useless if we “set our minds to
make the unanimity existing in our nation more intensified” and
“always bear in mind that the interests of the State and nation
stand first and foremost.”42 The coronation was but the means
to implant an idea, and that idea was nationalism, from which
all good things would flow.
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The Wild Tigers
While the second coronation was being planned, but beforeit actually took place, Vajiravudh inaugurated what he un-
doubtedly regarded as his most important means for building
nationalism, the Wild Tiger Corps. The corps was basically a
paramilitary organization, a kind of home guard, made up of vol-
unteers who were recruited at first from among the members of
the civilian bureaucracy.
No creation of the King’s was a better vehicle for his na-
tionalistic ideas, and no concept for carrying out his national-
istic program was more fully realized. Further, no organization
was dearer to his heart. The corps was his child, his delight.
Its members were his comrades, his fellow “club” members, his
companions at arms, his students. The Wild Tiger clubhouse
was a place where the King could relax. The whole corps idea
hearkened back to Saranrom Palace and the Thawipanya Club
atmosphere, the “war maneuvers” of the pages and courtiers,
with the King as absolute director and manager, although in a
“democratic,” that is, comradely, way.
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The creation of the corps was officially announced on May 1,
1911—six months and eight days after Vajiravudh became king.1
On May 6 the formal ceremony inaugurating the corps and its
first members was held in the Chapel Royal of Wat Phra Kaeo.
The ceremony consisted of the customary lighting of candles,
professions of faith, and reading of scriptures by monks. The
King accepted the position of captain general, deposited some
strands of his hair in a receptacle at the top of the staff of
the corps banner, and then, bearing the banner, led the men
to a formation in front of the chapel. There Prince Vajiranana,
the Buddhist patriarch, delivered a sermon praising the corps,
then blessed the members and banner with holy water and with
Pali stanzas from the Temiya Jataka, to which he added a final
stanza:
By the power of these words
I ask that the fortune of victory be yours,
I ask that this volunteer Corps
Be united and free from danger,
And that it endure.2
The ceremony was private, it was quiet, it was relatively
brief. But it was by no means casual. The presence of Prince
Vajiranana, the careful preparation of the banner, and the se-
lection of the members of the first company (kο̨ng) from among
those courtiers closest to the King and from the ranks of min-
isters of state, high princes in government, and representatives
of departments of the civil service, all showed that an event of
great importance had taken place.3
The ceremony itself and the initial comments of the King
also showed that the idea of the corps had been long forming in
the King’s mind. In the same month the corps was established
the King stated that he had been planning for many years
to create such an organization and that indeed, without such
preparation, he would never have been able to move so fast and
so well with the idea. The King traced the corps’ genesis back
to the war games he had introduced among his court pages at
Saranrom Palace in 1905. These war games, he stated, were the
initial experiments with the Wild Tiger idea. He wrote: “I acted
quietly because one does not wish to make too much of a thing
before one is sure that it will succeed.”4 The specific, practical
planning sessions for the establishment of the corps, however,
started as late as April 26, 1911, when the King and a small
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party of his closest courtiers, during a trip on the royal yacht in
the Gulf of Siam, set up the basic framework and compiled the
first list of volunteer members.
The inspiration for the corps, of course, did not come from
experiments or meetings. The corps had a meaning for the King
that undoubtedly went far back in his history. The times, he
saw, were ripe for the corps. Indeed, international times seemed
ripe, for the heightened nationalism and superpatriotism, the
urgently felt need for preparations of total populations for some
great national endeavor, were obvious throughout Europe in the
years prior to World War I. Sir Robert S. Baden-Powell’s Boy
Scout movement, which began in England in 1908 and spread
like a grass fire through the receptive dry lands of Germany,
France, Russia, and the United States, was but one symbol of
the readiness of an idea. The Boy Scout movement was not
the inspiration for the Wild Tiger movement, although the King
knew of Baden-Powell and may have been stimulated by some
of his ideas. The Wild Tiger Corps, true enough, had its germ
in European ideas, in the King’s appreciation of the strength
of European nationalism; the same perceptions prompted both
Baden-Powell and Vajiravudh. But Baden-Powell’s organization
came too late to have been responsible for the Wild Tiger idea,
and the Wild Tiger concept was certainly not a literal or even
close approximation of the entirely youth-directed, essentially
nonmilitary concept of the Boy Scouts. The outward similarities
of the Tiger Corps to the Boy Scouts were definitely not the sign
of an imitation with “comic” overtones, as one Westerner of the
time implied.5
ORIGINAL PURPOSES OF THE CORPS
The King’s original aims for the corps in furthering national
policies are made clear in a number of his writings and
speeches,6 particularly in a series of addresses he gave to corps
members in May, June, and July of 1911.7 The King evidently
saw the organization as a new instrument for bringing the Thai
nation together; breaking the narrow interests, personal and
departmental, of civil servants; stimulating martial values; and,
above all, creating among the Thai people a new national spirit,
the spirit of the Wild Tigers.
The King cast his arguments for the corps in historic terms.
The very name Wild Tigers, he said, was an old one, used
in former times for men who kept watch on the frontiers of
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the country, observing enemy movements, sending back reports
to aid the Siamese army. These Wild Tigers of former days
had qualities of ruggedness, loyalty, and fearlessness combined
with expert knowledge of nature and warfare. And it was their
presence and the presence of many others with the Wild Tiger
spirit, including “nearly all the kings,” that made it possible for
the Thai nation to prosper and survive.8
The old society which possessed this Wild Tiger spirit, said
the King, also had the advantage of not being divided into
civilian and military groups. All young men served their country
in war; only after such service and after they had established
families were men considered civilians. Small as Siam then was,
and surrounded by enemies, it expected all men to become
strong, to know how to defend the country, to gain expertise in
arms, to begin to learn the arts of war “as soon as they were
able to walk.” Principal ministers of government functioned as
leaders in both peace and war. It was only after prolonged peace
that the country became soft, that government officials began
using the labor of soldiers for their own personal ends in the
departments under their control, that enterprising men sought
ways to avoid service, that military service became unpopular
and even regarded as shameful. This theoretical sketch, which
had some basis in history, set the scene for the King’s essential
arguments in favor of the Wild Tigers.9
In support of the purely military advantages of the Wild
Tigers the King stressed the military danger Siam faced:
How many countries close to us have already fallen to European
power? Do you know? Burma, which was once our competitor, is
a possession of the British. Cambodia, which was once a brilliant
nation and was once the master of us Thai, is now a possession of
the French. Vietnam is a possession of the French. More than half
of Malaya is a possession of the British. Java, once very magnif-
icent, is a possession of the Dutch.10
And on he went with India and Korea. Only four countries were
still independent, but two of these, Persia and China, were in
chaos. Only Japan and Siam were still free and orderly. “Of
those two countries, which is the more respected in the world?
I’m sorry to have to answer that it is Japan. Why? Because
Japan has clearly demonstrated to the world that it still has
able soldiers.”11 Siam in contrast, said the King, was weak. Its
people were asleep. And it would be too late to awaken when
the enemy was at the door. Siam had to learn to be prepared,
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even in peacetime, for “when other countries see we are pre-
pared to fight, they are likely to give up the attack, for an attack
on a country that is prepared to resist to the fullest becomes too
costly to pursue.”12
The military services, of course, had to bear the chief burden
of defense, but civilians with proper military training, that is,
the Wild Tigers, could support the military in time of need. The
Wild Tiger Corps would enhance the country’s military strength
by giving civilians the opportunity to harden their bodies and
commit their minds and spirits to the nation, as soldiers do.
Once again, as in the proud past, all men of Siam would share
in the task of defending the country.
The value of the military strength of the Wild Tiger Corps
was, however, far outweighed in the King’s mind by its spiritual
strength, by the contribution it would make toward national
unity by uniting civilian and military, by uniting the various civil
sections of government, and, finally, by uniting the entire people
in Wild Tigerism, that is, nationalism.
The corps, by blurring the lines between civilian and mil-
itary, would ally these two social elements in a common cause:
We should understand that although we have two separate names
for soldier and civilian, the truth is that we have one name that
applies to both, and that is the word Thai. Soldiers are one part
of the Thai people, civilians are one part of the Thai people; how
can they then be separate groups? Every soldier is also a civilian.
Every civilian likewise ought to be a soldier.13
The overriding fact was that civilian and soldier must both see
themselves as part of the Thai nation, equally willing to do their
jobs, equally willing to make sacrifices of personal comfort, per-
sonal advantage, even life itself, for the good of the nation. It
was not for soldiers to sacrifice and civilians to be comfortable.
All must sacrifice; civilians must learn to be something in the
way of soldiers themselves.
A real problem that had bedeviled Vajiravudh’s father, King
Chulalongkorn, in his program of reforming government
administration was that of interministerial, interdepartmental,
and interpersonal rivalry.14 The problem stemmed from tradi-
tional administrative practices that made it difficult to remove
high officials from office and that produced an extraordinary
bond of loyalty and continued service between a high official
and his staff. Vajiravudh saw the problem clearly. He stated:
“Officials often seem to believe that their first and only debt
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of loyalty is due to the particular Ministry or Department in
which they serve; they must do all they can to advance the
interests and prestige of that Ministry or Department even at
the cost of another branch of the service.” Chulalongkorn, Va-
jiravudh said, “was well aware” of the problem and sought
remedies in education, “which requires much time,” and in con-
scription, “which was not popular with certain classes” (that is,
the official classes). What was to be done, he asked, to break
down parochial interests, to bring all civil servants into one dis-
cipline?
Suppose something of a military nature were tried? But although
military, it must be something with an element of freedom in it. It
must be a military organization with liberty to join or not as the
individual pleased. Hence the origin of the Wild Tiger Corps.
The King made explicit his expectation that the Wild Tiger
Corps, although cast in a military form, would educate his offi-
cials in the idea that the interests of the individual and the de-
partment or ministry were subservient to those of the state, that
the good of the country was paramount.15
The very structure of the Wild Tigers was designed to shake
up the loyalties and ranks of the civil bureaucracy, for Wild
Tiger positions did not correspond to regular department po-
sitions. A person high in a ministry might well be a common
soldier in the Wild Tigers —a revolutionary approach to station
in Siam, where customarily a person’s rank in the bureaucracy
determined not only his salary and the number of subordinates
he supervised but also the prestige accorded him, the language
with which he was addressed, and virtually every other aspect
of his social status. The King justified his approach by citing
the general who, aboard ship, must obey the captain; the high
prince who, in school, must obey his teacher. So in the Wild
Tigers every man, no matter what position he might hold
outside, must obey his Wild Tiger officer. The King generalized
that the discipline and the stability of any group depended on
everyone’s obeying the orders of those whose responsibility it
was to give them.16
By bringing citizen and soldier together, by inculcating in
civil sectors of life the values of sacrifice and unity he saw in
the military, Vajiravudh hoped to bring a new spirit of unity to
the nation. This unity of purpose would prompt everyone to do
his duty toward the nation, which would be “the best way for
one to demonstrate that he loves his nation more than he loves
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himself.” For only by acting in harmony with the interests of the
group could any individual survive. The nation was the highest
group; if its constituent parts did not work together, the nation
could not survive. Individuals who worked for their personal
advantage in ways that harmed the group, helped destroy the
group and, in the end, themselves as well. He compared the in-
dividuals in a group to the parts of a human body:
… if the hand feels that it has done enough work and will not
bring food to the mouth, what will happen? No food goes to the
stomach, which is ready to digest the food that does not come.
So, lacking food, there is nothing to sustain the blood. The blood
thins and is unable to care for the flesh and sinews of various body
parts. So they weaken. The body emaciates. And the hand that re-
fused to take up the food dies along with the rest.
So with nations. A nation, he said, is nothing other than many
groups of people joined together in a great body; these groups
must be in agreement if the organism is to escape destruction.17
Combining and surpassing all the King’s particular aims for
the Wild Tigers was his vision of the Tigers as bringing about a
“true national feeling,” a “Wild Tiger spirit,” an ideal of nation-
alism among all his people. This was the only aim of the Tigers
he mentioned in an important speech he gave on December 3,
1911, at coronation time:
The aim of this national institution is to instil in the minds of the
people of our own race love and loyalty towards the High Au-
thority that controls and maintains with justice and equity the po-
litical independence of the nation, devotion to Fatherland, Nation,
and our Holy Religion, and, not least of all, the preservation of
national unity and cultivation of mutual friendship. These qual-
ities form the strongest foundation on which our national exis-
tence will rest and not belie its name as the Nation of the Free.
Thus shall we deserve well of our ancestors who gave their life’s
blood in firmly planting the home of our ancient race in this land
of Siam.18
This message of three-in-one loyalty to king, nation, and
religion—undoubtedly inspired by the British “God, King, and
Country”—was a foundation of the King’s nationalistic ideas and
was continually developed before Wild Tiger audiences. These
general nationalistic concepts, which will be developed in later
chapters, were imparted to Wild Tiger groups more fully than to
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any others. The King obviously saw the corps as playing a large
role in the dissemination of his basic nationalistic ideas. This
large role included such specifics as supplying the nation with
slogans and goals. The motto of the Wild Tiger Corps, embla-
zoned on its flags, badges, and signs, read “Give up life rather
than honor.” This motto, although coined for the Tigers, was
clearly meant to set a standard of patriotism for the whole of
the Thai nation.
The King assigned a new specific duty to the Wild Tigers in
an order issued on June 20, 1911.19 This order made it a duty of
the Tigers to help preserve public order and called for them to
aid local authorities in suppressing crimes, fighting fires, pro-
tecting the person of the king, and performing humanitarian
deeds. Proper reports were to be made of such activities; those
who had done outstandingly meritorious acts were to be cited
in the Čhotmaihet su̓apa (Wild Tiger Documents) on pages fig-
uratively called “plates of gold,” and those who had failed their
trust were to be listed on pages of “dog hide.”20
There were other royal purposes, or possible purposes, with
regard to the Wild Tigers that are not made explicit in the
King’s writings or speeches. Some of these purposes may even
have been unconscious. When the King spoke to the Wild Tigers
of very broad nationalistic aims and ideals, for instance, it
seems hardly possible that he expected the corps to convert
these ideals into reality. The corps at the outset was too small
in numbers, too limited to the Bangkok bureaucratic elite, to
convey these ideals to provincial and village Siam. It would
appear that the King gave his speeches to the Tigers—on a
regular weekly schedule for a long period of time—in large part
because he needed an audience for his ideas, and the corps, his
own creation, gave him an audience that was congenial and re-
ceptive.
The Tiger Corps was indeed congenial to the King; it func-
tioned as a kind of club for His Majesty and was an extension of
the club atmosphere he had earlier tried to establish as a prince
at Saranrom Palace. Although all ministries and departments of
government in a sense “belonged” to the King, in another sense
none did. The Wild Tiger Corps, however, transcended bureau-
cratic offices, was super-ministerial, and was the King’s own.
Vajiravudh composed the Tigers’ mottoes, he wrote the Tigers’
songs, he designed the Tigers’ uniforms, he led the Tigers’ pa-
rades, he organized the Tigers’ maneuvers, he established the
Tigers’ oath, he wrote the Tigers’ rules of discipline—he en-
gaged himself in every minute detail of Tiger activities. And
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he loved doing all these things. Faced with a government led
by older ministers who were set in their ways and had the
prestige of having worked closely with King Chulalongkorn in
formulating state policies, Vajiravudh hoped consciously that
the Tigers would help him bring this old order into his grasp.
One cannot help but feel that unconsciously, however, he leaned
on the Tigers to provide him with the sense of total control that
the regular government was not providing him. It is too simple
to say that the Tiger Corps was a toy for a frustrated monarch,
but it undoubtedly had something of that meaning.
Vajiravudh in one early speech denied vehemently—perhaps
too vehemently—that the Wild Tiger Corps was his “party”:
But, all of you, don’t misunderstand. Don’t think that, for my per-
sonal advantage, I am ordering or pressuring anyone into joining
the Wild Tiger Corps. Don’t make the further mistake of thinking
that if someone doesn’t join the Wild Tigers he won’t be able to
advance in government service. For this is not my group. I give
you my word I have no such desires and wishes. I regard the
whole of the Thai people as my group.21
In fact, of course, the corps did function as the King’s group,
and it was clearly so regarded by some individuals in the gov-
ernment whose later opposition to the corps constituted a se-
rious problem for King Vajiravudh.
The special relationship of the Wild Tigers to the King was
made explicit in June 1911 when the corps was given the as-
signment of protecting the King, of forming a kind of elite royal
guard.22 The traditional royal guard, drawn from the regular
army, was maintained. But in addition to this guard, the King
expected the Wild Tiger Royal Guards, a company composed of
his closest courtiers, to keep a cordon surrounding him when
he went to crowded places. If for any reason the Tiger Royal
Guards were not sufficient in number, other Tigers were to help
perform this service. It has been suggested that this royal use
of the Tigers betrayed a lack of confidence in the army.23 Al-
though this would be hard to prove, at least for 1910–11 it is
a possibility. It seems more likely, however, that this use of the
Tigers as an elite royal guard merely reflects the fairly common
desire, by no means peculiarly Siamese, of a new monarch to
keep closest to him as protectors those whom he particularly
trusts—probably the same desire that led the young King Chu-
lalongkorn in 1868 to create an elite company of guards from
among his court pages to ensure his personal safety.24
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INITIAL ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
CORPS
As the King’s special creation, the Wild Tiger Corps from the
outset was provided with extremely detailed definitions of its
administration, its drills and exercises, its dress, its insignia, its
rules. The corps regulations and orders were all written either
by the King personally or by his chief lieutenants following his
instructions. These regulations were, during the history of the
corps, constantly being changed, amended, expanded, clarified.
First of all, it was declared that membership in the corps
would be voluntary. Legally it was. But the King knew that “the
Siamese as a people are ready to follow an example or a leader”;
by his becoming the corps’ leader and gaining the “hearty ap-
proval” of his ministers of state, “the success of the movement
was assured.”25 Although the King repudiated the idea that
success in the Wild Tigers assured success in the bureaucracy,
undoubtedly many men joined in the hope that somehow their
display of patriotism and self-sacrifice would come to the notice
of the King and help their careers. Mere proximity to the king
in Siam, in fact, was (and still is) regarded as portentous; the
“magic” of the king had beneficial powers that were stronger
the closer one got to him.26 On men who were not so positively
influenced, negative pressures undoubtedly had their effect. A
foreign commentator stated that, in fact, membership in the
corps became obligatory, so that anyone who was not enrolled
“was regarded as a suspicious and untrustworthy person.”27
This statement may well be too strong, but there is certainly
evidence that some overzealous officials put pressure on their
subordinates to join in order to make a good impression on the
King.28 To what extent the King was aware of this practice is
not known. On one occasion he denied the need for one group
of officials to be released from Wild Tiger drill, on the grounds
that the corps was voluntary and no special release was re-
quired; members could be excused on the legitimate grounds
of pressing government work, or they could resign.29 On an-
other occasion, however, the King ordered the Ministry of the
Palace to have a list prepared of all officials in the Secretariat
Department who had not yet become Wild Tigers. Although no
explanation for the order was given, the implications are ob-
vious.30
To be accepted into the corps, the applicant had to be a
Thai citizen, at least eighteen years of age, of good character,
a civilian, and a Buddhist. (There was some later relaxation
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of the rules, e.g., acceptance of non-Buddhists.)31 A member
also had to have the requisite entrance fee of fifty baht (about
twenty dollars at the time) and the funds to buy a uniform and
to pay the annual dues of thirty baht (about twelve dollars). A
member’s status remained probationary until he had drunk the
waters of allegiance in a special ceremony before the King. At
this ceremony the Wild Tiger received a “commission” from the
King, a mark of dignity equal to that accorded regular members
of the civilian and military bureaucracy. The ranks in the corps,
which resembled those in the military, were awarded by the
King on the basis of the person’s presumed knowledge of Wild
Tiger qualifications, that is, military drill, and it was not unusual
to see, in the words of a foreign commentator, “striplings of
twenty … commanding gray-haired men of fifty.”32 The special
criteria for rank in the Wild Tigers are shown in the compo-
sition of the first 122 appointments to the corps on May 6,
1911. Nineteen officers were appointed. Seven of these were
court pages; none were nobles of the highest title; and only one
was a prince of conferred (krom) title. Among the enlisted men,
however, were one noble of the highest title and nine princes of
conferred title.33
In addition to regular members, there were a number of
other categories of members: reserve, subsidiary, special, pro-
bational, outside, and suspended.
Members of the corps were immediately recognizable as dif-
ferent from any other group in Siam. The colors of the original
dress of the members were an appropriately tigerish black and
yellow. The hat was black felt, wide brimmed, turned up on
the right side and secured by a black and yellow cockade, in
the center of which was a badge shaped like a tiger’s face;
it also had a black leather chin strap and a yellow hat band
with black tiger markings. The tie was black satin; the trousers
were black with yellow braidings; the boots were black; and
the cloak was black with yellow lining. This was the “ordinary
service uniform”; there were numerous variants for mounted
guards and other special and provincial units, and there were
different uniforms tor field exercises. There was a bewildering
procession of changes in the details of Tiger dress over the
years. And, it should be remembered, Tigers were required to
purchase their own uniforms.
Other special identifying symbols included special flags for
corps units; three units were awarded flags at a formal cer-
emony on February 17, 1912, for example.34 Even individual
officers had flags designed for them with suitable symbols: a
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Lieutenant Bua (lotus) was given a flag with a lotus cluster;
Prince Damrong was given a flag with a genuflecting angel, his
special identifying symbol.35
The basic unit of the Wild Tiger administration was the
company. By the end of 1911 there were four companies in
Bangkok, and each provincial government circle (monthon) had
at least the beginnings of a local company. Companies in the
capital were to consist of 266 men; those in the provinces were
to be half that size. Figures are hard to come by, but there
were probably about 4,000 corps members by early 1912.36 The
overall administration, headed by the King as captain general,
was in Bangkok.
Administrative divisions of the corps constantly changed,
but one distinction was made from the outset between the or-
dinary Wild Tiger units (in Bangkok or elsewhere) and those
units designated “Royal Guards,” sometimes translated “His
Own.” The Royal Guards units were much closer to the King and
were drawn largely from his palace retinue.
All corps units were expected to have drill fields and club-
houses. The clubhouse functioned as the meeting hall for
lessons and lectures, and as unit headquarters for enlistment
and record keeping. The clubhouse was also to serve as a social
hall, as a gathering place for members in off hours, and as a site
for indoor games. In the clubhouse would then develop the kind
of social atmosphere that the King had learned of in England,
the atmosphere of camaraderie, of group loyalty and esprit that
Siam, he felt, so sorely needed. The first clubhouse, located
near Dusit Palace, was opened on July 22, 1911, with a bene-
diction by the Prince Patriarch and other monks, followed by the
contribution by His Majesty of a dinner party for officers and a
motion picture show for all.37
The principal activities of the Wild Tigers were to learn
and put into practice proper discipline, to learn how to march
and drill, to participate in various ceremonies and fetes, and to
practice field exercises on maneuver.
The rules of discipline laid down by the King in several
orders were precise and rigorous. They covered modes of attire,
modes of requesting leave, and modes of saluting.38 They also
prescribed the penalties for infractions, which varied from
payment of fines to expulsion from the corps. Ten “tardy” no-
tices a month, for example, resulted in a fine not to exceed ten
baht (about four dollars at the time); a second similar offense
resulted in demotion to the suspended-member category.39
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Great stress was placed on military drilling and marching.
The Wild Tigers were expected to meet daily at 4:00 P.M. and,
on most days, drill for two hours or so.40 Other drills apparently
also took place; officials of the Ministry of the Interior, “anxious
to join the Corps,” had preparatory drilling in July 1911 from
seven to nine every morning.41 Drill masters with experience
were borrowed from military units. Before special events,
drilling was particularly intensive. An inspection of the Chi-
angmai unit was preceded by drilling “every morning and
evening,” and as a result, it was reported, “many of the
members feel their bones aching.”42
One provincial official of the time, who praised the Wild
Tigers, recalled in his autobiography an incident that shows the
seriousness of the King’s interest in drill and the burden it put
on civil officials. The official entered the corps early and soon
became an officer. In 1913 he led his troop to a large Wild Tiger
gathering in the capital. He marched his unit proudly before
the King at the royal parade grounds. Vajiravudh, visibly upset,
stopped the troop. He ordered the official to repeat his march
and correct the error. The march was repeated. It was repeated
over and over, but never to the King’s satisfaction. The official
was about to faint. The King, still angry, told the official that
the fault was not that of the troop, but of its leader. He ordered
the troop dismissed and then commanded the official to drill by
himself. Commented the official: “If anybody had been there to
see, they would have thought me out of my mind.” Finally, in
sheer exhaustion, the official said, “I’m just not able to do it and
beg your leave.” The King relented and told the official of his
error: he had been taking three steps too many. That evening,
to show that his anger was not personal, the King came to the
official’s quarters, drove him to a shop, and asked him to choose
some clothing at the King’s expense.43
Marches and parades of properly drilled Wild Tigers were
held frequently. The first public march, on June 17, 1911, was
led by the Royal Bodyguard Band, followed by the standard
bearer. Heading the Royal Tiger Company was His Majesty. This
parade attracted thousands of onlookers.44 A similar parade on
June 29, in which some 800 men marched “smartly,” again at-
tracted thousands.45 Important ceremonies, such as the coro-
nation and celebrations of the King’s birthday, regularly in-
cluded parades of Wild Tigers as well as of the regular military.
A special effort was made during the coronation days to give
prominence to Wild Tiger participation. An all-out effort was
made to bring as many Tigers to the capital as possible. Re-
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portedly some 4,230 officers and men came.46 The Wild Tiger
day was December 9, and the field display before foreign and
local guests began at 3:00 P.M. with marches and flag presenta-
tions. At 4:40 the King made his entrance on horseback, accom-
panied by the mounted company of Wild Tiger Guards. Salutes,
flag raising, music, and speeches followed. Enthusiastic cheers,
a “rush-up” to attend the King, and a royal presentation of a pin
of remembrance of the day concluded the affair.47
Shortly after the coronation, there were two important Wild
Tiger fetes: the final coronation party on December 10 and a
historical pageant of Wild Tiger traditions early in January.
The Wild Tiger party was held in the clubhouse grounds,
which were converted into “a veritable enchanted land” with
numerous booths, stalls, and entertainments.48 One booth, the
product of the Fourth Royal Bangkok Company, was fashioned
in the form of a large tiger’s head; its open mouth was the en-
trance, its stomach a cafe, and its sides the exits.49 At the stalls,
besides food and drink, Wild Tiger souvenirs of handkerchiefs,
badges, and booklets were given away. The evening closed with
a fireworks display in which the outstanding set pieces were
the King’s monogram and a tiger’s head with the motto of the
corps.50
The Pageant of Wild Tiger Traditions was an elaborate affair,
lasting for three days (January 3, 4, and 5, 1912). The pageant
was officially presented to the King in honor of his birthday. In
fact, however, the King himself was the chief planner, stager,
and organizer of the pageant; he was indeed, as he was formally
designated, the “Master of the Pageant.”51 Other top officers
of government were called upon to lend their special talents:
Prince Damrong, the Minister of the Interior, was historical as-
sistant; Prince Paribatra, the Minister of Marine, was musical
director.52
The pageant, held outdoors on the Wild Tiger drill field, lived
up to its advance billing as “a magnificent spectacle.” Said a
foreign observer of the players:
With their excellent scenic arrangements they gave a good idea of
the history of Siam from the earliest times to the present day. The
costumes were historically correct, and no pains had been spared
to make the performances as realistic as possible. Nor were battle
elephants wanting, richly hung with costly trappings and jewelled
ornaments.53
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The pageant announcement made it clear that the King’s
concept of Wild Tiger traditions was as broad as the country
itself, “since the ‘Wild Tigers’ of old were the makers of Siamese
history.”54 Altogether nine historic episodes were enacted, and
the last episode on the last night was followed by the trooping
of the colors and the singing of a patriotic song, “Love of Our
Race and Our Fathers’ Land.”
There were other not-so-formal social activities of corps
members during the initial year. A cryptic newspaper item told
of at least one: “His Majesty the King took part in two plays at
Phrapatom last week, when a number of members of the Wild
Tigers comprised the audience.”55
In addition to discipline, drill, and social diversion, which
were year-long corps activities, members were expected to
make a concerted effort to attend and fully participate in annual
military maneuvers. In the first year of corps history, these ma-
neuvers were held in stages from January 20 to March 2, 1912.
The center of the maneuvers was Nakhο̨n Pathom (about thirty-
six miles west of Bangkok), where the King had built a “winter
palace,” theater, parade grounds, and Wild Tiger clubhouse.
The purposes of these maneuvers, in addition to the obvious
aim of preparing the Tigers to play their role of supporting
the army in time of war,56 were succinctly spelled out by the
King.57 First, participation in war games would heighten civilian
appreciation of the Thai soldiery, would convince civilians that
soldiers’ duties were onerous and required endurance. Such ap-
preciation would lead to greater harmony between civilian and
soldier. Second, the shared efforts and hardships experienced
in the war games would bring civil servants closer together. In-
stead of just meeting in their official capacities, in which true
characters are masked, real bonds of sympathy, understanding,
and trust would emerge from the fellowship that field exercises
would elicit. Third, war games would bring out the true man in
each person, the man who had faced adversity and trial, who
had endured them rather than be shamed before others, and
who in the end would take pride in his achievement and so
become a better person and worker for it.
The essential format of the war games was simple. One con-
tingent of Tigers was designated the defender; the other, the
aggressor. A neutral party judged each action and issued a final
report on who won and why. The first engagement took place
on January 20 and 21 at Nakhο̨n Pathom between two of the
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Bangkok companies, one designated the red team and the other
the green. The green team, acting as aggressor, was defeated
by the red, whose second-in-command was the King.58
A much larger exercise was conducted between February 2
and 6, when various provincial units were added to the Bangkok
companies. All in all, almost two thousand people were involved.
The importance the King gave to these maneuvers can be
judged from the fact that a special royal request was sent to
every government ministry for the release of all men who could
be spared.59 The response was good; for example, Prince Deva-
wongse of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs released twenty-nine
of his staff and kept only ten in Bangkok.60 In those maneuvers
the yellow team, defending Nakhο̨n Pathom, was headed by the
Minister of Local Government, Čhaophraya Yommarat; the red
team, attacking from Ban Pong, was headed by the King. After
four days, the red team was declared the winner and the exer-
cises came to an end.61
In subsequent weekends through February, maneuvers of
smaller scale took place. On February 10 a unit of Royal Tigers
led by the King attacked the bungalow of Prince Damrong, de-
fended by the Prince and a local Tiger unit. A newspaper re-
ported that the issue was somewhat indeterminate, but the
Prince “would have appeared to have escaped any serious injury
since he was seen out motoring the following afternoon.”62 On
subsequent weekends, maneuvers were held at Nakhο̨n Pathom
and at Hua Hin.63 The King appears to have spent all of Feb-
ruary at Nakhο̨n Pathom, being joined there by various units
from the capital and elsewhere for the weekend maneuvers.
In addition to enduring the rigors of the war games them-
selves, the Tigers were subjected to the various deprivations of
camp life. They were allowed to bring only two sets of clothes;
no luggage was allowed, nor was there any place for storing
personal articles of value. The Tigers rose at 5:00 A.M. If there
were no games during the day, they drilled and played field
sports. In the evenings they prayed, sang patriotic songs, and
went to bed at eight o’clock. Leaving camp was forbidden; all
gates were monitored, and guards were posted in town to catch
truants. Men who were used to the comforts of home and ser-
vants found that they even had to wash their own clothes.
Of course food, medical services, and lodging—such as they
were—were supplied free, and money not spent on liquor and
entertainments was money saved.64 But full acceptance of the
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war games depended on belief in their high purpose. Some men
undoubtedly did share the King’s enthusiasm. It seems likely,
though, that most accepted the experience passively.
THE BOY SCOUTS
One branch of the Wild Tigers which was certainly not lacking
in enthusiasm was the Boy Scouts. The Boy Scout organization
was established by royal decree on July 1, 1911; in the decree
it was clear that the scouts, literally the “Tiger Cubs” in Thai,
were to be a junior edition of the adult corps, with the same
aims as the parent body. The decree stated:
Boys in their adolescent years should also receive both physical
and mental training of the sort given Wild Tigers so that when
they become older they will know their proper duties as Thai men.
Everyone should do what is useful to the nation and country, to
the land of one’s birth. And the instilling of the proper spirit must
begin when one is still young. A tree that is to be shaped into a
pleasing form can be most easily trained when it is young and
supple.65
The King, who was scout chief, spelled out these aims further
in an address on December 5, 1911, when he enumerated the
scout principles as loyalty to the sovereign, love of nation, and
loyalty to the community.66 And in an address on December 3
he pointed out that his wish was to inculcate in the minds of
the younger generation the high patriotic qualities of the Wild
Tigers.67
The training of the Boy Scouts in Siam closely mirrored
that of the Wild Tigers; they drilled, paraded, took part in the
war games. In the maneuvers at Nakhο̨n Pathom in early Feb-
ruary 1912, only three units were cited for outstanding perfor-
mance of duties; one was a Boy Scout unit, and another was
a Boy Scout and Tiger unit combined. The scouts threw them-
selves so enthusiastically into the maneuvers that it appears one
group of them actually succeeded in capturing the King.68 Ac-
cording to one source, the King saved himself from “capture” at
the last moment by having the royal trumpeter blow the royal
anthem, which forced the “invaders” to stand at attention while
His Majesty proceeded to slip away.69
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The devotion of the Boy Scouts is well illustrated by a letter
of one Thai scout which was published in the London Daily
Mirror. The scout, describing the rigors of camping, told of the
scouts’ cooking for themselves, “even though some of us did not
know how to,” and tramping knee-deep through muddy paddy
fields, and ended with:
I once had to run in the mud, and when I got out of the difficulty
I felt so tired that I could hardly breathe and could not run any
further. But, being ashamed before the other scouts, I leapt down
into a trench without being seen, and there I rested until I re-
covered.
Fortunately for me I was not conspicuous by my absence. If I
was found out while being in the trench, what should I do? I had
to make a hole in the ground and put my head in for shame.70
The enlistment of boys in the scout movement was phenom-
enally rapid. By December there were more than 2,000 in 63
units in the capital alone;71 by 1922 the number had increased
to 21,500 in 177 units.72
The boys’ enthusiasm was matched by government efforts of
support. Scoutmasters had to go through special training and
be examined on, among other things, the proper methods of
instilling the spirit of the Wild Tigers, i.e., nationalism.73 In-
struction in scouting principles had entered the regular school
curriculum by 1913.74 Scouts who had rendered outstanding
service, such as helping put out fires, aiding the police to arrest
criminals, and rescuing people from drowning, had their names
inscribed on scrolls of honor. And men who had completed their
scouting days were entered into the reserves, exhorted to retain
their principles, and given a special medal as a gift from the
King to serve as a constant reminder, a talisman, an amulet to
help the wearer adhere to the good and to ward off evil tempta-
tions.75
The stress on nationalism persisted in the Boy Scout
movement throughout the reign. Indeed the question once
arose in the press as to whether the “good deed for the day”
aspect of international scoutism was “being urged” upon Thai
boys at all.76 While there was always some attention paid to
doing valorous deeds for the good of the nation, it appears that
not until fairly late was there any explicit advice given scouts to
perform small useful acts. Not until 1920 were scouts urged to
help children cross streets or to pick up bits of broken crockery
on the footpaths and to ask themselves at bedtime “What good
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deed have I done today?”77 Attention to crafts such as carpentry,
tailoring, mat making, and mechanics seems also to have come
late78 and may have been part of an effort to stimulate Thai in-
terest in the manual arts, hitherto largely left to the Chinese.79
The marches, drills, exercises, sports, and war games, however,
remained central. Years after their scouting days, men remem-
bered particularly these aspects of scouting.80 One Thai writer
recalled in particular the song scouts sang in their marches:
All of us Scouts are completely at the service of Your Majesty
Who established both the Tigers and the Scouts for the good of the
Thai.
We are most loyal and determined to help our nation and faith,
To defend our Thainess and the honor of our king
So the Thai will be Thai forever and never be brought to dust.81
REACTIONS AGAINST THE CORPS
There are indications of some rumblings and grumblings about
the Wild Tiger Corps almost from the moment of its inception.
The defensive tone taken in some of the early orders, and some
modifications made in the corps, indicate that some of these
criticisms reached the ears of the King. The earliest complaint,
that uniforms were too expensive, was cited in a document re-
futing this charge, which stated that, although there were three
Wild Tiger uniforms, only one, the field uniform, was really
necessary and that it cost only forty-six baht (about eighteen
dollars at the time).82 The early establishment of a “suspended-
member” category was apparently motivated by the need to ac-
commodate individuals who were unable to live up to the drill
and discipline regimen of regular members.83
The strongest expression of antipathy to the corps appeared
in the remarks of a group of young army officers who were
arrested in February 1912 for complicity in a planned coup
d’état.84 The coup group of 1912 and its motives deserve to be
discussed fully (and shall be in the next chapter); it is obvious,
however, that the hostility to the Wild Tigers expressed in ex-
treme form by this group was present to some degree in various
circles of the bureaucracy.
The members of the coup group of 1912 were extremely
jealous of the Wild Tigers. The Tigers, first of all, were obviously
very close to the King’s heart; he spent much time, attention,
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and money on them. The young army officers felt that the army,
and they themselves, were not being properly appreciated. In
their view the Tigers represented a waste of money and energy,
since the army represented the real defense of the nation. On
the other hand, it was also a sore point that military men were
not allowed to join the regular Tiger Corps (a few high officers
were designated members of a “special” category); the theory
was that the military did not need the kind of training the corps
members were receiving. Also, many of the courtiers closest
to the King, who dominated the Royal Guards Company of the
corps, were individually resented for their “superiority.”85
How much of this resentment, this antipathy, this criticism
was general, of course, cannot be known for certain, for the
press treated the subject very gingerly indeed. But that it went
beyond the 1912 coup group is clear. One coup leader reflected
that he, then a drill master but not a member of the corps, felt
tired for the old men he had to march and said that he knew
they were “forced” to be part of the corps.86 Another indication
of the generality of criticism is the report of a foreign observer
who undoubtedly was relaying some of the adverse comments
he heard in Bangkok in early 1912.87
The adverse criticisms that had circulated underground
beforehand and were brought to the surface by the discovery of
the coup plans clearly influenced several discussions within the
Wild Tiger Royal Guards in 1912. The first meeting was held on
March 12, presumably to provide at the King’s request an eval-
uation of the Wild Tiger organization as it neared the end of its
first year of activities. It is undoubtedly significant that the King
did not attend this meeting. At the meeting, the guards did cite
some of the Wild Tiger achievements but also suggested that
means be found to open the membership to the less affluent and
to men in the military.88
A second series of meetings was held in late March. Again
the King was absent. A special committee of five members was
chosen by general election to take the sense of the meetings
and draft proposals for change to be submitted for a final de-
cision by the King. Although the five-man committee had no
executive power, its composition, the result of a vote of 6,669
members, is revealing. The five “winners” were, in order of
popularity, Prince Chakrabongs, Prince Damrong, Prince Pari-
batra, Čhaophraya Yommarat, and Prince Charoon. The leading
vote-getter had the reputation, deserved or not, of being op-
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posed to the Wild Tigers. None of the five, with the exception of
Čhaophraya Yommarat, could be considered Wild Tiger enthu-
siasts.89
The Wild Tiger meetings of late March were spirited and
open. The members voted against property restrictions for
members; they voted for allowing entry to army officers; they
voted for medical examinations for prospective members; they
voted for institution of an examination for the promotion of of-
ficers; they voted for the automatic transference of a Tiger to
reserve status after six months’ service; they voted to cut the
entrance fee from fifty baht per year to ten baht. Some matters
were discussed but not voted on because the King’s views on
these matters were already known. For example, the sentiment
was in favor of cutting drill time, but it was already known that
the King favored making drill compulsory only once a week;
the view was also expressed that the King’s favorite Palace
Guard Company should be eliminated, but the King’s declared
intention of retaining this elite guard made discussion of this
issue pointless.90
On April 12, King Vajiravudh called a general Wild Tiger
meeting on his own to discuss the various proposals. His
Majesty was obviously incensed at what had taken place in late
March; he chided the members for calling a meeting “which
greatly exceeded its powers” by discussing matters beyond its
purview. He accused those who had participated in the March
meetings of “sinning behind my back.” But, he said, he would
let “bygones be bygones.” As to the specific recommendations,
some he could accept, some he could not. Annual dues could
not be cut until a survey was made. As for withdrawal from
the Wild Tigers, he would allow special withdrawals for those
pressed by work or pressured by superiors. But he added, in a
note of sarcasm, that if he did not have the duty to head the
Wild Tiger movement, he might consider going into the reserves
himself, “for I have much government business to do.” The tone
of the rest of the meeting remained icy. The King presented his
new rules for entry into the Tiger reserves and invited expres-
sions of opinion on these rules, but he prefaced his invitation by
saying, “I don’t have to ask your views.” Čhaophraya Yommarat
was the only commentator, and he ventured to say that the rules
were good. As for the committee of five, the King summarily dis-
missed them with the remark that too many were princes who
had too much else to do, and, in the interest of speed and effi-
ciency, he would undertake the task of revision himself.91
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On April 16, 1912, one small but significant suggestion for
reform was made by Prince Chakrabongs, the King’s most out-
spoken brother and Army Chief of Staff. He pointed out that
commissions to military officers bore only the royal seal
whereas commissions to Wild Tigers were accorded a royal sig-
nature. This minor distinction, said Prince Chakrabongs, was
leading to the erroneous conclusion that the King held the
Tigers in higher regard than he did his soldiers. Prince
Chakrabongs did not suggest how the King ought to handle
commissions; he urged only that His Majesty treat them all
alike.92
Despite his pique, the King did bring about some reforms.
Drill hours were reduced, and only one drill day a week was
required of long-term members.93 Some effort seems to have
been made to reduce the charge of favoritism by opening up the
ranks of aide-de-camp Wild Tigers to men other than those in
the palace retinue,94 And Wild Tiger commands outside that of
the Royal Guards were allowed to set their own dues schedule.
By the end of 1913, one command had reduced its entrance fee
from fifty to five baht and its annual dues from thirty to twelve
baht.95
LATER HISTORY OF THE CORPS
Although the aborted coup of 1912 and the open criticism of
the Wild Tigers somewhat chastened the King, he by no means
abandoned the movement. There seems to have been some
diminution of Wild Tiger activity for several months after
March, but by fall the pace had picked up again. A second
Pageant of Wild Tiger Traditions was held in early January,96
and the annual maneuvers were given as much attention as ever
in 1913. One of the clearest evidences of the King’s continued
interest in the Wild Tigers was his authorship in 1913 of a play,
Huačhai nakrop (Soul of a Warrior), that was essentially a pro-
paganda piece extolling the virtues of the Tiger Corps and of the
Boy Scouts.
The later history of the corps reveals two essential facts:
first, that the corps continued to expand; second, that some new
emphases were developed.
With regard to the elaboration of the corps along original
lines, there is no need here to go into extensive detail. There
were constant revisions of administrative organization—the
names and numbers of units, the grouping of units. And there
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were frequent changes in insignia and dress; a comprehensive
revision in 1917 embodying all such changes since 1914 took
up 130 pages of the Royal Government Gazette.97 New func-
tional units of the Tigers—including an artillery unit, an ambu-
lance section, and a marine division—were periodically added.
New clubhouses in the capital and the provinces were contin-
ually being opened. Although the annual Pageant of Wild Tiger
Traditions was not continued after 1913, the staging of plays
and fairs by Wild Tiger groups was expanded. The King’s use of
Wild Tiger units as sounding boards for his ideas on nationalism
also continued.98 The practice of having an end-of-the-year eval-
uation of Wild Tiger activity seems also to have continued, al-
though the reporting committees in all the years after the first
one were largely made up of the King’s own men and nothing
critical seems to have emerged.99 And, lastly, annual maneuvers
were held without fail. The King’s undiminished interest in the
maneuvers is evidenced by a letter to the Minister of the Palace
in 1916 informing him not to schedule any ceremonies for Feb-
ruary because the King planned to be away the whole month on
Wild Tiger maneuvers.100 Plans for the maneuvers of 1926 were
under way when the King died.
Expansion in numbers of Wild Tigers seems also to have con-
tinued in later years. Although total figures are lacking, there
are spotty records that show the addition of almost 2,000 new
full members in 1915.101 The total membership by 1924 was re-
ported to be over 10,000.102 Much of the growth seems to have
occurred in the provinces, and news of provincial activity, such
as locally organized maneuvers and drills, became particularly
prominent in the later years. On trips that the King made to the
provinces, much attention was paid to Wild Tiger displays. The
trip to the southern provinces in 1915 was made complete with
marches, displays, and maneuvers of Wild Tiger units, and the
King was convinced that the Wild Tiger purpose of bringing gov-
ernment officials closer together was being fully served.103 In
another trip to the South in 1917 in which Wild Tiger units again
outdid themselves, the King was so pleased that he conferred
the designation “His Majesty’s Own Guard” on the company at
Phuket.104
The most marked change in emphasis in the Wild Tiger
Corps after the abortive coup of 1912 was an obvious effort to
bridge the gap between the military and the paramilitary orga-
nizations.
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The Wild Tiger maneuvers of 1913 were remarkable for
having military units involved in the war games for the first
time. The leader of the White Team (opposed to the King’s Red
Team) was, in fact, a regular army general, the Commander of
the Fourth Infantry Regiment.105 Although the stated purpose
in adding regular army units was to give Wild Tigers the expe-
rience of contending with trained troops, the unstated purpose
was surely to lessen the jealousy of the regular military forces.
Another formula for conciliation was adopted in 1915 and fol-
lowed through the rest of the reign: after the regular Wild
Tiger maneuvers were held, the King attended the army ma-
neuvers, becoming, according to the press accounts, the first
Siamese sovereign “to share the hardships of his troops in
peace time.”106
The King’s attention to the regular military, already evident
in 1913, was greatly intensified in the years of World War I.107
And the war years also gave the King the opportunity to see the
Wild Tigers in a new light, although he denied the newness of
his insights. The range of his aims remained much the same, but
the relative importance of the various aims changed. Emerging
as the most important task for the Wild Tiger Corps by 1914 was
its role of backing up the military, becoming Siam’s second line
of defense. Siam’s army had to bear the chief burden of defense,
said the King, but if an enemy really did come to take over
the country, the army was too small to hold off long. And Siam
lacked the resources and the time to build up a fully effective
army. Meanwhile the Tigers would be the people’s militia, re-
lieving the army from the burden of securing internal order so
that it might concentrate on the external enemy.108
In a long essay written in October 1914 the King gave a rea-
soned argument for the importance of the Boy Scouts and Wild
Tigers in wartime. Both, he said, were of particular importance
in a small country which had no large population from which to
draw conscripts and so had to depend on all men to help defend
the country and to do so willingly. The only thing that could
substitute in war for large numbers was bravery and personal
ingenuity. Volunteer trainees could be of inestimable value in
protecting the countryside, in securing roads and communica-
tions networks, in supplying the army with information, in pre-
serving internal order.109
In speech after speech during the war years Vajiravudh re-
peated the theme that Wild Tigers must look on the soldiers
as their elder brothers, as the prime defenders of the nation
whom the Tigers must support. The theme could not help but be
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gratifying to the regular military.110 On July 21, 1917, the day
before Siam declared war, a Royal Decree on the Duties of the
Volunteer Wild Tiger Corps To Preserve the General Peace was
issued that spelled out the supportive military role the King had
already generally defined.111
An indication that the King’s new desire for a united effort,
stimulated by the war in Europe, did effect something of a rec-
onciliation with army ranks may be present in a remarkable
address given by Prince Chakrabongs on the occasion of his re-
ceiving a special rank in His Majesty’s Own Wild Tiger Mounted
Guards on April 9, 1917. In the speech Chakrabongs referred
for the first time publicly to the “long-time rumor” that he dis-
liked the Wild Tigers. He remarked that the rumor astonished
him and must have arisen from a misunderstanding. The Prince
declared, “I am a servant of His Majesty who founded the Wild
Tigers. How then could I hate the Wild Tigers?” The Prince ad-
mitted that he was outspoken, that when he saw something that
deserved criticism, he criticized. He went further and allowed
that he had noticed deficiencies in some aspects of the corps
and in some individuals in the corps. But, he said, this did not
constitute an overall judgment; his overall judgment remained
favorable to the corps. Finally, Prince Chakrabongs expressed
hope that his reception into the mounted guards would prove
his good wishes and still all unfavorable rumors.112
At the conclusion of World War I the King evidently believed
that the reconciliation of the Wild Tigers and the regular army
was complete. The soldiers were proud of their wartime effort
and were now, said the King in an address to the Wild Tigers,
“holding out open arms to us like brothers, which is not what
once was.”113
EVALUATION
Evaluations of the Wild Tiger Corps in Thailand today tend to
assume polar opposites of high praise or utter condemnation.
Critics who condemn the corps do so usually on the grounds
that it was a useless, wasteful, gaudy show. There is no doubt
that the corps cost money. But the money came largely from
either the privy purse or the pocketbooks of members. Two
early attempts to charge Wild Tiger travel expenses to min-
istries were unsuccessful; the requests were regarded as not
“in the spirit” of the Wild Tiger movement.114 Apparently some
corvée labor was used in the preparing of camp sites at ma-
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neuver grounds.115 And from time to time in the last five years
of the corps various money-raising schemes were tried, in-
cluding benefit play performances,116 sports displays,117 car
races,118 issuance of special Wild Tiger postage stamps,119 and
special lotteries and fairs.120 Out-and-out appeals for dona-
tions121 and the creation of a Society for the Furtherance of the
Wild Tiger Scout Movement122 with dues of five baht per year
also helped raise money. Most of these fund-raising activities
were organized in 1919 and 1920 to provide funds for 10,000
rifles for use in Wild Tiger training.123
In the end, the financial argument against the Wild Tigers
must rest on the conclusion that the corps brought little of
real value to Siam. An argument can indeed be made that the
corps produced rivalry and division in Thai society. Elements
in the civil and military bureaucracy remained antagonistic to
the corps. The elitist Royal Guards were particularly resented.
Vajiravudh was aware of the jealousy his guards stimulated,
but he justified the special attention they were accorded on
the grounds that they were not a territorial unit but a group
whose main function was to protect His Majesty. Further, he
said, the guards were the “experimental” unit of the Tigers;
they were the Tigers who would try out new drill methods, new
weaponry.124 Lastly, the King rationalized his attention on the
basis of the very hard work and special devotion to duty the
guards exhibited: the King suggested that, rather than envy the
guards their special insignia and uniforms, other Wild Tigers
ought to emulate them in energy and hard work.125
As to the Tiger movement as a whole, at first the King was
rhapsodic. In his diary for September 1911 he spoke of the pop-
ularity of the corps and its success in producing national unity.
Membership in the corps had transformed weak men into strong
men, drunkards into sober men, selfish men into self-sacrificing
men. The King in those first months looked on the corps as his
monument “more solid than any statue or stone that might have
been built at much greater cost.”126 In later times the King con-
tinued to praise the movement as a success, excoriating those
who opposed it. But he undoubtedly felt the corps had not re-
alized his early high expectations. At the end of World War I
he praised the defense role played by the corps and sarcasti-
cally referred to his desk-bound bureaucrats as men who were
“sitting in an office playing at making black ink marks on paper”
and, when and if war came, could only “splash ink on the faces
of the enemy or beat their heads with paper.”127 Yet the King un-
doubtedly knew of reports in the 1920s that admitted failures.
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One such report claimed that, given the voluntary nature of the
corps, little improvement could be expected. Several reports re-
ferred to the serious falling off of interest in drilling; by 1922,
said the report of one official, “virtually no members at all”
were coming in for training and the officers themselves were
not coming in to supervise the exercises.128
On the positive side of an evaluation of the Wild Tigers,
several arguments can be made.
The military aspects of the movement certainly had some ef-
fects. By and large, European observers were impressed with
what they saw in the way of discipline and national unity demon-
strated by the Wild Tiger movement. In the neighboring colony
of French Indochina, the French were aware that “The King
and the Siamese aristocracy have created and are maintaining
a Nationalist movement that it would be a mistake to ignore.”129
Several articles appearing in the Courrier d’Haiphong and the
Saigon Opinion even raised questions about Siam’s intentions
and pointed to the need for France to develop the defensive mil-
itary position of its colonies.130
But no evaluations of the Wild Tigers that rest primarily on
its specifics—its finances, its military role—can come to grips
with the substance of a true judgment. For the Wild Tiger
movement was first and last a means to bring about a feeling of
nationalism among the Thai people. The movement succeeded
to the extent that it stirred in the Thai people a devotion to
nation, a commitment to national unity. Here it cannot be denied
that the movement achieved success; how much success re-
mains the question. From the accounts and memoirs of some
former members of the corps, there can be no doubt that many
were stirred.131 Some men and many boys who had never before
thought of dying to protect their king, nation, and religion had
the concept, as expressed in the very language of the King, per-
manently etched on their minds. And the example of the King
living, eating, and sleeping in the field with his Wild Tiger com-
rades proved to many the King’s sincerity.132 Yet the total group
affected was, after all, small. When the corps was abolished
by Rama VII, no one rose to defend it; the corps as an insti-
tution was nothing without its “golden bo tree shelter.”133 The
essential idea behind the institution, however, had a life beyond
the institution itself and its founder.
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The Monarchy
On February 29, 1912, a fairly obscure army captain rushedfrom a meeting in a modest second-floor law office in
Bangkok to deliver some urgent news to a fellow officer who
taught at the army cadet school.1 On receiving the news, the
cadet school instructor, who had connections higher up, led the
captain to Prince Phanthuprawat, chief of a unit of army engi-
neers. Prince Phanthuprawat took the news to the top, to Prince
Chakrabongs, the Army Chief of Staff and Acting Minister of De-
fense.
THE ABORTIVE COUP OF 1912
The news was startling, and it was bad. For the captain’s story
was that he had just attended a meeting of junior military of-
ficers who were plotting a revolt against the leadership of King
Vajiravudh. The government moved fast. Prince Chakrabongs
rushed to Nakhο̨n Pathom to inform the King. By the following
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day arrests were under way. On the morning of March 2 a
government press release indicated that matters were under
control.2
The abortive coup of 1912 was more than a dramatic
episode in the history of modern Thailand. The motives of its
leaders showed the spread of Western political ideas, including
the idea of nationalism, among the Thai people. Some of these
ideas, in the forms in which the coup leaders expressed them,
bear unmistakable traces of His Majesty’s own rhetoric. The
abortive coup of 1912, then, in some respects constituted an in-
direct tribute to the effectiveness of Vajiravudh’s nationalistic
message.
The essential aims of the 1912 coup group were not entirely
in the category of political idealism. Dissatisfaction with the
King on a much more personal level was, in fact, the first
stimulus to revolutionary thought. The coup idea seems to have
originated in an incident that occurred shortly before Vaji-
ravudh became king. A small group of soldiers got into a quarrel
with a group of pages of the then Crown Prince Vajiravudh over
the favors of a girl who sold betel nut. The quarrel ended with
the soldiers, armed with sticks, chasing the pages back into
the safety of Parusakawan Palace. The following day the Crown
Prince demanded redress for the insult to his position by the
application of an old provision of the palatine law that called
for lashing on the back with a rattan rod. King Chulalongkorn
at first resisted. So did the Minister of Justice, Prince Rabi,
who pleaded that the new Westernized penal code made lashing
with the rattan outmoded. (Undoubtedly both the King and the
Prince were concerned over the possible bad effects that the re-
sumption of such “barbaric” practices would have on Western
states at the very time Siam was seeking to achieve removal
of treaty restrictions on its juridical sovereignty.) The Crown
Prince insisted. The beatings were administered, and the seeds
of embitterment with Vajiravudh were planted among the mil-
itary and among some members of the legal profession.3
Personal antipathy to the Prince intensified after he became
king in 1910. Testimonies of those involved in the 1912 abortive
coup show a wide range of criticisms: coup members spoke
not only of Vajiravudh’s insistence on the “shameful” beatings
but also of his “absorption in putting on plays” and indulgence
in other extravagant diversions; his overfondness for the Wild
Tiger Corps, whose maneuvers were no better than “play-
acting”; his waste of money in “building various palaces”; and
his excessive devotion to “officials in the royal household” who
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were “eating up the kingdom” and who insulted those beneath
them. Some criticisms circulated in the form of rumors.4 These
criticisms were generalized into comments such as “The King
does not pay attention to the government” and “Our country will
be in danger of foreign exploitation because of the wickedness
of one person.”
The personal antipathy to the King on the part of some of
the coup members, however, became part of a larger picture. It
merged with, and can hardly be separated from, the conviction
that absolute monarchy in Siam was outmoded and must go.
None of the coup leaders held that the removal of “one person”
was the whole solution to Siam’s problems. The coup leaders
spoke against “obligation to one solitary person”; they spoke for
“faithfulness to the Thai nation.”
In the area of political ideology, the ideas of the coup party
of 1912 were far from mature. A few of the coup members
knew something of outside events and attempted to instruct
the others in the idea that absolute monarchy was an unpro-
gressive and dying institution, that virtually all other states in
the world were either constitutional monarchies or republics.
They told less-well-read members about the forms of govern-
ments in Europe and America, the success of Japan after its
adoption of a constitution, the movement of the Young Turks,
the democratic revolution in Portugal, and finally and above all,
the victory of the Kuomintang in China. Siam, they said, was
behind the times; Siam also needed a parliament, in which the
people could have a voice in government, in order to progress
economically, socially, politically. The coup group, however, had
not yet crystallized its thoughts on the form of government best
suited to Siam. Some opted for a republic. The majority appear
to have favored having a king under law, that is, a constitutional
monarchy. But no constitution had been drawn up, no clear po-
litical path for the future had been agreed upon.
The lack of a precise political goal, however, was not seen
as an obstacle to taking political action in the interests of the
nation. The nationalistic purposes of the coup group are hard
to question. Patriotic slogans abounded and were convincingly
phrased. The nation’s lack of progress, the poverty of the
people, the susceptibility of the country to foreign domination
were all cited as real ills. All Thai had to love their country and
put its interests before all else. Death was preferable to national
slavery. It is paradoxical that many of the remarks and slogans
of the coup party closely reflected the ideas of the King himself.
Said one coup member, “We are Thai and must love our nation
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and religion and land of our birth”—a paraphrase of the King’s
own “nation, religion, and king,” with “land of our birth” substi-
tuted for “king.” The motto of the coup party was “Give up life
rather than nation”—almost identical to the Wild Tiger motto
“Give up life rather than honor.”5
Although the coup members focused mainly on internal af-
fairs, they took an occasional glance at the presumed reaction
of the outside world. The prevailing thought seemed to be that
foreigners who looked down on the Thai as unprogressive, who
even criticized the Thai king for his judicial practices, would be
favorably impressed by a move toward constitutionalism. The
view was also put forth that the existing government was ex-
ercising too harsh a policy with respect to local Chinese, that
this policy had to be changed or it might lead to revolts of the
Chinese in Siam and to severe action on the part of the Chinese
republican government.6
The King’s very stress on the crucial need for national de-
fense was used by the coup party, and used against him. The
argument here repeated the King’s own comments that long
peace in Siam had led to national weakness and consequent dis-
advantage in terms of outside power. The coup members, almost
all of whom were soldiers, however, faulted the King for not
giving adequate support to the regular armed forces. The army,
they said, lacked weapons; its leaders were ignored.7 The real
defense of the kingdom was not being prepared to do its job.
The cry “Can all of us soldiers and Thai just silently watch our
Thai nation be destroyed?” yielded the answer “No, of course
not.” Indeed, the coup leaders argued, soldiers were the only el-
ement in society brave enough and in a strong enough position
to do something to remedy the situation.
Some of the coup leaders undoubtedly had selfish motives
as well as political and nationalistic ones, but the self-serving
motivation appears not to have been dominant. Only a few of
the secret, and often extremely frank, testimonies refer at all
to the relatively poor wages and the slow promotions in the
army. Perhaps if the coup party had grown larger in numbers,
and with such growth had appeared more likely to succeed, the
numbers of those who joined in the hopes of gaining personal
advantage would have become more significant.
The organization and tactical plans of the 1912 coup party
had serious weaknesses. What started out as barracks-room
talk, in which some junior officers of like mind discovered each
other, was formalized in an organizational meeting of a core
group of seven officers on January 13, 1912. This meeting was
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followed by some ten or eleven subsequent meetings through
the rest of January and all of February. The main purposes of
the meetings were recruitment and indoctrination. Recruitment
was on a person-to-person basis. By the end of February
somewhat over one hundred people had attended meetings, and
recruitment among provincial military units had just begun. Al-
though most recruits came from army units in Bangkok, a few
civilians—mostly lawyers and translators—and some three or
four young naval officers had joined the coup party by the end
of February. Members were asked for financial support8 and
help in spreading the word. The coup group members were very
young; almost all were in their early twenties.9
The recruitment arguments followed the antimonarchic and
pro-nationalistic lines already presented above. Appeals were
also made to new members to be with the times, to be modern
and not old-fashioned. Hints that the group was large, num-
bering into the hundreds, and had friends in high places among
senior officers were also used by original coup members. Al-
though the direct and unsupportable claim that Prince
Chakrabongs was sympathetic to the group seems not to have
been made, new members were well aware that the coup party
leader, Dr. Leng Sičhan (an army captain, with the title of Khun
Thawaihanphithak), was the personal physician to the Prince
and his family. Recruits were encouraged to think that if Dr.
Leng were the head of the party then there must be important
men in the nation backing it.10
It would appear from some of the testimonies of those ar-
rested that they became involved by deception: they were in-
vited to a meeting to “shoot birds” or to have a social evening
only to discover that they were listening to conspiratorial talk;
then they were pledged to secrecy, usually by the administration
of an oath, solemnized by a ritual in which a bullet was dropped
into a glass of liquor, which was passed around for all to drink.
The claim to innocent or reluctant involvement is hard to credit,
however; it seems to have been the natural defense of men ac-
cused of a serious crime. More than one coup member specifi-
cally denied the innocence of anyone who went to meetings and
asserted that men were carefully screened before they were in-
vited to an indoctrination session.11
The original plans of the nucleus coup group were for ten
years of preparation, but it became clear by the second meeting
that it would be impossible to maintain secrecy for such a long
period. The new plans, far from complete by the end of Feb-
ruary, called for action in early April at the annual ceremony in
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which the King would accept the oath of allegiance of his offi-
cials. Coup members who formed part of the royal guard would
then surround His Majesty and compel him to yield to their
demands. Those demands, although not yet decided on, would
at a minimum be for King Vajiravudh to promise to grant his
people a constitution and place himself under law; if the King
were unwilling to make this concession, he would be replaced
by Prince Chakrabongs. Some coup members suggested that
Prince Chakrabongs be named constitutional monarch from the
outset. Still others suggested that the monarchy be completely
abolished and a republic instituted, with Prince Rabi installed
as first president. Of these three plans, the second, calling for
installation of Chakrabongs as king, seems to have been most
popular by the end of February. The coup members, of course,
expected to have all of March to perfect their plans and make
their final decisions.
Two other “plans” emerge from the sources, but neither is
well substantiated. One called for the coup group to take no
action other than to petition the King for a constitution; this
“plan,” articulated by a small number of those arrested, sounds
like an after-the-fact attempt to reduce culpability. As violent
as the petitioning-plan was mild was the second “plan”: a plot
by coup members to “do violence” to the King. According to
some rumors, the plotters had planned to kill the King.12 The
charge of violence was, in fact, made by the court martial judges
and by the King.13 It was, however, heartily denied by all those
implicated both at the time of the coup and later, and seems
to have been based primarily on an ill-advised attempt by one
of the coup members, after the arrests had taken place, to
threaten government leaders with a cannonading unless those
arrested were freed. This threat apparently transformed the
early lenient disposition of the King into a mood of bitterness
and harshness.14
Discussions among coup members about the best alternative
to King Vajiravudh as leader of Siam reveal something of coup
mentality. Prince Chakrabongs, although completely oblivious
of the fact, was undoubtedly the leading contender. He was, first
of all, an army man and would therefore presumably be most
sympathetic to the specific army grievances held by the ma-
jority of coup members. Further, he was seen as an honest man
whose heart was with the people; on maneuvers, for example,
he sloshed with his troops in the rain. A second choice among
the princes was Prince Paribatra, the Minister of Marine, whose
candidacy was supported by the naval officers. The only other
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name to be put forward was that of Prince Rabi (the Prince of
Ratburi), who had a reputation for fairness, based, no doubt, on
his opposition, as Minister of Justice, to the flogging of the army
officers.15 Prince Rabi was the favored candidate for the Thai
presidency among those who wanted a republic. At no time,
apparently, was it even vaguely suggested that Dr. Leng or other
leaders of the coup party should themselves take over top posi-
tions in the government.
The sentences given the coup members were made public
on May 5, 1912. Ninety-one persons were found guilty of con-
spiracy. Three were sentenced to death; twenty, to life impris-
onment; the remainder, to prison terms of twenty, fifteen, or
twelve years. The King, in an act of clemency to show that he
did not “entertain any feelings of revenge,”16 immediately re-
duced all sentences: the death penalty was reduced to life im-
prisonment; life imprisonment was reduced to twenty years;
the remaining sixty-eight prison sentences were reduced to sus-
pended sentences.17 In a final act of clemency twelve years
later, in November 1924, all prisoners were freed.
It is difficult to measure the real effect of the abortive coup
of 1912 on the thinking of the King or other Thai of the times.
The foreign-language press in Bangkok speculated that the
“present disaffection” and the “mutinous doctrines” were but
the manifestations of the spirit of “liberty and progress” and
the “wave of unrest” then sweeping through Asia; that the coup
movement, although it did not “touch the masses,” did indicate
the existence of a “growing force of public opinion” that “re-
quires guidance.”18 Editorials saw the coup as showing that “pa-
triotism is an enormously greater force than it was a score or
so of years ago.”19 But, the press pointed out, “the new reign
has furnished evidence enough that the progress of the nation
continues unhasting and unresting, and that the new spirit is
understood and appreciated by the monarch.”20 The King’s re-
duction of the sentences of the coup members was seen by one
paper as giving “full proof” that
he holds liberal views, that he has not desired nor does desire to
withhold that discussion of public questions which is the right of
a free people, so long as the expression of these views does not
harm his country. His Majesty desires to see the people capable
of taking their part in the affairs of state and has no intention of
restricting their free speech during the interval that must elapse
before the public are fit for the high duties involved …. The wise
decision of the King to treat the conspiracy more as a youthful ex-
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aggeration than a serious endeavor will draw the teeth of dema-
gogues and at the same time satisfy the legitimate aspirations of
the people.21
The opinions in the foreign press on the effects of the coup
seem largely wishful thinking. There is little evidence that the
discovery of the coup plans resulted in any important change in
public policy; there is no evidence that it fundamentally shook
the King’s confidence in the monarchic institution.
Among the relatively minor changes that may be attributed
to coup influence were two that came in April. One was the
transfer of the highest court of appeal in the country from the
office of the King to the Ministry of Justice. This move was
seen as “a modification of the constitution in the direction of
extending the reign of law.”22 A second change that seems
likely to have been a response to coup leaders’ criticisms of the
King’s prodigality was the King’s removal of the Privy Purse
Department from a tax-exempt category. By this action all the
King’s personal lands and properties were to be subject to
the same taxes as those levied on properties of ordinary cit-
izens, for, as the King explained, “Apart from the official side,
I consider myself as being on the same footing as any ordinary
person.”23 Other changes of some significance included various
efforts to enhance the prestige of the army and to modify the
training of Wild Tigers.24
The army, for its part, made one innovation that seemed cal-
culated to improve the overall image of the army in the King’s
eyes. This was the formation in May 1912 of a voluntary Asso-
ciation to Promote the Army of Siam. To show their love of land
and king, association members agreed to forgo a portion of their
pay (1 percent was the minimum) to raise funds to buy the army
some heavy artillery.25
DEFENSE OF THE MONARCHY
King Vajiravudh, like his father before him, saw kingship as
natural to Siam, essential to Siam’s progress. He saw Siam’s
successes in history as the results of wise royal leadership. And
he saw loyalty to the monarch as one of the three necessary
loyalties for the further development of Siam as a united, pro-
gressive, modern state. Together with loyalty to nation and
religion, loyalty to the king was part of his definition of nation-
alism.
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The essentiality of loyalty to the king is stressed again and
again and again in Vajiravudh’s writings and addresses; it is a
perennial theme throughout his reign. In an essay of 1915, for
example, Vajiravudh made loyalty to the king part of the very
definition of a “true Thai.”26 In some speeches and essays the
theme is developed at length. It is the entire subject of a speech
to the Wild Tigers in June 1911. Indeed, the first part of the Wild
Tiger oath was an oath of loyalty to the king. In the 1911 speech
Vajiravudh told why.27
First of all, Vajiravudh made clear that he supported the
pledge of loyalty to the king not because he was king; it was the
institution he supported. And his support was based on belief
in a Hobbesian history of man in a primitive state, with the
device of a leader finally being adopted by tribal groups in order
to achieve external protection and internal order. The leader,
or king, received the delegated power of the group and used
that power for the benefit of the group. So the show of honor
and respect to the king was in effect a show of honor and re-
spect to the entire group, each of whose members had yielded
power so that it could be combined in the person of the king.
And, by the same token, deprecation of the king amounted to
self-deprecation. The withholding of respect or obligation to the
king simply amounted to a loss of power for the leader, making
him less able to do the tasks that he was delegated to do for the
group. The King proceeded to give examples showing the ne-
cessity to delegate power. Ships needed captains, and captains
must command. Similarly with the ship of state, whose captain
was the king. Further, the king had symbolic significance. For
power is an abstract term and, like such terms as good and evil,
was hard for earlier peoples to understand unless anthropomor-
phized. Just as good was personified as a god or an angel, and
bad as a devil or demon, so power was seen in the form of a
king; the king became the visible expression of the glory of the
land. That glory belonged to everyone in the nation, and it was
the duty of all to protect it and defend it. Anyone who would
harm the king could only be considered as someone who was ex-
ceedingly evil and would do harm to the nation, would destroy
the peace and welfare of the group.
From these abstractions and rationales for royal power, the
King in his June 1911 speech dropped to a more personal level.
He chided those who thought being king was a desirable job, a
job with an enormous income, all kinds of personal perquisites,
and freedom from any restraint. If a king could merely indulge
himself, do nothing but devote himself to pleasure, then his
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position would be enviable. But the duties of a conscientious
monarch were onerous indeed. And Vajiravudh could be nothing
but conscientious, a king who would do his duty “to the best of
my ability and strength,” a king who was “prepared to sacrifice
my pleasures, my body, even my life for the good of the nation.”
All he asked of the Wild Tigers and of his people was that they
work with him, for “if we sink, we all sink; if we are saved, we
are all saved.” In any case, however the ship might fare in the
stormy seas, “I will not abandon you, I will not flee.”28
In an extension of his remarks on royal conscientiousness,
Vajiravudh depicted himself as the moral exemplar of the state.
In an address to students at the Royal Pages School in 1915 he
likened the task of students and of government officials to that
of a mountain climber. He said, in part:
I try to climb the mountain every day. The mountain I climb is
much higher than yours. Yours is but a small hill whose top is
soon reached. But the mountain I climb—its top cannot be seen.
Therefore I ask you to bear in mind that whatever the dimensions
of your difficulties, I also experience difficulties and fatigue. I do
not believe I am in any way better off than you.29
More than moral exemplar, the king, in Vajiravudh’s view,
was the ultimate source of all power in the state. Since all
power and justification for authority ultimately went back to
the throne, officials should not assume that they had any au-
thority in their own right. Officials should not expect com-
moners to respect them for their ranks or titles. They should
not be respected because of their high birth, their position as
“gentlemen” (phudi). For a “gentleman”—the Thai word literally
means “good person”—who behaves poorly is no gentleman,
and an ordinary man of good deportment is.30 An official must
earn his title of respect and his label of gentleman by rigor-
ously adhering to the royal will and by serving, as the monarch
himself does, as a moral example to all the people.31 In the end
the official is but the pale reflected light of His Majesty’s bril-
liance. And the people know this:
Why do people respect the nobles? Only because they know the
nobles convey a part of royal power. They do not respect the
persons of the nobles as such. If you don’t believe me, imagine
what would happen if someone went into the countryside claiming
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he was a čhaophraya by virtue of his commission from the King
of Cambodia or the King of Burma. Would he get the people’s re-
spect? Not at all!32
While Vajiravudh was not loath to have his people believe
in the traditional special powers, the karmic royal virtues, that
Thai kings were thought to possess,33 in his public remarks he
stressed the human rather than superhuman qualities of the
king and the pragmatic benefits of kingship. In his Wild Tiger
addresses he was fond of speaking of himself as just another
Thai citizen or as a friend; in his addresses to young people he
asked that his words be regarded as those “of a teacher and not
those of the king.”34 The Thai king, he pointed out, was not like
the ancient king of China whose face could not be looked upon;
the Thai people wanted to see their king, and Vajiravudh did
not separate himself from his people. Indeed, he moved among
them. In other lands kings were regarded as angels or gods, but
in Siam the king was regarded as a human being. Vajiravudh de-
scribed himself as but a Thai, with thoughts like those of Thai in
general.35
The humanity and accessibility of the Thai monarch are con-
trasted strongly with the seclusion of the Japanese emperor in a
newspaper article the King wrote in 1912 under the pseudonym
“Asvabahu, a travelled Siamese.” Vajiravudh remarked that he
had long pondered the deeper meanings behind the degree of
exposure of the monarch and his relationship with his people.
There were advantages and disadvantages to seclusion and to
exposure. The secluded monarch tended to preserve his dignity
better, was regarded with more reverence. “It is one of the pe-
culiarities of human nature,” said the King, “to prefer showing
reverence only to mysteries.” And, “the very mysteriousness of
the Emperor of Japan ensures reverence in him.” On the other
hand, what the sovereign who exposed himself to his people lost
in reverence, he gained in better understanding of his people’s
wants and needs and in ability to create a bond of human sym-
pathy between himself and his subjects. The accessible sov-
ereign ran the risk, however, of having his subjects “regard him
more in the light of an influential acquaintance, who ought to
be of the very greatest use to each of them individually, with
the inevitable consequence that anyone who does not get every-
thing his own way thinks himself personally and particularly ag-
grieved, and therefore thinks himself entitled to bear a personal
grudge against the Sovereign!” The King continued:
The Monarchy
65
The policy of our own King, however, and that of his August
and Beloved Predecessor before him, has always been to grant
to his subjects free access to his Person; and, in spite of the
disadvantages resulting therefrom, as mentioned above, I would
not for worlds have it otherwise. I am sure we ought all to be
most grateful to our King for granting us the privilege of free
access to his Person; for we like to think of him as a Father, who
comes freely among his beloved children, interesting himself in
their works, and entering into their fun. A Father who thus comes
amongst his children ought surely not to lose his dignity thereby,
because a few naughty, spoilt children are impolite and unman-
nerly enough not to behave themselves properly. My friends, it
is up to you to ensure the continuance of that privilege which
was voluntarily granted to us; I mean the privilege of free access
to our King. Shall we lose the privilege because a few “naughty
children” do not know how to behave themselves like gentlemen?
There is no need to cringe and crawl, but we can and should
give our Sovereign the welcome of the children to the father, the
friend! … Surely you could be loyal without being slavish, and
polite without cringing? Impoliteness is not a sign of indepen-
dence, but merely a sign of want of breeding!36
But on royal leadership the King insisted. Siam, he said,
was fortunate in having had a long history of continuous royal
successions. The orderly succession of kings had reduced po-
litical discord, had saved the country from foreign threats when
Western power began its insistent demands in the nineteenth
century:
In their wisdom, our Kings did not set their faces against the
stream of progress. On the contrary, they welcomed civilisation
and progress with open doors, and our rulers moved along with
the stream and have been doing so ever since. Civilisation came
to Siam and found no need to knock in any way as insistently as
she has had to do in both Japan and China; the stream of progress
found no formidable barriers set up purposely in its path, such
barriers as were found being merely natural ones, which our wise
rulers have always tried to remove as soon as possible.37
The image of King Vajiravudh as captain of the ship of state,
developed fully in the speech of June 1911, recurs in many
speeches and writings and is alternated with similar images.
In one speech the King likens himself to one of the three flags
of the Thai people—the others being nation and religion.38 In a
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poem he looks at the natural world and sees that all things in
nature need leaders; even cattle need a leader “to lead the herd
where the grass is.”39 And, of course, even the gods have their
chief in Indra in the heavens.40
The challenges to absolute monarchy that were so evident
in 1912, however, could not go without reply. Such challenges
were not entirely new in the reign. In fact, King Chulalongkorn
in 1887 had been presented with a petition by several of his
officials asking that a constitutional monarchy be established
in Siam.41 Chulalongkorn could turn away his polite petitioners
with a reasoned reply; Vajiravudh felt he had to go further.
Even before he became king, Vajiravudh showed that he was
his father’s son on the subject of constitutionalism. In 1905 he
penned a short sketch of what it would be like if Siam had a
parliament. The parliament session he depicted was marked by
interminable and pointless speeches, and it ended in chaos.42
Another early essay on parliamentary government, written by
a courtier for Vajiravudh’s own journal, undoubtedly reflected
Vajiravudh’s views. The essay pointed out that in states with
parliaments the law is not fully respected, for laws written by
the people cannot be respected by the people in the way that
royal law is respected. The essay argued further that parlia-
mentary government was slow and divisive. Government tended
to polarize into parties and proved the proverb that “Two lions
cannot live in the same cave.” The essayist admitted that in a
monarchical government much depended on the monarch, but
he said that in Siam, where the monarch was good, compas-
sionate, and just, the system worked well. Critics of such gov-
ernment in Siam were like those who complained of the soot
that emerged from the productive rice mill.43
The essential arguments of Vajiravudh against constitution-
alism in Siam, aside from those that stressed the value of the
monarchy, were that, in fact, the monarchy was already under
law, with a degree of constitutionalism already in existence, and
that Siam was not ready for any further constitutionalism. The
King dismissed the critics of the monarchy as poorly informed
young people at best or self-serving ambitious individuals at
worst.
The changes in the constitutional position of the monarchy
had come about, said Vajiravudh, through the introduction of
new laws granted to the people by the king. In effect such laws
limited the power of the king, who could not repress the people
at will without violating his own laws. The king was not above
the law to do whatever he wanted, right or wrong. He had to
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Royal Leadership in Siam. King Vajiravudh, through his
ability and diligence, raises Siam on the ropes of its sol-
diery and arms, its internal peace and order, its edu-
cation, and its agriculture and industry above the level
of the Burmese, the Cambodians, and the Vietnamese.
The faces behind Vajiravudh represent the previous five
Chakkri kings. Cartoon from Dusit samit.
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use his power in righteous and productive ways.44 Vajiravudh
further claimed that democratic methods had long been exer-
cised in the Thai polity; the founder of the dynasty had indeed
been “chosen by the people” after his predecessor was deposed
for madness.45
On the critics of monarchy, first of all the King said they
were very few—“not one in a million.”46 Those few were exces-
sively impressed with foreign ideas. He counseled young people
in particular to beware of rumormongers, of those given to ex-
travagant talk,47 of those who looked on all Europeans as “pre-
ceptors in the ways of Progress and Civilisation.”48 Students
should study European political concepts, but they should judge
whether or not such concepts were suitable to the Thai, whether
Siam was at the moment ready for such concepts. Further,
they should examine their own motives: if they favored certain
political changes, did they favor them because these changes
would be useful to the majority of the Thai people or because
they would suit the purposes of a small minority? Vajiravudh ex-
pected that a fair judgment would lead students to reject po-
litical change and conclude, with him, that “things of benefit to
Europeans might be evils to us.”49 Some critics the King put
in the class of people who were merely seeking to avoid their
responsibilities to the state by favoring new political orders
that would give them personal license to do as they pleased
or provide them with new avenues for achieving power. These
people earned the King’s sharpest castigations as “buffoons”
and “sinful destroyers” of the nation.50
Vajiravudh, who was always well read on foreign affairs, was
keenly aware of foreign political changes and their impact on
educated Thai. The early years of the twentieth century had
seen revolutions in Turkey, Portugal, Persia, and China, and in
1917 czarism yielded to Marxism in Russia. The King wrote
many essays and translated numbers of articles on these foreign
developments.51 His theme was consistent: foreign revolutions
were no example for Siam. His writings on China were most nu-
merous, probably because he felt that, with the large Chinese
minority in Siam, affairs in China had the greatest potential of
causing unrest. In one essay, for example, he doubted the pos-
sibility of success for the republican government in China. He
could not believe that the Chinese would be able to change
their character in a blink of an eye, that they could create “a
true republic in my lifetime.”52 And affairs in China as of the
end of 1912 seemed to the King to justify his doubts. The po-
litical executions, the absence of law, the prevalence of disorder
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all demonstrated China’s failure to make a foreign polity work.
Vajiravudh saw China in chaos, with anarchy, tyranny, and in-
justice prevailing. He once remarked that Westernizing “politi-
cians” in China had “set back the progress of China by at least
a century already!”53
In a series of articles on the Chinese Revolution as of the
end of 1912,54 the King explored the details of the Chinese
scene so that his people would know the facts and not blindly
admire or seek to emulate what they did not understand. Vaji-
ravudh’s conclusion was that “in name at least, the ‘Republic of
China’ exists. There is certainly a government in Peking, which
calls itself the Republic, but is it a real one? … this seems ex-
tremely doubtful.” The King put the republic through various
tests and found it consistently wanting. The president had not
been elected. Not even the assembly had been elected; it had
rather “Like a glorious God in Hindu mythology … sprung into
being of its own accord.” The assembly “in no way represents
the people”; it “is not a constitutionally representative body.”
The King gave the original Chinese revolutionaries credit for
good intentions, but he was pessimistic as to how matters would
eventually turn out:
I do not in the least doubt that Sun Yat Sen meant to have a re-
public when he started the revolution. He undoubtedly felt that
China was really having a bad time all round, and probably be-
lieved that he could save her from total destruction if he could
only turn the Manchus out and turn the country into a republic.
He counted upon the sympathetic interest of people in Europe
and America, and he was right. He got it, with his war-cry of “A
republic for China.” People in Europe and America have very hazy
ideas about China on the whole. They believed the Chinese to be
a downtrodden people, and naturally sympathised with them in
their struggle for liberty. Then, sure of that sympathy, Sun Yat Sen
and his friends went to work with a will, and started preaching
revolutionary doctrines and Republicanism to their fellow coun-
trymen. I do not think anyone will contradict me when I say that,
to the majority of Chinamen, the revolutionary leaders’ preach-
ing conveyed nothing beyond a vague idea, that if the revolution
succeeded, they would gain all sorts of wonderful advantages.
For example, more wealth would come to them, they would be
treated as equals by the Europeans, and so forth; and it cannot
be denied that such enthusiasm on their part was infectious, not
only to the Chinese themselves, but also to those of other na-
tions, (some Siamese among them), who in point of fact knew but
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little of Chinese affairs. So Sun Yat Sen started the revolution, and
carried it through. He and his friends succeeded in pulling down
the Monarchy, but when it came to setting up a republic in its
place, they found it not so easy to do as to talk and dream about
it. Republics are easy to set up in Dreamland, but it is another
thing to do it in China. Sun Yat Sen was no man to build up any
sort of government, and he himself knew it. That was why he so
kindly left everything to Yuan Shih Kai …. It now only remains for
Yuan Shih Kai to carry out his part of the bargain, and establish
the Republic of China. For the present, we can not admit that he
has done it. Will he ever do it? Will he ever be able to do it in re-
ality? Does he really want to do it?55
In a series of articles on the Young Turks and their revo-
lution, also written in 1912, Vajiravudh was equally critical.56
The principal aim of the young revolutionaries was to bring
down Sultan Abdul Hamid, whom they saw as “the one drag
upon the progress of Turkey.” Sultan Abdul, Vajiravudh ad-
mitted, had his faults; he was no saint. But then no ruler could
afford to be a saint “except in those ancient times, when
saintship seemed to have been easier of attainment than it
is now.” At least the sultan had “kept his head, and also his
Empire,” neither of which the Young Turks were able to do.57
In his remarks on Turkey Vajiravudh showed considerable
empathy for the sultan. In “explaining” the faults of the sultan,
he was undoubtedly calling, probably unconsciously, for un-
derstanding of his own problems. The King, for example, al-
lowed that corruption had existed among the sultan’s officials.
But, asked Vajiravudh, what could the sultan have done? If he
had dismissed all corrupt officials, he would soon have been
without a government, and any replacements he might have
found would have been just as corruptible as their prede-
cessors. What the sultan needed, and could not get by snapping
his fingers, was a new society with a new morality, with new
ideals and standards. It is clear, here, that Vajiravudh had very
much in mind the propaganda work he was so actively engaged
in—his work to establish in Siam those values without which no
regime, constitutional or otherwise, could hope to achieve real
reforms.
On the subject of constitutionalism, Vajiravudh stated his
belief that Sultan Abdul Hamid “did not consider it wise or ad-
vantageous for Turkey to have progressive institutions thrust
upon the people before they knew how to benefit by such insti-
tutions … that his desire was to go slowly and to gradually in-
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troduce such reforms as he felt absolutely sure the people were
ready for.”58 The Young Turks, however, a small clique of clever
agitators and young officers “who had just enough knowledge
in them to make them dangerous,”59 carried out their revolution
and deposed the sultan. Carrying out such a revolution was not
difficult, for “destruction is terribly easy,”60 especially since the
Young Turks felt no need to worry about the opinion of the
public, “to consult the opinion of a ‘thing’ like that. Who cares
anything as to what the ‘thing’ may do or say?”61 The conse-
quences were foreordained. Since the mass of the people knew
nothing of the “blessings of popular government” and “had not
the vaguest idea of the meaning of the term parliament,” the
Young Turks “had to teach them, by driving them to the poll at
the point of the bayonet!” The King remarked, “Parliament in
Turkey has been nothing but a farce.”62
The final denunciation of the Young Turks, however, was
accorded them for their failure to preserve Turkey. By 1912
war had broken out in Turkey’s Balkan provinces, the empire
was coming apart, and the Turkish army was collapsing. The
“warlike Turkish soldier,” once moved by an “overwhelming
sense of loyalty to the Sultan,” had been demoralized by revo-
lutionary propaganda; for this the Young Turks were also held
responsible: “… the Young Turks may be said to have killed the
ideal Turkish warrior when they killed loyalty and caused the
death of discipline.”63 The King summed up his feelings on “the
fruits of Turkish constitutionalism” in a scathing denunciation
of Turkey’s young revolutionaries:
… they came before us with a swagger, their mouths full of brag-
gadacio, raising false cries of “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity,”
spreading the fever of excitement which reached even as far as
these parts of Asia, setting the example for all braggarts in the
Orient to raise cries for “Constitution,” a thing which not one
in one hundred millions understands the least bit about, except
that it is something “civilised”! It is for this that I am down on
the Young Turks; and I frankly admit I feel no sorrow in their
downfall, since it will serve to disillusion such Orientals (including
a few of my own countrymen), as may have caught the “Consti-
tution” fever badly.64
Experiments with constitutionalism in other Asian states
elicited similar royal reactions. With respect to Persia, where
revolutionaries had succeeded in forcing the shah to accept a
popular assembly in 1906, the King wrote: “The Persian people
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have been saddled with a parliament that they understand
nothing about and do not want, and which has caused the
country more trouble than all the most incompetent shahs put
together.”65
The last country to be dealt with by Vajiravudh in his 1912
series of articles was Japan,66 which he “felt sure” would be
brought up “as an example and an argument” to disprove his
allegations that Asian states were not ready for constitutional
government. Vajiravudh maintained his ground; he readily ad-
mitted the successes Japan had achieved but held “that Japan
does not owe her present greatness to constitutionalism; on the
contrary, Japan has attained her present position, not on ac-
count of constitutionalism, but rather in spite of it.”67 And the
King strongly substantiated his argument with abundant evi-
dence that the crucial decisions and fundamental policies that
led to Japan’s progress had been taken long before the adoption
of the 1890 Constitution. Further, the Japanese government
since 1890, wrote the King, could not be called a pure parlia-
mentary regime; it was rather “a bureaucratic monarchy, not
to say oligarchic”68 government with at best a constitutional in-
strumentality in “the experimental stage.”69
The lessons for Siam were clear. A small group of young
people with “the wrong kind of education, and an insufficiency
thereof” had picked up ideas of Western political institutions
and sought to apply them in Asia with catastrophic results.70
Where their revolutions had succeeded, they had merely insti-
tuted “synthetic constitutions” without affecting basic problems
or traditional political points of view. The revolutionaries had
proved that they could stir things up, could destroy; they had
yet to show that they could build anew. Using a dramatic ex-
ample, the King pointed to the success of Chinese agitators in
getting their followers to cut their pigtails. What, asked the
King, had this to do with “the inner consciousness of a man”?
How would any tonsorial technique enable a person to pass, at a
stroke, “from the darkness of political ignorance to the brilliant
light of political understanding”?71
Vajiravudh obviously had men such as those involved in the
abortive 1912 coup in mind when he advised his people to learn
from mistakes made elsewhere and to beware of “that insidious
foe, who comes in the guise of a friend, a self-styled ‘patriot’
with his mouth cram full of dead theories specially dug up and
dressed in attractive garments to catch your fancies!”72
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The show of constitutionalism without the substance was
worse than useless; in the King’s trenchant English, “… the
glory of a nation who assumes the cloak of Constitutionalism …
[is] like the glory of the ass who wore the lion’s skin! If only the
ass had not started braying, he would not have been found out
so soon; but what ass could ever help braying?”73
Siam had its own national “traditions and fundamental prin-
ciples” that could not be swept away “with one magnificent
wave of a magic wand.” The King denied that he was a reac-
tionary; he was a conservative, perhaps, but not a reactionary.
He favored reforms, he said, when they were needed; he fa-
vored real liberty and real equality and not artificial represen-
tations of these virtues. But, the King concluded, Siam not only
was not ready for democratic government but would be ruined
by such government. He stated that “any precipitate movement
in the direction of constitutionalism would cost us dear.” It
would cause confusion that would lead to results “too appalling”
to mention.74 The Young Turks, he said, had succeeded in de-
stroying Turkey in three short years, “but Siam will not take so
long to destroy. A year, at most two will be enough.”75 Revolu-
tionary confusion in some states was damaging, but in Siam’s
case it would be the end; China might lose territory, Turkey
might lose its imperial lands, but tiny Siam would simply cease
to exist.
The King did not argue publicly against the theory of
constitutional government on general principles. He admitted
that progressive states in Europe and America had such govern-
ments. But Europe and America were not Asia. And, he pointed
out: “Where a nation has not gradually grown up in the under-
standing and practice of self-government, it is sheer absurdity
to talk sentimental nonsense about setting up a parliamentary
regime.” Democratic political systems took centuries to bring
about; they came slowly and only at the price of the blood
and tears of countless people. England, for example, had taken
several centuries to “grow” its parliamentary practice. And al-
though the United States had started off its history as a con-
stitutional republic, it had been able to do so because it was
founded by Englishmen who were “already well-used to the rep-
resentative method of government.”76
But privately the King freely criticized the basis of
constitutionalism. Several pages in his diary, written for his
own benefit and the education of his closest courtiers, are de-
voted to a hard look at the constitutional system of government.
First of all, he admitted that absolute monarchy had its weak-
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nesses; the overriding one was the danger of the ascent of
an incapable monarch. An unwise, selfish, or cruel king could
do incalculable harm to the nation. Constitutional governments
sought to remove that danger by placing power in the hands
of the people. A government responsible to the people that
could be changed whenever the people chose was, he said,
an excellent system—on paper! But in practice the system had
many imperfections. The citizenry by and large lacked enough
knowledge to govern themselves. And the necessity for the
people to govern themselves through elected representatives
led to all sorts of aberrations of the democratic ideal, such as
party politics, bribery, vote-buying, and the spoils system. The
King’s criticisms were reasoned. He did not stand as an unal-
terable opponent. He wrote, “If any responsible and well inten-
tioned groups should petition me to grant a constitution … I
would be glad to consider it.” More significantly he said that
the people of Siam would determine their own future. Whenever
the great mass of citizens made clear they wanted constitu-
tional government, whatever its imperfections, “there’d be no
one able to oppose them.” But clearly that day had not yet ar-
rived.77
Even though Vajiravudh professed admiration for pro-
gressive European states with parliaments, he could not sup-
press, privately at least, a certain satisfaction in a minor
“setback” to British constitutionalism that occurred in 1917.
The King had learned that the new prime minister, Lloyd
George, had made bold changes in the cabinet to make it “less
unwieldy and unpractical as an instrument of government in
these critical times.” Vajiravudh wrote in a letter to his minister
to France:
This change will have the effect of causing some chagrin to “politi-
cians” all over the world, whose theory of constitutional gov-
ernment has thereby received a direct blow to its prestige, since it
has been examined and found wanting in times of national crisis.
It is surprising—and also very refreshing—to find how silent our
own “nationalists” and “Constitutionalists” have become! Well,
well, “It is an ill wind that blows nobody any good,” and this
dreadful war has been a blessing in disguise to those who are
lucky enough to be able to stay out of it!78
The King’s reactions to republicanism and constitutionalism
were by no means peculiar to him; they were echoed by other
leaders in government and the royal family. Prince Devawongse,
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for example, shared Vajiravudh’s view that Siam was already,
in effect, a constitutional monarchy and strongly rejected the
idea of a parliament for Siam. Writing to the King in 1919, he
pointed to the danger of rushing “half-ripe” to parliamentari-
anism, which in Russia had led only to the tyrannies of Bol-
shevik enslavement of the people. And he specifically mentioned
the danger that members of parliament might easily succumb to
pressure groups in the community and enact self-serving legis-
lation such as reinstitution of the gambling houses that Vajira-
vudh had taken action against in 1916.79
Prince Paribatra, in a letter written to the King shortly after
the abortive coup of 1912, defended the monarchy and strongly
supported Vajiravudh personally. He attributed the growing po-
litical consciousness of some people to the spread of education;
to the influx of foreign peoples, that is, the Chinese, who were
accustomed to anti-monarchic views; to the growth in the
number of officials, many of whom tended to forget their obliga-
tions to the king; to the increasing influence of an irresponsible
press; and to the operations of lawyers whose search for legal
loopholes tended to reduce respect for royal decrees. The
Prince came up with solutions. The first was to make clear “that
there is but one king who has the power to govern the country.”
All government officials, from cabinet ministers on down, should
recognize that they were but the servants of the king and ex-
ecutors of his policy. A second solution was to make certain that
the welfare of the people was paramount, that government did
not exist for the welfare of officialdom. Thirdly, the government
should make its purposes and plans better known to the public;
it should explain its actions, preferably through its own press
organ. Lastly, a law regulating the press should be enacted.80
After reading some press criticisms, Vajiravudh’s brother,
Prince Chakrabongs, wrote a memorandum to the King to the
effect that the absolute monarchy could use an escape valve for
attacks in the form of a revival of the long-defunct Legislative
Council established in 1874 by King Chulalongkorn. The King
replied that, although he was a constitutionalist at heart, he did
not believe that Siam was ready for a proper legislature; as for
the halfway house of an appointed council, that would not still
criticism, for it would be sure to be attacked as but a rubber-
stamp institution.81
The King summed up many of his ideas on politics in a short
play written the year before he died.82 Called Coup d’état and
set in a mythical kingdom, the play recalled many of the events
of 1912. The play deals with an attempt by some revolutionaries
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to overthrow a king who is unjustly blamed for all the ills of the
country; the coup fails, and the king is discovered to be a man of
great worth whose “desire has always been to govern his people
so that they should obtain as much happiness as possible”83 but
who has been prevented from putting his progressive policies
into effect because of the obstruction of the government’s all-
powerful ministers and parliament.
Through the speeches of characters in the play, the King
gave vent to many of his own ideas. Monarchy is praised. Re-
publicans are damned. Revolutionaries who desire the removal
of the king are made out to be selfish men, traitors, or people
“too enamoured of theories.”84 One character looks at China
and comments: “China has been a Republic for several years,
but has it become any better than it was before?”85 Another
looks at Russia and concludes that the Russian people are suf-
fering more than ever: thousands have died; many must eat
“the flesh of dead and putrid horses”; and “instead of having
freedom they are being oppressed a thousand times worse than
before.”86 These various views are summed up in one re-
markable speech:
I will say briefly, that every one of those who have expressed the
desire for changing the form of Government from a Monarchy to
a Republic have no reason for their desire except a personal one
and from want of judgement, believing the words of demagogues
and of newspapers owned by aliens or by people with personal
grievances, who are endeavouring by specious words to foster
sedition and rebellion. Comrades! We are true-born Coronians, so
why do you want to listen to the words of aliens? We have re-
ceived from our ancestors a noble heritage, namely birth in the
Coronian Nation which we all love and want to cherish; shall we
sell our birth-right to the Jews and the aliens? Let us not do it,
comrades! Be patient. It is true that we are at present passing
through some hard times, but it is nothing so bad as we shall
see as slaves of the Bolsheviks. Do you want a Republic, com-
rades. That will be the first step leading us into slavery under the
Bolsheviks! That will be the first step towards an inferno that is
hotter than the nether most hell!87
On democracy in general, one character in the play notes
that such governments do work where historical traditions have
favored them; the American government, for example, is a
success, but the United States, after all, was founded by Eng-
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lishmen “and no people understand the principles of constitu-
tional government better than the English.”88 But the applica-
tions of democracy are like doses of medicine:
If the medicine we choose is too strong it may do more harm than
good, as for instance a purgative if taken in excess may make us
so ill that we may even die of it. Strong purgatives are useful in
that they cleanse the system of undesirable elements, but they
also weaken our system for a time so that we become less able to
resist the invasion of disease germs from without, and if the new
disease should get a firm hold the result might be fatal.89
DUSIT THANI
What has to be one of the world’s most unusual expressions
of political thought was the miniature city called Dusit Thani
that King Vajiravudh had built in 1918. Dusit Thani is still the
subject of controversy. Courtiers who were once close to the
King have written of it as an experiment in democracy, as ev-
idence of the King’s intention to establish parliamentary gov-
ernment in Siam, as the first planting of the seeds of democratic
thought in Siam.90 Detractors have called Dusit Thani mere fun
and games, playacting or puppeteering.
Dusit Thani was indeed a play: the setting was a beguiling
miniature town; the owner, director, and principal actor was
the King; and there was a cast of hundreds, the King’s closest
courtiers. The substance of the play enacted, or at least some
scenes of it, were indeed political.91
Dusit Thani, however, was first and foremost a model city,
built in Dusit Gardens behind the royal palace and later moved
to more spacious quarters behind Phya Thai Palace.92 The city
was elaborate, complete with houses, palaces, temples, roads,
rivers and canals, trees and parks, fountains, waterfalls, and
electric lights—an enchanted fairyland by more than one ac-
count. The King was chief planner and chief architect. The city
had two daily newspapers and one weekly journal.93 It had a fire
department, electric company, sewage department, and health
department. Parties and ceremonies were held on its grounds.
And boat races of miniature boats on its miniature river were
held almost nightly “for relaxation after work” under rules es-
tablished by the Dusit Naval Association.94
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The political life at Dusit Thani started in 1918 with the
election of a mayor in October and was formalized with a con-
stitution granted by the King in November, amended slightly
in December.95 The preamble to the constitution stated that
Vajiravudh’s purpose was to offer “residents” of Dusit Thani
(i.e., his courtiers) the opportunity to study self-government.
The government’s purview was, of course, restricted to the
miniature affairs of the miniature city. Ultimate power was re-
tained by the King, who might at any time revoke any action at
Dusit Thani that he disapproved of.
The constitution of Dusit Thani called for popular elections,
with suffrage extended to all “residents,” who numbered about
200. The elected mayor and his appointed cabinet were to serve
for one year. An assembly of representatives from each district
was provided for in the amended constitution. In order to stim-
ulate interest in the political process, the King created two po-
litical parties, a Blue Ribbon Party led by himself and a Red
Ribbon Party led by his closest courtier, Čhaophraya Ram. Some
seven elections for mayor were held in the first two years, with
at least one mayor’s career ended abruptly by the successful
politicking of the King’s party.96
In terms of its real effect on the world outside the palace,
Dusit Thani had no influence at all. In fact, very little news
of the existence of Dusit Thani appeared in the public press.97
Some writers have suggested, however, that the ultimate plan
was to extend the Dusit Thani idea into the regular government,
starting with the provincial government at Samut Sakhο̨n, a
province close to Bangkok.98 The Deputy Minister of the Interior
apparently talked to the King about conducting such an exper-
iment on the provincial level.99 The closest the King came in
an official document to declaring Dusit Thani a real model for
the real world was in his dedicatory comments on the opening
of Dusit Thani’s municipal hall on July 9, 1919: “Our method of
proceeding in this little country of ours will I trust be an ex-
ample for Siam, but to achieve such rapid success as has this
little country is not possible, for there are obstacles.”100
A final assessment of Dusit Thani’s significance as a repre-
sentation of Vajiravudh’s thoughts is hard to make. Certainly
much of the miniature city was for fun. And firm evidence of an
underlying serious intent is scanty. Yet serious purposes cannot
be ruled out; the King was fond of thinking in utopian terms, of
setting forth models and ideal types which would spread their
message as a pebble spreads ripples in a pond. Serious or not,
Dusit Thani gives us yet another instance of the King’s mode of
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thought, for Dusit Thani, the model of democracy, was entirely a
monarchic creation. It was conceived by the King, was managed
by the King, and was expanded or curtailed depending only on
the monarchic perception of need.
A DEMOCRATIC KING
Despite the abundant proofs that Vajiravudh was fully aware of
his absolute powers as a Siamese monarch and was anxious,
in fact, to focus more attention on the monarchy than ever in
order to build national unity, the image of him among the Thai
is that he was a democratic king. One author entitles a chapter
on Vajiravudh “The Liberal”;101 others refer to him variously as
“an expert in democracy,” “a true believer in the principles of
democracy in its true sense,” and “a very democratic king.”102
In part this image of Vajiravudh may have derived from his
efforts to endear himself to his people, to move among them
more freely than was customary, and to include the public in
various festivals. From the very start of the reign, elements
of the general population were included for the first time in
such events as the cremation rites for Chulalongkorn and the
coronation ceremonies for Vajiravudh.103 There were, of course,
countless other official ceremonies that had to be performed,
age-old obligations of a monarch who was supposed to have in-
herent magic powers. These ceremonies were traditionally per-
formed by the king for the public, but not with the public, and
it would appear that Vajiravudh performed many of them per-
functorily. But not all of them. One such ceremony was the royal
kathin, the rite of presentation of robes to Buddhist monks.
In 1913 the King, breaking custom, decided to go on an unof-
ficial kathin by boat to a small temple and soon found himself
the “object of a warm popular demonstration.”104 A newspaper
writer commented on the event as follows:
In their enthusiasm the people afloat hemmed the King’s boat
all round. The officials would have liked to keep the distance a
little bigger, but His Majesty enjoyed the unaccustomed nearness
of the people. The Royal acknowledgement, oft repeated, of the
people’s greetings, was one of the ways of fulfilment of the Coro-
nation promise to extend his favour to all his people. The occasion
does not arise often as regards the great bulk of the people, but
this was one, and the opportunity was taken advantage of.105
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Another impromptu kathin occurred a few days later. The King
noted in his diary that while on a pleasure jaunt he happened on
a rural kathin. He was invited to take part, and he did—joining
in on the prayers, the gift-giving, the noodle repast (“it was
delicious”), and play-watching.106 The unexpected success of
these events led Vajiravudh to try to repeat them, and “people’s
kathin” followed in 1914, 1915, and 1916. The later affairs,
however, lacked spontaneity, and one feels that the real desire
of the King to come into closer rapport with his people was
thwarted by the elaborate preparations of his courtiers to give
him a good show, with safe official floats substituted for the
lively enthusiasm of an unpredictable crowd.
Probably more important, however, in giving Vajiravudh the
“democratic” image was his practice of surrounding himself
with courtiers of less than princely rank, with whom he spent
much time. The Thai definition of “democratic” here really
means egalitarian rather than democratic in a political sense.
Although the highest levels of government continued to be oc-
cupied by senior nobles and princes of elevated rank, the rela-
tions between these nobles and princes and the King were not
close107—a fact that accounted for many of the charges of gov-
ernment inefficiency that were made against Vajiravudh’s reign.
However the King’s habits affected the administration, it is true
that the guests at Vajiravudh’s dinner parties, his social com-
panions, his “neighbors” at Dusit Thani, his most trusted Wild
Tigers, the actors in his dramas all came from a relatively small
circle of mahatlek (court pages) and others in the inner circle of
the Ministry of the Palace. And these men represented various
classes. Many were commoners. Some were of Chinese descent.
Those whose ancestors were royal were of lower royal ranks.
It was because of this choice of associates that Vajiravudh was
awarded a reputation for favoring sycophants by those who crit-
icized him and the name of democrat by those who admired him.
In any case, it does not appear that the King chose his asso-
ciates for political purposes; rather, he seemed simply to prefer
to spend time with men of humble origin, whom he treated with
remarkable freedom and familiarity.108
The Monarchy
81
5
National Survival and
Militarism
The stress on military preparedness and military values thatled to the creation of the Wild Tiger Corps was also evident
in many other aspects of King Vajiravudh’s national policy and
nationalistic program. The justification for this stress was Vaji-
ravudh’s oft-repeated assertion that Siamese freedom was in
real danger.
Was it? With the advantage of hindsight it is tempting to say
no. For no new demands for Siamese territory or other conces-
sions were made by the powers during Vajiravudh’s reign. But
from the perspective of 1910, it was by no means clear that new
demands might not be forthcoming at any time. A loss of ter-
ritory, after all, had occurred just the year before Vajiravudh
came to the throne; another, two years before that; yet another,
three years before that—and so back through the nineteenth
century. The new king who came to the throne in 1910 had no
reason at all to assume that the 1909 loss was to be the last.
Nor were foreigners very sanguine about Siam’s chances for
survival. One writer saw for Siam the inevitable doom of the
“small and feeble” nation that formed “a barrier between two
portions of a powerful and aggressive empire.”1 He added that
82
Siam “occupies the uncomfortable and precarious position of a
fat walnut clinched firmly between the jaws of a nut-cracker, the
jaws being formed by British Burmah and French Indo-china.
And for the past thirty years those jaws have been slowly but re-
morselessly closing.”2 Prince William of Sweden, although more
hopeful, still found it “difficult to say” what “the future destiny
of the country may be.”3 An American educator termed Siam’s
liberty “precarious, unquiet, and charged with responsibility.”4
And, representing at least one official view, the Russian min-
ister to Siam claimed, in a private letter to his foreign minister,
that the British in the 1910s had said “quite openly that the
fate of Siam was predestined, that sooner or later this country
would be either a British colony or it would be divided between
England and France.”5
Even as late as the years following World War I, rumors
periodically cropped up that the British were about to make
new territorial demands of Siam in the Malay Peninsula;6 such
rumors were undoubtedly responsible for the advice given the
King in 1919 by his minister to France that Vajiravudh should
not proceed with plans to visit Europe. Such a visit, said the
minister,
may be made a lever to obtain some advantage from us. This
danger is very persistent in my mind, for there has already been
a precedent in the case of His late Majesty. On the eve of his
departure a demand was made to Him for the secret treaty in
the Malay Peninsula. I have a feeling that only an opportunity is
sought to present the same demand again.7
A missionary concluded in 1923: “The encroachments of foreign
nations make it uncertain how long there will be an independent
Siam.”8
Not all observers were as gloomy as these about Siam’s
future. But no wise monarch would ever take only the most en-
couraging prophecies of his country’s future as his guide.
Within government circles in Bangkok, the dangers to the
country’s independence seemed manifold. It was apparent that
some British colonials in Malaya were not satisfied with the
borders that had been established in 1909; one pamphlet pub-
lished privately in 1923, for example, pleaded passionately for
the British to take over Pattani.9 Although there is no evidence
of official British interest in further border rectifications, King
Vajiravudh was aware of the attractiveness of his remote
southern provinces and made several journeys to the South
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to let his Muslim and Malay-speaking subjects see him and to
demonstrate to them that he was their king too. He wrote that
the southern provinces were beautiful, were underpopulated,
and had much untapped wealth, and he encouraged Thai of the
Bangkok area to invest in the South. For, he pointed out, things
of value could not be kept secret long, and the South, if not ex-
ploited by the Thai, would be taken over “by other people” who
would recognize its value.10
Fear of French acquisitiveness was particularly strong. The
vituperative comments by French colonialists about Siam
before Vajiravudh came to the throne are too numerous to
quote. One will suffice, that of a French columnist who was
quoted in the Bangkok Times of February 24, 1904, as saying:
Carthago delende est—for the honour, for the prestige, for the
peace of France and of French Indochina, Siam must be de-
stroyed, it being impossible for her to play an imperial role at the
same time as ourselves. Inevitably the day will come when this
people—brigands, robbers of men and holders of slaves—will tire
the patience of the English as well as our own.
No doubt this remark (as well as other similar ones) was read
by the 23-year-old Prince Vajiravudh. Although the treaty of
1907 labeled the Thai cession of three provinces to French Cam-
bodia at that time as the “final settlement” of all border ques-
tions,11 history had shown the inadvisability of absolute reliance
on treaty verbiage. The caution with which the Thai approached
the economic development of their own northeastern provinces
was undoubtedly in part a result of fear of French reactions.
A railroad line built into the Northeast would, it was clear,
prove a boon to this perennially impoverished region, and it
was repeatedly favored by Thai officials. But, in addition to the
problem of financing such an enterprise, the view prevailed that
building a railroad would “stir into activity certain political ele-
ments in France and Indo-China which are now dormant.”12 One
French reporter even ventured the view that the Thai would
not spend any money “developing territory that to-morrow may
cease to be Siamese”; he said that “dread of a French occu-
pation of the right bank of the Mekong” and of the valley of the
Mun River would prevent the Thai from building any railroads in
the area “for fear of France taking possession of those lines on
short notice.”13 Stories continually reached Bangkok of French
intentions of building a road or railway opening up French
Laos and Siam’s adjacent northeastern provinces to French eco-
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nomic penetration; the existing pattern of trade of this region,
flowing westward, was obviously a matter of some annoyance to
the French.14 The Thai kept close watch on the Northeast, and
reports that Northeasterners resented the French and loved the
Thai, that the French were having continual trouble with da-
coits and were barely able to govern their Lao territories,15 un-
doubtedly heartened the Thai. The policy with regard to the
problems of the French in their territory, however, was not to
interfere and in fact to aid the French by refusing to allow anti-
French political activists to enter Siam and deporting any who
managed to skip over the border.16
Another source of worry with respect to Westerners was
the Western community in Siam itself. There was continual ri-
valry among the Western diplomats; each contended for special
influence, particularly by trying to manipulate the system of
foreign advisers to his country’s advantage. In this situation,
the Siamese government attempted to play the role of special
friend to all. It was not an easy role to play because of “the
rabid competition between foreigners in outbidding one another
whenever there is anything to be obtained,”17 The prizes most
bitterly competed for were posts in the ranks of foreign ad-
visers. The system of appointing foreign advisers to the various
ministries and departments had started during the reign of
King Chulalongkorn as a temporary expedient to forward the
work of governmental modernization until such time as suffi-
cient numbers of Thai could be trained to manage government
affairs on modern lines.18 Foreign governments were aware of
the leverage gained by having their own nationals in the ranks
of the Siamese government service; a rough index of a foreign
government’s political influence was the number of posts that
the government had been able to win for its nationals. From the
start, Britain had the largest group of advisers and technical
experts. The Thai, however, attempted to keep some balance
by apportioning the key advisory posts among several foreign
nationals: that for finance to a Briton, justice to a Frenchman,
foreign affairs to an American.
Whenever an advisory post became vacant, the scramble
for preference began. No prize was beneath contempt. In
1910–1911 there was a long series of exchanges between the
British minister and Siamese government officials over the
Siamese intention of appointing a Dane rather than a Briton
in the Royal Survey Department. The British, stating that they
were reluctant to conclude that the Siamese “desire to put a
slight on His Majesty’s Government,” asked that the Siamese
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government “consult” with the British before taking a step
“which seriously affects the interests of His Majesty’s Gov-
ernment in Siam.” British pressure in this instance was par-
ticularly heavy-handed, and the Siamese government let it be
known that it “did not feel itself obliged to consult another
Government about its employment of officials.” After several
months’ delay, the Danish appointment was made.19 A similar
pressure was put on the Thai by the French in 1917 to appoint
Frenchmen to managerial posts vacated by Germans in the
Siam Commercial Bank. The French minister stated that he
would regard such appointments as “testimony of confi-
dence.”20 French persistence in this matter brought the affair to
the attention of the King, who in a long letter to the French min-
ister pointed out that, although he was anxious to accommodate
the minister, other appointments had already been made and
that for the King to revoke them now would be “awkward,”
would lay the King “open to serious criticism of arbitrariness, an
accusation which even I cannot afford to ignore.”21 The French
minister had charged the Thai with giving preference to the
British and had implied that His Majesty was strongly influ-
enced by the British minister. The King went to some lengths
to point out that the British minister and he never met private-
ly, but that the British minister sometimes wrote the King “to
present his own personal views in certain matters”; he invited
the French minister to do likewise.22 The Siamese government
in general maintained its essential freedom in appointment of
foreign advisers; it realized that yielding too readily to foreign
pressures would be even more dangerous than never yielding
at all. In response to German pressures in 1911 for more power
than their Thai counterparts in one enterprise, the King advised
his officials that
we cannot forget that the government is a Thai government, we
are Thai, I am a Thai king who, if I were to use my power to op-
press my own Thai people for the benefit of foreigners, would be
going too far. If I did so even once it would not be long before
respect and trust of the government would come to an end and
I would be unable to do anything in the future. It would be like
putting a rope around my own neck.23
There are indications that the influence of foreign advisers
diminished during Vajiravudh’s reign. For example, the new ap-
pointee to the post of “General Adviser” in 1916 was demoted
to the rank of “Adviser in Foreign Affairs.” The King made his
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reason clear. In a private letter he explained that, since the new
appointee was “not only my junior in age, but also in education
and experience, I could not see why I should have adopted
him as my mentor in all affairs.”24 By the end of the reign one
foreign adviser wrote that in the last few years foreign advisers
had been eliminated from positions of actual control of gov-
ernment affairs; he accounted for this trend by the growth of
Thai expertise, courage, and ambition.25
Thai suspicions and fears of foreign diplomats were not
occasioned only by disputes over foreign advisory posts. For-
eigners in general were not trusted. The background of the
French minister to Siam as a colonial administrator in Indochina
was resented, and this resentment was not kept secret. In a
letter to the King, the Thai minister in Paris wrote that the
French Foreign Office knew “very well our objection to men of
such experience.”26 The recall of the French minister in 1918
under a cloud was a matter for considerable royal rejoicing.27
There were even suspicions that foreign legations were not
above meddling in local affairs. Here again the French seem
to have been most suspect. For example, when the head of a
Chinese secret society which was rumored to be planning a
revolt against the government was elevated to be headman of
those Chinese who were French subjects, Prince Chakrabongs
wondered whether the French did not favor “these arrange-
ments” because they knew the Siamese were gaining in
strength and so favored “some disorder to cut-down our
strength.”28 In 1912 the French urged that a Chinese labeled
an “undesirable alien” by the Thai be allowed to return to Siam.
The Siamese Minister of Foreign Affairs confided to the General
Adviser: “I cannot help thinking that it must be with a sinister
purpose if the French Government will insist upon the return of
this man to Siam.”29 The French did insist, and the government
yielded.
All in all, it is impossible at this point to tell how real
the threats to Siamese independence were during the reign of
King Vajiravudh. Certainly there were danger signs, especially
during the earliest years of the reign. And, whatever the re-
alities may have been, whether or not any designs on Siam’s
future were actually being drawn in Paris, London, Berlin, or
even Tokyo, the Siamese felt they could not be complacent.30
Complacency with regard to outside threats had indeed
never been the keynote of Thai foreign policy. From the early
nineteenth century on, the Siamese government had been par-
ticularly sensitive to the realities of growing Western power.
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The concessionistic foreign policy pursued by Kings Mongkut
and Chulalongkorn originated out of their appreciation of
Western power. And the vast program of reform and modern-
ization of government conducted by King Chulalongkorn was
meant to strengthen Siam internally so that it would be better
able to meet outside threats.
Part of King Chulalongkorn’s program of internal reform had
been to build Thai military might. Even before a Ministry of War
was organized, Western drilling techniques, uniforms, and ar-
maments had been adopted. The organization of the military
administration—a complicated task because the traditional ad-
ministration drew no sharp lines between military and civil af-
fairs—occupied much of Chulalongkorn’s attention. By 1892,
however, a Ministry of War had been created, and in 1894 the
first conscription law was passed, a law that laid the founda-
tions for a modern military force.
A mark of the great importance Chulalongkorn attached to
the military is the fact that over half of all the sons he sent
abroad to study were required to receive military training.31
And these sons, on their return home, were in a very short
time awarded the premier positions in the armed forces. For
example, by 1910 Prince Chira had become Commander in
Chief of the Army; Prince Paribatra, Commander in Chief of
the Navy; Prince Abhakara, Deputy Commander in Chief of the
Navy; Prince Chakrabongs, Army Chief of Staff; and Prince Pu-
rachatra, Inspector General of Army Engineers.
This policy of adding to the real strength of the military was
continued by Vajiravudh. One of the King’s earliest acts was to
further the work of his father in streamlining the military es-
tablishment by combining all army leadership posts under the
Minister of War and separating out the navy under a newly
created Ministry of Marine.32 The favor to be awarded the mil-
itary forces was also shown at the coronation celebrations. One
whole day was given over to military programs. Some 30,000
troops participated, the largest force ever assembled in the
capital.33 Practical measures for improving military strength
were taken throughout the reign, following much the same
pattern as that established by King Chulalongkorn. Ships were
bought for the navy. Army maneuvers were held annually—and
usually attended by the King. New weapons were bought even
when these led to budget overruns.34 Vajiravudh gave every
sign that he intended to make sure that Siam would stay abreast
of modern military developments.
Chaiyo!
88
The establishment of an army aviation corps was one out-
standing example of royal emphasis on military modernity. In
1912, three Thai officers were sent to a French flying school.
By the end of 1913 the three had received their flying certifi-
cates and returned to Siam. Airplanes were bought. An army
airport was started at Don Muang. And new pilots were trained.
Aerial displays were given for the benefit, and delight, of the
King, the princes, and the people.35 After watching the first
such display, Vajiravudh in his diary entry for January 13, 1914,
drew a broad conclusion: “I am delighted that we Thai are not
bested by the Westerner; truly we can do whatever they can
do.”36 By 1920 Siam had over 100 pilots, airmail service had
begun, and the airport at Don Muang was called “one of the
finest aviation camps in the world.”37 The French in Indochina
and the Australians both commented on their “humiliation” be-
cause of the leadership of “a little country like Siam” in the avi-
ation field.38 Aviation seems to have caught the Thai public’s
imagination as it had caught the interest very early of Prince
Chakrabongs, the Army Chief of Staff. Although no national
drive for public financial support was ever officially launched,
voluntary contributions continually poured in to the Ministry of
War for the purchase of new planes. Interest seemed heaviest,
logically enough, in the more remote provinces, and the army
paid tribute to this interest by naming new planes for provinces
which had subscribed money.39 An American pilot who stopped
in Siam on a round-the-world flight in 1920, on his return to
New York talked first about Siam and remarked that “Siam
is leading most of the countries of the world in aeronautical
development.”40
Still another demonstration of Vajiravudh’s attention to the
practical strengthening of the military is a volume he wrote on
trench warfare in 1916, obviously in response to the trench war
then being waged on the Western front in Europe.41 In addition,
the King wrote countless articles on various aspects of warfare
by land, sea, and air.
There is no doubt that Vajiravudh believed in military power.
Perhaps his clearest statement in this regard is preserved in the
lines of one of his plays:
Those with power usually get what they want.
A fist is justice; the larger the better.
The small-fisted must stoop and crawl,
Waiting in doubt and fear, not daring to rise.
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What the powerful say is never wrong,
Or, even if wrong, the fist makes it right.
Even children contradict the small fist that cannot prevail;
It needs the loan of a big fist to put things right.42
Yet the King was fully aware that it would be impossible for
Siam to build the sort of power that could stand against a de-
termined European enemy. His thought was to build as strong a
force and as independent a force as the country could afford in
order to act as a deterrent to foreign cupidity. In a government
liberally sprinkled with foreign advisers in virtually all depart-
ments, the King was proud that Siamese policy with regard to
the army and navy had “always been to run them ourselves as
much as possible.”43 Although the military was one of the first
branches of government to use Western expertise, it was, for
reasons of pride and security, the first to abandon reliance on
Westerners.
Vajiravudh was firmly convinced that Siam must build its
own independent force and rely on its own military strength; it
must not rely for its defenses on the expressed good intentions
of any other state. In an essay published early in the reign, he
summarized his position succinctly:
Every small nation must place its trust equally in its courage and
its utmost efforts for its own people. Trusting or hoping for help
from others is the best guarantee of failure …. Thailand must find
its strength in its own Thai people. Thai weapons must protect
Thai borders. And if the Thai nation hopes to survive, it must rely
on its own strength and on the true patriotic feelings of those who
are truly Thai.44
NATIONALISTIC MILITARISM
There was a crucial difference between the military outlook
of King Vajiravudh and that of his predecessors, and that dif-
ference is revealed in the above quotation. The difference is Va-
jiravudh’s view of the military as a means for building national
esprit, for welding together a unified and patriotic people, for
creating a symbol of national pride.
One target of the King’s program of militaristic nationalism,
or nationalistic militarism, was the military itself. The same
kinds of appeals the King made to the Wild Tigers he made to
the military; in fact, the “Wild Tiger spirit,” the spirit of self-sac-
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rifice for love of country, the spirit the King hoped would an-
imate the whole of the Thai nation, was, he said, essentially a
warrior spirit that should find its purest expression in the sol-
dierly ranks. In a speech on the responsibilities of the people
to the nation, Vajiravudh pointed out that it was the particular
responsibility of young men to serve in the armed forces and
do the essential job of defending the country. It was impossible,
he said, for a society to operate with each individual defending
himself from internal and external dangers. The society needed
armed forces, police, and gendarmerie in order to ensure peace
and make it possible for people to pursue their livelihoods. And
these protective agencies needed to be staffed by young men,
men who were both strong in their youth and still free from
family responsibilities. This obligation of all young men was
a kind of “expression of gratitude to their elders.”45 And the
“elders” in the society, the parents of the young men, should
help instill in their offspring soldierly values, the desire to serve
the nation as fighters for its freedom. Parents should willingly
sacrifice their personal comfort by urging their sons to
serve—for the welfare both of the sons and of the nation. To
encourage or aid a son to avoid military service was not an
expression of love, for it denied the son the good training he
would receive and it encouraged the son to spend his time in
wasteful ways. Vajiravudh told the parents that boys naturally
“like being soldiers”; it should not be difficult for parents to abet
that natural inclination.46
In speeches to the military forces, the King consistently
placed himself in their ranks as a fellow soldier and friend.
All deserved the special honor and respect that devolved on
Thai men who defended their ancestral bequest of freedom. And
this honor was shared equally by officers, noncommissioned of-
ficers, and foot soldiers. On the occasion of presenting to an
army troop a “flag of victory” similar to those he gave Wild Tiger
units, the King stated that his gift was “proof that my heart,
that of your general, is with every one of you soldiers, every day,
every hour, both at midday and at midnight.”47
Among the many patriotic songs, poems, and plays written
by the King, several are meant particularly to inspire the
soldier. In a play written in 1912 appear the lines:
When you are about to die, don’t deplore the life you are losing;
Think only that you are giving your life for your country.48
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In a later play occurs the thought: “Dying on the field of battle
is the most splendid way of all for men to die.”49 In still another
play appear in Thai translation the well-known lines of
Macaulay:
How can man die better
Than facing fearful odds,
For the ashes of his fathers
And the temples of his gods?50
And in a poem extolling bravery in battle one stanza reads:
When the hour of death draws nigh,
Show you are men of a brave race.
Man leaves but a trace in history,
So valiantly face your foe to die.51
The kind of esprit he hoped to build in the armed forces
would, the King felt, make a vital difference in Thai military ef-
fectiveness. Two illustrations used by the King make his point.
One, developed in a speech of January 28, 1914, before an au-
dience of soldiers and Wild Tigers, told the story of a ruler of
Afghanistan who was planning a war against the British. The
ruler was informed that British soldiers were of low class and
were unpopular in India. The British viceroy in India, hearing
of the war plans, invited the Afghan and his army of 8,000 men
to see a review of British troops. The ruler came and spent
a week—a restless week, for he did not trust the loyalty of
his men. All the British, however, slept well, and they paraded
smartly and put on a fine martial show. The Afghan ruler was
astonished at British efficiency and asked the viceroy how he
managed to shape a randomly chosen rabble into a cohesive
body of loyal fighting men, a feat he could not match even by
handpicking his army. The viceroy asked his guest what Afghan
soldiers fought for. He was told they fought for rewards, men to
enslave, and booty. “That is my answer,” said the viceroy, for, in
contrast to these selfish goals, each British soldier “thinks only
of the honour of his company, each company is for the regiment,
each regiment for the army, and the army is for the Sovereign.
Thus everybody’s ideal becomes one … every man is imbued
with the same desire to uphold the power and dignity of his
Sovereign.” The Afghan ruler saluted his host and avowed that
“nothing in the world can contend” against men so dedicated.52
Having told his story, Vajiravudh pointed to the obvious moral
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that the spirit of patriotism that animated the British, and that
had saved Siam in its perilous moments in past history, would
also save Siam in the future. A second illustration used by Va-
jiravudh to show the real military strength of patriotism and
loyalty was drawn from the modern history of Japan. Japan’s
victory in the Russo-Japanese War, truly a David-versus-Goliath
battle, came about chiefly, said Vajiravudh, because the Russian
soldier did not know what he was fighting for.53 The spirit of the
Japanese soldier, on the other hand, had been raised to fever
pitch. It was the fusing of the ancient martial values of bushido
with the modern military techniques of the West, both brought
into service in the single cause of the emperor, that had pro-
duced the “extraordinary signs of loyalty and patriotism” that
had made Japan’s record in two modern wars the cause of “a
great deal of wonder and admiration.”54 Again the moral was
clear: a little state whose soldiers were united and fearless had
little to fear.
To illustrate his point that a little state could indeed defend
itself, Vajiravudh in one speech drew a parallel between men
and ants:
If you see an anthill, although you are much larger than the hill,
do you go trample on it? It doesn’t take much thought for you to
decide that you dare not. You get a stick to destroy it or burn it.
You find a hoe or a spade to dig it out. Perhaps the ants will move
away before you do anything. I’m not suggesting here that you go
fight giants. I ask you only to put yourselves in the position of the
ant whose nest is about to be stamped on by an enemy. If such an
enemy comes to bother us we can give him some nasty bites.55
Among the practical steps taken by Vajiravudh to enhance
morale in the armed forces were revisions of the law on con-
scription. The Military Service Law in effect when Vajiravudh
came to the throne had been enacted in 1905. Under its provi-
sions all men between the ages of eighteen and forty were liable
to two years of compulsory service. By 1910 the law had re-
ceived much criticism because there were various loopholes in
it that made it possible for many men, especially those of the
upper classes, to avoid service. Prince Chakrabongs commented
that, because of the loopholes, “the army could only get men
who could do absolutely nothing, and who had no pretensions
as to their capability of doing anything.”56
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A series of steps was taken from 1910 to 1917 to reduce
the number of exempt categories. First, students in secondary
schools who were over the age of eighteen were made liable
to conscription.57 Second, the exemption of government em-
ployees was ended.58 The final step eliminated all other exempt
categories except those of the medically unfit, monks with ec-
clesiastical rank, and hill tribesmen.59 The “escape” categories
that had been available particularly to the wealthy and elite
classes were deliberately removed in a campaign to make mil-
itary service more democratic, to reduce the stigma that had
become attached to military service, to stem the flood of young
men into minor clerical positions in the government in order to
avoid service—in short, to “bring home to every one that the
life of a private is an honourable calling.”60 This last point was
made often, for the government realized that until the principle
was accepted that “there is nothing dreadful in the sons of gen-
tlemen serving in the ranks”61 Siam was not likely to get a pa-
triotic army in which every young man would be willing to serve
“in order to defend his Fatherland in time of stress.”62
But the King’s message of military values went far beyond
the military itself—and even beyond the Wild Tigers and Boy
Scouts. It went to the nation at large. The values of discipline,
loyalty, and unity inculcated in the army, navy, police, Wild
Tiger Corps, and Boy Scouts were, in the King’s view, necessary
values for the total population. And the rallying cry of defense
for the nation’s freedom was one that he wanted to be picked up
not just by the thousands in uniform but by the millions in the
towns and fields.
The theme of the need for every man to defend the nation
was developed by the King in countless essays, speeches,
poems, and plays. In an essay of 1911, typical of many striking
the same note, Vajiravudh started by pointing to the great Thai
inheritance bequeathed by Thai warrior heroes of the past. We
are glad, said the King, to have been born of a race so brave,
whose men—and women—loved their king, nation, and religion
so much that they were not afraid of dying to maintain Thai
freedom. “We who have received such an inheritance, can we
let this inheritance be destroyed?” Are Thai today to be the prof-
ligate sons of hard-working fathers? No, we cannot waste what
our ancestors worked so hard to give us. At this point in the
essay the King began to use a rhetorical device that he turned
to very often; he used the word “Thai” in its two meanings, one
referring to the race or nation, the other meaning free:63 “We
were born in the Thai race, we were born free [Thai], we must
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die free [Thai]; if we become slaves, we will no longer be Thai
[free].” So the Thai today must face up to whatever dangers may
come to the country. Whoever is not willing to sacrifice his life
for the country, said the King, “let him give up being a Thai, let
him not call himself a Thai and so shame his fellow countrymen.
Anyone who is not completely willing to sacrifice his life to pre-
serve his king, his country, and his religion should abandon his
motherland and go live alone, for he loves himself more than his
nation.”64
Typical of the King’s poems dealing with this theme is the
following, which was composed by Vajiravudh while he was
still Crown Prince and was sung on many occasions during the
reign:
Free-born men
Let us not forget our race and our faith;
Let us not have been born in vain
Of a free nation.
How could a man who respects himself
Remain idle?
Each one ought to work,
That all may be ready!
In a country without love and union
The best work cannot bear fruit;
And if a nation is breaking up and near its ruin,
How can the private individual hope for prosperity?
If foreigners should rule over us,
We should be slain and ill-treated;
They would oppress us from morning till night,
As is the way of conquerors.
Do not imagine that they would respect our position and name,
Or that they would consider our birth;
We ourselves should suffer
And be put to shame before the rest of the world.
Therefore, comrades, may we be loyal to the King
And true to our country and our faith:
May we offer our lives without regret
That the freedom of “the Free” be not lost!
Let us stand united,
And certain victory is ours!
Let us be brave and firmly determined
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To protect our liberty till heaven and earth pass away!65
The civilian no less than the soldier, said Vajiravudh, must be
willing to defend the nation. For, he asked in a speech, are not
civilians also Thai? “What language do civilians speak so that
they need not perform the duty of defending their nation and
their land? Even wild animals know how to protect their nests
and lairs. If we do not defend our homeland, are we not worse
than they?”66 And in another speech the King stated: “If we love
the nation, we must protect the nation.” If the Thai lose their
freedom, there will no longer be a Thai race. Whatever the cost
in lives to preserve freedom, that cost must be paid. For the sur-
vivors in a free Thai state, no matter how few, will be Thai and
the Thai race will go on. But if the nation is destroyed, it will
not matter how many people live. In effect they will be dead, for
they will no longer be Thai; “wherever they go they will be sor-
rowing like fatherless children.”67
The theme of total national commitment to defense is also
an important element in several of the King’s plays. It is central
to the plot of one play, whose title in English would be The Soul
of a Warrior. The play concerns an older man who has little re-
spect for the military or military values. Siam is invaded, and
the hero discovers the values of self-defense. In a speech after
his enlightenment, he tells his daughter:
In times to come when you have children at breast, teach them
never to abandon their race, teach them to be willing to sacrifice
their lives rather than abandon their leaders, teach them to be
steadfast in love of our king. Have them love our country and hold
firmly to Buddhism, more willing to die than to be lacking in any
of these duties.68
BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR I; SIAMESE
NEUTRALITY
Just four years after King Vajiravudh mounted the throne, World
War I broke out in Europe. The rumblings of war, of course,
had been heard much earlier. The growing political and eco-
nomic rivalries of the major European powers, the fierce com-
petition that had been so manifest in the imperial contests for
power throughout the “unclaimed” world in the late nineteenth
century, had come more and more to focus on the gray zones of
political claims on the European continent itself. This narrowing
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of the target, which had started some time before Vajiravudh
became king, had, indeed, helped save Siam. World War I was,
then, seen by the Thai as a breathing space in time, a respite, a
new and probably brief chance to accrue strength and rally the
people before the day of peace in Europe, which, by all logic,
would coincide with the day of resumption of power plays in the
weak world outside. Vajiravudh summed up this feeling dramat-
ically in a speech to the Wild Tiger Corps:
Foreigners already have their eyes on our rich country. Even if
they do not grab our land but only send off many of their people
to live here, to eat our food, to suck our blood, what do we do?
Let them come and then prepare ourselves? But then there would
be no time to prepare! We must be prepared before they come.
We must be prepared before anyone makes plans to come. We’ve
talked about it, so now let’s truly prepare. We must prepare now
while they are fighting and have no time to think of us. We must
be prepared! The time is now.69
World War I presented Siam with a whole new range of
policy options and propaganda opportunities. And Vajiravudh
was determined to make the best use of such options and op-
portunities. On the policy level he was determined that Siam
should follow a course that would yield the greatest advantages
in terms of international standing. On the propaganda level he
was stimulated to use the war to lead his people further along
the path toward the nationalism that he had already charted as
his primary goal.
The first order of business as declarations of war multiplied
with each new day in early August 1914 was for Siam to clarify
its international position. This was done on August 6 with a
royal proclamation for the observance of “a strict and impartial
neutrality.”70 This policy was in full accord with the King’s
private views.71 Neutrality, indeed, was the only course possible
for Siam at the time. The King and his highest officials were
thoroughly acquainted with affairs in Europe, with the political
and economic rivalries that had led to the outbreak of war,
with the delicate balance of power in Europe that made guesses
as to the final outcome extremely difficult. The profundity of
Siam’s knowledge is well illustrated by a series of talks given
to the Wild Tigers by Čhaophraya Yommarat in August, Sep-
tember, and November of 1914.72 Chaophraya Yommarat de-
scribed in great detail the history of German unification under
Bismarck, the Franco-Prussian War, the growing alliance be-
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tween France and Russia, the German advances in military and
economic strength, the British concerns over German naval and
economic competition, the involvement of whole populations in
xenophobic nationalism. He spoke realistically about the impos-
sibility of determining who the eventual victor would be, espe-
cially since Siam had to rely on English and French sources for
news. Again he was the realist when he pointed out that inter-
national law was not like national law in that there was no su-
pernational court of justice; justice was whatever the strongest
power determined it should be. At least some of these com-
ments were made in the presence of the King. All of these views
were undoubtedly shared by the King, and the King may even
have “suggested” beforehand the topics his minister should
speak on. The King himself, however, said little about the war,
at least not publicly or in his own name.
For Vajiravudh, a keen student of international law himself,
was determined to observe the strictures of neutrality with the
utmost circumspection. In a speech to the Wild Tigers on August
9, he set forth his concept of neutrality—“neither rejoicing nor
sorrowing on account of the victory or defeat of one side or the
other”—and the proper behavior of a neutral: “… it is best for
us Siamese not to speak too much. With regard to the war, the
more words spoken, the greater the difficulty to recall them;
if less were spoken, less would remain to be recalled, while if
none were spoken at all, that would be the easiest of all.”73
And the King followed his own advice scrupulously. The King’s
public pronouncements on the war were meager indeed. In his
annual addresses of 1915, 1916, and 1917 Vajiravudh spoke of
the war only in terms of Siam’s impeccable neutrality; even the
speech of 1917—the year that Siam entered the war—contained
only the laconic remark “It gives Me much satisfaction to state
that the friendly relations between the Kingdom of Siam and
all Foreign Powers continue to be cordial and firmly main-
tained.”74 And one of Vajiravudh’s first acts after the war broke
out was to compel all Siamese princes in military training in Eu-
ropean states to resign their foreign commissions “in order to
prevent any possible breach of neutrality on the part of Siam.”75
High princes and officials in Bangkok of varying political biases
continued, apparently, to attend parties and affairs given by
the German community,76 as well as by nationals of the Allied
Powers, with the King’s approval. And each new declaration of
war by a major power, including that by the United States on
April 6, 1917, was followed by a new Siamese declaration of
neutrality.77
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Yet the formal course of neutrality Siam pursued did not
mean that the war was ignored or that Siam was not constantly
reevaluating its policies. The war, rather, was used as justi-
fication for a new nationalistic campaign, and the policy of
neutrality itself was eventually abandoned, after adequate unof-
ficial preparation by the King, when events in Europe seemed to
show that neutrality was no longer advantageous for Siam.
The direction the new propaganda campaign was to take
was indicated in a speech by the King on August 9, 1914,
in which he urged Wild Tigers and soldiers “to learn a good
lesson from this war, and profit by its examples.” The lesson
was not how to fight, but how to unite to meet the common
peril. In England, France, Russia, and Germany internal faction-
alism had come to an end as parties and classes submerged
their differences in order to fight their common enemy. The King
asked his listeners if they would “be ready to drop all personal
quarrels in order to turn and face our common foe together.”78
Obviously, to Vajiravudh the war gave new meaning and ur-
gency to his nationalistic messages.
All the familiar programs of the years before 1914 were
maintained in 1915, 1916, and 1917. Wild Tiger speeches, drills,
and maneuvers continued. Military exercises continued. In
some cases old efforts were intensified; for example, the army
in 1916 for the first time called up reserves to take part in the
war games.79
CREATION OF THE ROYAL NAVY LEAGUE
In late 1914 one new campaign was started that became the
King’s prime interest, the beneficiary of countless writings and
organizational efforts; it was given attention comparable only to
the attention the Wild Tiger Corps had received in its earliest
years. This new pet project of the King was the national sub-
scription of money from the general public to buy the Thai navy
a new warship, a light cruiser, to be called Phra Ruang after the
legendary heroic founder of Thai independence.80 In support
of this project the King wrote two plays, countless essays, and
several poems on the importance of navies, on naval warfare,
and on the importance of making contributions to Siam’s de-
fense;81 he sponsored or encouraged various benefits, including
some twenty-six theater performances, to raise money for the
cruiser fund; and he gave lavishly out of the privy purse to swell
the coffers of contributions.
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Appeal for Contributions to Cruiser Fund (Adver-
tisement in Dusit samit). The drawing is by the King;
the text was originally in Thai.
The campaign for the cruiser fund started in late October,
less than three months after the war began in Europe. Pre-
sumably it originated with a group of officials who, seeing
Siam’s weakness by sea, decided that Siam needed a new
warship to protect its coasts and river banks. Recognizing that
the government could not afford to buy such a vessel the offi-
cials decided to lead a drive to enlist funds from the general
public. The officials presented their plan to the King, who ac-
cepted it, named the sponsoring group the Royal Navy League
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of Siam, consented to be the patron of the league, and gave
the name Phra Ruang to the vessel to be obtained.82 In fact,
however, the cruiser fund idea was the King’s from the very
start; the official story that the idea originated with a group
of government servants was undoubtedly put forth to avoid
the awkwardness of having His Majesty initiate a drive to give
himself a warship.83
Without doubt the King believed in the military benefits of
the campaign he launched. In his view the Siamese army was
well advanced; the navy, however, was still relatively weak. Al-
though an enemy invader could be met by land forces, an in-
vader by sea would find Siam vulnerable. Vajiravudh likened
Siam’s defenses to a wall that was complete on only three sides,
leaving the country wide open on the fourth. A householder
who built a fence to keep out wild animals and robbers could
hardly feel secure with fences on only three sides of his home;
similarly, Siam could not be secure so long as its defenses by
sea remained inadequate.84 The King summed up these ideas in
several poems. One of these poems was printed in the second
issue of a journal entitled Samutthasan published by the Navy
League; it reads:
Come let us help, without delay,
To rouse popular enthusiasm
For the Navy League and invite
Thai everywhere to build the barrier to protect Siam.
……………………………
On land we have soldiers ready to fight the invaders;
The glorious Wild Tigers wait to help in the fighting.
The gap that remains in our defense is by sea.
We lack the ships and power to protect us.
To ignore this is like leaving an open door.
If the enemy bursts in, how can we contend?
Don’t be indifferent; we urge you to be concerned.
To be unconcerned too long will lead to great difficulties.
The enemy can attack and set our homes on fire,
Reducing our homes to ashes and scattering our goods.
Our families will be lost, our positions ruined.
Those remaining will be shamed and will prefer death to lost honor.
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Wake up! We are born Thai [free]; let us not lose the chance
To help our Navy gain the strength to defend our country.85
The equation of national power and naval strength was, in
Vajiravudh’s view, demonstrated conclusively by Britain: “Any
nation that has a navy it can send to battle on the sea has
the power to protect its race, religion, and king.”86 The King
assiduously studied naval matters, naval strategy, and naval
vessels and came to the conclusion that a light cruiser, with a
draft shallow enough to cross the sand bar at the mouth of the
Čhaophraya River, would best suit the Siamese navy’s needs.87
The vessel he had in mind should be fast, capable of outma-
neuvering larger, more powerfully armed vessels. The German
ship Emden and its dramatic career early in the war much im-
pressed the King.88 Even one vessel, as the Emden had proved,
could be enormously valuable. A cruiser patrolling the waters
of the Gulf of Siam would be able to gain intelligence on naval
movements in the gulf and could be a respectable adversary in
fighting quick campaigns.
Far more important than the military benefits of the cruiser
campaign, however, were the benefits to be expected from the
campaign itself in stirring Thai nationalism. Stimulating Thai
nationalism was clearly the primary objective, for the King cer-
tainly would have been able, if he had thought the need pressing
enough, to purchase a naval vessel out of government funds.
In his birthday speech of January 1, 1915, Vajiravudh spoke of
the subscription drive as “an evidence that the Siamese people
are determined, like their ancestors, to show their affection and
loyalty to their Sovereign, to preserve the independence of the
nation, and to uphold our Holy Religion.”89 In its editorial com-
ments on this speech, the Bangkok Times perceived the King’s
intent, that the “actual object” of the cruiser fund campaign was
“after all a small thing compared with the spirit that animates
the movement, the spirit of sacrifice for national security, which
marks the growth of national consciousness.”90
To achieve the kind of national consciousness he desired,
it was necessary that everyone give, that the gift be voluntary,
that the gift represent an outpouring of the hearts of true Thai
for the welfare of their country. And it was in such terms that
the King and his officials spoke of the cruiser fund. The remarks
made in a speech by the High Commissioner of Phuket were
much to the point:
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His Majesty could easily have raised the money by taxation or oth-
erwise, but it is better for it [the cruiser] to be bought by vol-
untary subscriptions. So all must help, women as well as men, for
they are the chief sufferers in case of war. If we pay for it we shall
have an interest in it, and more regard for our country. Why do
we love our children? Because of what they have cost us.91
To bring the costs, and so the love, to all, the campaign was
extended into the provinces, and officials high and low were
urged to give speeches to promote public understanding and
rally public support. In a report on the successes of the High
Commissioner of Nakhο̨n Sawan, the generosity of a boatman,
a blind man, and a farm wife were particularly noted.92 And in
Phuket, particular pride was taken in the large number of con-
tributions from women, which was interpreted as showing the
truly voluntary nature of the donations, and in the success of
the campaign in reaching Chinese coolies in the tin mines. The
coolies were addressed in the Chinese language by their bosses,
who urged them to make donations to the cruiser fund to show
their gratitude for the many favors the Siamese government had
shown Chinese immigrants. In the speeches to the miners, it
was particularly stressed that the size of the gift was less im-
portant than the act of giving itself; the important thing was
that everyone should give.93 This point was often made; as one
official put it, no gift would so please the King as a ten-satang
(about four cents) contribution to the cruiser fund.94
In his own writings the King on occasion played on the
theme of pride and shame. Writing under the pseudonym Asv-
abahu, the King said that he had been asked if he would make
a contribution; there was but one answer for a “true Thai” to
give, and for Asvabahu in particular, well known for his patriotic
writings, “I could look no one in the face if I didn’t contribute.”
Vajiravudh went on to classify Thai who were not moved by the
national appeal as sick, mentally retarded, thickskulled, addle-
brained, doperidden, ignorant, misled, or selfish. Everyone, he
said, could afford to give a little, and little by little the fund
would grow. Everyone could make some small sacrifice for the
nation’s welfare. And in an obvious dig at the Bangkok elite, he
specified: men with many concubines could give up one; men
who ate out often could eat at home for a month; men who
played billiards every night could sacrifice games three nights
a week; men who liked loose women could sleep at home for
a while; those who liked the movies and an after-movie supper
could give these up for a week or two; those who liked fancy
National Survival and Militarism
103
clothes could dress in homespun for a change. Through such
deprivations the drive would succeed and the day would arrive
when the Phra Ruang would steam up the river for all to see.
On that day of fulfillment, those who had given, who would be
part owners of Siam’s pride, would rejoice. And those who had
not given would be filled with shame. In fact, said the King, the
entire prestige of the nation was bound up in the cruiser-fund
campaign. Failure of the campaign would earn the Thai the rep-
utation of giving only lip service to national love, of not being
“civilized” enough to see the benefits of naval defense. So, con-
cluded the King, “we must help each other succeed” and on the
day of success all Thai subscribers would be able to greet “our
ship” with “full hearts and full voices shouting ‘Chaiyo! Chaiyo!
Chaiyo!’”95
This same vein of pride and shame is developed in a play,
Mahatama (The Mahatma), that Vajiravudh wrote specifically to
support the cruiser campaign. The chief character, Son Setthi,
opposes giving contributions to a warship fund. He falls asleep
and, in a dream, learns that the fund drive has failed and
that enemy warships, meeting no opposition, have easily con-
quered the country. An enemy soldier sarcastically praises Son:
“You did a good job in destroying the Thai nation; I thank you
heartily.”96 Near the end of the dream, as the shamed Son is led
out to be shot, he says:
Before I die I want to say one thing. I am sorry I have been the
worst citizen possible. It is not right for me to be called a Thai.
I am not at all sorry to lose my life now, for if I went on living I
couldn’t face anyone. If I have any regrets it is that I won’t get an-
other chance to help my nation. If I had only known that this was
the way it would come out, I would have contributed 5,000 baht
to the warship fund. If I had done that, I would have no regrets
now about dying.97
At the end of the play Son wakes from his dream and gets the
second chance his nightmare denied him.
Other techniques the King used in his cruiser campaign
propaganda were designed to work upon the Thai “natural
traits” of apathy and generosity and the Thai love of fun and a
good show. The apathy or even-temperedness of the Thai, Va-
jiravudh said, made it difficult for them to be readily roused
to action. The Thai people tended to postpone action, to fail
to appreciate urgent needs; they had to be reminded again
and again of their obligations.98 And so the reminders came,
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in lighted street signs, for example, that spelled out “Have you
contributed to the cruiser fund?”99 and in newspaper advertise-
ments that read:
HAVE YOU GIVEN YOUR DONATION YET?
IF NOT,
WHAT ARE YOU WAITING FOR?
WHY DO YOU TARRY?
SIAM HAS NO TIME TO LOSE! 100
As for Thai generosity, the King said simply that the Thai were
not stingy; they had only to be affected and they would give
freely. Their liberal donations to Buddhist temples proved their
unselfishness. The Thai, he said, should see donations to the
cruiser fund as meritorious acts showing unselfish concern for
all Thai citizens, loyalty and gratitude to the sovereign, and, in
the end, understanding that the temples built by merit would
be protected by a meritorious navy.101 The appeals to the Thai
love of fun in the cruiser subscription drive took many
forms—concerts, performances of plays, publishing of
stories—but none was more popular than the miniature naval
engagement staged for a temple fair in January 1916. Models
of naval vessels, three battleships, one cruiser, and four de-
stroyers, propelled by gasoline or electricity, sailed across a
small pond, saluted the King, and then took part in a naval en-
gagement, which a newspaper described as “a most realistic
affair” in which “mines explode, a village is wrecked and the
effect of gun fire on shore defences is plainly visible to spec-
tators.”102 The elaborate show, which involved much detailed
planning and took 200 men to stage, was meant to be fun, but
it was also meant to illustrate the usefulness of cruisers and to
convey the message that appeared at the end of the 26-page
program of the spectacle: “Help Thailand—our country.”103
The cruiser fund campaign, in monetary terms, got off to
a grand start. Aided by donations of the King, from various
sources, that amounted to 200,000 baht, by April of 1915 the
fund had reached the figure of 1,000,000 baht. In another year,
the 2,000,000 baht figure had been reached. Although the cam-
paign had lost some glamor and the rate of contributions had
slowed down, it was clear by 1917 that the Siamese people
would one day be able to buy their king the warship he could
then bestow on the royal navy.
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ENTRY OF SIAM INTO THE WAR
The policy of neutrality that Vajiravudh had adopted in August
1914 had met general acceptance in educated Siamese circles.
Although some German-educated princes and nobles were un-
doubtedly pro-German, and some English-educated princes and
nobles were pro-British, the sympathies of neither side were so
strong as to create a party in favor of Siam’s direct involvement
in the war.
Insofar as a general sentiment can be identified, it was
rather more pro-German than pro-Allied. The reasons for such
sentiment are clear. The Germans had no imperial record in
Siam, in great contrast to the flagrant records of both the
British and the French, whose empires in Malaysia and In-
dochina had been augmented at Siam’s expense. Further, the
German community in Siam was well liked. The Germans had
a better reputation than any other foreign group for learning
the Thai language (few Thai spoke German) and for mixing with
the Thai socially—to such an extent that many Germans inter-
married with the Thai and some even became naturalized Thai.
German trade with Siam had expanded greatly in the years
immediately preceding the war, and German products were
regarded as top quality.104 German technicians and experts em-
ployed in the Railway Department, the Department of Com-
munications, and the Siam Commercial Bank were favorably
regarded for their skill and efficiency.
From the very start of the war, however, Siam, because
of its geographic position, had to be much more cautious of
provoking British or French suspicions of unneutrality than of
provoking German suspicions.105 And the British and French
were extremely sensitive to possibly unsympathetic views and
much more likely to apply pressure on the Thai than were the
Germans. Even before the end of 1914 the Thai, having learned
that the French in Indochina were accusing them of partiality
toward the Germans, planted a story in the Saigon press to
the effect that, despite the “strict neutrality” of the Siamese
government, the Thai citizenry, far from being pro-German,
was horrified at German “acts of sacrilege and vandalism” in
Belgium and French territories.106 The Bangkok Western-lan-
guage press in 1914 consisted of three English-language news-
papers, the Bangkok Times, the Daily Mail, and the Siam Ob-
server, and all leaned toward the Allies. The local Germans,
after lodging an unproductive objection to this state of affairs
with the Siamese government, began to issue their own paper,
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the Umschau. The British minister in August 1916 objected to
the Umschau. In a fine instance of diplomatic tightrope walking,
the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out to the British
minister that any objection that he might make to the Germans
would only occasion a countercomplaint by the Germans against
“certain of the other local papers, which … are distinctly fa-
vorable to Great Britain and its allies.”107
One area in which the Thai did cooperate fully with the
British was action against the supposed activities of Germans
in abetting the conspiracies of Indians in Siam aimed at un-
dercutting British power in Burma and India. The British were
extremely sensitive on this subject. They brought some sev-
enteen Indians to trial for sedition in Burma in 1916. During the
trial proceedings, which started in March and ended in August
with guilty sentences for most of those accused, some testimony
indicated that seditious activities had also been conducted in
Siam.108 The British kept the Thai alerted to the Burma evi-
dence and also to news and rumors of similar activities. They
asked the Thai in March 1915 to take action against supposed
Indian agitators on the Siamese southern railway and in August
1916 to patrol the west coast of Siam to watch for a possible
shipment of arms from Siam to Burma through “unscrupulous”
Japanese agents of the Germans. The Thai complied with both
requests.109 Wildly extravagant newspaper stories, starting with
one in 1915 about thousands of Indians being trained in Siam
by Germans to invade Burma and ending with one in 1917
that linked the German conspiracies in Burma and Siam to the
Zimmerman Plot to get Mexico and Japan to dismember the
United States, were featured in the Bangkok Times as well as in
the New York Times and the London Times.110 The Thai, while
denying the truth of the exaggerated accounts, took all British
official requests seriously and were commended by the British
for “the services they have rendered.”111
By the end of 1915 and through 1916, however, the Siamese
King and many Siamese officials began to display a friendliness
to the French and British that, although it did not constitute
a withdrawal from neutrality, seemed to be greater than the
geographic and political realities required. Late in 1915, for
example, the King sent money to the widows and orphans of
the Durham Light Infantry Company, the unit in England in
which he had once served. The King justified this action on the
grounds that it would still British suspicions that the Thai were
pro-German.112 And when, in September 1915, Vajiravudh was
offered an honorary generalship in the British army—a favor he
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returned by conferring an honorary generalship in the Siamese
army on George V—he accepted, according to a statement he
later gave his ministers, for the same reason.113 Other public
acts friendly to the Allies sprinkled the calendar of events in
1916—for example, royal presences (and presentations of gifts)
at fairs, parties, and plays for the French Red Cross, the Russian
Red Cross, the British Red Cross, and the Allied Red Cross.
More subtle indications of a pro-Allied bias can be perceived
in the pages of the journal of the Royal Navy League, Samut-
thasan. The sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915 evoked a long
article in the August issue by the King, writing under the pseu-
donym Ramachitti, who deplored the act as a violation of inter-
national law.114 In the September issue Ramachitti translated a
series of American notes protesting German practices of sub-
marine warfare. In a commentary appended to the translation,
he labeled the United States as the only major power not in
the war and the outstanding protector of the rights of neutral
states; supported the American protests, stating that, indeed,
nothing in war could justify the abandonment of morality and
the killing of innocent people; and said that the Thai, as Bud-
dhists, could not help but agree with this moral stance.115 Sub-
sequent issues of Samutthasan, and occasionally the news-
papers, contained other articles by the King, always writing
under a pseudonym, that were distinctly critical of and uncom-
plimentary to the Germans. None were violently anti-German,
however. And certainly none called for a declaration of war. In
fact, even if the King had not used the stratagem of a pseu-
donym, none could be regarded as a real departure from neu-
trality.
One of the King’s young courtiers, recalling this period of
time decades later, has noted that Vajiravudh consistently main-
tained a public position of neutrality and kept silent about
whatever personal opinions he may have held. The courtier says
that he later discovered, however, that the King had been con-
ducting an extensive personal correspondence with various Eu-
ropean friends during this period, asking for their opinions and
adding the intelligence from these replies to what he already
knew in order to help him make up his mind on future Siamese
courses of action.116
Early in 1917 the signs that a change in policy was being
considered became unmistakable. Precipitating the change was
the altered position of the United States. The Germans resumed
unrestricted submarine warfare on February 1, 1917, and two
days later the United States severed its relations with Germany.
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Barely had the news of this American action reached Siam
than Prince Devawongse, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote
to Vajiravudh’s private secretary for foreign correspondence,
Phraya Buri, raising questions about the effect this American
move toward a declaration of war would have on Siam’s po-
sition. In his letter of February 9, Prince Devawongse set forth
his opinions on what a Siamese declaration of war might mean.
For one thing, it would allow the Siamese to seize the German
merchant vessels that had taken refuge in the port of Bangkok;
if they could be seized before the Germans damaged them,
this would be a gain that would be about equal to the loss
Siam would incur by German confiscation of Siam’s consid-
erable bank assets in Germany. A declaration of war against
Germany would have distinct dangers, however. First, the
Germans had done nothing specific against the Thai to justify
such a declaration. And the members of the German colony
in Siam, who, the Prince said, numbered about 300 (in fact
the total was closer to 200) and would become enemy aliens
if war were declared, would pose a threat. Some might fight
the Thai and destroy property; particularly to be feared were
those who were in charge of the railroad line then under con-
struction in northern Siam. Others might foment trouble among
sympathetic Siamese military officers or among those Chinese
merchants who had had close business connections with the
Germans. Siam might find itself with a civil war on its hands. An
alternate course of action would be to follow America’s lead and
simply break off relations. Such a step would free Siam from
obnoxious treaty provisions with at least one major European
power. Even such a limited step, however, was dangerous and
ought not be undertaken until the Siamese military forces had
signified that they were fully prepared to meet any emergency.
The minister throughout his note, with all his words of caution,
sounded as if he were arguing for a more conservative approach
than he imagined the King would favor. He ended by pointing
out two facts: first, that Britain, whose views the Prince re-
garded as vital in such matters, was not encouraging Siam to
follow America’s lead; second, that America’s call for neutral
states to follow its example had not led to a clatter of scissors
snipping diplomatic ties. Each state, he said, was deciding its
own policy on the basis of its own advantages, as indeed it
should.117
The Prince’s recommendations undoubtedly had weight, and
Siam confined its reaction to the American move to protests
against the violations of international law implicit in the
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German submarine campaign. These protests were communi-
cated in March to the German government and to the Austro-
Hungarian government by the Siamese minister in Berlin. A
further protest against a German policy of making subjects of
neutral countries who were serving on Allied merchant vessels
liable to seizure as prisoners of war was sent to the Germans
in mid-April. None of these communications were made public,
however, until the end of April 1917.118
On April 6, 1917, the United States finally declared war
against Germany. The United States, depicting its role as that
of champion of “the rights of nations great and small” and de-
fender of neutral rights in general, urged other neutrals to join
in the crusade. The American declaration led to still another
reexamination of Siam’s position—both because of America’s
moral leadership and, even more important, because of the
great material strength that the entry of the United States
would necessarily contribute to the Allies. The first Siamese act
following the American declaration, however, was a restatement
on April 12 of Siam’s neutrality in the enlarged conflict.119
No new foreign policy decisions were made, or even dis-
cussed, by the King through the rest of April and most of
May. For during the period from April 10 to May 22 Vajiravudh
was busy on a trip to Siam’s southern provinces. During the
King’s preparations for his journey and his absence from the
capital, two members of his government, Prince Chakrabongs
and Prince Devawongse, became deeply involved in the war
problem. Both princes had engaged in conversations with the
diplomatic representatives of England, France, and Russia in
Siam and, as a result of these conversations, had taken up di-
vergent positions on foreign policy. Prince Devawongse, sec-
onded by the British, favored continued neutrality; Prince
Chakrabongs, urged on by the French and Russians, favored
active Siamese involvement on the side of the Allies. It was up
to the King at the end of May to resolve the dispute and chart
Siam’s future course of action.
The only real concern in the deliberations on the war at the
end of May was Siam’s advantage. Was it in Siam’s interest to
remain neutral? Was it in Siam’s interest to join the Allies? What
would be the reaction of the major Allied powers to Siam’s de-
cision? If Siam were to join, what reasons should be given for
the action? What rewards might Siam, as an ally, expect at the
war’s end?
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In a secret memorandum of May 25 concerning Siam’s pos-
sible entry into the war, Prince Devawongse gave his views on
some of these questions. The memorandum was probably pre-
pared to bring His Majesty up to date on the subject of the
war after his trip to the South. The Prince’s prime concern
was how to respond to the representations the British, French,
and Russian ministers in Bangkok had made to him at various
dates in April and May. The French and Russian ministers had
urged the Siamese to declare war. They had pointed out that the
failure of Siam to publish its objections to German submarine
warfare and Siam’s continued neutrality after the American
appeal to neutrals were tantamount to being pro-German. And
they had promised that, if Siam joined the Allies, they would
help Siam gain beneficial treaty revisions, revisions that would
remove restrictions on customs duties. The British minister, in
his talks with Prince Devawongse, had deplored these actions of
his diplomatic colleagues and had stated that his view—and that
of his government—was that Siam’s decision on the war should
be made by Siam alone and not in response to promises or pres-
sures. Insofar as Britain was concerned, he had said, no treaty
revision could be contemplated, for Britain, unlike France or
Russia, had a considerable stake in Siamese trade and so could
not lightly abandon its treaty rights. He had also stated that re-
vision of customs duties might well create difficulties for trade,
which would be a disadvantage for both England and Siam. The
British minister had mentioned, however, that, as a measure to
placate the French and Russians, Siam might publish its notes
to the Germans objecting to submarine warfare, and this Prince
Devawongse, with the King’s approval, proceeded to do on April
30. With regard to his own opinions on future policy, Prince
Devawongse stated: “I have believed from the start the Allies
would win, but see no good reason for Siam to join in; remaining
neutral is our best course.”120
Prince Chakrabongs, who did not agree with the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, presumably also told the King his views.121 He
probably also wrote to him during this period, for Vajiravudh
sometime later complained of the “many violent memoranda
submitted to me by my brother concerning our foreign policy,”
memoranda that supported the French and Russian position and
depicted Prince Devawongse as overly reluctant to take any
action that might provoke British resentment.122
On May 28, 1917, King Vajiravudh read to his Council of
Ministers a long and critical statement on the war that was
meant to clarify issues and serve as the text for a definitive de-
National Survival and Militarism
111
cision on Siamese policy.123 After a brief historical background
on Siam’s neutrality, the King analyzed in hard terms the re-
alities of Siam’s position. First of all, he asked—and then an-
swered—the question “What is the true position of Siam?” Siam,
he said, lay between the colonial territories of England and
France. This central fact had determined, from the start, that
Siam could never dare to show the slightest partiality toward
Germany; to do so would have meant Siam’s immediate annihi-
lation. And, further, Siam had been able to declare itself neutral
only because it had suited the purposes of its powerful
neighbors: “If at any time they had felt our neutrality to be an
obstacle, there is no need to doubt that they would have ceased
to allow it to continue.” Those who would argue against this
reasoning and cite the inviolability of Siam’s sovereign rights
should take a look at Greece. Siam, however, had two choices:
to join the Allies or to remain neutral.
Siam’s choice, said the King, should always be based on
what would serve its interests best. At the start of the war, when
it could not be clear which side would win, Siam, as a small
country that could not afford any vengeful enemy, had had to
decide on neutrality. But now that Germany was clearly losing,
it was time for advantages and disadvantages to be weighed
anew.
In a future that would be dominated by the victorious Allies,
Siam’s interests no longer lay in neutrality; they lay in joining
the victors. As a neutral, Siam could hope, at best, to retain
what it had, but it would run a large risk of losing a great
deal. As a member of the Allies, Siam could hope, at least, to
retain what it had, and it would stand a good chance of making
real gains. As a neutral, Siam would be at the mercy of the
Allies. If Britain and France decided to take over German assets
and privileges in Siam—and France, said the King, already had
such intentions—Siam could do nothing but yield. Siam would
have to yield not only rights but honor and part of its freedom.
If, however, Siam joined in the war, Siam almost had to come
out better than even. The undesirable treaties with Germany,
at least, would be terminated. And there was a possibility that
some treaty concessions could be won from the Allied powers.
Although cool logic showed the advisability of joining the
Allies, a declaration of war, said the King, could not be made
in a vacuum. Reasons had to be given for a declaration. And
Germany had done nothing antagonistic to Siam: no Thai na-
tionals had been killed; no Thai ships had been torpedoed; no
Thai sailors had been taken prisoner. If Germany had committed
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some injury, even a slight one, the King said almost ruefully,
then “I would not hesitate in advancing the view most strongly
that we had just cause to rid ourselves of our neutral position.”
Any declaration of war without proper reason would be under-
stood as a “policy” decision, one made to pursue advantages.
Such a declaration would from the outset, then, fail in its in-
tended effect; Britain was already wary of the new additions
to the Allied roll of nations, such as China, which expected re-
wards or expected to share in the ultimate victory. Further, if
Siam hoped to allay suspicions of its motives, it could declare
war only if it could offer real services to the Allies, and the King
could not imagine at this point what those services might be.
Under these circumstances, the King suggested, Siam
should wait for an opportunity to declare war to present itself
and, in the meanwhile, do its best to prepare for the peace by
making pro-Allied statements and by taking steps to remove
German nationals from posts in Siamese government depart-
ments, an action that it would be better for Siam to take on its
own than be forced to take by the Allied Powers.
King Vajiravudh ended his statement with a plea to his min-
isters to discuss it freely; he said that, if they had criticisms
of his suggestions, they should make them right away and “not
suppress them and then grumble later that you had no chance
to present your views.”
The Council of Ministers on May 28 essentially agreed with
the King’s policy statement. Some of the ministers whose min-
istries had German employees spoke of the difficulties of finding
replacements, but none spoke against the policy of re-
placement. The consensus Was that a policy of neutralism
friendly to the Allies should be pursued and that eventually
Siam should find an honorable way to enter the war. The min-
isters also agreed that if the Allied Powers officially invited
Siam to enter, the government would then be able to enter with
honor.124
Although he was out of town for the May 28 meeting, Prince
Chakrabongs sent a strong letter of support to the King. He
urged the King to put into effect immediately the policy of dis-
missing the Germans; suggested that Siam should not be unduly
influenced by the negative feelings of the British, whom he
described as a people who were always interested in “prac-
tical politics” and their own interests; and proposed that a note
verbale be issued deploring the “inhuman manner” of warfare
of the Central Powers and denouncing this evil in the interest of
upholding “the sanctity of international right.” If the Germans
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objected to the note, so much the better, since that would
provide Siam the desired opportunity to sever diplomatic rela-
tions. The Prince’s letter was much more aggressively prowar
than the King’s May 28 statement had been. Chakrabongs crit-
icized various ministers at length for dillydallying and for ex-
cessive caution. He advised that Siam “must find a way” to
enter the war, that to “sit idly by while luck passes” would give
England “a free hand” to do as it liked in Siam after the war,
that Siam would be like someone “blindfolded in the center of
the room” with respect to the trade arrangements that would be
made at the war’s end.125
The King was obviously impressed by Prince Chakrabongs’s
arguments, which corresponded so closely to his own.126 In a
council meeting on June 1, he proceeded to announce as firm
policy: (1) the dismissal of all Germans; (2) a search for a good
reason to enter the war without waiting for an invitation from
the Allies (the powers who were unenthusiastic about Siam’s
entry had grown to two; Japan had joined Britain by June 1);127
(3) the issuance of a private “verbal note” to the foreign min-
istries deploring the German methods of warfare (with hope of a
German objection that would allow Siam to sever relations); (4)
the avoidance of any mention of hoped-for concessions from the
Allies in the form of tariff concessions—Siam’s new policy must
assume the form of a solely moral protest. Even the firmness
Prince Chakrabongs recommended appeared in the wording
throughout; the statement closed: “And let me remind you, no
further wavering is allowed.”128
On this vital subject of Siam’s decision to enter the war,
the common view in Thailand today is that Vajiravudh led the
country to war because of prejudice and passion and pro-British
sentiments acquired during his long residence in England. The
record does not substantiate this view. Although the King may
have had his private biases,129 the reports of the secret min-
isterial meetings clearly reveal a king who was committed to
pragmatism and realism and was willing, indeed, to resist
British pressures toward neutralism in order to promote his
country’s welfare.
After June 1, the diplomatic and practical preparations for
war proceeded apace. The heads of various ministries were
asked to complete detailed plans for replacement of Germans,
for capture of German ships, for imprisonment of enemy aliens,
and for other such actions. Allied diplomats were informed
of Siam’s intentions; Siamese legations abroad were also in-
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formed. The reception by June 18 of a cordial reply from London
welcoming Siam’s imminent entry into the war resolved the last
doubts as to the policy decision.130
Only one important matter remained: to prepare the popu-
lation for the policy change. And here the King stepped forward
to perform the role he enjoyed most; he became chief propa-
gandist for the new cause. But since Siam was still technically
neutral and since the government was anxious not to alert the
local Germans before all was ready, the King issued the pro-
paganda under his pseudonym Ramachitti. Using this thin dis-
guise,131 Vajiravudh published in the newspaper Nangsu̓phim
thai from July 7 to July 21a series of articles that were bitterly
anti-German.132 The Germans were characterized as a people
who believed that “might is right,” and their history was sur-
veyed to show their aggressiveness, their disregard for the
rights of other peoples. German transgressions in World War I,
said Ramachitti, finally compelled America, which had “for so
long remained steadfast in her neutrality,” to declare war “to
defend the Rights and Liberty of all mankind.” Siam could do
no less than follow America’s lead. The arguments for continued
neutrality were all bankrupt: even if Germany won the war, a
Siamese record of neutrality would not save the country from
German aggressiveness; the German “intrigues” with “Indian
seditionists” in Siam had already proved how little respect the
Germans had for the neutral rights of the Siamese. And, most
important of all, Siam as a Buddhist nation that believed in the
right could not remain aloof while members of the family of
civilized nations were “suffering injuries and atrocities at the
hands of a ferocious giant.” The Germans, he concluded, “have
shown themselves to be monsters of depravity before the whole
world, utterly without shame or fear of sin”; for Siam not to act
against such evil would be “tantamount to aiding and abetting
the wicked bandit.”133 And so, for the highest moral reasons and
in keeping with Siam’s finest traditions, “Siam must break with
Germany who is the enemy of the world.”134
On July 22, 1917, the day after these last ringing words by
Ramachitti were published, Siam declared war on the Central
Powers. The wait for a provocative incident had been aban-
doned, and the declaration of war, drafted personally by the
King, who deliberately borrowed from lofty phrases of Woodrow
Wilson and others, was based on the need to help defend “the
peace of the world,” “respect for small States,” and “the
sanctity of International Rights.”135
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To solemnify the declaration of war and put the power of
traditional royal magic behind it, the King performed a “First
Action” rite. Wearing a “victory dress” all of red (the proper
color for Sunday wear), carrying the sword of the sixteenth-
century warrior king Naresuan, and bearing auspicious leaves
in his right hand and tucked behind his left ear, the King pro-
ceeded at 7:00 A.M. to the Chapel Royal at Wat Phra Kaeo,
where he offered candles and prayers to the Emerald Buddha.
He then proceeded to the hall that housed statues of his royal
predecessors and asked that the merit of their transcendent
virtues might help bring victory in war to Siam and its allies.
After this he went to a hall of audience and gave a short address
announcing Siam’s declaration of war before the royal min-
isters, foreign diplomats, and members of the press. Last came
the “First Action” rite proper. This symbolic act was performed
on a special stage built at the Royal Plaza. Before the dais stood
a newly planted tree representing the enemy. In the ceremony
the tree was first “disgraced” by being doused with wash-water
from a royal footbath; then, on the King’s direct order, it was
chopped down. The meaning of the rite was clear enough; Siam
had taken its first action to destroy the enemy.136
In fact, however, some very practical steps had been taken
several hours earlier. In the early morning hours of July 22 the
declarations of war had been delivered to the German and the
Austro-Hungarian legations; all male enemy aliens had been ar-
rested; the German merchant ships in the port of Bangkok had
been seized; and various strategic places—particularly along
the route of the railway line to the north, then being constructed
under the supervision of German technicians—had been put
under elaborate guard.
Plans for these actions had been extremely well laid. For
weeks military, police, and civilian units had been secretly
preparing for the great day. All Germans and Austrians had
been placed under constant surveillance. Navy construction
crews had been feverishly building ladders specially designed
for scaling the large German merchantmen from the small Thai
navy launches.
And all had gone extremely well. Aside from some minor
damage the German crews had managed to inflict on their own
vessels, nothing untoward had happened. No sabotage had oc-
curred. The railways, despite the loss of German technical help,
continued to run without any delay in schedules. The King was
pleased. The navy, army, and police were pleased. And foreign
observers in Bangkok and elsewhere were lavish in their praise
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of the thoroughness and efficiency of the Thai operation. The
Far East, published in Tokyo, commented on Siamese “busi-
nesslike efficiency” in executing a task “that has simply been
bungled by other nations.”137 In a later birthday message to
the King, the Siamese princes remarked on the submission of
the enemy aliens, who were “awed by Your Majesty’s powers
and greatness.” The message went on: “Everything was accom-
plished without necessitating the shedding of a single drop of
blood and without causing the least trouble or inconvenience to
the general public, who simply woke up from their sleep and
saw victory already attained.”138
The follow-up actions with respect to the captured German
ships and the prisoners of war were also handled in an orderly
fashion. Thai claims to the ships were legally cleared in a prize
court, and the ships were then repaired, renamed with Thai
names, and put to use, some by the Thai and some by their
allies, under charter terms favorable to the Westerners.139 The
prisoners of war, who by August 8 included German women
and children, were eventually transported by the Thai to British
prisoner camps in India. This last action was insisted on by
the British, and, although some Thai suspected the British of
racial motives (not wanting white people to be held prisoner by
Asians), King Vajiravudh, who was “elated that we have been
able to intern Europeans which has undoubtedly increased our
prestige a great deal,” decided that continuous imprisonment of
the Germans was not necessary or politic.140
Although Siam’s major objective in joining the war was to
further foreign policy aims, a secondary objective was to use the
war to further internal policy aims of stimulating nationalism.
Joining in the battle, the King undoubtedly thought, would
shake the Thai loose of the lethargy and selfishness that were
characteristic of a people long used to peace. Vajiravudh had ex-
pressed such sentiments in an essay of 1915:
Where there has been a long period of peace, people have had
time to think of the pursuit of pleasure and the gratification
of self, so that they have grown selfish; their outlook on life
and things in general have become narrower and narrower, until
nothing becomes so important to them as their own selves. In a
way, I agree with some of the German writers who say that war is
actually a blessing in disguise, because war compels one to think
of something bigger and greater than one’s own self. War cer-
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tainly rouses people from that dream of self-interest, from which
it is extremely difficult to wake, except with the thunder of guns
or the points of bayonets.141
The primary objective, it was decided, was best promoted by
quiet means: Siam should not make a point of what it hoped to
achieve from its allies at the war’s end. Private though this ob-
jective may have been, it was guessed at and hinted at on oc-
casion. The prescient editor of the Bangkok Times on the day
after the declaration of war, while lauding Siam for its moral
stance, pointed out that essentially Siam’s action was “a matter
of practical politics” and that, while the question of duties re-
vision had not yet been raised, it was sure to be raised “when
the time comes.”142 Prince Mahidol, half a world away in the
United States at the time of Siam’s entry, was caught off guard
and spoke freely about the benefits Siam hoped for:
First she will secure her place as an independent nation, free
to work out her own destiny without fear of more powerful
neighbors. Again, she will get rid of the extra territorial rights
which now brand her as a nation of inferior civilization. She will
be recognized as she ought to be in the great family of nations.
She will, I hope, obtain a readjustment of her internal relations
which will relieve her of the unequal and unfair tariff agreements
under which she now suffers.143
By the beginning of 1918 King Vajiravudh was willing to state
publicly that Siam’s entry into the war “enables us to hope that
we may be able in the future to enjoy every right and privilege
on an equality with all the other nations.”144
THE SIAMESE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
One wartime activity of Siam that served both foreign policy
objectives and the domestic policy of nationalism was the orga-
nization of a Siamese Expeditionary Force. The original Siamese
intention was not to participate directly in the war in Europe,145
but pressures chiefly from the French, supported by Prince
Charoon, the Siamese minister to France, and by Prince
Chakrabongs, led to a new decision to outfit and dispatch expe-
ditionary units. Prince Charoon not only suggested to the King
that Siam should “take some active part or make a bit of a show”
but also specified that aviation and ambulance units would be
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the best bargains, since they would give even small Siamese
forces great visibility and prestige.146 Some of the King’s min-
isters seemed primarily interested in keeping costs for the force
as low as possible, but others, such as Prince Charoon, argued
that “Siam should give as much as possible without counting
the cost NOW. It will pay in the long run to do all one can and
to show the other Allies that one is doing so.” Prince Charoon’s
view was that some expenses “will pay in the long run. I do not
say in money but in other ways.”147 The ultimate decision, made
in September, was a compromise: there was to be a Siamese
contingent of around 1,300 men (though the number was to
be kept secret so as not to lead to disparaging comparisons);
the contingent was to consist of an ambulance section, a flying
squadron, and a detachment of automobile drivers and me-
chanics.148 The units sailed for France in June 1918 and served
through the end of the war.
As an instrument of foreign policy, the Siamese Expedi-
tionary Force was expected to demonstrate the sincerity of
Siam’s intentions of aiding its allies and to bring the name
of Siam before the world. Siamese participation as an active
partner in the war effort, it was felt, could not help but increase
the country’s chances of improving its treaty conditions at the
war’s end. A further practical result of sending the expedi-
tionary force would be that Siamese military units would gain
invaluable field experience.
As an instrument of national policy, the Siamese Expedi-
tionary Force was seen as a means for rallying the Thai people.
The method of selecting the members of the force was itself a
means of promoting patriotic feelings. Service in the force was
described as a special honor; therefore, enlistment was made
voluntary and opened not only to men in the armed forces but
also to civilians. The call for volunteers was issued late in Sep-
tember. Three weeks later the King expressed his great gratifi-
cation at the response, thanking all who had volunteered—many
more than could be used—for their loyalty and patriotism.
Further, during its months of preparation in Siam the expedi-
tionary force received special attention from the King and con-
siderable publicity.
Late in December 1917, the Ministry of War took the oc-
casion of the annual “Swinging Ceremony,” a traditional Hin-
duist rite, to stage an elaborate military procession and “a
splendid popular advertisement” for the armed forces, in-
cluding, of course, the Siamese Expeditionary Force. The
purpose of the procession was to show the antiquity of the mil-
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itary tradition in Siam and to increase the pride of the Siamese
in their existing military might. The military procession, com-
plete with floats, bands, and even a large model airplane, was
staged on two days and attracted large crowds.149
On January 8, 1918, the King gave a dinner party for a
group of Thai officers who had been selected to constitute a mil-
itary mission to go to Europe to act in liaison with the Allies
in the prosecution of the war. After the dinner Vajiravudh ad-
dressed the group on their responsibility “to show to the nations
whose prowess, we must confess, we have known in the past,
how much we have advanced.” The members of the mission, he
stated, “will be the first persons to carry with them the dignity
and fame of my Army to be made known before the world, and
will be the first to unfurl the Siamese flag on the continent
of Europe.” These men were in effect the King’s representa-
tives, he said, and they were chosen because they possessed
the “high patriotic qualities” that are the measure of a nation’s
greatness. He described the sending of this mission, and of the
full Siamese Expeditionary Force later, as of the “utmost impor-
tance” not only for the King and the individuals involved, but
for the entire Siamese nation. Posterity, he said, would one day
be able to turn back the pages of history and “exclaim with
pride: ‘Ah! they are not cowards! They enhanced the dignity and
honour of the nation, did things befitting the name of Thai, and,
loving freedom, were ready for every sacrifice ….’”150
To promote public awareness of the military and the war,
on April 6 King Vajiravudh instituted a new order of chivalry,
named the Honourable Order of Rama. The order was created
particularly for individuals who distinguished themselves in mil-
itary service, especially those who proved themselves ready
“to sacrifice their lives in defence of the independence and
prosperity of the Nation and Country.” Many members of the
Siamese Expeditionary Force were eventually to receive this
coveted new mark of royal favor.151
On May 26 the Siamese Expeditionary Force itself was
hosted by the King at dinner. His remarks on this occasion were
similar to those he had made to the military mission in January.
He spoke of the long time that the Thai people had been forced
to feel “slighted and hurt because others looked on us as a small
and inferior nation.” Now, he said, the chance had presented
itself for the Thai to show the world that they had been accepted
by the powers as an equal. This chance could be seized because
the government, despite the criticisms of many, had gone ahead
and developed an army. On the troops now going to Europe
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would rest the reputation of Siam; Siam would be judged ac-
cording to how its troops behaved, on the field of battle and
elsewhere. And so these troops must be on constant guard to
earn for Siam nothing but praise. But, said the King, in this re-
spect he had full confidence in each and every member of the
expeditionary force.152
The dinner on May 26 had one interesting nationalistic
byproduct. After the dinner, English films were shown; at the
end of one film there flashed on the screen the Kipling lines
“What stands if Freedom fall?/Who dies if England live?” Prince
Chakrabongs told the King how moving he found these lines.
And the King, when he awoke the next morning, penned the
words of the reign’s most famous patriotic poem:
Love the king with complete loyalty.
Love the nation with unswerving duty.
Love the Buddhist Trinity faithfully.
Love honor to merit the world’s praise.
On all occasions show respect
And think of your land
As the state where Thai live in peace.
We must cherish it so it endures forever.
Whoever invades the land of the Thai
We will fight to the last man, to the last mile,
Sacrificing life’s blood and life itself
Rather than lose our honorable name.
If Siam endures, survives,
Then, secure, our lives go on.
But if Siam’s doom arrives, can Thai endure?
Our family line is gone; the Thai are done.153
Popular involvement in the Siamese Expeditionary Force
was promoted by the organization of a fund drive. Private in-
dividuals who wished to make contributions were encouraged
to do so. This money was to be used to buy cigarettes, socks,
and chocolate bars and in other ways contribute to the personal
comfort of the Thai soldiers. The drive started in October 1917.
It was nationwide in scope. Various benefit affairs, including
motor races and performances of plays, were also organized to
add to the public contributions. By the time the drive ended,
about $100,000 had been collected.154
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That the measures taken to make the Siamese Expeditionary
Force a national symbol had been successful was demonstrated
on June 19, 1918, when the force left Siam. After various cere-
monies and departing speeches, the soldiers boarded the troop
transports.155 It was very early in the morning, and for “se-
curity” reasons the departure of the force had not been made
public; so, as the ships went up the river to turn at the Samsen
bend, “there was practically no one to be seen along the river
banks.” But the soldiers “cheered lustily the whole time while
going along the river,” and their cheers woke up the people
along the banks. By the time the ships came back down the
river the “banks were absolutely full with people, all jetties and
landings were crowded to a dangerous point, everybody de-
sired to see and wish ‘bon voyage’ to the brave soldiers, who
were going away to take part as representatives of the Siamese
Nation in the great war.”156
To mark the first anniversary of Siam’s entry into the war,
Vajiravudh on July 22, 1918, issued a royal proclamation re-
peating many of the lofty phrases he had previously used about
the great cause in which all the Siamese people were involved.
He praised his people for their spirit of unity, their loyalty, their
patriotic love of country; these, he said, had been manifested
by the troops who had volunteered their lives, by the support
everyone was giving to fund drives, and by the devotion of all to
the performance of their duties and the maintenance of peace
and tranquillity.157
After the arrival of the Siamese Expeditionary Force in
France at the end of July 1918, there were periodic favorable
reports on the group’s activities. Such news as “… the French
general public express much admiration for our soldiers for
their smart military bearing and for their discipline”158 was
bound to swell the national pride of Thai at home. In Europe,
the Siamese minister in Paris made special efforts to ensure that
Thai troops were given all due courtesies as full partners in the
war effort, were not treated in any way as inferiors, and par-
ticularly were not confused with colonial contingents, such as,
for example, the Vietnamese labor battalions.159 The arrival of
the Siamese motor unit at the front in September was noted in
the Thai press, and the French recommendation of the Croix
de Guerre for two Thai officers in November was well publi-
cized. On December 17 the King received telegraphic news that
Siamese contingents had advanced with the Allied army of oc-
cupation into Germany. Vajiravudh’s reply, printed in the local
press, said in part: “It was the proudest day in my life when I
Chaiyo!
122
learnt that my troops had advanced into enemy territory, and
the memory of this glorious event will ever live in mind as an
incentive to further sacrifice on behalf of my beloved nation and
motherland.”160
POSTWAR CELEBRATIONS
The end of the war with the proclamation of an armistice on
November 11, 1918, occasioned a long series of nationalist out-
pourings in Siam.
On November 19, 1918, King Vajiravudh issued a Procla-
mation of Victory. In this proclamation he set aside December 2,
the anniversary of his coronation, as a day of national thanks-
giving for the victory that had come in part, at least, as a result
of Thai invocation of the Holy Buddhist Trinity and the virtues
of Siam’s previous monarchs.161
The December 2 holiday started in the afternoon on the
palace grounds with ceremonies in the traditional style: a “First
Action” rite was again performed, this time to signify
achievement of victory; reverential prayers and invocations for
continued aid were offered to the spirits of the departed royal
ancestors and to the Buddha.162 After the close of the private
ceremonies, the royal party proceeded to the Royal Plaza.
There, in a specially constructed pavilion, the King led his
people in ceremonies of public thanksgiving. These ceremonies
were completely without precedent in Thai history. Thai kings
were expected to conduct countless ceremonies for the public;
never before, however, had such ceremonies been conducted
with the public as participants. On the broad open grounds of
the Royal Plaza there gathered government officials, military
units, foreign diplomats, “a dense mass of the cosmopolitan
people of Bangkok.” At an altar facing this assemblage of thou-
sands Vajiravudh led the thanksgiving rites. A foreign reporter
present was deeply moved by the spectacle:
At the outset all knelt—the King, the Princes, the officers of state,
the assembled troops, the school children, the people on the
plain. It was the greatest moment of the day—a people kneeling
in prayer. None could fail to be thrilled by the spectacle. It was
where the bare plain held possibilities above the temple …. The
people were on their knees some few minutes, and then rose
together and proceeded with the service. The chanting of the
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prayers of thanksgiving … by the great body of the assembled
troops was most impressive. The great volume of sound seemed
to come in waves ….163
The ceremony closed with the playing of the national anthem,
followed by enthusiastic cheers for the King. As His Majesty left
the plaza in his carriage, there were more “hearty cheers of
the great multitude, cheers which were taken up and continued
along a good part of the road round the Royal Plaza.”164
The success of the day and the public participation were not
simply happy accidents. The government had wanted a display
of unity, and government offices had been given a holiday,
people had been urged to decorate their houses with flags,
public transportation fares had been reduced by half, free re-
freshments had been provided—all in an effort to give sign of
and substance to national spirit.165
The celebration of the day of national thanksgiving was
not confined to Bangkok. Provinces were instructed to take
part by closing government offices, distributing copies of the
King’s royal proclamation, displaying flags, and holding their
own public ceremonies.166 In the ceremonies at Ayutthaya,
closely patterned after those in Bangkok, the King’s portrait
was substituted for His Majesty’s person. A “beautifully be-
decked boat” carrying signs about the victory plied the wa-
terways to bring the thanksgiving message to villagers. About
10,000 people in the city, and many more thousands on the
waterways, joined in the festivities.167 Reports from Nakhο̨n
Pathom, Lampang, and Lopburi indicate that provincial cooper-
ation was widespread.
The next wave of celebrations, those associated with the
return of the Siamese Expeditionary Force units, was prepared
for by the screening of films of the force. The films arrived in
Bangkok in January 1919, and by March they were being shown
to large crowds in the provinces.168
On May 1, 1919, the first returning contingent, consisting of
some 340 members of the aviation corps, arrived in Siam. The
welcoming arrangements were elaborate: buildings along the
Čhaophraya River were decorated; fireworks were set off; the
King, officials, troops, and families all greeted the returning sol-
diers at appointed places. The King gave each of the soldiers a
medal commemorating his service in the war. And he addressed
the returning members of the expeditionary force as comrades
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and as sons who had brought honor and fame to Siam, its
monarch, and its people. During the following three days many
other functions were held to welcome the soldiers home.169
Shortly before leaving Europe, the remainder of the Siamese
Expeditionary Force took part in three gala victory parades:
in Paris on July 14, in London on July 19, and in Brussels on
July 22. Communiques from the Siamese general staff given to
the press mentioned how well the Thai troops marched, how
proudly the Siamese colors were carried in the streets of Paris,
how cordially the Siamese were greeted everywhere.170
In Bangkok it was decided that Siam should time its formal
victory celebration to coincide with the arrival of the 800 re-
turning members of the expeditionary force. The celebration
started on September 21, 1919, a Sunday, and lasted for three
days; September 22 and 23 were declared national holidays.171
On the first day the returning members of the expeditionary
force were formally received at the Royal Plaza. The ceremonies
were led by the King, who, “filled with emotion,” praised the
soldiers for their sacrifices to show all the world that Siam
was a nation devoted to righteousness. He added that, indeed,
it was Siam’s “respect for right which has made us into a
Nation, a compact Nation,” composed of people loyal to their
sovereign, loyal to the nation, and steadfast in their noble faith.
The King proceeded to bestow decorations on fifty-four men;
five received medals of the new Order of Rama. The colors of
the Motor Transport Company were also given the Order of
Rama.172 Among the other highlights of the three days of events
were a torchlight procession, parties at the British and French
legations, a royal banquet, nightly illuminations, a gymkhana
at the Royal Bangkok Sports Club, and performances of plays
in pavilions put up by various government ministries. Popular
enthusiasm ran high; even before the troops landed, people
came down the river in small boats to see them and to cheer
them with shouts of victory.173 A newspaper reported that
“there was no mistaking the heartiness of the popular
welcome.”174 The final day was given over to more somber rites,
the interment of the ashes of the nineteen war dead in the
base of a special monument then under construction. (Though
none of the nineteen had actually died in battle, they were
nonetheless regarded as casualties of war.)
Like the day of national thanksgiving, the victory celebration
in September was nationwide in scope. The ceremonies and fes-
tivities were, however, even more elaborate and apparently in-
volved even more provincial centers.
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Another national celebration, which was similar in scope
and purpose to those commemorating the end of the war, took
place in October 1920 to herald the arrival of the Phra Ruang,
the naval vessel purchased in England with the money that had
been contributed by the people to the Royal Navy League fund
drive. The reception of the Phra Ruang was declared an affair
of state. Prince Abhakara had purchased the vessel, a destroyer
(at the last moment the British Admiralty had refused to allow
the Siamese to purchase the scout cruiser they wanted175), and
had captained it back to Siam. On its arrival at Paknam at the
mouth of the Čhaophraya River on October 7, the vessel was
welcomed by various officials. The vessel, moored in the river,
was outlined with electric lights and “made a fine display”; on
shore, government buildings were lit up, and each department
hosted night-long performances of plays and other entertain-
ments.176
The Phra Ruang came up to Bangkok on Friday, October
8; its arrival at the capital was the occasion for three days of
ceremonies and festivities, including formal reception by the
King and a ride by the King on the vessel up and down the
river. Sunday, October 10, was the public day, and the throngs
of people from Bangkok and the provinces who had made their
contributions were allowed to come on board and inspect their
purchase. People came by the thousands and demonstrated
their delight: “The ship was crowded all day, and any handle
that could be turned, or gun made to move, was operated by
enthusiastic sightseers. The vessel was garlanded wherever it
was possible to hang flowers….”177 To those who made a further
contribution to the Navy League, a souvenir picture of the Phra
Ruang was presented.178
The campaign to enlist popular interest obviously seems to
have succeeded. One writer, answering a foreign critic who
questioned Siam’s need for a navy at all, commented:
… man does not live by bread alone, nor is any nation made a re-
ality by a cash nexus. One of the aims of this reign has been to
bring home to the people that their claim to self-determination in-
volves on their part the duty of self-defence. The gift of the Phra
Ruang is one response of the people to that teaching. From that
point of view it is surely worth the money paid, and all the signifi-
cance that is being attached to its arrival.179
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As the fitting close to Siam’s involvement in World War I,
on July 22, 1921, the fourth anniversary of Siam’s declaration
of war, a permanent monument to Siam’s war dead was ded-
icated. The monument, located in a prominent place near the
Royal Plaza, was beflagged with colors of the Allied Powers. All
day long, wreaths were placed at the memorial by various sec-
tions of the population. The King, foreign diplomats, and some
French aviators who were on a formal visit from Indochina also
presented wreaths and took part in an official ceremony.180 With
the ceremony of 1921, July 22 became a day of national com-
memoration in Siam.
Celebrations of the military that were, not exclusively asso-
ciated with the war and Siam’s role in it were also held in the
postwar years. The King continually made the point that the war
had helped secure Siam’s future, but the future was not without
threat; Siam must stay on guard and maintain its military es-
tablishment. The King seized every opportunity to dramatize
the importance of the armed forces. For example, in November
1921, on the eleventh anniversary of the King’s first coronation,
a great two-day military tournament was staged featuring dis-
plays of the skills of “every branch of the Service” from ancient
hand-to-hand (and foot-to-foot) combat to the building of a
bridge under battle conditions by the army engineers. The tour-
nament even included a mock engagement featuring the
“bombing” of a village by the air corps and the dousing of the
flames by the fire brigade, whose arrival was greeted with loud
cheers by the enthusiastic audience.181 In December 1921, on
the occasion of the visit to Siam of Marshal Joffre, who was re-
ceived with extraordinary displays of courtesy and honor, the
Siamese military was again shown off “at its best.” Some four
thousand troops were assembled for a general inspection, and
other activities were scheduled that were calculated to impress
the French general with Siamese military strength and profi-
ciency.182
PRODUCTS OF PARTICIPATION
In the area of foreign relations, there is no question that Siam’s
participation in World War I yielded practical results. Since
these results were primarily the consequence of diplomacy and
only indirectly related to the rising spirit of nationalism, they
need not be related in detail here; a brief summary will suffice.
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A large step was taken at Versailles. One objective, the
formal abrogation of all German treaty rights in Siam, was
easily accomplished. Although Siam had expected no difficulty
in gaining “full satisfaction” from the Germans, nonetheless
Prince Charoon, the head of Siam’s delegation to Versailles, ex-
pressed the belief that the recognition by the powers of Siam’s
“full jurisdiction over one of the great European states” augured
well for the future: “To have this in black and white signed by
all the Allied nations as well as the enemy, is indeed important
for the future.”183
With regard to the more difficult goal of revising treaties
with other nations in order to rid Siam of the limitations on its
fiscal and juridical autonomy, the King’s advice to his delegates
at Versailles was to pursue these goals astutely and delicately,
“being careful not to make other delegates annoyed or angry,
which would lose us our advantage.”184
The Siamese delegates followed Vajiravudh’s instructions,
but found only one responsive listener, the American president
Woodrow Wilson. After his conference with the Siamese, Wilson
wrote the Department of State that he felt “there is a great deal
of force in their contentions” and indicated his desire “to go as
far as it is prudent and possible … in conforming to their sug-
gestions.”185 The negotiations with the United States proceeded
rapidly and successfully, and by the end of 1920 a new treaty
had been negotiated whereby the Americans surrendered all
fiscal rights (subject only to most-favored-nation treatment) and
all extraterritorial rights (subject only to a five-year option to
withdraw cases from Siamese jurisdiction).
The American concessions were real and significant, but
there still remained the large task of convincing other nations
to follow the same route. And Great Britain, the most powerful
Western power in Asia and in Siam, was the power to convince.
The British were generous in their praise of Siam and Siam’s
war role. And the British minister in Siam assured Vajiravudh
that the British delegates at Versailles would be “wholehearted”
in their support of Siam. Since the minister was not specific as
to what would be supported, the King in his reply came closer
to the point: “Siam’s desires will not be really very ambitious
and will be confined merely to things that really matter in order
to ensure our national freedom and right to live!”186 In an effort
to persuade the minister to help, the King added: “I have been
called an incorrigible optimist, but somehow I have faith in the
honesty of my Allies, especially in my immediate neighbours,
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who in my opinion must surely have already become convinced
of the sincerity of Siam’s desire to live at peace and absolute
amity with them.”187
The British seemed willing enough to consider tariff revision
favorably, but they were reluctant to renounce extraterritorial
rights.188 The British minister to Siam, and British individuals,
were critical of Thai courts and opposed to placing British
subjects unconditionally under Thai law. A veritable campaign
had been waged in the English-language press since at least
mid-1918 about Siamese judicial shortcomings and the con-
tinual “poor advertisements of the state of the administration of
justice in Siam.”189 In the spring of 1919, while the Versailles
meetings were going on, the chief justice of Siam’s highest
court, Prince Svasti, was involved in a scandal that resulted fi-
nally in his dismissal from the government. Prince Charoon was
convinced that the Svasti case constituted a real “handicap” in
negotiations with the British.190 One of the Siamese delegates
to Versailles, in his conversations with an official of the British
Foreign Office on Siam’s hopes for treaty revision, assured
the official that Siam would do nothing drastic with its au-
tonomy; he said, also, that the British claim that Siamese courts
“do not quite work in good order” represented merely one
opinion—an opinion with which he certainly could not concur.
The Siamese delegate, in what would appear to have been a
considerable departure from the royal instructions calling for
extreme care, made an indirect threat to the British by bringing
up the Japanese idea of a Monroe Doctrine for Asia, but added:
“Siam prefers her old friends and neighbours.”191
In Siam the policy of doing all that was possible to please the
British, to win them over with favors, was continued. One re-
markable evidence of this policy was the proclamation early in
January 1920 of a decree barring all former enemy aliens from
reentry into Siam for three years.192 By way of preparing for this
policy, which may have reflected the King’s own anti-German
bias, Vajiravudh, again using the alias Ramachitti, wrote a bit-
terly anti-German article entitled “We Don’t Need Lizards.” The
article, repeating much of the atrocity propaganda of the Allies,
compared the “Huns” to water lizards and declared that Siam
already had a surfeit of vile creatures of that sort.193
Despite the blandishments of the Siamese, little progress
was made in treaty negotiations for some time. Only two
powers, Japan and France, seemed willing to follow the
American lead. By 1923 a new treaty on the American model
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had been negotiated with Japan, and discussions with France
along the same lines were well advanced. No progress at all,
however, had been made with the British.
The logjam was finally broken in 1924 with the appointment
of Francis Bowes Sayre of the Harvard Law School as Adviser
in Foreign Affairs. Sayre took the Siamese case directly to the
centers of power and decision in Europe, and in a period of nine
months succeeded in persuading the ten European states with
special rights in Siam to assent to new treaties.194 By August
of 1925 he was able to cable King Vajiravudh that “Siam’s com-
plete autonomy is now regained.”195
The achievements of the war in the area of the mind, in
stimulating the national unity the King hoped for, are much
more difficult to estimate than the achievements in the area of
foreign relations. Vajiravudh apparently thought that the results
were good. In his birthday speech in 1921, in commenting on
the general state of Thai nationalism, he observed that there
had been “a progressive realization” of the consciousness of the
Thai people “of the love for their country, of the duties that
the individual owes to the State, and of the notion of right and
justice for nations,” all of which were tokens of a people “being
truly civilized.” He added “… it has become more and more ap-
parent that our people are realizing the importance of the de-
fence of their country.”196
Some foreign observers also noted real effects of the mili-
tarist campaigns and of involvement in the war itself in stim-
ulating nationalism in Siam. Most conscious of change were
the French in Indochina, who consistently throughout the reign
were most sensitive to Thai nationalism as the source of a pos-
sible threat to the French colony. The Saigon Opinion in early
1921 commented:
The Siamese nation is at an interesting stage of its evolution. In
it, as in many others, the great War has infused a new ardour,
a powerful breath of national feeling, a certain degree of com-
bativeness in order to reach the level of civilisation of the great
Western Powers.
The article went on to speak of the “awakening of this small
nation” and “the fever which now burns the Siamese people,”
who had come to realize “that a people cannot escape defeat
and humiliation unless it has the energy indispensable for the
defence of its own interests.”197
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The French writer in Indochina may have somewhat exag-
gerated the strength of Siamese national spirit, but it can hardly
be doubted that some change along the lines of his observations
occurred as a result of Siam’s participation in World War I.
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The West as Model
Nationalism in Siam under King Vajiravudh was riddled withparadoxes—as it probably has been in all places and in all
times, for nationalism is essentially a phenomenon of the emo-
tions rather than of reason. A population stirred to loyalty to the
state is the goal, and the ways to that goal are various and often
seemingly incompatible. A nationalistic people needs to be
proud of its nation. And the elements of that pride must, in large
part at least, be universals, that is to say, elements widely
agreed upon as desirable throughout the world. A nationalistic
people must feel that it excels in significant ways, that what it
excels in—an empire on which the sun never sets, an ability to
tame and populate a wilderness, a refinement in the arts and
culture—elicits the praise and envy of other peoples. In addition
to universals, a nationalistic people may focus its pride on qual-
ities that are unique, that no other people considers noteworthy
or worthwhile. But an exclusive diet of the special is an austere
diet little apt to satisfy nationalistic appetites. Nationalism char-
acteristically has fed on both the universal and the particular.
132
And so with the new and the old. Since nationalism is a
modern phenomenon, its tokens have taken modern forms. Ex-
cellence or preeminence in the desiderata of the industrial age
has been the goal. Miles of railroad lines, gross production of
coal and iron, numbers of cotton mills, total tonnage of mer-
chant ships, firepower of armies are the criteria for pride. But
nationalism need not consist entirely of the new. The old also
has its place. The new tends to equate with the universal; the
old, with the unique.
In developing a nationalistic program for Siam, King Vaji-
ravudh had to include the universal and the new, to which he
could also add the unique and the old. The former will be con-
sidered in this chapter; the latter, in chapter 8.
In the fields of the widely acknowledged new sources of na-
tional pride, Siam could hardly hope for preeminence. For these
fields were virtually all pioneered by Western nations; the stan-
dards of value of the modern world were Western values, arising
out of the context of centuries-long development in Western
culture. They were values that had been forged in the blast fur-
naces of the Industrial Revolution into the constituents of un-
precedented wealth and power. The best that Siam could hope
for in these fields was some progress, some significant advances
that would win the nation respect.
And so Siam under Vajiravudh built railroad lines and tele-
graph lines, constructed roads and bridges, improved ports, es-
tablished military and civil aviation. The modest program of
technological advance started by King Chulalongkorn was con-
tinued and expanded by Vajiravudh. Whenever possible—as, for
example, in the field of aviation—maximum capital was made of
modern advances for nationalistic purposes.
The use of the modern Thai military as a point for new pride
is clear. Above and beyond the belief in the practical utility of
the armed forces as armed forces, King Vajiravudh obviously
saw the army, the navy, and, indeed, the Wild Tigers and Boy
Scouts as proud emblems of Siam’s growing modernity. With
due allowance made for Siam’s size, its military might, said Va-
jiravudh, was approaching equality with the West.
The ultimate in national pride, the King implied, would come
from real power defined in Western terms of economic and mil-
itary strength. Power produced pride. But it was also true—and
here the King spoke unequivocally—that pride produced power.
The road to power for a small, underdeveloped, and ununified
country such as Siam was extremely long and lonely. Such a
road could not be traversed without stamina and spirit. It could
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not be traversed without a national will. So, while power should
be pursued in a practical way with whatever means were at
hand, the national will also needed development. Development
of a national will would bring real power much faster. And de-
velopment of a national will, further, would be easier to accom-
plish, would require at least less capital if not less energy. Such
seems to have been the pattern of Vajiravudh’s conscious and
unconscious thought.
The outstanding instances of the Westernization programs
initiated by Vajiravudh, outside of the military, belong predom-
inantly to the category of the accomplishable, the attainable.
They were often programs for introducing symbols of Western-
ization. Even though the new elements were little more than
symbols, they could win foreign praise, they could raise internal
morale, and they could lead to equation—in a limited way—with
the West. Perhaps even, miracle of miracles, the “symbol” might
prove in the end to be the “secret.” The unknown wellsprings of
the mysterious West might serendipitously be found to lie, for
example, in the Western predilection for surnames.
SURNAMES
In traditional Siam, as in the rest of South and Southeast Asia,
surnames were unknown. For most people the only appellation
was the given name. There was a wealth of such names.1 Some
were pure Thai words for various fruits and flowers,2 personal
characteristics, and the like. Less frequently, Sanskrit or Pali
words were used. Many of the latter had grandiloquent or reli-
gious meanings—for example, “peerless,” “merit,” “superb.”
It can be assumed that, for purposes of personal identifi-
cation, the Thai in traditional times were well served by given
names. Society in those times was village oriented, and there
was little population movement. Further, Siam lacked social
organizations such as the clan, for which in many societies
special means of organizational identification have been de-
vised. The preponderance of outside cultural influences from
India, where surnames are not used, rather than from China,
where the names of ancient progenitors have long been passed
on from generation to generation,3 reinforced the habit of re-
liance on given names and enriched the vocabulary from which
such names could be chosen.
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Not for all individuals in traditional Siam, however, did
identification rest on personal names alone. People who
“counted” in traditional society—that is, the elite, who were
either members of the royal family or appointed nobles—were
identified by an elaborate system of titles made up of ranks and
conferred names. These titles functioned in much the same way
as personal names. A commoner born as Sing (“Lion”) could rise
in the bureaucracy to the appointed rank of čhaophraya with
the specific conferred name Bο̨dintharadecha. His rank and
conferred name (Čhaophraya Bο̨dintharadecha), rather than his
given personal name, would be the name used for him. Similar
ranks and conferred names existed for members of the royal
family. The conferred name usually indicated in some way the
individual’s duties or functions, and when a person was pro-
moted to a new rank, he was usually given a new conferred
name as well. At any given time no two individuals would ever
bear the same title; identification of members of the elite, from
lesser clerks to high ministers of government, was thus precise
and unequivocal. The use of such a system of titles deem-
phasized the individual, since an individual, as he rose in the
bureaucracy, would be known by different names at different
stages of his career.
A clue to Vajiravudh’s interest in the subject of name reform
was provided by an essay he wrote in 1906. The then Prince,
writing under a pen name, gave essentially practical reasons
for favoring surnames: surnames would be a great convenience
in precisely identifying people and showing their family back-
ground.4
This early trial balloon was followed in later years by some
favorable editorials in the press on the subject of surnames.
There is no doubt that the English-language press, at least, fa-
vored reform in the Siamese name system. It even gave nation-
alistic reasons for such a reform. One correspondent in 1910
suggested that surnames indeed constituted “one of the signs
by which one may judge of the progress of civilization in a
people” and that in this area Siamese civilization could stand
improvement.5 A year after Vajiravudh came to the throne an
editorial in the Bangkok Times recommended adoption of family
names as a means for placing more emphasis on the individual
and his family connection and thus advancing “the patriotic
spirit which is moving the country today.”6
The decree announcing the awarding of surnames was
issued—with very little prior notice of its coming—on March 22,
1913.7 It thus was an early act of the King, coming only two
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years and four months after the start of the reign. The pre-
amble of the decree gave only a brief statement of the reasons
for its enactment. It said that the King wished to ensure that
government records of births, marriages, and deaths would be
clear and reliable and that identification of individuals and their
line of descent would be free from possible error. These goals
he believed would be achieved by the universal adoption of sur-
names in the state.
The obvious benefit of surnames, cited by various Thai au-
thors,8 was their great utility in personal identification. The
growth in population had led to a great multiplication of rep-
etitions of given names. One commune might have ten people
named Di; how could the good Di be told from the bad one?9
Clearly this was a problem for society as a whole, and most
particularly for government. A government that was anxious to
build its central power needed to establish a close connection
with its people, and a close connection required precise identi-
fication of individuals.
A fuller explanation of the social utility of surnames has
been given by a former royal official. He cites three main func-
tions of surnames. First, surnames are the basis for the contin-
uation of a paternal line of descent. Second, surnames promote
family identity, a love and friendship that extends from family
members of high rank down to those of low position. And, third,
surnames are a good attribute of people no matter what their
race or lineage because the family name is “like a flag of victory
promoting the pride of people who are members of the family.”
The family name is something family members are spurred on to
protect, to keep unblemished, to glorify by individual achieve-
ments and beneficial intrafamilial contacts.10
The social value of surnames was clearly spelled out by King
Vajiravudh himself. In his birthday speech of January 1914, he
succinctly summed up the specific social aims of the new law:
“It is hoped that this law will prove a social benefit and an aid
in the maintenance of family tradition. It will also serve as an
incentive to every one to uphold not only personal honour but
the honour of the family as well.”11 In an essay, he explained
the more far-reaching results that he hoped for. The cohesion
of the family, the growth of love and respect along family lines,
the proper governance of a family —all of which, he said, would
be promoted by the use of surnames—would be means for in-
stilling respect for government. A family, the King stated, is
bound together by love. Younger members of the family respect
their elders because they know that their elders act only for the
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benefit of the family as a whole. The strengthening of such at-
titudes on the family level could not help but find expression in
attitudes toward government. Inculcation of love in the family
would inevitably promote inculcation of love toward the head of
the government of the nation.12
Administrative and social usefulness were arguments for the
surname decree, but, as with so many of the King’s actions,
international prestige was never far from the King’s mind. Vaji-
ravudh’s syllogistic reasoning is clear: Western countries were
progressive; Western countries had surnames; Thailand, to be
progressive, must also have surnames. The King came closest to
stating the equation that surnames equal progress in an essay
comparing surnames with clan names.13 He wrote: “Now we
have surnames and it can be said that we have caught up with
people who are regarded as civilized.”
The King’s essay comparing surnames with clan names
demonstrated two important aspects of the King’s nationalism:
first, his desire to equate the Thai with Westerners; second, his
desire to distinguish the Thai from the Chinese and to prove
that the Thai were ahead of their one-time-superior neighbors
in the march toward progress. Clans, the King stated, marked
an early stage in human progress and arose out of the need for
primitive groups in a Hobbesian world to protect themselves.
Such was the nature of the Scottish clan, the Chinese sae,14 the
American Indian totem. But the march of progress had moved
beyond the clan to the larger unit of the nation. And in the
nation clans were a disruptive force that had to be eliminated.
“Nations,” the King stated, “that have become civilized in the
modern sense, even if they traditionally used clan names from
ancient times, have changed to the use of surnames.”15 Only
the Chinese, as a nation in the modern world, still clung to the
use of “the old-fashioned clan names.” The King admitted that
in earlier times the Chinese had been more advanced than the
Thai and that the Thai, for this reason, had looked up to the
Chinese, had been glad to learn from the Chinese.16 But times
had changed. The Chinese had grown self-satisfied, had fallen
behind in the advance of civilization, were determinedly holding
on to customs now out of date. The Thai, the King implied,
must turn to new leaders. And, in the matter of surnames, by
so doing Siam had “succeeded in surpassing its neighbor which
still has no surnames but only the clan names that were their
ancient custom.”17 The Thai surnames, then, had nothing to do
with Chinese clan names, and the King showed considerable ir-
ritation with those whose ignorance or superficial knowledge or
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sympathy with the Chinese led them to suppose that the royal
decree on surnames was inspired by the outmoded Chinese
custom.18 Such people should certainly realize that the King
was perceptive enough to know better.19
The decree of March 22, 1913, was a clear document of
twenty articles that set forth the details of the law. Its main
provisions were as follows: Surnames were to be adopted by
all Thai. The surname was to be the permanent name of the
family and was to be handed down in the male line. A married
woman was to bear her husband’s surname. Neither given name
nor surname was to be changed without securing prior per-
mission from the district (amphoe) official The family head, that
is, the oldest living male of a family, was to choose the family
name. This name had to be a suitable one: it must be in keeping
with the person’s position (certain names were to be restricted
to royalty or to the nobility and were not to be used by com-
moners); it should not have coarse connotations; it must not re-
quire more than ten letters to write; it must not duplicate any
other surname in a district or neighboring district. District offi-
cials were to help the people choose surnames, and, to this end,
circulars were to be issued listing possible names. Names were
to be registered in the district office, and a certificate of reg-
istration was to be awarded the family head. There was to be
no charge for this registration. The decree was to become law
on July 1, 1913, and six months thereafter all heads of families
were to have complied by registering a name with the district
office. At the end of the six-month period no official document
was to be prepared that did not set down the surname as well
as the given name of individuals mentioned in the document.
The decree of March 1913 constituted the basic law, but
there were elaborations in the writings and actions of the King.
The surname idea was Vajiravudh’s; it became one of his pet
projects. He could not restrain himself—as in so many other of
his favorite projects—from getting personally involved in the de-
tailed working out of the idea. He developed systems for differ-
entiating social classes by means of the surnames. He decided
how names should be transliterated into Roman letters. He per-
sonally devised and awarded many names for members of his
court.
Surnames, the King had early decided, were not to be
chosen at random or haphazardly. The family name should be a
token of family pride, and every effort should be made to find
as root for the name some distinguished or noteworthy prog-
enitor. Certain names were reserved for high princes. These
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names were composed of elements derived from an ancestor’s
name to which was added na Krungthep (“of Bangkok”).20 High
provincial officials who stemmed from regional hereditary
princely families were surnamed na plus the name of the lo-
cality—for example, na Chiangmai and na Songkhla. Members
of the nobility were frequently given names pointing to the of-
ficial position the family held.
The King freely offered his services to members of the court
who wanted personal royal attention in devising a proper
surname. The petitioner was urged to supply the King with in-
formation on his parentage, his family’s usual occupation, and
the like. Vajiravudh then meticulously set to work. Often he
chose an ancestor’s given name, a place name, or an occu-
pation as the base for the surname. If the King thought the
root word he had settled on was too homely, he drew on his
fund of knowledge of Pali and Sanskrit and brought forth the
name in more resplendent form. Someone whose family had
been associated with horses or the cavalry would find the simple
Thai word ma rendered as Atsawa. If someone’s ancestor had
been called Lek (“little”), the substitution would be apt to be
Čhula. Foreigners who wished to be naturalized as Thai could
also petition for Thai surnames. The names awarded usually
had some connection in meaning or sound with the original
foreign names. For example, a Chinese named Tan was renamed
Tantha; a Westerner named Lawson was renamed Lawasan.21
When the King personally devised a surname, he prepared
a document setting forth the name, the reasons for his choice,
and the way in which the name should be transcribed in Roman
letters. One petitioner, a noble with the title Čhaophraya
Thewetsarawongwiwat, was advised to take the name of a royal
progenitor, Prince Kunčhο̨n, spelled Kunjara in Western
letters.22 Such documents are still preserved by many Bangkok
families. And the spellings devised by the King, which are
transliterations of Thai writing rather than phonetic renderings,
are also usually adhered to.23
When the decree was announced, the Bangkok Times hailed
the news and opined that “the change can be brought about
without great difficulty.”24 This optimism was unwarranted. As
it turned out, numerous difficulties arose. The deadline in the
original decree was not met. Other deadlines were set: April 1,
1914; April 1, 1915; April 1, 1918.25 All proved to be too op-
timistic. By the end of the reign in 1925, it appeared that en-
forcement of the decree had been indefinitely postponed.26
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The main difficulties in enforcement arose in rural areas.
Urban Thai, Bangkok Thai, especially those associated with the
government, seem to have taken to surnames readily enough.
Educated Thai could understand the reasoning behind the
decree and, further, were the element in the population most
anxious to please the King. The King’s personal interest was
a powerful stimulus; apparently King Vajiravudh himself de-
vised or awarded more than 3,000 names.27 In the countryside,
however, among the farmers who comprised some 90 percent
of the population, the decree was more difficult to enforce. The
majority of the farmers were illiterate, and surnames meant
nothing to them. Apparently there were breaks also in the
administrative machinery leading from Bangkok to the villages.
At the top of the administrative ladder the law was effective, but
as it was passed down from ministerial office to province to dis-
trict to commune to village, enforcement became progressively
laxer and laxer. As late as 1924 the Ministry of Interior was still
having trouble in getting its own officials to comply with the
law. By this date the ministry had made possession of a family
name a prerequisite for all new appointments to the positions
of commune head and village chief.28 But it seems clear that
many of these lowest officials in the hierarchy, the officials who
maintained the closest relations with the general population,
were themselves unappreciative of the surname decree. A news-
paper report of 1924, which complained of the lack of effort in
urging people to adopt surnames, stated: “The average kamnan
[commune head] and phu-yai-ban [village chief] say frankly that
they have neither duty nor responsibility in the matter….”29
Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that the average
farmer did nothing to acquire a second name.
For those in the general population who did attempt to
comply with the decree, there were also problems. A newspaper
report illustrates the dilemma faced by many:
If the average farang [Westerner] was suddenly fronted with the
problem of selecting a surname for himself and his family, with a
world of names to choose from, he would naturally be somewhat
bewildered, and one may be sure a deal of human nature would
be displayed in the choice. How many of us would after due de-
liberation select the ordinary names we now bear? Who among us
would expect his wife to be content with a plebeian patronymic
when there is a bookful of high-sounding possibilities?30
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Some Thai commoners chose their names well, too well from
the government’s point of view, by seizing on names with royal
or noble connotations. To check this tendency, lists of forbidden
names had to be compiled and disseminated.31
As far as is known, there was only one objection to names
on principle. An article in a Thai publication late in 1925 raised
the question of whether the possession of surnames might not
lead to favoritism: a high official might tend to be prejudiced in
favor of a job applicant or a legal suppliant who bore the same
family name. This objection was dismissed in the English-lan-
guage press with the statement that “With or without surnames
there are ways of pressing the claims of relationship on those in
place and power….” In fact, the argument continued, the pos-
session of surnames should discourage favoritism, for the name
advertised the relationship for all to see.32
Problems of surnames in the countryside did not cease even
among those who had chosen and registered names and ac-
quired the legal documents recording the new possession. For
the whole process was still meaningless to the average peasant.
The surname did not answer any need of his; it did not fill a
vacuum in his cabinet of desires. It was tolerable; it, at least,
did not cost anything.33 But it was no more loved or even re-
membered than Americans love or remember their social se-
curity numbers. The ordinary villager who got a paper with his
surname on it, said one newspaper account, brought it home
and stuck it into the bamboo-plaited wall or in the thatched roof,
and in no time at all the document was gone—eaten by rats or
termites. If the villager should be asked what his surname was,
he would not know.34
In the years since the first proclamation of surnames in
1913, surnames have become universal in Thailand. The law on
surnames is enforced; government records include surnames.
Characters in novels and short stories are supplied with sur-
names. Newspaper accounts give surnames. And individuals,
even in villages, apparently know their surnames. There is no
doubt that the family name has become a permanent feature
in Thai life, so much so that many Thai are probably unaware
that there was ever a time when surnames did not exist. Yet it
would be inaccurate to assume that surnames perform the same
function in Thai society that they do in Western society. For
the most immediately recognizable part of a Thai name remains
the first name. And this is the name that is most frequently
used. A newspaper article may begin by referring to Mr. Sanya
Dharmasakti, but later references will always be to Mr. Sanya.
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The predominance of the first name extends even to Western
writings on the Thai: Pridi, Thanom, Seni are all more familiar
than Phanomyong, Kittikachorn, or Pramoj. In the village, adults
are apt to know their own family name and those of a few close
neighbors, but school-age children often do not.35 The surname
functions as a means of making government records accurate; it
functions to identify individuals precisely. On the personal level,
it may be felt to be a kind of royal ornament, perhaps a kind of
honorable title, in the tradition of the titles once granted by the
king to government officials.36
The larger social purposes that King Vajiravudh hoped
would be served by family names seem not to have been served.
The Thai traditionally have felt no strong familial ties in time;
there has been little or no interest in genealogy. Nor is there
now. King Vajiravudh hoped that Thai bearing the same name, a
name derived from an honored progenitor, would develop a kind
of family pride. This sense of lineage ties and lineage respon-
sibilities might then serve as a stimulus to national drives and
national unity. No such sense of lineage seems to have resulted
from the adoption of surnames. No perceptible change in atti-
tudes toward the past or the future has been noticed.
The success of Vajiravudh’s reform lay in the acceptance of
a Western model by domesticating it. A foreign concept was
transformed and made Thai. By providing surnames with high-
sounding Sanskrit roots, Vajiravudh gave the reform the fa-
miliar ring of traditional conferred names; in a sense he was
elevating the entire population to the prestige of royal position.
The failure of the reform lay, it would seem, principally in
Vajiravudh’s own definition of success. It is difficult to imagine
that the unity, power, and devotion to the nation that Vajiravudh
admired in the West could have been achieved in any appre-
ciable degree by adopting the Western custom of surnames.
Hardly so much could be expected from what was essentially a
convenient habit.
“KING RAMA”
The system of names, ranks, and titles in traditional Siam was
enormously complex. It was difficult even for Thai to under-
stand; most Westerners despaired of understanding it.37
Siamese leaders were well aware of the difficulty West-
erners had with princely and noble names, ranks, and titles, and
from the time of King Mongkut attempts were made to explain
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the system and even to simplify it. For the kings and officials
knew that what the West could not understand, it would be sure
to deprecate.
It was primarily to win Western approbation that several
changes in the system were made in the Sixth Reign. One was
to provide translations for princely ranks whereby the three
highest such ranks would be termed His (or Her) Royal
Highness, His (or Her) Highness, and His (or Her) Serene
Highness.38 Some thought seems to have been given to refor-
mation of the names and titles of appointed nobles throughout
the bureaucracy; at least Prince Damrong was charged with the
task of preparing a “rationalization” scheme for such official
designations. Prince Damrong submitted a huge draft along
with a note saying that true rationalization embracing all min-
istries of government would be impossible to achieve.39
The most important change in the area of official appella-
tions was the adoption by the King of a new “dynastic” name
on November 11, 1916, the sixth anniversary of his first coro-
nation.40 The name Ramathibο̨di in Thai, to be translated King
Rama in English, followed by the proper reign number, was to
be used as a simple means for designating the kings of the
Chakkri dynasty. The dynastic founder, formerly termed Phra
Phutthayο̨tfačhulalok, became Rama I; his successors became
Ramas II, III, IV, V. King Vajiravudh was to be known as King
Rama VI. Older name systems were not to be abandoned: the
use of the very long official “royal style and title” was to con-
tinue; so was the use of personal names, which had been in-
stituted by King Mongkut. But preference was to be given to
the new scheme. Although no clue as to the origin of this name
scheme appears in the available literature, it seems clear that
it was inspired by European custom. England had its succession
of Georges; now Siam had its succession of Ramas.
After the adoption of the Rama name, all medals that bore
abbreviations for King Vajiravudh were changed so that the ab-
breviations would stand for King Rama VI. By 1919 the King had
even come to use Rama R. (a shortened version of Rama Rex) as
his personal signature.41
Some changes, apparently inspired by the European model,
were instituted in modes of address. The terms nangsao for
“Miss,” nang for “Mrs.,” and khunying for “Lady” (the wife of a
high-ranking noble) were prescribed by royal rescript in 1917.42
A similar system for children was instituted in 1921, but the dis-
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tinctions it made between the offspring of government officials
and those of commoners raised an outcry in the local press and
the system was quickly abandoned.43
THE FLAG
Symbols. Lions and unicorns rampant. Black eagles with
feathers unfurled. Stars and stripes. What is a nation without
its emblems, its immediately recognizable symbols? Vajiravudh
was well aware of their importance. In one speech he stated
it very clearly: “Whatever the task undertaken, there must be
something to symbolize its meaning so that the spirit will be in-
volved.”44
A country’s primary symbol is its national flag. Siam had
one, a white elephant on a red field, the design from King
Mongkut’s days. But to King Vajiravudh it seemed not dignified
enough. And shame of shames could and did result when out
of inadvertence or ignorance the flag was raised upside down.
Such a misadventure occurred in September 1916.
The misadventure was associated with the King’s trip up
river to the northern provinces. It had long been customary for
Bangkok kings to make a royal progress by boat to the palace
retreat at Bang Pa-in, near Ayutthaya, during the lull in gov-
ernment business in September. In 1916, however, rains had
been particularly heavy and there was fear of destructive floods.
The King decided to journey farther to the north than was usual
in order to appraise the flood dangers for himself. The boat
trip would also constitute a holiday, and the visit to new places
would give him a chance to see some of his up-country subjects,
and be seen by them, for the first time.
The royal party reached the town of Utthaithani on Sep-
tember 15. The local people, whose opportunities to welcome
a royal guest were rare indeed, outdid themselves in prepa-
ration. A royal pavilion had been specially built. Everywhere
there were banners and flowers. And flags. The national white
elephant flag. Or, more commonly, since elephant flags were ex-
pensive and hard to come by, simple streamers of cloth of the
colors of the elephant flag, red and white.
On the following day the King and his party proceeded by
land to visit a local temple and to give the people of Utthaithani
a chance to pay their respects to their monarch. On the way Va-
jiravudh noticed that there were relatively few national flags;
he also had misgivings about the use of strips of red and white
Chaiyo!
144
cloth in lieu of a flag, feeling that these partook too much of
“Chinese custom.” But the genuine displays of popular affection
stilled his misgivings.
Along the route lay a small peasant house whose owner,
somehow, had found a small flag. The King stared in disbelief.
The flag was flying upside down, with the elephant supine, all
four feet pointing heavenward. The King quickly turned away
and made no remark then or later. But, according to a member
of his party who remembers this incident at Utthaithani and
whose description is relied on here, the incident was the crisis
that ended in the adoption of a new national flag shortly there-
after.45
Whatever the importance of the incident at Utthaithani,
there were other reasons for Vajiravudh’s interest in changing
the flag design. For one thing, the King had always taken a
special interest in such symbols as medals, decorations, and
uniforms, and the flag fit into this category. All flags, even those
of ministries or departments, had to be submitted for the King’s
approval, which was by no means automatic.46 Flags were given
great prominence. The theme of many of the King’s addresses
was the flag as the symbol of national spirit. One could look on
a flag, he said, as merely “a piece of cloth” or as “a rag on a
pole.” But in fact, because of the association of ideas, a flag was
transformed in men’s eyes into a rallying point for the entire
nation.47 The King made clear that the flags that he presented
as colors to military and Wild Tiger units were to be regarded
as betokening the King’s own presence. In one typical address
Vajiravudh told a story about the god Indra’s instructions to his
soldiers in a battle: when they became exhausted, they were to
look at the flag of their general, for that would make them re-
cover their strength. Siam, the King said, had three flags—the
king, the nation, and Buddhism. Of the flag that symbolized the
nation he said:
The Thai flag is no one’s slave! It has never been anyone’s slave!
We’ll never let it become anyone’s slave. We will never let this flag
be dirtied in the dust, be besmirched in the mud. We may stain it
with our blood, but it is impossible for us to let it be soiled by dust
or mud!48
The national flag was, of course, especially important. It
was, or ought to be, the symbol par excellence of national
glory. But Siam had a flag that was termed by one Westerner
a “distinctive emblem”49 and described by another as “pic-
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turesque.”50 Perhaps it was the picturesque that bothered the
King. The elephant flag may have been seen as too exotic,
too quaint for a young nation that wanted respect, honor, and
esteem for its progressiveness.
Further, the elephant flag had some practical disadvantages.
The flags were printed, and printed materials had to be bought
from abroad. Importation made them relatively expensive. The
design was often poorly executed, frequently making the ele-
phant an un-definable species of quadruped. If a simpler design
were adopted, one that could be made locally, one that it would
be impossible to hang improperly, the national flag, rightly dis-
played, could become common and universally known
throughout the country.
The matter of changing the flag design was broached to
government ministers. On May 27, 1916, the Minister of
Marine, Prince Paribatra, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Prince Devawongse, collaborated on a report that advised
against any flag change, at least for the moment. Their ar-
gument was based on tradition: the old flag was well known
all over the world; it was highly respected by the Thai people;
it was associated with the prosperity of the kingdom and the
dynasty. As to the King’s dissatisfaction with the execution of
the elephant design, the navy could either release an approved
design to foreign manufacturers or else see to the local manu-
facture of a suitable product.51
The matter rested for a time. The King experimented with
various designs, including a pattern of red and white stripes
that he ultimately rejected as too plain.
Siam’s entry into World War I seems to have decided the flag
matter once and for all. At a meeting of the Council of Ministers
on August 18, 1917, Prince Chakrabongs announced the King’s
resolve to adopt a new flag and the council went along.52 The
new design, decreed on September 28, was the striped tricolor
that remains the national flag of Thailand today.53
Vajiravudh produced the design. He found it beautiful. He
found it practical. He noted that the colors—red, white, and
blue—put Siam more fully in harmony with the Allied nations,
Siam’s brothers in arms, most of whom had standards of red,
white, and blue.
The King expanded on the symbology. The colors had
meaning: they represented the triumvirate of nation, faith, and
king (the Thai version of “god, king, and country”), the main-
stays of the united and strong Thai people. And to express his
satisfaction with a deed well done, Vajiravudh wrote a poem:
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Let me speak of the meaning
Behind the three colors.
White is for purity and betokens the three gems
And the law that guard the Thai heart.
Red is for our blood, which we willingly give up
To protect our nation and faith.
Blue is the beautiful hue of the people’s leader
And is liked because of him.54
Arranged in stripes, these three colors form the flag
That we Thai love.
Our soldiers carrying it forth to victory
Raise up the honor of Siam.55
PATRIOTIC HOLIDAYS
The court calendar of traditional Siam was replete with rites
and ceremonies. Most of these ceremonies were Brahmanic in
origin and were conducted within the palace; they were derived
from Indian practices based on the belief that the conduct of
proper rituals by the king or through his auspices would ensure
prosperity.
Significant changes in the court ceremonies were brought
about by King Mongkut in the mid-nineteenth century. The
changes were in two main directions: first, to add Buddhist cer-
emonies or provide for Buddhist participation in Brahmanic cer-
emonies; and, second, to add ceremonies giving prominence
to Siam’s royal house. The latter ceremonies had the effect of
adding a patriotic element to what had once been exclusively
magico-religious court affairs. Thus, for the first time, cere-
monies were inaugurated to honor the previous monarchs of the
Chakkri dynasty and to celebrate both the king’s birthday and
the anniversary of the king’s accession. In bringing into being
ceremonies of this patriotic sort, Mongkut was inspired by the
practices of nations of the “progressive” West.
The changes in royal ceremony introduced by King Mongkut
were continued in effect, with only periodic modifications, by
Kings Chulalongkorn and Vajiravudh. Vajiravudh modified the
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accession anniversary program on occasion by adding to it the
simultaneous celebration of other events—the opening of the
Bangkok water works in 1914, the introduction of the “Rama”
name in 1916, the commemoration of the armistice and League
of Nations in 1919, and the honoring of Siam’s military forces
in 1921. And he made his birthday celebrations more elaborate
than those of his predecessors, with more events scheduled
and wider participation, particularly of the population in the
provinces.
Vajiravudh’s main contribution to the ceremonial schedule
was to add two new patriotic days: Chulalongkorn Day and
Chakkri Day.
Chulalongkorn Day, October 23, the anniversary of the
King’s death, grew out of the public festivities during his reign
on his day of accession, November 16. These festivities were
celebrated on an unprecedented scale in 1908, the year com-
memorating the fortieth anniversary of the reign, and an eques-
trian statue of Chulalongkorn, paid for by voluntary public sub-
scription, was unveiled in that year. In 1910, the year of his
death, November 16 continued to be celebrated, but as a day of
mourning. In 1911 attention to Chulalongkorn was, of course,
centered around the day of his cremation, March 16; in the
fall, preparations for Vajiravudh’s second coronation took prece-
dence over everything else. By 1912 Vajiravudh had decided to
preserve a special day for his father, but he chose to move the
date from November to October 23, the date of Chulalongkorn’s
death. Chulalongkorn Day thus originated. In Bangkok the rites
centered around the equestrian statue of the King, in front
of which King Vajiravudh, and others, presented memorial
wreaths. The tribute to Chulalongkorn was in large measure a
popular and spontaneous outpouring of public sentiment, but
the government supported the occasion by providing entertain-
ments and by closing public schools for the day. The significance
of the day was made clear to the school children; the Bangkok
Times editorialized:
… the pupils have explained to them why the occasion is ob-
served. It is well that youth should be taught to praise and honour
the great dead; and just as Victoria Day is largely an opportunity
for bringing home to youth at school something of the meaning of
the British Empire, so Chulalongkorn Day may well survive to a
later generation as an aid to inspire youth with the spirit which
the Rulers of Siam in our time have done their utmost to foster.56
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Special rites and festivities for Chulalongkorn Day continued
throughout the Sixth Reign, and the day continues as one of
Thailand’s national holidays.
Chakkri Day, Vajiravudh’s second contribution to the cere-
monial schedule, was deliberately fostered as Siam’s “National
Day.” The essential purpose of Chakkri Day is to pay obeisance
to the deceased monarchs of the Chakkri dynasty. The practice
of paying such obeisance, before statues of earlier Chakkri
kings, started during the reign of King Mongkut; ceremonies of
obeisance were conducted on several occasions during the year.
King Vajiravudh singled out April 6, the date of the accession of
the first Chakkri king, as the day on which the honoring of his
predecessors was to be the central event. In 1918 the statues
of the preceding five kings were moved from a building within
the confines of the palace grounds, an area forbidden to the
general public, to another building in the accessible precincts of
the royal temple, Wat Phra Kaeo. The new site was suitably re-
named Prasat Phra Thepbidο̨n (“Palace of the Holy Ancestors”),
usually called the Royal Pantheon in English.57 On April 6, an
elaborate ceremony was performed in the pantheon and the day
was declared an auspicious day “both for the Chakkri Dynasty,
and also for Siam as a Nation.”58 On April 7 the pantheon was
opened to the public for general devotions.
In 1919 the ceremonies were repeated, and April 6 was for
the first time termed Chakkri Day and observed as a national
holiday.59 The observance of Chakkri Day was thus established.
The final elevation of Chakkri Day occurred almost as an
afterthought. In June 1920 the Spanish Minister for Foreign Af-
fairs, wanting to make a list of the national days of various coun-
tries, asked Prince Charoon, the Thai minister in Paris, what
day Siam celebrated as its national day. Prince Charoon could
not decide whether the proper answer should be the King’s
Birthday (January 1), New Year’s Day (April 1), or the Day of
the King’s Accession (November 11), so he put the question
to Prince Devawongse in Bangkok.60 Prince Devawongse pro-
ceeded to ask Vajiravudh, and the King’s reply was that
Charoon’s three guesses were all wrong; the Thai day compa-
rable to the French July 14 or the American July 4 was April
6—Chakkri Day.61 Perhaps because of Prince Charoon’s igno-
rance, Chakkri Day in 1921 was preceded by an announcement
from the Ministry of the Palace on the significance of the day.
Also, to make the day more popular, the festivities on April 6,
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1921, were made more elaborate than in prior years; they in-
cluded continuous performances by military brass bands from
4:00 P.M. to sunset.62
“CHAIYO!”
“Hooray!” “Viva!” “Sieg Heil!” “Bravo!” “Olé!” A comparable
term for expressing enthusiasm for a football team, a political
leader, or a king was unknown in old Siam. There was little
room in the traditional culture for such terms. Kings and other
great persons were revered, not cheered.
The few occasions when popular enthusiasm could be given
voice were affairs associated with religion. At the ordination
rites for a young monk or at temple circumambulatory rites
(wian thian), the mass of people might express their joy by
shouting “Ho hiw!” or, to show more joy, a lengthened “Ho-o-o-
o-o hiw!”
With the increase of public exposure for kings in the
Western style, and the desire by kings for more “public spirit”
and expressions of patriotism, the need arose for a more appro-
priate cheer.
If only because of his Wild Tiger appearances and speeches,
Vajiravudh quickly outdistanced his father in frequency of
public appearances. And in the first years of the reign, the “Ho
hiw” cheer was apparently used before the King. But in January
1914, after a very important nationalistic speech to a Wild Tiger
audience on the valor of the Thai ancestors, Vajiravudh in-
structed the Tigers in how to give a new yell, “Chaiyo!” It is
probable that some experiments with the yell had already been
conducted,63 but the performance of the unfamiliar cheer was
still deficient. Vajiravudh taught the Tigers how to space out the
syllables, chai—yo, and how to deliver the cheer in unison. The
Tigers ended up with a loud and clear “Chaiyo,” delivered three
times, that was completely to the King’s satisfaction. From
that time forward “Chaiyo!” became the Siamese equivalent of
“Hurrah!” and was used repeatedly after the King’s addresses
and at his various other appearances before Wild Tigers and
other groups.64
According to one Thai commentator, the King preferred
“Chaiyo” to “Ho hiw” because the latter cheer was so closely as-
sociated with Buddhism that it did not seem proper for purely
secular occasions. Other reasons may easily be imagined. For
one, chaiyo means victory; it thus had connotations well suited
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to the nationalistic and militaristic purposes of the King. For an-
other, Westerners found the sounds and tonal pattern of the old
yell exotic—eerie or funny rather than inspiring.65 Vajiravudh
most certainly would have been sensitive to such Western reac-
tions, would have been anxious to adopt a yell more acceptable
to Western ears.
SPORTS
In his search for the Western key to unlock nationalistic out-
pourings, King Vajiravudh came close to success in his stress on
sports.
When Vajiravudh came to the throne, the status of sports
in Siam contrasted sharply with that of sports in the England
that the King had known as a prince. English schools, clubs,
and military units all had their cricket and football teams and
countless other athletic groups that vied with each other in
seemingly endless matches. Final events attracted national at-
tention and enthusiastic crowds; in 1897 a crowd of 65,000 wit-
nessed the football contest for the English Cup played at the
Crystal Palace in London. In Siam the scene was totally dif-
ferent. Team sports were virtually unknown. Traditional ath-
letic events, such as takrο̨, boxing (Thai-style), and swordplay
competitions, were contests between individuals rather than
groups. Individuals played as individuals and not as represen-
tatives of schools or other such social units. Although Western
team sports, as well as other foreign sports such as gymnastics
and jujitsu, had entered Siam by 1910, they were not widely
played and attracted little attention.
Very early in the reign Vajiravudh adopted the policy of
sponsoring sports and athletics as part of national policy. The
training of both the Wild Tigers and the Boy Scouts included
athletic events of various sorts. The English-language press
commented in 1911: “At the moment physical culture seems to
be becoming a matter of national interest.’’66
The reasons for the King’s interest are apparent. The King
strongly believed in physical fitness, hardiness, and stamina; he
equated these with manliness and the “warrior” spirit that Thai
men were not demonstrating to their fullest potential. Further,
he believed that Thai men wasted much of their leisure—and
their strength—in gambling, drinking, and even opium smoking.
The government took steps to limit the accessibility of these
harmful attractions; gambling dens were finally outlawed com-
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pletely by 1917. But removal of corrupting and wasteful temp-
tations was not enough; attractive and worthwhile substitutes
had to be supplied. Sports and athletics were decided on as
those substitutes. The King pointed out that Thai soldiers, for
example; had had few forms of relaxation in the past. Military
training did require men to expend energy, but this was work,
not fun. Drinking was one resort, but it was expensive, and
it led to troubles for civilians (whose heads got broken), for
the police, and for officers. The army’s sponsorship of sports
was providing soldiers with a new form of relaxation that was
fun and not criminal.67 Sports had advantages, furthermore,
that went beyond the physical. Creation of a team of players
meant greater unity for the group: it tied a school together;
it made army men, or navy men, or a Wild Tiger unit, or any
group represented by a team, into a unified, loyal whole. And
for rival teams competing in a sportsmanlike way, it brought
increased knowledge, mutual respect, and a feeling of cama-
raderie. After team matches had been introduced, the King com-
mented: “The feeling of being friends and companions between
soldiers and Wild Tigers arose primarily from their playing
football together.”68 A final product of inculcating enthusiasm
for sports, it was hoped, would be to weld the entire nation to-
gether; as the Thai interest in and proficiency in sports grew, a
welling up of confidence and pride, national pride, would result.
To the extent that sports could further nationalism, Vajiravudh’s
prime goal, it was worth a serious effort.
The first actions to promote sports were taken in the
schools. On his annual visits to the Royal Pages College and to
Suan Kulap School, and on his periodic visits to the War College
and other Bangkok schools, the King viewed various athletic
events and awarded prizes to outstanding players. The Suan
Kulap visits began in January 1913,69 and every January there-
after the King came to the school, devoting a major segment of
his time there to viewing various athletic events. These events,
in which athletes and teams from other schools also partici-
pated, had by 1917 grown to include three cup prizes for track
contests and three for football championships.70 On December
27 and 28, 1913, Vajiravudh spent an entire day at the Royal
Pages School, arriving at 3:00 P.M. and leaving at 4:00 P.M. the
following day. Much of this time was occupied in viewing ath-
letic events. For the first time at the school a sports match was
scheduled—between the Royal Pages School and King’s College.
While there is no proof that the King had promoted the match,
he was openly pleased at seeing his two schools come together
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in sport and fellowship and he exhorted the students to uphold
the reputations of their schools, for by so doing they would be
upholding the honor of the country.71
Another early approach in expanding interest in sports was
developed through the Ministry of the Interior. This approach
was aimed at the provinces and was directly linked to the desire
to discourage gambling. On October 28, 1913, the minister
called together the lord lieutenants of the six provinces closest
to Bangkok. A proclamation had been issued shortly before
the meeting prohibiting “free gambling,” that is to say, open
public card playing, which had theretofore been allowed on the
three great national holidays. The minister urged the lord lieu-
tenants to do their utmost to “revive the national sports as a
popular institution at holiday time.”72 The advice was quickly
taken up. A few days after the conference, news from Nakhο̨n
Pathom announced that a “great feature” of the celebration
of the King’s Accession (November 9 through 13) would be a
series of athletic events. At the New Year’s festivals in Ayut-
thaya and Phitsanulok in April 1914 similar efforts were made.
The Lord Lieutenant of Ayutthaya made the new policy explicit
by delivering a speech against gambling.73 Reports from other
provinces, including some concerning the third great holiday,
the King’s Birthday, indicate that the policy was generally and
immediately put into effect.
The pro-sports policy, pursued in only moderate measures
through the first five years of the reign, came flamboyantly alive
in 1915. In the fall of 1915 the King became a football enthu-
siast. And, in immediate consequence, all of Siam was gripped
by football fever.
The source of the King’s sudden enthusiasm for football can
only be speculated on. In the summer of 1915 he made a journey
to the southern provinces. While in the South he attended a
number of functions in which sports contests, including football
games, were featured. Football seems to have gained, by this
time, a fair amount of popularity in the South, perhaps because
of the influence of the more football-conscious British colony of
Malaya nearby. In any event, in late July during the later part
of the King’s tour, the King’s attendants arranged a series of
football games between teams made up of members of the royal
retinue matched against teams from Nakhο̨n Sithammarat. The
King obviously enjoyed the matches, and his ideas of utilizing
sports on a national basis seem to have crystallized at this time.
After seeing the football games in Nakhο̨n Sithammarat the
King wrote:
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I am happy with this English game and wish it would spread
widely. Perhaps this is because I was educated in England, but I
hope you won’t think this is the only reason. I hope you who are
of the same race and generation as myself will agree that football
will be useful to the Thai people. We should help each other to
make this game that the British have demonstrated the utility of
endure long in Siam.74
Within four days after his return from the southern tour
the King had arranged for a series of eight matches between
various units of the Wild Tigers, the army, and the police.75
These appear to have been test-out and practice games. By the
end of the month the King, obviously feeling that his Thai boys
were ready, challenged the most avid “footballers” in Siam, the
British, to a match. The Thai players were to be the team of
the Royal Hunters Company of Wild Tigers; the adversaries,
a team of the Royal Bangkok Sports Club.76 While the Sports
Club legally and officially was not a foreign club (the King,
indeed, was the club’s honorary president, and Thai were free
to become members), in fact the club and, in particular, its
athletic activities were dominated by the British. Thus football
mania in Siam was to be kicked off by a competition with a dis-
tinctly nationalistic coloration, the Thai opposed to the British.
The match took place on September 5 and resulted in a
Sports Club win. But the disappointment of the Thai in the
results of the match did not cool their ardor for the game.
Royal high favor for football led to organization of many new
teams—by the palace guards, by the police school, by teachers,
by Wild Tiger units. In early September newspapers reported
that “there is not a football to be bought for love or money in
Bangkok.”77
The next move by King Vajiravudh was to institute a gold
cup competition for Thai teams. The competition began on Sep-
tember 11, 1915, and ended, three rounds and twenty-eight
games later, on October 27 with the Royal Naval College team
the winner of the cup. This series of matches became an annual
affair; the cup was later to be named the Warrior Cup. The or-
ganization of the Warrior Cup competition brought into being
a King’s Cup Committee to supervise the event. The committee
also issued a brochure that spoke of Vajiravudh’s “aim in giving
special encouragement to the game of football. The King wisely
desires to promote in every way opportunities for healthy open-
air exercise, and considers football to be a game suitable for the
development of the nation’s manhood and warrior spirit.”78
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In November yet another organization was created, the
Football Association of Siam, which was to serve as the general
governing body for football affairs. Vajiravudh became patron
of the association, and his favorite courtier, Phraya Prasit (later
to become Čhaophraya Ram), its president. The Football As-
sociation of Siam, as its first task, organized yet another cup
competition, the King’s Gold Cup, to be played for by a team
representing the association and a team of the Royal Bangkok
Sports Club. This game was to be preceded by still another
match between Thai and Westerners organized by the Sports
Club for the Sports Club’s own cup. In 1915 the King’s Cup
contest ended in a draw and the Sports Club cup went to the
Siamese team. On the Siamese victory the English-language
press commented: “His Majesty was really delighted with the
result…. There was no mistaking the popularity of yesterday’s
win…. The big crowd went away thoroughly happy.”79 The final
match of 1915, also sponsored by the Sports Club, was for the
club’s Pollard Cup. The round of games started on December 24
and ended on January 6, 1916. The Siamese team also won this
contest, handily and gratifyingly.
The King played a prominent role in the actual work of pro-
moting football—the organizing of teams, arranging of matches,
and awarding of cups. And a very significant part of the popular
enthusiasm came from the King’s display of direct interest by
his constant attendance at games. In the Warrior Cup series
of twenty-eight games scheduled almost daily from September
11 to October 27, the King went to every game but the last,
and that game was played on the day after the championship
had been won.80 On more than one occasion Vajiravudh watched
in pouring rain, staying until the last whistle. In 1915 he per-
sonally presented the winning prize at all cup events and gave
special medals to players of the winning teams. There is little
doubt that he considered football not only good for Siam but
also good fun for himself. The King’s interest drew other high
dignitaries, princes and nobles, to the games. Even the Queen
Mother came to one match, to have “a look at the game which
is now rousing so much enthusiasm.”81
The character of the football season in Siam was fairly well
set in the first year of play in 1915. The essential matches were
the Warrior Cup competition to determine the Siamese cham-
pions, and the two “international” competitions, the Sports Club
cup and the King’s Gold Cup. Other all-Thai matches, for a
junior cup and a senior cup, were added. There was some desire
to internationalize the game further by engaging in matches
The West as Model
155
with foreign teams. When a British warship, the Whiting, came
on a visit to Bangkok in September 1918, a match was quickly
arranged between the British navy team and a team repre-
senting the Siamese navy. The match, held on September 12,
was attended by “a huge crowd.” The game, after “a hard,
ding dong struggle,” ended in a tie; the crowd was not dis-
pleased, and the match was called “one of the happiest and
most successful events in the present naval visit.”82 There was
some discussion periodically of arranging matches with teams
in British Malaya. In 1917 a Penang team, saying it had heard
of “the ability the Siamese have shown in the game since His
Majesty the King showed his personal interest in it,” suggested
the visit of a “Siamese eleven” to Malaya and the Straits Settle-
ments.83 The Thai did not follow up on this suggestion. A more
precise suggestion was made in 1919 by a Bangkok business-
man who proposed to the King’s secretary that a Siamese team
play a Chinese team from the Straits Settlements.84 The pro-
posal was put to the Football Association, which decided against
the match on political grounds. Playing a “Chinese” team, the
association concluded, would tend to crystallize racial feelings
in Bangkok; local Chinese, who were coming to feel more and
more “Thai,” might be impelled to sympathize with the for-
eigners. A truly representative foreign team, including West-
erners, Chinese, and Indians, would be an entirely different
matter.85 The proposal thus was politely declined as “too pre-
mature.”86
Royal promotion of football continued unabated in 1916. For
example, of a series of games played on October 18, 22, 24,
25, 27, 28, and 31 and November 1, 3, and 6, the King missed
only two games.87 He was present at all cup games. By 1917
royal attendance began to drop off, but by this time football had
definitely caught the public fancy, and games continued to at-
tract large and enthusiastic crowds through the remainder of
the reign.
The aim of using football to counteract public apathy was
certainly achieved. But not always in the manner intended. On
one occasion in 1915 the King had stated:
In my opinion, there is nothing that helps the formation of
friendship more than taking part in or watching of sports and
games, since there is that absence of formality which charac-
terizes more serious functions, and people who meet in the field
Chaiyo!
156
of sport become friends more readily than at more formal gath-
erings. Friendship thus begun without the feeling of constraint is
more likely to be lasting than otherwise….88
And in a government booklet on football appeared the
words:
Football is a clean and open fight, not an occasion for taking
unfair or secret advantage which is the essence of meanness.
Neither in victory nor in defeat ought there to be any thought of
revenge on the one side or of jeering at the vanquished on the
other. That is to say, Football is a game which steadies a man and
makes him a sportsman.89
Such ideals proved easier to proclaim than to realize. In Siam’s
first football year the competition for the King’s Gold Cup be-
tween the Thai and the British saw displays of temper and “a de-
termination to win anyhow” that went beyond sportsmanship.90
Said one paper of the game, “the less said the better.”91 One
columnist, less reluctant to comment, wrote of spectator in-
volvement, strained relations, “good fellowship” turned sour,
and “very ugly remarks” against both sides, and recommended
that games between the nationalities be abandoned.92 It is note-
worthy that the next game the Thai played against a Sports Club
team was noted for its excessive gentleness, leading the press
to wonder if “some one” had “whispered” to the Thai players.93
In succeeding years there were periodic reports of excessive
zeal and partisanship, particularly in games between rival Thai
teams. While overexuberance between Thai and Westerners
could be looked on as contributing to a nationalistic arousal,
bitter rivalries and divisions among Thai teams could hardly be
seen in the same light. Most games seem to have been fairly
played, but on occasion there were ugly displays and even vio-
lence. The most violent outburst occurred on August 17, 1919,
on the occasion of a playoff for the senior cup between the Royal
Pages and the Naval Cadets. The press called the game a dis-
grace, with fouls occurring every minute of the game; it re-
ported that the Cadets, urged on by the crowd, played liked “a
band of hooligans.” When the crowd began to encroach on the
field in support of their losing favorites, the referee called the
game. The crowd then got ugly, throwing bricks and stones and
injuring several people, including the referee.94
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The August 17 game marked the nadir of football in Siam
and revealed several problems aside from that of inculcating the
British kind of sportsmanship ethics. The main problem seems
to have derived from partisanship of the King himself. The
King, forgetting his nationalistic objective, identified himself
with certain teams. One was the team of the Royal Pages, di-
rected by Phraya Prasit, who was also President of the Football
Association of Siam. The Pages team was very good. Two years
earlier, after winning a crucial game, it had had its win dis-
qualified on the basis of an infraction of the rules. Vajiravudh
was privately incensed at the decision. The Pages, in a pique,
even left the Football Association for a time.95 The influential
backing the Royal Pages received permitted them to organize
an expert team, and good football players were deliberately re-
cruited to join the Pages so they could add to the strength of
the team.96 The end product of this favoritism—and favoritism
for the Pages, as one Thai pointed out, had been the cause of
trouble in Siam earlier in the reign97—was to arouse strong an-
tagonism to the Royal Pages team.
Several changes followed the episode of August 17: Phraya
Prasit resigned as president of the Football Association; navy
teams were royally reprimanded. Eventually, much of the bad
feeling wore away.
All in all, it appears that encouragement of football and
other sports did succeed to a degree in furthering Vajiravudh’s
goals. Western observers at the time were impressed. A long-
time British resident concluded that “… by the end of the
second season [1917], the enormous crowds of people of every
age and rank, shouting themselves hoarse and sometimes
breaking the ropes even in the presence of royalty, showed con-
clusively the entire success of this device for dispelling the erst-
while apathy.”98 An American writer was even more sweeping
in his praise. In an article in the New York Times the writer
gave full credit to the English-educated Vajiravudh for deliber-
ately introducing football as an instrument of national policy.
And the policy had worked, he said: football, together with the
Boy Scout movement, had “made over” the Thai nation; it had
changed the youth “from a life of enervation and luxury to one
of vigorous athletic competition”; it had produced a “moral re-
generation that reduced to a minimum the two greatest vices of
Siam,” opium and gambling; it had awakened the Siamese youth
to a “patriotic impulse and a sense of national obligation.”99
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The American writer undoubtedly went too far and claimed
too much. But some claim for sports is justified. Never before
in Siam’s history had masses of thousands of people gathered
to cheer on “their side,” to dare cheers even at the risk of
incurring royal displeasure. Feelings were aroused, mostly in
Bangkok but to some extent also in the provinces. Not all these
feelings were nationalistic or patriotic in a broad sense. But
some were. And almost all feelings of loyalty to a group larger
than a family were new to Siam and could be built upon to
fashion national patriotism.
STATUS OF WOMEN
In furthering the cause of nationalism, women in Siam came
into the King’s program in two principal respects. First, Vaji-
ravudh felt strongly that women as well as men must be imbued
with a sense of nation. Second, he believed that the status of
women in Thai society should be elevated so that Thai women
could be compared favorably with their sisters in the West. In
both respects, Western ideas affected the King’s attitude.
Insofar as nationalism was concerned, the main thrust of
the King’s arguments seemed to be directed toward men. When
Vajiravudh used terms such as “warrior spirit,” he obviously
had men in mind. He, therefore, on occasion made special ref-
erence to women so that no one would assume that the need
for nationalism was confined to men. Such references appear
in several of his plays, essays, and speeches. Women, he made
clear, should also love their nation. And this love could be ex-
pressed in a number of ways. In wartime, for example, women
could serve as nurses. Women could also contribute to fund
drives such as that for the cruiser fund. Says one heroine: “I
am a woman. I cannot be a soldier or a Wild Tiger. Since I
cannot pay homage to His Majesty with the strength of my
body, I must do so with money.”100 Vajiravudh’s heroine un-
derstands the reasons behind her devotion to her country: “Al-
though I’m only a woman, I’ve sense enough to see that if our
Thai nation is destroyed, that will be the end of us Thai.”101
The heroine is even willing to defy her husband, who is opposed
to nationalistic fund drives; she thus exhibits, with the obvious
approval of the royal author, that devotion to nation outranks
devotion to one’s spouse.102 The principal way in which women
could exhibit their nationalism, however, in the King’s view,
was by doing a good job at their main work in the home. They
The West as Model
159
should provide their husbands with happy and comfortable sur-
roundings so that the men could at work apply themselves
to their fullest capacities.103 They should teach their children
proper values, including love of nation.104 And in times of stress
they should support their menfolk, never undermining their
bravery or willingness to fight.105
On the status of women, Vajiravudh’s policy had several
circumstances in its favor. First, the traditional position of
women in Thai society was high. It was a fact that the vast
majority of Thai women, those of the countryside, had social
rights and status equal to men in all important respects. Most
Westerners were convinced that such women occupied “as high
and honourable a position as the women of the people in any
country.”106 In the words of one contemporary Britisher: “…
the women of the lower orders have always enjoyed absolute
freedom.”107 The King knew this and commented that the equal
status of women in rural areas meant that, in this respect,
“our Thai country people are much closer to ‘civilization’ than
people in Bangkok or large towns.”108 Another favorable cir-
cumstance was that some steps toward the elevation of upper-
class women had already been taken during Chulalongkorn’s
reign. Queen Saowapha had been much honored by the King;
she had emerged out of the harem to take part in various public
functions, and she had established girls’ schools and sponsored
the training of Thai nurses.
Although Vajiravudh was able to build on programs of the
past, he moved much more boldly than his father had. The
King’s interest was apparent as early as his coronation, and
Thai women were called upon to play a role in court functions
of the time “to an extent that took their own breath away and
astonished the public.”109
Vajiravudh made the purpose of his reforms in the status of
women abundantly clear, and in doing so he also made clear his
reliance on ideas of the West. The status of women in a society,
he stated in an essay specifically on the subject, is a symbol of
the degree of civilization in that society.110 Where women are
elevated, there is civilization; where they are not—where they
are slaves, workhorses, or chattels of men—there is not. The
“jungle people” of Malaya, Borneo, and Africa, he said, treat
their women as slaves. In England, by way of contrast, men
and women are more or less on equal terms. In ancient India,
noted for its high civilization, men and women were equal in
many respects; the decline of India coincided with the coming
of the Muslims and the degradation of women, including the
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imposition of purdah. The history of mankind was spotted with
the record of men’s mistreatment of women. In some societies
men took many wives. In some, men even ensured their hold on
women by resorting to extraordinarily cruel tactics such as the
footbinding in China that made it impossible for women to run
away. Men even used religion as a weapon; men, the priests, in-
structed women to be acquiescent as part of their religious duty.
While Buddhism, said the King, included no such religious in-
struction, in other ways Siamese women of the upper class were
taken advantage of by men. And foreigners criticized the Thai
for their treatment of women. The King concluded:
This situation is most shameful! Are we Thai so callous—with the
hide of an elephant or a rhinocerous—that we are not disturbed?
Even if you yourself are not a bad person as are some of our
nationality, and many of them are nobles, shouldn’t you help by
speaking up and complaining? Can you silently look on while the
outside world speaks of our customs as those of a jungle people?
Please understand that others are taking our measure! Please do
think this over.111
In his essay on the status of women, Vajiravudh enumerated
two major and two minor restrictions on Thai women. The major
restrictions were the limited freedom women had to socialize
with men on equal terms and the practice of polygamy. The
minor restrictions were women’s black teeth (a consequence
of betel chewing) and their short hair styles. In other writings,
the King added one other major restriction, limited access to
education, and one other minor restriction, the wearing of the
trouserlike phanung.
The King’s desire that women be given freedom to meet
and mix with men socially was evidenced in word and deed. He
deplored the argument that men had put forth that, if women
attended public affairs together with men, they might become
exposed to suspicion and become objects of gossip. He sarcas-
tically remarked that there was indeed some danger of giving
women a chance to meet men: they might find out just what
special creatures men really were!112 To promote social inter-
course between men and women, the King regularly included
women in theater parties and other social affairs he attended.
His half-sister, Princess Walai, frequently accompanied him to
such affairs.
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In November 1920 Vajiravudh became formally betrothed
to Princess Vallabha Devi, a daughter of Prince Naradhip. Al-
though this betrothal ended in an annulment four months later,
the alliance with the Princess, and with other women who fol-
lowed, gave the King an opportunity to set an example for elite
society. The Princess during the four-month engagement went
everywhere with the King. The press reported some twenty-
seven functions they attended together, including dinner
parties, theater performances, horse races, school inspections,
and football matches.113 By this tactic His Majesty gave a royal
nod in favor of the association of the sexes.
One innovation in Bangkok elite circles that created quite
a stir in the 1920s was Western social dancing. The Teachers
Club staged a debate on the subject early in 1920, and a less
formal debate continued to be waged in the columns of the local
press, both Thai and English.114 The pros argued for dancing
as a means of promoting social intercourse; the cons protested
that dancing would lead only to the further degradation of Thai
women. One Thai writer editorialized that Europeans “know
how to behave when dancing; we don’t.”115 While the argument
continued, social dancing apparently became increasingly
popular. Although the King took no part in the debate, nor, as
far as is known, on the dance floor either, the government-spon-
sored annual fair did provide a dancing hall, which “helped
on the movement,”116 and the King and his fiancée did attend
dance exhibitions (one on October 30, 1920, in which a Thai
couple displayed the steps of the foxtrot and tango)117 and
formal balls. (The press had noted at the time of the betrothal
that Her Royal Highness was “fond of dancing.”)118 Again, the
sign of royal approval was unmistakable. By early 1921,
Bangkok society was in the grip of a “dancing craze,” and the
annual fair provided a dance hall “on a much larger scale than
formerly.”119 Even after the displays of royal favor, arguments
on dancing continued. But so did the dance.
Opponents of Thai social dancing relied heavily on the ar-
gument that in a polygamous society in which women were
not given proper respect, dancing became but another means
for men to extend their sway over women.120 Discussions of
dancing, indeed, seemed inevitably to lead to discussions of
polygamy; one Thai correspondent suggested that the Teachers
Club debate on dancing give way to a debate on the Siamese
practice of keeping lesser wives.121
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The King, however, kept the two subjects separate. He ap-
proved of dancing; he strongly disapproved of polygamy.
Polygamy had been one Thai practice that had consistently
aroused Western antipathy. And Siamese kings, starting with
Vajiravudh’s grandfather, had been on the defensive about the
practice.122 Vajiravudh, at once more familiar with Western no-
tions of propriety and more anxious than any of his prede-
cessors to excise customs that Westerners regarded as barbaric
or uncivilized, spoke out frequently against Thai multiple mar-
riages.
In an important essay of 1915 on the conceptual “cakes
of mud” that were clogging the wheels of Siam’s national
progress, the King devoted many pages to problems in the
area of marriage and the family.123 He castigated “temporary
marriage,” that is, informal cohabitation, as a custom that en-
couraged promiscuity, gave no security to women, and was
subversive to morality. He wrote: “Have pity on our women
and girls! Help them to obtain some justice and equality. Help
them to become honoured as the future mothers of our nation.”
He castigated the “parental irresponsibility” that resulted from
temporary marriages in which the partners, having joined to-
gether for sexual enjoyment, gave little heed to “their duty to
bring up their children so as to become useful members of the
community, and good, loyal citizens of Siam.” And lastly, he
castigated “traffic in young women,” which he described as a
new fashion worse than polygamy. The old custom had been
for a well-to-do man to have a principal wife and, in the same
household, a number of female servants who also served as
lesser wives. The new custom favored by the “modern young
Siamese” who claimed to be opposed to polygamy was to ac-
quire a number of secret wives, often by paying the parents for
them. The old custom had the virtue of being a more or less
permanent arrangement; the new custom was highly temporary.
Wealthy men simply used young, ignorant girls, tossing them off
when they tired of them.
At one time the King suggested that improvement in the
status of women would require “a correction of both the
customs and laws of the country.”124 With respect to change
in customs, the King hoped that his writings urging men to
behave, urging parents to care for their children and not sell
their daughters, urging women not to “marry” a man who kept
wives the way a farmer kept chickens would have some
effect.125 On the matter of legal change, there was much dis-
cussion and thought, but in the end no law emerged.
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The legal discussions reveal the King’s mind exceptionally
well. The King first aired his views on the need for some mar-
riage legislation in January 1912 in a private discussion with
Prince Damrong and Prince Devawongse.126 The Princes agreed
on the need, and by June 1913 M. Padoux, the legal adviser, had
drawn up a draft code to which the King reacted with extensive
comments.127 The most significant aspect of the code was that
it did not outlaw polygamy, and Vajiravudh, despite his personal
preference for monogamy, approved. A marriage code, he said,
should not reflect the King’s “personal convenience” alone. A
marriage code, above all, had to reflect realities, and the reality
in Siam was that polygamy existed, it had long existed, it would
not cease to exist automatically on the passage of a law. Some
councillors, Prince Svasti for one, disagreed with the King and
advocated the institution of monogamy at least on paper. The
King was vehemently opposed to a law for show:
Finally, I beg to express an emphatic opinion, that if we are going
to practice Polygamy, there is no need to hide it, but if it is thought
best to hide it, then do not practice it at all. It would be better to
act so than to act the Pious Old Tiger; in other words, let us not
be hypocrites.
Vajiravudh marshalled other arguments. A law against
polygamy, he said, would antagonize the Thai nationals in the
southern provinces who were Muslim. He wrote: “I do not wish
to do anything, which would force my Malay subjects of Patani
and Satul to run away from the harshness of our laws, to seek
refuge under the more equitable laws of the English, who (very
wisely) do not interfere with the marriage customs of their
subjects.” As to the plea for monogamy on moral grounds,
Vajiravudh wrote that the issue was by no means clear, that Bud-
dhism did not consider plural marriage immoral, that European
and Siamese moral values were too different to be compared,
and that “it is most difficult to judge who is on the higher plane
and who on the lower.”
One modification of marital practice the King did support
was the civil registration of marriages. It was true that lesser
wives were disadvantaged and exploited, but through insti-
tution of marriage registration such wives would acquire status
and protection by law. The law might, further, adopt the prin-
ciple, which already had some social sanction, that “all children
of a man, no matter by which kind of wife, should be recognized
as his legitimate children….” In this way, the King wrote, “we
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Siamese would then actually be going in advance of Europe
in the way of providing justice for children!” By September
4, 1913, a draft “Law on Family Registration” had been pre-
pared, incorporating the King’s ideas by making no mention of
monogamy but including a system of registration.
No marriage code, however, was enacted during the reign.
Indications are that the King was unwilling to assume full re-
sponsibility for a decision on such a delicate matter. And none
of his councillors seemed anxious to share the burden. In a
meeting of the Council of Ministers on June 4, 1917, for ex-
ample, a tentative decision was made to send the draft to the
Legislative Council (Ratthamontri Sapha). The problem was
that the Legislative Council chairman (Prince Rabi) had re-
signed and no satisfactory replacement was willing to serve.128
The matter seems to have been permanently deferred at this
point.
There was one other approach open to His Majesty to bring
about a change in Thai marriage custom: setting the example
for others to follow. This approach, indeed, had been suggested
to King Mongkut in 1853 by an American missionary. Mongkut
had claimed the times were not right, and he had walked away.
Vajiravudh did not walk away. He fully intended to set an ex-
ample of monogamy for his people. On November 10, 1920, he
announced his betrothal to the Princess Vallabha Devi, and ten
days later, at a party given for the King and his fiancée by Thai
students who had studied abroad, he publicly announced his de-
cision to take but one wife.129
The King did not adhere to his decision. His desire to set a
moral example was outweighed by his desire for an heir. In fact,
there is considerable reason to suppose that the only reason he
married at all was to provide the dynastic line with a suitable
and indisputable successor, a son of his own. The text of the
annulment of his betrothal to Princess Vallabha Devi on March
15, 1921, owing to their “incompatibility of temperament,” said
as much. It said that His Majesty, in proclaiming his betrothal,
“had no other desire than firmly and definitely to ensure the
succession to the Throne with a view to the good of the country,
the welfare of the Royal House as well as the happiness of His
Majesty’s Own Person.”130 The fact that the King, whatever his
reasons may have been, had failed to contract any alliances
with women until shortly before his fortieth year was in itself
indication that policy rather than passion motivated him. His
continued bachelorhood, “regarded by the people as a national
calamity,”131 must have seemed indeed tinged with possible
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calamity as, one by one, his full brothers began to die off.
By August 1925 there remained only himself and Prajadhipok,
and Prajadhipok’s health had never been good. There were, of
course, half-brothers, but the feeling that the line would best be
preserved by remaining with the sons of Queen Saowapha was
strong.
Four women succeeded Princess Vallabha Devi. Princess
Lakshmi La van was elevated to the rank of Royal Highness
in September 1921 and became consort in August 1922. Two
sisters were ennobled as concubines, one with the title of Phra
Sucharit Suda in October 1921 and the other with the title of
Phra Indrasakti Sachi in June 1922. Phra Indrasakti, who re-
portedly had several pregnancies ending in miscarriages, was
elevated to queen late in 1922, but was demoted from that
rank in September 1925. The last wife, Suvadana, was named
consort and raised to royal status in October 1925, during the
eighth month of her pregnancy. Princess Suvadana bore the
King a daughter, Princess Bejaratana, on November 24, 1925,
thirty-six hours before Vajiravudh’s death. Since tradition and
the King’s own testament on succession ruled out female suc-
cession to the throne, Prajadhipok, the King’s last remaining full
brother, who was named in the testament as his successor, came
to the throne on November 25.
A third major restriction on Thai women was their limited
access to education. Tradition had encouraged that boys receive
the rudiments of learning in temple schools. These schools
were not open to girls. School education for females, supported
by Western missionaries and some Thai, most notably Queen
Saowapha, had started some years before 1910, but the educa-
tional opportunities for females were still severely limited. Vaji-
ravudh was determined to advance the status of women in this
respect. One significant step taken early in the reign to promote
education for females was the opening of Siam’s first teachers’
training college for women in December 1913.132 A Ministry of
Religious Affairs and Education report for 1917–18, pointing to
the serious lag in female education, stated that 7,411 girls were
in school as compared with 389,806 boys.133 The King, in his
birthday speech of 1918, had declared: “The question of female
education is one of importance and necessity in view of the fact
that to women belongs the care of children from infancy and the
work of teaching and training them while in the home.”134 And
in a didactic poem on the virtues of women, Vajiravudh devoted
several stanzas to women’s need for learning as an ornament
more valuable than beauty or wealth: “For knowledge runs deep
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like a branch of the Indus/Which no amount of bailing can ever
empty.”135 Perhaps as a consequence of the King’s interest, the
Ministry of Education in 1918 exhibited a “new interest” in edu-
cation for girls and cited a new policy of allowing girls up to the
age of twelve to attend government schools for boys.136
The most important step, however, in advancing the edu-
cation of women was taken in 1921. The Elementary Education
Act of that year, which set forth the principle of compulsory
primary education, made no distinction between the sexes. The
act stipulated that, in all areas in which the law came into
force, every boy and every girl was required to attend school.137
The effects of the law were dramatic: the percentage of girls
in school skyrocketed from 7 percent in 1921 to 29 percent in
1922 and reached 38 percent in 1925.138
The minor hindrances to the progress of women in
Siam—hair styles, dress fashions, and tooth color—were ob-
viously all in the category of appearance. Vajiravudh looked
on Thai women with Western eyes and found the old styles
distinctly unattractive. He wrote: “Every book I have read by
a Western writer has commented on the great oddity that,
for whatever reason, women cut their hair short. And they
state that many Thai women would be very pretty except for
their short hair which makes them ugly.” On the Thai women’s
preference for betel-stained black teeth, he wrote that it had
“long been a subject of foreign criticism” and added: “I myself
very much detest black teeth.”139 What Westerners thought was
obviously of great importance to the King. What Westerners
thought became fact to him, so that traditional Thai fashions
were seen not as fashions but as facts that could be explained
only as deliberate devices fostered by Thai men to keep their
women in bondage. Thai men, he said, wanted to keep their
women unattractive so that they could hold them back better.140
And so, the King reasoned, whatever he could do to help Thai
women improve their appearance would forward the emanci-
pation of women.
The King’s ideas on fashion were translated into action by
the women with whom he associated. His favorite half-sister
and sometime companion, Princess Walai, was one of the first
Thai women to wear her hair long,141 and long hair “under the
personal influence of His Majesty” became the favored style.142
The King’s first fiancée, Princess Vallabha Devi, established the
skirtlike phasin as the style to be favored over the trouserlike
phanung. The Princess first wore the phasin at a party on No-
vember 23, 1920. It was an immediate success. One newspaper
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rhapsodized that the day would “go down in history” as the day
a new fashion was set for the ladies of Siam.143 By the end of
1920 the phasin had become the “national dress” for women.144
The phasin was a fine compromise from a nationalistic point
of view. It looked like a skirt, it was pleasing to Western eyes,
but it was a genuine Thai style that had long been favored
by women in the northern provinces. It had an additional ad-
vantage over Western dress in that it did not have to be im-
ported. Promoters of the phasin were aware that they were not
putting Thai weavers and sewers at a disadvantage.
One female fashion developed late in the reign that had
nothing whatsoever to do with Thai tradition: the wearing of
hats. The hats of the day were large and floppy brimmed. At
their first appearance in late 1920 a letter to the editor of the
Bangkok Times pleaded that Siam be spared “the glorious, and
notorious, hat of the European one million varieties on Siamese
Ladies heads.”145 Siam was not to be spared: the appearance
of the King’s companions “gloriously” behatted put the new
Western mode beyond censure.
The fashion reforms sponsored by the King were eminently
successful from all points of view. An article in the army mag-
azine summed up the effects: the hair and dress styles of the
King’s companions, as expected, were imitated widely, for “what
the upper class do, the lower class will follow”; the new styles
won general Thai approbation, for they tended to put “the
Siamese lady more on a level with ladies of the West”; and,
as for the Westerners’ reaction, “the Europeans all smile ap-
proval.”146
EDUCATION
Taken in its broadest possible sense, education was the main
concern of King Vajiravudh. For his strongest aim was to ed-
ucate his nation to its nationhood. His speeches, his writings,
and many of his projects, including the Wild Tigers, the Boy
Scouts, and the pro-sports activities, were all educational. They
were meant to teach his people the values of hardiness, self-
reliance, and industry for their own good and for the good of
the nation. Given this didactic bent, it would be surprising if
the King had not also been keenly interested in education in its
more restricted usual sense. He was.
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Royal concern for education did not start in the Sixth Reign.
In a sense, support for education was part of Thai tradition in
that aid to the monastic order was a recognized obligation and
the order provided young boys with the rudiments of learning.
This traditional aid to education was expanded by King Rama
IV, who instituted the beginnings of modern (i.e., Western) ed-
ucation by bringing Western tutors into the palace, and further
expanded by Rama V, who adopted the principle of public edu-
cation for the masses and began to construct a school system to
put that principle into effect. In the main King Vajiravudh was a
continuer of educational policies already started. But some fea-
tures of his program for education bore unmistakable signs of
his nationalistic purpose.
A measure of the King’s strong espousal of education can
be seen in his declaration that he regarded the building of a
school as an act of Buddhist merit and that, in fact, he would
not follow the practice of his predecessors and build a new royal
temple as a meritorious act but would, instead, build schools.
The first formal declaration in favor of schools by Vajiravudh
grew out of a request from a noble who had built a school and
asked His Majesty to dedicate it. The King wrote: “Well done.
I am certain that this meritorious act will yield better results
than the building of a temple for the shelter of sham monks
who don yellow robes in order to escape their obligations.” The
King asked the Minister of Education to prepare a royal decla-
ration that “If anyone wishes to make merit, achieve beneficial
ends, and please His Majesty, let him build schools. To build new
temples is not to my liking.”147 The declaration was prepared
and issued by August 1911.148
The King’s declaration was accompanied by action. By June
1911 he had established a new private school under royal pa-
tronage and supported by the privy purse. The school, which
had its precedent in the school for pages at Saranrom Palace,
was called Royal Pages College (Rongrian Mahatlek Luang). It
was expected to be “a model school for the Kingdom,”149 whose
exemplary ideals and practices would spread, in the utopian
fashion, throughout Siam. In fact two other schools followed the
model of the Royal Pages College: King’s College in Bangkok,
which had been a special school under the Ministry of Justice
and came under the King’s patronage in 1916;150 and a new
school, the Royal Pages College of Chiangmai, set up on the
same lines late in 1917.151 The original Royal Pages College was
given a large piece of land near the King’s Chitralada Palace,
and temporary structures built in the early years were later re-
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placed by elaborate permanent buildings in a modified temple
style. The complex came to be, in effect, the memorial “temple”
of King Vajiravudh; after his death the school was renamed Va-
jiravudh College in his honor.152
Many of the King’s notions on education were put into effect
at the Royal Pages College. The school was deliberately orga-
nized on the lines of an English public school: it was a boarding
school with teachers living in; it had several houses; lower
classmen were expected to serve upper classmen. The aim was
to produce an educational environment that promoted not only
book learning but total mental, physical, and moral training for
boys and young men. Vajiravudh stated explicitly that he did
not want “walking school books” but “manly young men, honest,
truthful, clean in habits and thoughts.” He wanted a school that
would turn “a boy into a fine young man and a good citizen.”153
The King took a personal interest in the school; he appointed
its masters and visited it several times a year. He gave talks
at the school twice a year—in November near the anniversary
of his coronation, and in May at the wisakhabucha ceremonies
(ceremonies commemorating the anniversary of the birth, en-
lightenment, and death of the Buddha). The November speeches
stressed the importance of education, the need to respect and
obey the masters, the overriding necessity for adherence to
high ethical standards.154 The wisakhabucha speeches were
usually in the style of sermons on the values of Buddhism and
the ways to be a good Buddhist.155 These and other speeches
the King gave to school audiences also contained nationalistic
messages urging the boys to fulfill their duties to the nation
by improving their knowledge, exercising their bodies, and ob-
serving proper moral behavior. “A country’s advancement,” he
said, “depends on its education,” and Siam’s advancement de-
pended on a youth with education, morality, and national de-
votion superior to those of their fathers. Siam, he said, had
to advance in order to survive, for, with the continued ad-
vancement of other nations in the world, to stand still was to fall
behind.156
The main means of inculcating nationalism among students,
however, was not to make speeches directly on the subject
but rather to stimulate a school spirit that would become the
building block for national spirit. The English concept that “no
one can love his country who does not love his school”157 seems
to have been absorbed by Vajiravudh as his own. The theory of
larger loyalties developing out of smaller loyalties was one of
the King’s abiding faiths; it was the theory behind the moves
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Royal Support for Education. A cartoon by the King to
advertise the 1919 Winter Fair, the proceeds of which
were designated to support the Royal Pages College.
The original drawing by the King was sold to help raise
funds for the college. The advertisement appeared in
Dusit samit; the original text was in Thai.
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to strengthen the family and to create groups such as the Wild
Tigers and Boy Scouts. Out of loyalty to a smaller group—family,
club, team, or school—would grow group solidarity, regard for
the interests of one’s fellows, willingness to make concessions,
discipline, and other virtues essential for the true expression of
loyalty to the nation. So within the Royal Pages College small
sodalities—houses, debating teams, athletic teams—were fos-
tered. These groups competed with each other. In encountering
the world outside the school, however, school fellows were ex-
pected to act as one. To promote such a school spirit, schoolboys
wore special identifying dress and competed with other schools
in athletic and other events. As boarders, the boys were ex-
pected to regard the school as home, with their teachers serving
as father substitutes. The honor and good name of the school,
the boys were repeatedly told, depended on the good behavior
of each. By contributing to the good name of the school the boys
were serving their own best interests and the interests of their
school, their nation, and their king. As graduates of a “good
school” the boys would have earned a passport to a favorable
reception in the world outside.158
One other school associated with the Sixth Reign was
Chulalongkorn University. It was formally inaugurated as
Siam’s first university in 1917. The basis for the university,
however, had been laid many years earlier in the civil service
training school in the Ministry of Interior. Early in his reign,
King Vajiravudh decided to enlarge this school to serve all min-
istries, to support it with the surplus of money subscribed by
the people for the equestrian statue of King Chulalongkorn, and
to rename it King Chulalongkorn’s Civil Service College.159 By
1915 a campus had been donated by the King and buildings
begun. Vajiravudh seems not to have been deeply involved per-
sonally in the details of the university, leaving its organization
to an expert board of governors headed by Prince Damrong,
but he did support the board and undoubtedly took pride in
the prestige of presiding over the establishment of Siam’s first
Western-style university.
Probably the most noted educational achievement of the
reign was the enactment of a compulsory Primary Education
Act in September 1921. The act was a logical development from
successive educational steps taken in the reign of King Chula-
longkorn. By 1910 the fundamental decisions had been made
for the organization of provincial schools under the Ministry of
Interior, for reliance on local committees and local financing
of schools, and for the eventual institution of compulsory ed-
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ucation. The records show that in promoting public education
King Vajiravudh did not assume personal leadership but relied
heavily on an energetic, Western-educated official, Čhaophraya
Thammasakmontri,160 who had already emerged as a prominent
consultant on educational matters to King Chulalongkorn
during the last years of his reign. Čhaophraya Thammasak was
appointed Minister of Religious Affairs and Education in 1915,
and, on the reorganization of the ministry in 1920, became Min-
ister of Education. He seems to have been primarily responsible
for most of the changes in education, such as the institution
of model schools in every amphoe (“district”) in the country
and the creation of district educational promoters (thammakan
amphoe), that led to the adoption of the compulsory Primary Ed-
ucation Act.161
The act which was to come into effect on October 1, 1921,
called for compulsory attendance at school of all boys and girls
from the age of seven to fourteen. Noncompliance with the act
could result in heavy penalties. All schools, whether supported
by the national government, local communities, or private
bodies, were to adhere to standards set by the Ministry of Edu-
cation for syllabus, length of term, textbooks, and the like. Na-
tional and local schools were to be tuition free, supported in
the capital and in impoverished areas by the government and
in most provincial areas by a school poll tax and voluntary con-
tributions. Although the act was to come into effect on October
1, it was never intended that on that date, or indeed on any
specific date, the full force of the act would come into effect.
Indeed it could not. There simply were not enough schools or
teachers to make total compliance with compulsory education
possible. The act was initially limited to certain village groups
(tambon) where reasonably adequate facilities existed. These
groups were specified; by the end of 1922 they totalled 45.76
percent of the village groups in the country.162 Furthermore,
even in these village groups enforcement of the act was not
made automatic for all members of the age groups specified.
Students who lived too far from a school were exempted. And in
areas where facilities were limited, only children in the higher
age brackets were required to go to school.163
The act did not revolutionize mass education in Siam. It was
not intended to. Most of its provisions were in fact already in
effect in the areas in which it was first applied.164 The act more
than anything else signified the coming of age of the idea of
public education. Commitment to the ideal of free public edu-
cation for all the people was confirmed.
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Public education received one new impulse during the Sixth
Reign that did closely reflect the King’s concepts. This impulse
was toward practical education, training in arts and crafts,
rather than just book learning. Schemes for vocational training
had been drawn up as early as 1899, but it was not until the
Sixth Reign that the first vocational school was started. The
School of Arts and Crafts was formally opened by the King
early in 1914, and over the years he periodically visited the
school, admired students’ workmanship, awarded prizes, and
in other ways showed particular royal favor for this aspect of
education.165 The main object of the school was to help revive
the traditional handicrafts of Siam. But emphasis on practical
skills went beyond the establishment of special schools; the cur-
riculum in all schools reflected this new concern. The basic cur-
riculum of five years was divided into two parts, the first three
years retaining “ordinary school studies,” the last two years
concentrating on useful studies such as carpentry, tailoring, and
farming.166
The need to make education relevant to Siam’s farm popu-
lation was frequently enunciated by the King and the Minister of
Education. In presenting his report on discussions of the draft
act on compulsory education, the minister pointed out that,
while a certain level of general education was needed by the
population at large, after Siam’s school children had learned
the basics they would best serve their own interests and the in-
terests of the nation by acquiring special skills in agriculture,
handicrafts, and business. Siam was essentially an agricultural
nation; its progress depended upon advances in agriculture.
Therefore, “It is necessary that we begin to train people to ac-
quire knowledge in the agricultural field and to increase re-
spect for agricultural pursuits.” And so with crafts and with
business. If the Thai were ever going to be able to compete with
foreigners, specifically Chinese immigrants, in such fields, they
must gain the requisite knowledge in school. The Thai had ap-
titudes and capabilities enough; they merely lacked the oppor-
tunity to develop those capabilities.167
The earlier educational emphasis on training for gov-
ernment service was deplored by both Vajiravudh and
Čhaophraya Thammasak. Such education was producing “a
nation of clerks.” It stimulated farm boys to leave the farms.
It led to the abandonment of business and the trades to for-
eigners. The Thai weakness for “clerkism” was criticized by the
King in more than one essay. He went into the subject most fully
in an essay of 1915168 in which he stated:
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Any man with a grain of commonsense must surely understand
that for a country like Siam, the agriculturist and cultivator is
much more likely to contribute to her wealth than the clerk, who
after all is as much an instrument as the pen or typewriter that
he uses (or misuses). As a producer his value is very low in com-
parison to what he consumes. And yet the clerk thinks himself su-
perior to the farmer, and the worst of it is that we others go on
allowing him to think it too!
When will our young men understand that it is quite as hon-
ourable to be a farmer, a cultivator, or an artisan, as it is to be a
quill-driver?169
The King laid the blame for clerkism in part on the schools but
principally on the society at large. He deplored the general at-
titude of according more prestige to the lowliest and least effi-
cient paper shuffler, who would willingly “starve on a beggarly”
salary in order to live in the “gaiety of the City,” than to the
“active producers of wealth for the country.” The King’s essay
was an attempt to sway public opinion; the educational reforms
were an attempt to expand the options—both in order to cure
the national vice of clerkism.
While most of the changes in education introduced by Va-
jiravudh aimed at simultaneously enhancing national strength
and national pride, some changes belong solely in the category
of stimulating nationalism. The use of schools to recruit and
train members of the Boy Scout movement, already discussed
in chapter 3, is one such change. Schools were also used to dis-
seminate the essential messages of love of nation.
Patriotic songs were written specifically for school children
to sing. One, for example, went:
All of us youths are proud to be of Thai descent.
Our hearts are strong to protect the power who loves the land,
King Vajiravudh, who has encouraged us all
To offer our bodies and our lives to the royal need.
We are heedless of sacrifice to save our freedom
So that we Thai will endure till the end of time.170
Another method of spreading the idea of nation to all the
country’s youth was dissemination of the King’s writings on the
subject. This practice was instituted in 1911 with the distrib-
ution of copies of the King’s essay Plukčhai su̓apa (Instilling the
Wild Tiger Spirit) to the schools. The Ministry of Religious Af-
fairs and Education, uncertain as to how the essay should be
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used, wrote the palace for instructions. Instructions were duly
sent. Teachers, it stated, should read this “great treasure for the
nation” to all the boys and girls, making clear any parts that the
students might have trouble understanding. The essay should
be read in a room containing the King’s portrait, so that the
reading might be conducted in an atmosphere of respect. At the
end of the reading, students should stand-and bow respectfully.
The readings were to be conducted periodically on suitable oc-
casions.171
ECONOMIC NATIONALISM
Some of the most virulent expressions of nationalism in late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe were in the
economic sphere. The competition for empire in the Golden
Age of Imperialism and the fierce commercial and financial ri-
valries of European states were to become important contrib-
utory elements in the bloody confrontation of World War I.
Nor were the postwar years to see any abandonment of the
belief that each nation must pursue its own economic interest
without concern for long-range consequences. Presaging the
catastrophe of the Great Depression of the 1930s was the agri-
cultural depression of the 1920s, in which the leading nations
pursued policies of autarky, protecting local producers by im-
posing political and fiscal obstacles on foreign competitors. And
national self-sufficiency not only was regarded as the answer to
economic problems but became an article of faith, a basis for
pride.
King Vajiravudh and many of his officials were well aware
of the main economic tenets of European nationalism. The Min-
ister of Agriculture, in a prescient memorandum to the King
written four years before World War I, pointed out that “… all
civilised states are putting every power they have at their dis-
posal to support their agriculture, trade and commerce, even
to the verge of war.” Siam, he said, must do likewise. And
Siam must prevent foreign domination of its economy: “… we
have to see to [it] that foreign wealth shall not come in to the
purpose of grinding down our people as they have ground down
their own….” Siam must develop an economic policy that would
wean the people away from their “thriftless” habits, introduce
improved farming methods, stimulate new enterprises, and, in
short, bring about an “important national movement” to “in-
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crease production and promote the national wealth.” Such a
movement would make “our beloved Fatherland … a recognized
power among the civilised nations.”172
The basic economic philosophy presented by the minister
corresponded with the King’s own views. The practical working
out of a policy of economic nationalism, however, was beset
with difficulties. In fact, the common view of the reign today is
that economics and finance were its areas of greatest weakness.
Cited as evidence by writers of the day and subsequent writers
are the budgetary deficits inherited by King Prajadhipok in
1925, the lavish expenditures on ceremonies and courtiers,
the large allotments to the military as opposed to the small
outlays for internal improvements, the two foreign loans (to-
taling five million pounds) floated in the London market, and
the periodic crises arising from rice shortages, silver shortages,
bank failures, and inflation. However, a thorough study and
evaluation of the reign’s entire economic and fiscal history has
just begun.173
The easy supposition that the King’s profligacy was the root
source of all the country’s economic ills is highly vulnerable.174
In fact, the total income of the national government was small,
and while different appropriations of money would have had dif-
ferent effects, the effects, given the limited resources, would,
in any event, have been slight. Further, a basic cause of much
of the reign’s economic distress in the 1920s seems to have
been the depression in prices of agricultural commodities, and
this was a worldwide phenomenon that Siam could do little to
contend with. For not only was Siam unable to affect the asking
price for rice, it was unable to raise tariff walls against foreign
imports because the country lacked tariff autonomy. The es-
sential economic difficulties of the Sixth Reign may then have
stemmed from external sources.
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that within limits some things
might have been done to promote economic development and
ameliorate economic hardships that were not done. In the field
of agriculture, for example, the ministerial budget was kept at
a low level and most projects proposed remained unfunded. At
the start of the reign the Bangkok Times commented that the
country was in need of “improved methods of agriculture” and
that the ministry, “hitherto much neglected,” was beset with
problems and required the leadership of a “strong man.”175 The
press kept up a continuous barrage of criticisms of agricultural
policy, even to the point of saying that the agricultural policy
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of the Siamese government was “that it has not got any such
policy.”176 In a letter to the editor in 1918, a writer bluntly
stated what seems to have been the common view:
The plain fact is that agriculture is not, and, so far as my expe-
rience carries me, never has been a serious interest of the state.
For some time now that has been cynically emphasized by the no-
torious fact that the Minister does not attend office…. the Min-
istry has not on its staff an agricultural chemist, and has never
shown the faintest recognition of the fact that there is a scientific
side to successful rice growing.177
Clearly critics in the press and elsewhere believed that more
should be done to help farmers organize their efforts so as to
secure a more advantageous bargaining position in the market
place, more should be done to secure credit facilities for
farmers, more should be done to build irrigation and flood
control systems.178 And these “mores” should be done by the
government. The plea for government attention, for government
acceptance of its responsibility, was insistent. As one editorial
put it, “Whatever is done, the initiative must come from the Gov-
ernment.”179
King Vajiravudh was aware of the criticisms of his economic
policies. His reaction was a curious mixture of denial of
problems, criticism of the critics, introduction of some remedial
measures, and, most significant from the point of view of nation-
alism, exhortations to his people to take economic initiatives on
their own for love of country.
The workings of economics and finance were something of
a mystery to Vajiravudh, and on occasion he admitted as much.
In 1912 he wrote, “When I come to the question of finance, I
never feel quite happy about it, because I never had a head for
finance.”180 In a long and scathing review of a book on political
economy, the King stated that such books had only one use for
him: they helped to put him to sleep. Economic theory, he held,
was useless. What other conclusion could be drawn from the
fact that rich men never studied political economy, and political
economists were never rich men?181
The King took strong exception to the “loud laments” that
the Thai peasantry was impoverished and exploited. The Thai
were not poor: there was no starvation in Siam; the people even
had money enough to indulge in gambling. The “so-called poor
people in Bangkok,” he said, “are quite rich” compared with the
urban poor in Europe. As for people in the countryside, “Our
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provincial people do not lack necessities; they have got decent
roofs over their heads, and ground to till and cultivate.” The
only “poor” people in Siam were the extravagant spenders in
Bangkok whose luxurious tastes ran beyond their means.182 The
King even wrote letters to the press, under the pseudonym Asv-
abahu, questioning the wisdom of publishing articles on “The
Poverty of the People.” On the basis of his extensive travels, said
Asvabahu, “I am able to attest that no other country has fewer
poor or needy people than Siam.”183
The King also argued that the government had limited re-
sources and must maintain its essential priorities. Defense, he
said, was more important to the nation than economic devel-
opment. If Siam became much more prosperous than it was,
how could its increased wealth be defended? Acquisition of
wealth was a worthwhile endeavor only if one had the means to
protect it. Siam’s defenses must come first.184
The King admitted, however, that the Siamese economy
needed improving in various ways. And, he argued, the gov-
ernment was doing what it could. Every birthday speech con-
tained references to the new railway lines that had been laid,
the financial measures that had been taken, the agricultural im-
provements that had been begun. In some areas the record was
impressive: railway mileage at the end of the reign was more
than treble the mileage that had existed in 1910. In other areas
such as irrigation, little had been done by Chulalongkorn and
little was done by Vajiravudh until the last years of the reign.
Some innovative approaches in the economic field were
tried by King Vajiravudh. They all bore a clear relationship to
the King’s philosophy that Siam should learn to be self-reliant.
The message of Siam for the Siamese thus spilled over into the
economic sphere.
One new approach, already mentioned under education, was
the introduction of an arts and crafts curriculum into the
schools. By training Thai artisans in these schools, it was hoped
that a new class of craftsmen would be created so that Thai
would be able to buy locally made products.
A second new approach was an effort to provide farmers
with a source of credit so that they would become less de-
pendent upon moneylenders, many of whom were Chinese im-
migrants. A law establishing National Savings Banks was pro-
claimed on April 1, 1913. The idea of such savings banks was
the King’s and apparently had come to him when he was in
England and saw such banks in operation there. The purpose
of the savings banks was to encourage people in the provinces
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to place their modest savings in an accessible institution where
their money would be safe and would accrue interest. Loan
policies were also designed to favor the small-farmer provincial
clientele.185 In 1916 another move in the same direction was
taken with the establishment of the first cooperative societies.
Some 60 societies had been established by October 1922. It ap-
pears, however, that neither the banks nor the societies were
much of a success. Government support was maintained at a
low level. After ten years of existence, the banks had not yet
made a “very serious appeal to the people” and had had little
general effect on the rural credit scene.186 The cooperative so-
cieties still belonged in the category of an experiment.187
A third approach of the government in fostering economic
nationalism was its direct sponsorship of new economic enter-
prises. The first manufacturing enterprise of any size in Siam,
and the only one to achieve success during the reign, was the
Siam Cement Company, which was founded in 1913. Siam pos-
sessed the basic raw materials for cement manufacture; the
prospect of Siam’s producing its own cement caught the King’s
imagination. He encouraged plans for the company and in-
vested half of the needed capital from the privy purse. The goal
was for the company to supply all of Siam’s internal needs. By
the end of the reign this goal had been reached. Further, the
company had expanded its work force to 300 men, and annual
dividends had averaged 12 percent.188 A much smaller effort at
paper manufacture, sponsored by the Army Survey Department,
met with only mixed success.189
The most ambitious effort of the government in promoting
new enterprise, its inauguration of the Siamese Steamship
Company in January 1918, was an unmixed catastrophe. The
idea of a Siamese merchant marine started with the seizure of
the German merchant vessels on the day Siam entered World
War I. Within days of the seizure, the King and Prince Paribatra,
Minister of Marine, were laying plans for a fleet of Thai mer-
chant vessels that would be owned by Thai, be captained by
Thai, fly the Thai flag, and enter the export carrying trade early
enough to be able to withstand postwar competition from the
major trading nations. The navy also argued the military ben-
efits of a merchant fleet, which could serve as a naval arm
in times of war.190 The demands of international politics com-
pelled the Thai to lease many of the most desirable vessels to
the Allies during the war.191 But before the charters came into
effect the Siamese navy pressed several of the vessels into mer-
chant service. The largest ship, the Yiam Samut (formerly the
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Trautenfels), returning fully laden from Japan, foundered on
rocks off the China coast in February 1913.192 The loss of the
Yiam Samut was but the first of a series of profound shocks and
disappointments experienced by the Siamese navy and, later,
by the Siamese Steamship Company. In December 1920 an-
other Thai vessel, the Kaeo Samut, was wrecked off the Siamese
coast; both ship and cargo were a total loss.193 In addition to
the mishaps at sea, the company experienced managerial diffi-
culties at home. Early in 1922 the Borneo Company, a British
shipping concern, was appointed managing agent of the Thai
company.194 The Thai “experiment in national commercial en-
terprise,” as the King called it,195 had failed.
By far the most characteristic form of government spon-
sorship of Thai economic development, however, was exhor-
tation. In numerous speeches and essays the King made the
case for Thai economic self-reliance. Part of national self-
awareness was awareness of the economic responsibilities of
Thai to Thai.
In an essay of 1915 whose title translates into English as
“Wake Up, Siam,” the King dealt exhaustively with the theme
of the economic dimensions of nationalism. The essay started
with a definition of the problem. At one time, Vajiravudh wrote,
the Thai people produced the articles they needed. With the
advent of peace and prosperity, the expansion of foreign trade,
and the immigration of Chinese laborers, the Thai came to rely
excessively on foreigners. Foreign imports drove Thai manu-
facturers out of the market. Cheap foreign labor replaced Thai
workmen in many crafts and industries. The Thai accepted the
new emergent economy because it was convenient. The Thai,
who “by nature do not like to work hard,” were content to leave
manual labor to the Chinese. The Thai became lazy, giving up
skills they once had, depending on foreigners for products they
once made. Locally, the Chinese took over food marketing in
Bangkok; they dominated the construction industry and car-
pentry trades. The international market supplied machinery, pe-
troleum, benzine, coal, sugar, and cloth. Some of these imports
were necessary, but not all. Petroleum for lamps could be re-
placed by locally produced coconut oil. Homegrown castor oil
could easily supplant imported lubricating oil. Siam had once
been self-sufficient in sugar and cloth and could again be. The
disadvantages in economic dependence were apparent enough
in peacetime; they would expand manyfold in wartime and make
Siam extremely vulnerable.196
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How were these economic problems to be solved? The re-
peated suggestions in the press that the government do some-
thing, that the government take corrective measures, said Va-
jiravudh, were unfair. The government’s responsibility was to
protect the people and to encourage their enterprise. But the
government could not accomplish miracles. It could not act
alone. The government, in the last analysis, could not be “Com-
mercial Magnate and Captain of Industry.”197 It was up to the
Thai people to help themselves:
For commerce and industries to flourish and grow, the proper
business men, men of integrity, to direct commercial and indus-
trial concerns must be forthcoming as well as a sufficient number
of labourers. If people in our own country would only realise this
elementary truth, there would be a little more energy among our
Siamese business men, and a little less fanciful talk. What is the
use of always blaming the Government for not making industries
flourish in Siam? What do you think business men are there for?
Do you think all you need to do is to look like splendid million-
aires, and loll about in your arm-chairs planning the latest addi-
tions to your gorgeous mansions? … If you do not help yourselves,
how could you expect the Government to help you?198
To those who looked on the government as the father of the
Thai people and then faulted the father for not caring for his
children, Vajiravudh responded by pointing out that fathers did
indeed have responsibilities. But were these responsibilities
endless? Once a father had raised, trained, and educated his
child, should not the child then assume his own adult responsi-
bilities?199
It was the responsibility of all the people to improve Siam’s
economic lot. Businessmen should invest in Siamese industries.
Farmers should plant crops to compete with imports. And con-
sumers should buy Thai products whenever possible. To those
who said local products were more expensive than imports,
he answered that the flow of capital abroad was an expense
that had to be considered. “If we want to retain monetary
assets in our country, we must buy only those goods made in
our country.”200 The consumer complaints that foreign products
were better made should prompt Thai craftsmen to perfect their
skills. The Thai in general must learn the virtues of thrift, of ac-
cumulating capital. The values the King hoped to instill were ex-
emplified by a character in one of his plays, an inventor, who
refused Western bids for his invention because he wanted to
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sell it to a Thai businessman: “I am Thai, so I want us Thai to
reap the rewards of my invention.”201 All Thai should be like this
inventor. All Thai should conduct their economic lives in ways
beneficial to the Thai; a patriotic people would enable Siam to
become productive, self-reliant, and strong.
The King advertised his views not only in speech and on
paper but also in deeds. He made regular visits to exhibitions
of Thai arts and crafts, to agricultural and trade fairs, to the
openings of new industrial plants, all in an effort to stimulate
Thai economic endeavors by displays of royal favor. Under the
King’s auspices Siam participated in foreign trade fairs and ex-
positions, including those in Turin in 1911 and in San Fran-
cisco in 1915, in order to show to the world the best of Thai
silver, pottery, lacquerware, and other products. Finally, in 1924
the King began preparations for a great Siamese Kingdom Ex-
hibition, slated to open late in 1925. There were many foreign
precedents for such an exhibition; the closest in time and place
was the Malaya-Borneo Exhibition of 1922, which its promoters
hoped would “be a help to the revival of trade.”202 Vajiravudh
had the same hope. His fair, he believed, would bring exhibitors
from around the world who would be able to show machinery
that could modernize Thai farming. And it would permit Thai
from all parts of the country to put their own goods on display
for new international buyers.
The Siamese Kingdom Exhibition was Vajiravudh’s last im-
portant project before his death. He donated to the government
a large tract of land he owned personally, naming it Lumphini
Park, and began to develop it with money from the privy purse.
The land was leveled, and a gateway, clock tower, permanent ex-
hibition hall, and several temporary stalls were erected. Electric
generators were ordered from Germany to light the fair
grounds. A brochure was prepared as a guide to exhibitors and
fairgoers. The work was well advanced by November 25, when
the King died. Within days the new government came to a de-
cision to abandon the project.203
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The Concept of Nationality
King Vajiravudh advocated the adoption of many Westernways to promote Thai national progress and national pride.
But, he pointed out, there were limits to what Siam could learn
from the West. In the choice of Western cultural elements, dis-
cretion had to be rigorously and constantly exercised so that
Thai culture would not be swamped and destroyed. On this
point he once stated:
I don’t at all object to all Western knowledge, for I myself have ob-
tained much knowledge from the West. So I don’t take exception
to the point that Westerners have much to offer in the way of tech-
niques and abilities. But I do question that if something is good
for Westerners it must necessarily be good for everyone else.1
Western civilization, he noted in his diary, was like a medicine.
It had to be used with great care. Put to good use it had good ef-
fects, but used indiscriminately it became a virulent poison with
rapid and fatal results.2
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Vajiravudh was obviously aware that, because of his Western
schooling and some Western preferences, he himself might be
subject to a charge of being indiscriminately pro-Western. To
counter such a charge he told a story of the gods who mask
their inner divinity by taking on rude outer shapes. “As for me,”
he said, “I am a rude man within, and wear a golden exterior….
Although I may use language and diction in the foreign style,
when you examine me closely you will surely see that my dip
in European educational waters has given me but a European
gloss; the flesh inside is still very much Thai.”3 This view was
seconded by one longtime British resident in Siam who com-
mented that the King was “passionately attached to the tra-
ditions of his country, that his intention in pursuing western
methods is only to adopt such foreign customs as may con-
tribute to the happiness and material welfare of his people, and
that the very last thing he desires is to see the nation divest
itself of its own ideals in favour of that veneer of so-called civil-
isation which has upset the national equilibrium and subverted
the morals of more than one Eastern race.”4
Whatever his personal predilections,5 Vajiravudh realized
that the Thai nation to be Thai must stress its unique values.
The Thai people must understand what being Thai meant, what
being a nation meant. Promotion of nationalism depended on
comprehension of nationality.
To aid in that comprehension he coined a word, heretofore
lacking in Thai, for nation. The word was chat, from the Sanskrit
jati. In fact, chat was not a new word; it had long been used in
its old Indic meanings of origin or birth or, by extension, caste.
Even more common in Buddhist Siam was the definition of chat
as a life span in the circle of rebirths. The word chat had de-
sirable connotations of common ancestry, common origin. It was
easy to extend the meaning to “nation,” used in the sense of
“race” in terms such as “Aryan race” or “French race.” In the
King’s usage the word played an important role in fostering
an idea by giving that idea a name. Siam was no longer just
a country (prathet thai or mu̓ang thai) with a Thai population
(chao thai or phonlamu̓ang thai), it was now also a nation (chat
thai) with its own national identity.6
What was a nation? The King defined it often. He started
with the ancient meaning of the term, family line or caste,7 and
said that the term later came to mean a group of people who
had originally been relatives or friends and lived together in
one place. But the meaning of nation in the modern world had
grown much larger. Nationality was an indispensable part of
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every individual. Who a man was depended on his nationality.
And since nationality was so important to modern man, man
must do his utmost to preserve his nation as his birthright. He
wrote: “Any man who does not know how to preserve his nation
cannot be a man.”8
King Vajiravudh often compared the relationship between a
man and his nation to the relationship between a man and his
family. The nation was a unity, like a family. Only by feeling the
oneness with fellow members could a nation exist. The members
of a nation must live in agreement and harmony with each other.
All the faults that weakened families, such as jealousy, self-
aggrandizement, disrespect, and disobedience, inevitably also
weakened nations.9 If any individual behaved badly toward the
nation, by failing to give it respect or by shirking his obligations
toward it, he was helping in the destruction of the nation. His
behavior was a reason for sorrow, as it would be in a family,
in which “if even one member behaves badly, all relatives are
saddened.” A nation should be loved, as one loves one’s father
and mother, and that love must be continually demonstrated.10
The true nationalist loved all fellow nationals as his brothers.
He helped people of his nationality in times of distress; he re-
frained from harming his fellow nationals; he redirected fellow
nationals who went astray; and he taught the young to love the
nation.11
The Thai nation must know what constituted a nation; it
must also know what constituted its “Thainess.” In the King’s
words: “We must remember that we Thai have characteristics
basically different from those of foreigners.”12 What set the Thai
nation apart? A combination of things including Thai history,
Thai art, Thai language, Thai literature, Thai Buddhism, Thai
love of the royal leader, and an essential Thai spirit, a fierce de-
votion to thai in the sense of “free,” a warrior spirit that the
King frequently called the Wild Tiger spirit. It was vital that all
of these characteristics of the Thai be preserved. That, indeed,
they be built upon and strengthened. The King’s views on the
monarchy and militarism as essential foundations of the Thai
nation have already been discussed; his views on history, art,
language, literature, and religion will be examined in the next
chapter.
One of the greatest dangers to the Thai nation was the
failure of its own people to appreciate the strengths and the
virtues of Thai culture. In a speech to a group of Thai students
going to study in Europe the King advised:
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Finally, I beg to remind all of you students that we are Thai.
Don’t disparage your nation, for in doing so you are in effect dis-
paraging yourselves. All peoples have both good and bad inter-
mingled in their characters. There is no nation that is absolutely
good or bad. There is much that is good in the Thai nation. We
must nurture the merits and the good characteristics of our race
and not let it be said that we are inferior and not the equals of
others…. A nation without its own traditional culture is not re-
garded by outsiders as a nation at all. It is looked down upon by
the world and is a subject of derision.13
The King spoke often of the Thai inclination to self-dispar-
agement, the “slavish habit of self-abasement.”14 In one ad-
dress, in which he exhorted the Wild Tigers to love their nation
and give it respect for its own true worth, he said: “If our nation
does decline so that others look down upon us, if our nation
does fall, it will be our own fault! For we ourselves do not know
how to cherish it, how to save it. We ourselves do not appreciate
its value. We ourselves continually look down upon it.”15
WESTERNERS
The tendency of the Thai to deprecate their own nation, said
Vajiravudh, grew out of an excessive admiration of the West.
Bangkok Thai of the educated classes were particularly subject
to this error. They placed Europeans “on pedestals” and treated
their own “kith and kin as less than dust beneath the feet” of
Westerners. Nothing was praiseworthy to them unless it bore a
Western stamp. A “habit of mind” had developed, an assumption
that “to have anything done at all well, it must be done by a
Farang [Westerner].” The farang had been exalted “to undreamt
of heights” and the Thai abased “to almost the lowest depth.”16
The extraordinary esteem given Westerners had brought
into being in Siam the “cult of imitation,” which the King iden-
tified as “the biggest and worst clog” on the wheels of Siam’s
progress.17 The unreasoning imitation of Westerners had been
carried by some to the ridiculous extremes of choosing Western
woolen trousers over Thai silk phanung, passing time in
shooting “inoffensive” birds, drinking brandies and sodas, and
indulging in other Western vices, thereby ruining “both their
physiques and their brains.”18 These imitators were also in-
clined to engage in “smart” talk that was critical of the gov-
ernment, comparing Siam unfavorably with one Western state
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or another. But, the King asserted, bad-mouthing one’s own so-
ciety did not earn foreign respect; in fact, just the opposite was
true: “Those Thai who respect themselves and their nation the
most are the most respected by foreigners.”19 Nothing could
be further from the truth, said Vajiravudh, than the mistaken
idea that the flattery of imitation would provide the imitators
with “a passport to the esteem of Europeans.”20 Imitators might
be tolerated, might even be liked, but they could not win real
esteem:21 “It is human nature to look up to one’s superiors, look
level at one’s equals, and look down upon one’s inferiors. And
what is imitation but a patent confession of inferiority?”22 Im-
itators could hope for no more than a “patronizing pat on the
back.”23 One image Vajiravudh was fond of and used more than
once was a comparison of imitators to puppy dogs. Europeans,
he said, reacted to the flattery of imitators by feeling
… rather kindly disposed toward the imitators, as one does to-
wards a little puppy that knows how to sit up! The fact of his being
able to sit up does not change the puppy into a human being, in-
spite of what the puppy itself may think about it. One likes the
puppy better than the other dogs which do not know how to sit up
and do not try to do so, not because one accepts the sitting puppy
as a human being, but merely because it knows how to imitate
one of our own postures, and one therefore pats it on the head
and calls it an intelligent dog! Why will not Asiatics, who slavishly
imitate European ways and customs, realize this truth?24
Thai imitators, further, were entirely too indiscriminate in
their choice of Westerners to imitate. They usually associated
with the worst farang elements in Bangkok, the managers of
hotels, bars, and houses of prostitution, people who did not
practice the virtues of their own culture. Unlike the better ele-
ments, the diplomats and merchants, who maintained their dis-
tance from the Thai, the vagabond elements were quite willing
to associate with anyone who had money. From them the Thai
imitators were picking up habits of indolence, boasting, criti-
cizing, and carousing. Foreigners of the better classes did not
behave this way. They did not, for example, criticize the
monarchy or the Thai government officers. The King posed
to the imitators the rhetorical question “Why do you wish to
behave like the common farang drunken in the middle of the
street?”25 On occasion he supplied his own answer to this
question: the aper of Western ways merely sought a rational-
ization for doing as he pleased, claiming the Western right of
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freedom to excuse his lack of discipline or respect, his entire
devotion to self, and his basic immorality. The assumption that
Westerners were superior in all things, an assumption made by
themselves and by their admirers, was entirely unwarranted,
said the King.26 Not all Westerners were moral exemplars. If
they were, there would be no need for jails in Western countries.
But on the contrary, he pointed out, “there are plenty of jails
everywhere and they are not empty either.”27 The war in Europe
should be a further lesson to those who steadfastly regarded Eu-
ropeans as “our preceptors in the ways of Progress and Civil-
isation,” for “all the good that Progress and Civilisation have
been able to do for them has been utterly incapable of saving
the great Powers from the most frightful war the world has ever
seen!”28
The cult of imitation, wrote the King in an essay on this
topic, was “a brake upon our National Progress,” for it stifled
originality and imagination, made one perpetually dependent
upon the actions of others, and wasted time. “We should re-
alize,” he wrote, “that we may now venture to think and act for
ourselves without waiting for the lead of our preceptors….”29
Vajiravudh, of course, was not unalterably opposed to all
Western ideas “so long as one does not bind one’s self hand and
foot to always follow some one else’s lead.” What was necessary
was that the Thai feel “free to adopt or reject or originate as it
best suits our national purpose.”30
A relatively new Western philosophy that had begun to make
an impact on educated Thai during the Sixth Reign was so-
cialism. The King reacted to this ideology and its spokesmen
with the same degree of vehemence with which he reacted to
revolutionary Western political concepts.31 Both social and po-
litical revolutionaries were, he said, afflicted with “unrest fever”
or “new mania,” a “fairly contagious disease” spread by “arrant
humbugs” among ignorant and gullible people who would “en-
thuse” over everything Western and everything new.32
The King wrote a witty essay entitled “Uttarakuru” exposing
what seemed to him the foolishness of these imitators of
Western fads. Uttarakuru was an Asian Utopia first described in
Thai in a fourteenth-century work which was based on a much
older Brahmanic text.33 In Uttarakuru the people all observed
the moral precepts and never strayed from righteousness and
so were blessed with beauty, longevity, and happiness. The best
blessing of all, noted Vajiravudh, was contained in the sentence
“Of all forms of wealth, no man knows which is his and which
is of another, all being common (property) everywhere, and
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no man ever cultivates lands, or ploughs fields or engages in
trade.” Here, said the King, is “pure, idealistic Socialism” with
“no individual property, and no manner of work.”34 The King
pointed out other aspects of Uttarakuruan society that he re-
garded as anticipating socialist thought. One was a “providing
tree” that gave men clothing and jewelry at their wish; this,
the King said, was a literary device that really implied com-
munization or nationalization of all forms of property. Another
was a short-term marriage system, which, he pointed out, was
very much like the free marriage ideas of such socialists as
George Bernard Shaw. A third was a child-raising system in
which “children grow up by themselves”; presumably, said the
King, this meant that children would belong to and be reared by
the state.
The irony and sarcasm of the essay made its point clear.
What need had the Thai for the foreign utopian thought of West-
erners such as Shaw or Keir Hardie, or their Chinese variants
such as K’ang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen, when Siam had its own
depictions of the ideal? The King wrote, “As long as human
nature remains as it is, so long shall we have new apostles
of Social Reform, who prate of ‘New’ theories, which are as
old as the hills! Shall we get any nearer to such an idealistic
state? Will such theories ever become really practicable outside
Dreamland or the Lunatic Asylum?”35
A continuous thread running through the King’s thought on
the West was his awareness of Western racial prejudice. Al-
though evidences of this prejudice had never been so obvious in
Siam as in neighboring Western colonies in Burma, Indochina,
or Malaya, they existed and occasionally surfaced. The most
patent evidences were the unequal treaties that restricted
Siamese fiscal and judicial autonomy, and, as has been pointed
out earlier, considerable state energies were devoted to ridding
Siam of these treaties. Other smaller evidences of Western
feelings of superiority abounded. The English-language press,
although usually very careful on this score, sometimes slipped
into a note of condescension. Foreign travel accounts were
more openly slighting or insulting, as, for example, this report:
Careless and heedless, pliable and open to influence, anxious and
easily intimidated, and when left alone gay and full of life, easy to
get on with, amiable, busy at fêtes, a witty chatterer, this is the
Siamese who with his small well-built body and pretty face, forms
a sympathetic nation, but in no way an imposing one.36
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King Vajiravudh was well aware of Siam’s foreign press image
and in a charitable mood once commented: “To most people
Siam is a country full of White Elephants and nothing much be-
sides.”37
Foreign residents in Siam by and large preserved their dis-
tance and their privileges. One British officer in the Siamese
service, queried as to the “general attitude of Europeans to con-
stables and Siamese officers,” replied: “It varies very much, but
as a general rule it is not very polite.”38 Francis Sayre, early
in his career as foreign affairs adviser, discovered that Western
diplomats were not in the habit of acknowledging diplomatic
faux pas to the Siamese and reported that, in one instance when
he felt that an American apology to the Siamese was in order,
it took “a long heart-to-heart talk” with the American minister
before he “rose to the occasion.”39 Among the Westerners in
Bangkok, the Germans had the best reputation for treating the
Siamese as equals. While the Siamese appreciated the German
attitude, the British did not. A British writer castigated the
Germans for their willingness “to descend” to the Siamese level
and praised his own people for not doing so; he added that, if
they did, they would soon lose “that priceless possession their
prestige, which the native, even if he is not regardful of his own,
recognizes in the white man and respects.”40
The main means of contending with Western racism,
whenever it obtruded, was to refuse to concede to it insofar as
possible. The King usually avoided out-and-out denunciations of
Western assumptions of superiority; rather, he insisted that the
Thai were equals and must act as equals. He even allowed that
some Western expressions of superiority were natural, for “or-
dinarily people of different nationalities feel that their own na-
tionality is first in the world and other people are less good.”
That in itself was not harmful. Indeed, the Thai were not above
such feelings; in casual speech a Thai was apt to refer to West-
erners with the vulgar pronoun man (“it”) and to a foreign king
with the undignified pronoun kae (“he,” but not suitable for
royalty).41 It was to be expected that “every patriotic man would
naturally have his own country’s interests at heart above the in-
terests of all others”; one could hardly look for “foreigners to
have the interests of Siam at heart as much as we ourselves.”42
Private feelings of Western superiority were one thing, but
naked insults and demands for special privilege were quite an-
other. Several incidents occurred during the reign that put to
the test the King’s determination to be equal. He came out well.
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The most highly publicized incident occurred in March
1915. Two Thai soldiers, returning from maneuvers, took
shelter in the shade under the house of Mr. P. A. Lewin, a
British engineer in the Siamese Railway Department. Lewin,
annoyed, drove the soldiers out by kicking them. The Ministry
of War, enraged at the “moral insult,” persuaded the Ministry
of Communications to dismiss Lewin from government service
and issued an official communique accusing certain foreigners
of looking “down upon us as non-equals.” The communique
closed with a veiled threat to foreigners that “… you cannot
expect our soldiers to remember every foreigner’s face and dis-
tinguish those who treat us nicely from those who do not.”43 The
Ministry of War’s blast, undoubtedly written by the mercurial
Prince Chakrabongs, created a big stir. The Bangkok Times ed-
itorialized that Lewin should not have taken the law into his
own hands, but questioned the severity of the punishment and
particularly objected to the general accusation at the commu-
nique’s end.44 Prince Chakrabongs immediately countered with
a letter denouncing the editorial in strong language:
… the Siamese do feel as probably all Asiatics do, that the Euro-
peans consider them (Siamese) as an inferior race. The ordinary
Siamese feel it by instinct, while the educated ones can read
about it in any foreign newspaper or book. You cannot deny the
fact that men of the white race in general consider us to be in-
ferior to themselves in every way. Well the ordinary Siamese do
not like it and they, by their ignorance, return the compliment.45
The Lewin affair finally drew in the British minister, the Siamese
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the King. Lewin was allowed
to submit a full apology, in return for which the King granted
him clemency and reinstated him in his position.46 Some months
after the Lewin affair, Vajiravudh, in a statement to Thai stu-
dents in Europe, again referred to it:
Formerly it was not at all unusual for a Westerner to slap or kick
a Thai and to do so with impunity. But if a Thai did anything
to a Westerner, even the smallest thing, it became a big affair
requiring us to beg their humble pardon. Nowadays this is all
changed, and if a Westerner does bodily harm to a Thai, he must
be punished no less than if a Thai injures a Westerner.47
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A few minor episodes further illustrate the Thai disincli-
nation to accept insults or discourtesies. In 1911, when three
high-ranking Thai princes stopped off at Singapore on their
way back to Siam, they paid a courtesy call on the British gov-
ernor. The governor kept the princes waiting for some minutes.
An objection to the governor’s discourtesy was communicated
to the British Legation in Bangkok, and this soon brought a
“fullest apology” from the governor.48 In 1915 Father Colombet,
a French cleric, complained that Thai soldiers marching in
column were deliberately insulting Westerners by failing to give
way to them on the street. The King noted that in Europe sol-
diers in column had the right of way; he disallowed the French-
man’s charge and advised that it be ignored.49 In 1916 the
British consul in Siam, T. H. Lyle, objected to the use of the term
nai, a Thai translation of “mister,” before his name. The King,
who had inaugurated the policy of using nai for “mister,” dis-
missed Lyle’s objection by saying that it presumably arose be-
cause he was “of the older generation of consuls and cannot
overcome the habit of looking down on the Thai.”50 The minor
quarrel over nai and “mister” continued to surface occasionally
in the press. The Thai held that nai was but a simple translation,
in no way demeaning; the Westerners objected that the Thai
practice of entitling all officials tended to make a nai “a
nobody.”51
One important affair involving racism and Westerners was
the internment of German and Austrian prisoners of war by the
Thai in 1917. The Thai obviously intended to keep the enemy
prisoners in Siam; they immediately began to build a permanent
camp for them at Nakhο̨n Pathom. The British minister strongly
objected to this policy, citing as his principal reason the danger
that the Germans might escape and cause trouble in India.52
The matter was laid before the King. He decided to accept a
British offer to house the prisoners at a British encampment in
India,53 and, after six months’ internment in Siam, the prisoners
were transported to India on two Thai ships.
There were problems from the start about the internment
of the Germans and Austrians. The internment policy itself was
adopted largely to please the British. The Thai were acutely
aware that Germans in England and Japan were not imprisoned
whereas those in British colonies were. And the decision to
move the prisoners to India was also made in response to British
insistence. The Germans wanted to stay in Siam, and many
Siamese preferred to hold them. Most vociferous on this subject
was Prince Chakrabongs, who as Army Chief of Staff had done
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much to see to the orderly arrest and the provision of re-
spectable quarters for the enemy aliens. The Prince resented
the presumed British belief that the Siamese might not be able
to guard the prisoners adequately; he resented the “colonial”
implications he saw in the British policy and the severity of the
British demands on Siam as compared with those on Japan; he
was deeply troubled by the seeming disregard of the British
for Siamese amour propre.54 Vajiravudh, however, was inclined
to make the best of things; he seemed to accept the logic of
British arguments and also the political reality that Siam was
not Japan.55 Siam, after all, had made a significant step forward
in merely taking white men as prisoners:
I know that it is regarded by many people as a great compliment,
not to say glory for Siam that she should not only be able to intern
Europeans, but that these same Europeans are even anxious and
willing to be kept interned by us rather than their fellow Euro-
peans. Indeed, being a Siamese myself I cannot but help feeling
elated that we have been able to intern Europeans which has un-
doubtedly increased our prestige a great deal, in the eyes not only
of our own people but in those of the other Asiatic races residing
in our country.56
There is no question that Vajiravudh believed significant
progress had been made by Siam in achieving equality with the
West. And equality was the goal, not racial enmity. He specifi-
cally warned his people not to hate foreigners, for “it is not nec-
essary to show our love of nation by being insulting in word or
manner or by hating other nations.”57
The signs that equality was being achieved were summa-
rized by the King in a letter to Thai students abroad in 1916. At
one time, he said, the Thai had been as afraid of Westerners as
they were of great demon yakshas, and Westerners, sensing this
fear, had been correspondingly demanding. But the Thai had got
over their fear, and Westerners no longer acted the bully. West-
erners had learned that the Thai could not be intimidated and
were now determined to “walk in equality” with the Thai. West-
erners who came to Siam to make a living “feel a lively respect
for us Thai and know better than to make us angry.” At one time
Westerners would not associate with the Thai; nowadays, “it is
impossible to see one who doesn’t.”58
The example of new international respect that Vajiravudh
was proudest of was his appointment as an honorary general in
the British army, which he reciprocated by offering George V a
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generalship in the Siamese army. King Vajiravudh referred often
to this “mutual bestowal of military ranks.” He was exceed-
ingly proud of it and saw in it “the meaning that the Siamese
Nation has already shown to the world that they deserve equal
treatment with other countries.” He took particular pleasure in
the special favor shown Siam, for no other Asiatic sovereign,
not even the Japanese emperor, had been similarly honored. He
wished his people to know that this honor was for all of them.
And the language Vajiravudh used, referring to King George as
a “Brother and Friend” who “stretches his hand over the ocean
in order to grasp mine,”59 is not merely the grand language of a
formal speech, it represents a conviction that Siam had entered
a new era of national and racial equality.
THE CHINESE MINORITY
King Vajiravudh’s views on the relationship between the Thai
and all other Asians were somewhat ambiguous. On the one
hand, the King recognized a certain similarity between Thai and
other East Asian peoples; at least they shared a common lot
with respect to their treatment by the West.60 He occasionally
used the phrase “we Asiatics.” On the other hand, his main ob-
jective was to strike out for recognition—by the Thai and by
outsiders—of the existence of the Thai as a separate people,
not to be confused with any other people or to be judged by
any other label but that of Thai. For example, in commenting
on an article on Yuan Shih-k’ai by a British writer, who had ac-
cused the then President of China of being guilty of “oppor-
tunism of the Oriental type,” Vajiravudh expressed no objection
to Yuan’s being called an opportunist but took exception to “of
the Oriental type” as a purely gratuituous and unjustified smear
of Eastern peoples. “Opportunists,” he said, “are bad whatever
their nation or language,” and opportunism “has nothing to do
with a person’s country or skin.”61 The King took even more vi-
olent exception to the term “yellow peril” that had gained cur-
rency in Europe early in the twentieth century. There was no
“yellow” peril, he said. There might be a Chinese peril, but the
Thai were also a “yellow” people, and they were a peril to no
one.62
One problem for Vajiravudh in defining the Thai nation or
“race” was the Chinese community in Siam. Chinese had long
resided in Siam; the Chinese had come to occupy an important
role in Siamese trade; and the Chinese were accepted. Many
The Concept of Nationality
195
had intermarried with the Thai. Many members of the Siamese
nobility and royalty were part Chinese in ancestry.63 Vajiravudh
did not seek to deny any of these facts; however, he did wish
to heighten awareness among the Thai of their identity by fos-
tering the idea that the Chinese and the Thai were different
peoples, that the ethnic Chinese were not Thai.
The insistence on Chinese separateness was part of the
King’s policy of nationalism, but the idea of separateness was
growing in any event. It was a product of the times, of the
developing nationalism within China itself—a nationalism as-
sociated with Sun Yat-sen, the fall of the Manchus, and the
soliciting of moral and financial aid from overseas Chinese com-
munities for political changes in China. Proselytizers for the
new China came periodically to Siam. Dr. Sun himself had paid
a brief visit in 1908. Signs of Chinese national fervor had begun
to appear in the last years of King Chulalongkorn’s reign: the
first Chinese-language school was established in 1909; Chinese
newspapers in Siam, which had been founded as early as 1905,
became more and more politicized; and a major Chinese strike,
lasting three days, posed a serious threat to Thai authority in
June 1910.64 The strike constituted a Chinese protest against
a new government policy of increasing head taxes on Chinese
residents to the level paid by Thai. Although swift government
action brought the strike quickly under control and showed
Chinese residents the effectiveness of Thai power, the very fact
that the Chinese had been able to organize, that Chinese secret
societies had been able to marshal mass support, that the griev-
ances aired had gone beyond the tax issue gave the Thai reason
for apprehension.
The Chinese problem that had begun to emerge at the close
of Chulalongkorn’s reign grew rapidly during the fifteen years
of Vajiravudh’s. Chinese immigration swelled, and for the first
time included significant numbers of women. New Chinese
schools opened; there were at least six by 1916, forty-eight
in 1925. The overthrow of the Manchus and establishment of
the Chinese Republic late in 1911 focused the attention of
overseas Chinese more sharply than ever on events in China
and heightened Chinese nationalistic inclinations and activities.
During the summer of 1915, for example, local Chinese orga-
nized a boycott of Japanese goods to protest against Japanese
political demands on China. In 1924 the Chinese of Siam sent
delegates to the first National Congress of the Kuomintang
Party. And there were constant rumors during the reign that a
new strong government in China would demand the opening of
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diplomatic relations with Siam so that it could better protect
the interests of its overseas citizens. Local Chinese on occasion
urged the government in China to take such a step.
In terms of administrative policy, the government of the
Sixth Reign undertook little that was new with respect to the
Chinese minority. It watched; it worried; it acted only when laws
were transgressed.
The government kept particularly on the alert for signs of
another strike. Fears of a new strike, perhaps even a revolt,
were most lively in the summer of 1911. Several letters from
Prince Chakrabongs and Čhaophraya Yommarat to the King re-
ported rumors that Chinese were collecting funds and arms
and drawing up detailed plans to challenge the government.65
The Thai Ministry of War was ready; a seven-page secret plan
detailed the steps that would be taken in the event that the
Chinese acted.66 No Chinese action came, and only minor out-
breaks between rival Chinese groups marred the tranquillity of
the reign.
The necessity of being on the ready absorbed considerable
government attention. There were continual reports from the
Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of the Interior
about the actions of individual Chinese suspected of being ag-
itators, about activities of Chinese secret societies, about the
Chinese press, about Chinese subscription drives, about
Chinese schools, about Chinese manipulations in trade and fi-
nance, about virtually every aspect of organized Chinese ac-
tivity. On occasion individuals were arrested and deported;67
on occasion newspapers were closed and circulars or handbills
seized. Fund drives for political purposes were banned, al-
though the effectiveness of the ban is doubtful.68 But harshly
repressive measures were rigorously avoided. When danger
threatened, the government was inclined to call in leaders of
the Chinese community, explain the government’s point of view
to them, and enlist their support. When the Chinese boycott
of Japanese goods started in 1915, the Minister of Local Gov-
ernment held a meeting with leaders of various Chinese as-
sociations and editors of Chinese newspapers to point out the
government’s view that such a boycott endangered Siam’s re-
lations with Japan, a power friendly to Siam; the minister was
pleased with the Chinese reception of his message.69 The policy
of friendly persuasion seems also to have been the first choice
in the provinces.70 Persuasion was reinforced from time to time
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by warnings, such as the King’s reflection in 1913 on the 1910
strike: “Just another ‘strike’ and I should be very loth to answer
for the consequences.”71
Only two laws passed during the reign were aimed at “the
Chinese problem.” Neither could be called repressive. And
neither was legally anti-Chinese.
The first was a law of 1914 calling for the registration of
associations.72 The already existing criminal code barred secret
societies and criminal associations; the new law provided a pos-
itive screening for clubs and associations. On registration an
association became a juristic person, liable to legal penalty.
Associations that could not show a constructive program and
provide a list of acceptable officers could be denied a license to
operate.73 The law was aimed particularly at preventing the for-
mation of Chinese associations reflecting the new political en-
thusiasms generated by events in China.74 Such associations,
which were not secret societies nor strictly speaking criminal
organizations, were much easier to control under the new law
than under the criminal code. After the passage of the law,
several arrests were made of Chinese attending meetings of
unregistered societies.75
The second law aimed particularly at the Chinese was the
law on private schools of June 1918. The law required that all
students in private schools be “(1) taught to read, write and un-
derstand the Siamese language with reasonable facility; (2) in-
structed in the duties of a good citizen, in the love of Siam, and
in a knowledge of the country including at least its history and
geography.”76 Other provisions called for the registration and
inspection of schools and specified that headmasters must be
proficient in the Thai language. Mission schools and most other
private schools were already being conducted along the lines of
the new law; Chinese schools were not. The law was meant to
bring about an end to the indoctrination of young Chinese “in a
purely Chinese atmosphere” and to give Chinese youths an ed-
ucation “in sympathy with the people of the country.”77 In fact,
however, the law was so weakly enforced that it achieved no
more than “a measure of purely nominal control” and Chinese
schools continued to “flourish and increase” as before.78
What the private school law of 1918 was supposed to do
was facilitate the assimilation of Chinese. Assimilation had long
been the Thai way, be it largely an unconscious way, of solving
or avoiding a “Chinese problem.” By the 1910s and 20s the
swell of Chinese migration, the influx of Chinese women, and
the heightened political awareness of the migrants had slowed
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the pace of assimilation. But the policy of assimilation con-
tinued. The first Thai nationality act, promulgated in 1911,
indeed seemed designed to facilitate assimilation, since it de-
fined as a Thai national everyone born on Thai soil regardless of
racial background or parentage.79
Assimilation of the Chinese in the past had been successful.
This success, it would seem, had had less to do with government
policy than with the basic receptivity of the Thai to strangers
and the lack of “racial feelings,” as this term is generally un-
derstood in the West.80 Chinese had intermarried freely with
the Thai at all levels of society; Chinese had been ennobled
and appointed to high positions in government; Chinese had
been granted all privileges of Thai citizens and, indeed, had
possessed some freedoms, such as freedom from corvée re-
quirements, that the Thai themselves did not have. And the con-
tributions of the Chinese, as traders, laborers, and craftsmen,
had been appreciated. Although the Thai and Chinese had held
some uncomplimentary stereotypes about each other, the rela-
tions between the two peoples had been remarkably amicable
and smooth.
Vajiravudh sought to continue the good relations. The King
understood the value of the Chinese in Thai society. He un-
doubtedly agreed with an analysis of Chinese contributions
made by Čhaophraya Yommarat in a report in 1916.81 The
report stated that the Chinese added people, industrious and
productive people, to an underpopulated land. Siam, with a pop-
ulation of but eight million in 1910, was considered by both
Thai and Westerners to be weak partly because it lacked people.
Where Chinese had come into Siam, such as in the tin-mining
provinces in the South, production had soared. Further, the
wealth the Chinese produced was a taxable wealth, providing
needed government revenues. The capital that the Chinese had
invested and the specialized labor they supplied would be hard
to replace. The report ended with the comment that if Chinese
were discouraged from coming to Siam, there was a danger
that their economic role might be filled by Indians, Japanese,
or Europeans, none of whom were as desirable or as culturally
assimilable as the Chinese. These economic arguments were un-
doubtedly persuasive in convincing the government to live with
the growing Chinese problem and not to impose any curbs on
Chinese immigration. The fact that the Chinese did not involve
themselves in Siamese politics, as the King himself noted, was
also a point in their favor.82
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The King showed his good feelings toward the Chinese in in-
numerable ways during the reign. Starting with the cremation
rites for King Chulalongkorn in December 1910, Vajiravudh re-
ceived Chinese delegations at many important public functions
and often addressed them. At the December 1910 rites, for ex-
ample, the King said:
The Chinese people and our own people have long been of one
heart; the Chinese have acted like people of the same race as
our people from ancient times to the present day. I am resolved,
therefore, always to assist and protect all the Chinese who come
to live in this country.83
The attitude displayed in this comment is remarkably similar
to that displayed by King Chulalongkorn, who in 1907 said: “I
regard the Chinese not as if they were foreigners but as a part
of our country and equally entitled to share in the fruits of the
country’s prosperity.”84
At the coronation festivities in 1911 Vajiravudh made a
special stop at the Chinese section of town to receive the con-
gratulations of the Chinese community. On this occasion His
Majesty promised that he would always treat the Chinese with
justice and would make no impositions on them that he did not
make on his own people.85 On provincial tours the King often re-
ceived Chinese delegations; in one town he bought a large pig in
the market as a present to the Chinese. Other evidences of favor
included a royal donation to a Chinese hospital in 1912, em-
phasis on the Chinese descent of King Taksin during the royal
kathin in 1916, the dedication of a Chinese school and a Chinese
theater in 1917, and sponsorship by the Ministry of Education
of athletic events at Chinese schools in 1918.
One policy of showing favor that was probably new was the
awarding of honorary noble titles to individual Chinese. The en-
nobling of Chinese in government service was not new, but Vaji-
ravudh seems to have been the first to give noble titles without
any duties or salary as a means of strengthening the bonds be-
tween wealthy Chinese and the government. Conclusive figures
are lacking, but one source indicates that some ninety-two
Chinese were given such noble titles during the reign. There is
no doubt that the awarding of noble titles was also used as a
means of repayment for donations to the King’s projects.
The relations between one wealthy Chinese, Yi Ko-hong, and
the government will illustrate the King’s methods of dealing
with the Chinese. Yi was so wealthy and powerful that Prince
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Chakrabongs suggested in 1910 that his power be curbed by
taxing much of his wealth away.86 This advice was not followed.
Rather, Yi was ennobled as Phra Anuwat Ratchaniyom and in
1920 was awarded a special royal order. Yi in return gave
bridges, various pieces of property, and a school to the gov-
ernment.87 Typical of the reciprocity between well-to-do
Chinese and the government were two acts associated with a
theater opened by Yi Ko-hong in 1917: on December 13 the
King honored Yi by visiting the new theater; on December 22
Yi lent the theater to one of the “King’s Own” Wild Tiger units
for a benefit performance.88 The King’s methods of winning
over wealthy Chinese were effective; Chinese businessmen in
general were particularly generous donors to the King’s fund
drives—the cruiser fund drive, the Siamese Expeditionary Force
drive, the Wild Tiger rifles drive.89
The King often expressed his gratitude to the Chinese for
their gifts, given, as he expressed it, in gratitude for the benefits
extended them in Siam. In an article whose title would be trans-
lated into English as “Thanks to Our Chinese Friends,” written
by Vajiravudh under the pseudonym Asvabahu, he praised the
Chinese who had subscribed to the cruiser fund. He compli-
mented them for realizing that a stronger Siam, free from
danger, would be a better place for them to live and work.
Chinese and Thai, he said, were after all “both Asians and ought
not be enemies.” In the article the King also included some
typical admonitions. The Thai and Chinese could remain friends
to the mutual advantage of both peoples, but the Chinese must
understand that in Siam the Thai were the masters and the
Chinese the guests. The host planned no injury to the guests,
but the guests must be good citizens and not listen to agitators
or instigators of trouble who spoke against the Thai.90 The gen-
erosity of Chinese to fund drives was even used by the King to
shame his own people. In the play Mahatama a Chinese peddler
makes his small donation, saying “Even though I’m Chinese, I
live in Thailand; I want the Thai to like me.” And a Thai servant
says, “Everyone I see makes contributions to the cruiser fund.
Even the Chinaman gives. If I don’t give I’ll feel shamefaced
before the Chinese.”91
The “Chinese problem” in Siam during the Sixth Reign had
two dimensions. The first dimension, how to deal with the
Chinese community, brought forth, as we have seen, a gov-
ernment policy that was notably consistent with the easygoing
policies of the past. The second dimension, how the Thai should
view themselves with respect to the Chinese, brought forth
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something new. It was this second dimension that related di-
rectly to Thai policies of nationalism; it was this second di-
mension that aroused Vajiravudh’s greatest interest.
The Thai habit of ready acceptance of strangers, in the
King’s view, bore the great danger that the Thai would lose
their own identity. An important part of the King’s nationalistic
message thus became the sharp differentiation between Thai
and Chinese. In this differentiation the Chinese came off poorly.
Chinese faults were contrasted with Thai virtues. The message
was distinctly anti-Chinese. But anti-Chinese statements were
not made to arouse the Chinese, or even to arouse the Thai, to
hatred or to any rupture of relations. They were made to help
the Thai realize who they were and what values Thai culture had
so that the Thai would bestir themselves to save themselves.
The best known of the King’s anti-Chinese writings was an
essay published simultaneously in Thai and English in July 1914.
The English title was “The Jews of the Orient.”92 The essay
began with an analysis of the Jewish problem in Europe. The
Jews in Europe, said Vajiravudh, differed from other Europeans
not only because of their religion but also because of their racial
exclusiveness. They always remained aliens, never became real
citizens of the country they lived in. The Jews also held to a
feeling of racial superiority, regarding themselves as the chosen
people and Gentiles as inferior. And, most important, the Jews
were thoroughly possessed by the moneymaking instinct. They
had raised moneymaking to a cult for which they were willing
to endure any hardship or privation, including obloquy and per-
secution.
After having provided this background of anti-Jewish stereo-
types, Vajiravudh proceeded to point out parallels between the
Jews and the Chinese. The Chinese also preserved their alle-
giance to their race, taking advantage of all the benefits of
foreign citizenship but giving no loyalty in return. The Chinese
also possessed the concept of racial superiority, regarding only
Chinese as civilized and classifying all other peoples as bar-
barians. And, lastly, the Chinese shared the Jewish money-
making instinct; they had indeed “discovered the Art of living on
nothing.” In their devotion to money the Chinese were without
morals or conscience or pity. They would cheat, rob, or murder
for money. The wealth that Chinese produced was sent back to
China; in effect the Chinese were “like so many vampires who
steadily suck dry an unfortunate victim’s life-blood.” In this re-
spect they were worse than the Jews, said Vajiravudh, for at
least the Jews, who had no country, spent their wealth in the
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country in which they resided. (The King did begrudgingly allow
one point in favor of the Chinese: that at least the Chinese, who,
unlike the Jews, had a country of their own, did not get involved
in local politics.)
“The Jews of the Orient” represents the King’s views at
their most extreme. The essay was scathing in its denunciations.
Needless to say, it borrowed heavily on anti-Semitic thoughts
of the West, thoughts the King had certainly become familiar
with during his long years in England. And it borrowed from
a growing body of anti-Chinese Western literature. Indeed, the
comparison of the Chinese to the Jews was not new with Vaji-
ravudh; it had been used at least as early as 1898 by a Britisher
in the employ of Siam who had written that the Chinese were
“the Jews of Siam.”93 There is good reason to believe, in fact,
that the essay was written with a European audience in mind:
the Jewish comparison might be expected to appeal to West-
erners, but it would be meaningless to the Thai, who were
hardly aware of the existence of the Jewish people. After the
essay appeared, the King noted with particular pleasure its
good reception by Europeans.94
Far more typical of the King’s anti-Chinese writings were
those that compared the Chinese with the Thai with the aim
of enhancing Thai feelings of national pride. Vajiravudh wrote
often of the “true Thai,” and by this he meant someone who
spoke Thai and was loyal to king, religion, and country. Mere
residence in Siam was not enough. Nor was citizenship enough.
Citizenship by naturalization or even by virtue of birth in Siam
did not necessarily produce “true Thai.”95
The Chinese were not true Thai because their basic identity
was Chinese. Their loyalty was to China; most of them lived
and worked in Siam only in order to accumulate wealth enough
to return to China. If war with China should ever come, the
Chinese in Siam who could afford to do so would certainly flee
to China. Even in peacetime, whenever there was any trouble
or even rumor of trouble in Siam, Chinese immediately readied
themselves to take passage on boats leaving the country.96 In
the areas of heaviest concentration of Chinese, notably in
Bangkok’s Sampeng district, the Chinese lived in almost totally
Chinese communities, spoke Chinese, were closely involved
with Chinese secret societies, and were virtually divorced from
Thai associations.
Many of the Chinese, the King wrote, were remarkably like
chameleons. These Chinese called themselves Thai. On occasion
they spoke Thai. They had Thai friends. They went to Thai
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temples. They were Thai when it was in their interest to be
Thai. But on other occasions they spoke Chinese, associated
with Chinese, took the Chinese side in disputes. Their apparent
acceptance of Buddhism was a matter of convenience, and when
it suited his purposes a Chinese could as readily become a
Christian, a Muslim, or a Hindu.97 Vajiravudh distrusted such
people. They were not “true Thai,” for “one is either Thai or
Chinese; he cannot be both.”98
The Thai tendency not to regard the Chinese as foreigners
arose, said the King, out of Thai lack of understanding of Siam’s
long-range interests. The Chinese were a convenience: they
worked hard for little pay. The Thai were too ready to accept
the easy way. As a result the Thai had become dependent on
the Chinese. This dependence made many Thai reluctant to
look at the problem that had arisen, to balk at saying anything
critical about the Chinese. Such dependence, which led some
Thai to say “If the Chinese go on strike again, we will all die,”
was woeful.99 Other Thai asserted that, if the Chinese were not
counted as Thai, there would be few Thai left to count at all.100
Not so, said Vajiravudh. The congestion of Chinese in Bangkok
gave a false picture, for in the countryside the Chinese were not
numerous and, further, were much less Chinese. The Thai must
not feel so abjectly beholden to the Chinese. The Thai must have
more self-reliance and self-pride. The King wrote:
I do not ask you to hate the Chinese; I ask only that you think
more of yourselves. You who are Thai must do more for your
own nationality than you do for the Chinese. Whenever you must
choose between what is of benefit to the Chinese or to the Thai,
there should be no question, you should choose the Thai. That is
my only wish.101
Many of the concepts about the Chinese that the King at-
tempted to foster were summed up in Chinese characters in
his plays. A minor character in Mahatama represents the good
Chinese who appreciates the life Siam offers him and is openly
grateful. In Huačhai nakrop the most villainous character in the
play, named Sunbeng, is often referred to by the derogatory
Thai term for Chinese, ai čhek. Sunbeng is depicted as com-
pletely selfish, with no loyalties to anything other than his per-
sonal interests. Sunbeng obviously stands for the self-seeking,
chameleonlike Chinese who cannot be relied upon. In the words
of one character in the play, such people “readily switch na-
tionalities. They join the Thai as Thai; they join the other side
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and become something else…. we can never be sure what they
are.”102 In still another play, Wiwaha phra samut, a Chinese
“boy” provides much of the comedy. He becomes the butt of
jokes because of his pigtail and his mispronunciation of Thai.
The humor is pointed, but it is not vicious. And a song, sung
by the “boy” in broken Thai, provided Thai audiences with
a clever encapsulation of royal views, a neat and memorable
poetic stereotype, of the average career of Chinese immigrants
to Siam:
Chinaman very smart; no look down on him.
He know how to make living in unfancy job.
He can be humble cook or boy;
He take hard work to make money.
Master trust him to buy things;
He diligent in getting good bargains.
He buy at cheap price in his way
And keep the change as he please;
He get old clothes of master to wear.
If the master scold, he can take it.
Little by little he save up money;
Before long he become rich
And leave the master to set up shop.
Soon the shop become full store;
Then he become a very smart big businessman.
The Secret Society choose him as third brother;
He can go about and throw his weight around,
He can do what he like and get away with it.
He watch out for police so they not bother him,
And then he be happy forever after.103
OTHER ASIAN MINORITIES
Second in size among the minority groups in Siam were the
Malays. The Malays were a distant second; they comprised only
about 2 percent of the total population. But the fact that the
Malays were concentrated in southern Siam, where, indeed,
in the southernmost provinces they comprised a population
majority, did make the Malays a special problem in terms of
Thai nationalism. Unlike the Chinese, the Malays had not mi-
grated to Siam; they had become Siamese nationals by virtue of
Thai political expansion southward over territories populated by
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Malays. The Malays, therefore, had every right to consider the
provinces they lived in as home. Their allegiance to the Siamese
nation could not be assumed. The nationalistic symbols the King
relied upon all heavily stressed the “Thainess” of the Thai. And
the Malays of Siam were not ethnically Thai; they were Muslim
and not Buddhist, and their language, customs, dress, and di-
etary habits were different from those of the Thai. Furthermore,
their history was that of a conquered territory once in vassal
status.
Vajiravudh was aware of the special Malay case insofar as
nationalism was concerned. He was anxious not to antagonize
the Malays, for he keenly felt the vulnerability of the area that
he frequently described as a rich jewel that Siam might well
lose if it were not treasured. And so he gave the Malays more
attention, accorded them more favors, than any other minority
group.
The King’s favor was exhibited by official royal tours in the
southern provinces. In 1915 the royal progress in the South
lasted two months; in 1917 it lasted six weeks. In fact the
South was the only region, outside of the Central Plain, to
which the King paid extensive visits. He visited Khorat in the
Northeast once, in 1921, but spent only a few days there, and,
as King, he never visited the North. On the southern tours he ex-
tended courtesies to Malay Muslim groups on many occasions.
At Nakhο̨n Sithammarat in 1917, for example, he granted an
audience to the heads of the Muslim communities and to the
imams and hajis of the various mosques in the area. At this au-
dience he received a loyal address by the Governor of Saiburi on
behalf of his coreligionists, thanking the King for his protection,
and was presented with a “sacred sword.” Vajiravudh, in his
return speech, pointed out that he regarded the protection of
Islam as his duty. He said:
We intend always to give all the people under our government our
protection and the opportunity to pursue their activities in the re-
ligious sphere to the full in freedom, without oppression or any
pressure to change their faith or believe in a religion they do not
favor. All of you who are adherents of the religion of Muhammad,
we feel, are our subjects in no way different from those who hold
other religions. And so we have declared our intention to protect
all adherents of Islam who live in our country.104
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He also expressed the hope that, if the need arose, he could
count on his Malay subjects to rally round the sacred sword
they had presented to him, to participate in the defense of the
nation. Although the King’s tours in 1915 and 1917 undoubtedly
had several purposes, including the wish to end rumors that the
South was a breeding ground for seditionists training to work
against the British in India, the basic purpose seems clear: to
strengthen the bonds between the government and its Muslim
Malay subjects. The King apparently considered his person as a
bonding instrument. Showing himself before large numbers of
his people in the South would, he felt, convince them that Vaji-
ravudh was their king and that he was a king who cared.
The King’s reception of Muslim Malays was by no means
restricted to his visits to the South. There were Malay com-
munities, which owed their origin to groups of prisoners of
war taken in the early nineteenth century, sprinkled around the
Bangkok area, and on local tours the King passed through such
communities and accepted their “enthusiastic welcome.”105 Va-
jiravudh also received Muslim and Malay representatives at
court on his birthday and on other occasions.
At his birthday celebration in 1916 the King took the un-
usual step of accepting a petition from Muslim representatives
who asked him to extend his protection over Muslim commu-
nities in the Bangkok area. A Muslim representative read a
loyal address in which the Malays expressed their “deep gratifi-
cation” and promised to give “unalterable loyalty to the Throne”
even to the extent of laying down their lives in the defense of the
king and the kingdom. The King was thenceforward termed “the
Protector of the Faith of the Prophet Muhammad.” The King’s
reply continued the theme of the original address. Vajiravudh
said that he was certain the Muslims in Siam would indeed
come forth to offer themselves in the defense of the realm, “…
for in so doing, they do but follow the precepts of their Prophet,
namely, that to die in defence of one’s religion is a meritorious
act, and indeed they would be serving the cause of Islam when
they serve the country that gives it her protection.”106 In an
audience with Muslim representatives on his birthday in 1917,
Vajiravudh received pledges similar to those of 1916 and, in ad-
dition, the “Aden Staff of Islam,” which was described as “a holy
emblem of Faith entitling the holder to the loyalty of all the
Faithful.”107
With respect to law, the Malays in southern Siam seem to
have continued to be given, through their religious leaders, the
right to decide cases “of Islamic nature.”108 Under the Edu-
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cation Act of 1921, no bars were placed on instruction in Malay,
although the teaching of Thai became compulsory. And a small
concession made to Malay Boy Scouts is highly indicative of His
Majesty’s attitude: the King himself gave Malay boys in the Boy
Scout movement in Pattani permission to wear Malay-style caps
in place of regulation caps, which the local boys considered
“not suitable.”109 This concession was undoubtedly based on His
Majesty’s overall delight with his southern compatriots because
of their enthusiastic acceptance of the Wild Tiger Corps and the
Boy Scouts.
Aside from the Chinese and Malays, there were various
other minority groups, but their numbers and their position
in Thai society were so insignificant that they did not require
special consideration. On occasion, however, one or another of
these small groups was accorded special attention: for example,
the Vietnamese in Bangkok participated in the funerary rites
for the Queen Mother in 1919110 and for Prince Chakrabongs
in 1920;111 the small Japanese community was honored by the
presence of the King at the cremation of the Japanese minister
in 1921.112 One governmental action with respect to the Indians
resident in Siam was of nationalistic significance: in 1917 an
order was issued that the use of the designation khaek (literally
“guest,” but also a somewhat deprecating term for “Indian”) in
front of personal names of Indians in government records was
to be abandoned. The use of the similar designation čhin in front
of Chinese names had been abandoned some time earlier.113
It would have been possible to view the various Thai dialect
groups in Siam as comprising ethnic elements different from
the Thai of the country’s center. The Lao of the Northeast and
the Thaiyai of the North could have been regarded as separate
from the Thai of the Čhaophraya Plain on historical and, to some
extent, on cultural grounds. The basic linguistic and cultural
affinities of all Thai groups, however, are very close, and these
groups have commonly been seen as comprising one ethnic
family. In any event and for obvious reasons the Siamese gov-
ernment, even before Vajiravudh’s time, had decided on a policy
of treating all these peoples as Thai and using the term “Thai”
for all of them.
The practice of using the term Thai for the Thaiyai of the
North and the Lao of the Northeast had apparently not ex-
tended below the top levels of government during Chula-
longkorn’s reign. Its spread to all levels of government was
vigorously promoted during the Sixth Reign. Consistent with
the policy of seeing all Thai dialect groups as Thai was the de-
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cision to use only “standard Thai,” that is, the Bangkok dialect,
in public schools; the Lao script was to be discouraged.114 In a
report on the Northeast in 1915, Prince Chakrabongs stressed
the necessity for a policy of national identification for the Lao,
who, he said, “must be regarded as Thai.”115 And in a report
on the northern provinces written after his trip there in 1916,
Prince Chakrabongs went into considerable detail about the
problem. He commented that high officials were careful not to
use the term Lao and were following the government policy
so that “all the people will feel themselves to be part of the
Thai nation and abandon the idea that they are in a subservient
territory.” Lower officials, however, he reported, were not con-
sistent in calling the local people Thai and tended to look down
on them “as do Westerners with regard to all Asians.” Some
officials used the terms thai nu̓a (“northern Thai”) and thai
tai (“southern Thai”) to differentiate the dialect groups. This
practice, said Prince Chakrabongs, should also be discouraged.
If distinctions were needed, terms such as “inhabitant of Chi-
angmai” or “inhabitant of Bangkok” would suffice. The Prince
further said that instructions to officials were not enough and
suggested that sanctions be imposed on erring officials, such as
denial of promotion or pay increases—or even dismissal.116
A logical extension of the broad application of the term Thai
to all Thai dialect groups in Siam would have been an attempt
to apply the term to such groups outside of Siam as well. This
idea, and the political concept of a pan-Thai state that would go
with it, was apparently never put on paper by any government
official or any other Thai during the Sixth Reign. The one ex-
pression of the idea on record during the reign was made by
a Westerner who suggested that the Thai race be preserved by
creating for it a solid, substantial government “from Yunnan and
Kwang-Si, in China, down to the southern limit of Thai speaking
people, and reaching from the Mekong Pacific watershed on the
East to the Salween river and Indian Ocean on the West.” In
such a fashion there would come into being “a separate ethno-
logical entity,” a structure for “the whole Thai race.” The idea
was presented as a dream “that will alarm no one since it is not
even dreamed by one of the Thai race…. And as in these days
the young men of Siam are given to dreaming dreams this may
give them food for thought that should be sobering in its possi-
bilities.”117
Whether Vajiravudh and his contemporaries ever dreamed
the pan-Thai dream, it is impossible to know. It can be assumed,
though, that if they did they certainly considered it an impos-
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sible dream. And highly impolitic to ever mention or even hint
at. The rumor that reached Siam in 1912 that the French were
thinking of breaking up Laos and attaching pieces of it to other
portions of French Indochina evoked no Thai response. The
press reported that Siam, both officially and unofficially, was
“entirely uninterested in what is after all purely an internal ad-
ministrative measure beyond her frontier.”118 Interested or not,
the Thai were determined to be diplomatically correct. And,
with respect to neighboring states, this meant keeping scrupu-
lously out of their affairs. As has been mentioned in chapter 4,
all efforts were made to allay French suspicions of Thai inten-
tions. In the 1910s and 1920s Siam was still too close to its
period of territorial losses, still too much in awe of its neighbors’
power, to dare dream of a larger sway at the expense of others.
This dream would come when power relationships changed with
the fall of France in World War II. But at the time of Vajiravudh’s
death in 1925, the pan-Thai dream still lay fifteen years in the
future.
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The Past as Model
Avital element in Siamese nationalism under King Vajiravudhwas an emphasis on tradition, the cultural inheritances of
history. Siam needed to be proud of its Western-style progress;
it needed also to be proud of the values of its own culture and its
own past.
The stress on the past seems an inescapable part of any
nationalist movement. In many, however, the look backwards
has created severe tensions, strains, and fundamental inse-
curities. Nationalist movements led by revolutionaries against
their own traditional social elites and classes have tended to
be iconoclastic, repudiating any and all symbols of tradition.
The anti-Manchu, anti-Confucian, anti-Mandarin reformers of
China, for example, had great difficulty coming to terms with
their own tradition; at one time they sought to “convert the
Temple of Heaven in Peking into a school of forestry.”1 Yet the
tug of the cultural inheritance on such revolutionaries could not
be denied. However it might be expressed—in arguments for
reappreciation of the values of the Chinese family or Chinese
mysticism or Chinese peasant life—it needed to be expressed
for the very sake of nationalism itself. A total rejection of all the
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past could only mean a total rejection of everything distinctively
Chinese, that is, a rejection of the Chinese nation, an impossible
stance for a nationalist.2
Tradition makes a very different claim on nationalist leaders
reacting against foreign rule. Here the philosophic way seems
clearer. The history before the dark colonial present is seen
as the golden age to which a people, once free of colonial
mastery, may return. Early in the history of Indonesian nation-
alism Sukarno put the problem clearly: “… first we point out to
the people that they have a glorious past, secondly we intensify
the notion among our people that the present time is dark, and
the third way is to show them the promising, pure and luminous
future and how to get there.”3 The problem with tradition for
the modern anti-colonialist is how to define it, how to reconnect
the thread that, in fact, colonialism and Westernization have
broken.
Compared with the problems faced by most modern nation-
alists in adjusting to the past, Vajiravudh’s task was simple.
There had been no foreign rule; the threads of Siamese tradition
were still intact. Nor had there been any revolution against
the country’s own social elites. There was, therefore, no reason
to repudiate the Siamese cultural inheritance. Traditional links
need not be severed; on the contrary, they required reinforcing
and reemphasizing. Whatever the problems a traditional lead-
ership may face in stimulating nationalism, they do not include
that of finding threads of continuity. Such threads abounded in
Siam; it was the role of the King as the nationalist leader to
identify the ones that would serve best in weaving the fabric of
a proud nation.
The ancient elements that Vajiravudh chose as having
greatest value for his nationalist program were four: history,
Buddhism, the arts, and literature.
HISTORY
While there were few philosophical or psychological obstacles
for King Vajiravudh in his use of history as a means of stimu-
lating nationalism, some problems did exist. First, Siamese his-
torical records were sketchy; second, the mass of the people
had only the meagerest knowledge of their history. In a sense
there were assets inherent in these problems: historical re-
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search and popular notions of history could both be expanded in
ways favorable to nationalistic purposes. To a large extent this
is what occurred.
The sketchiness of the Thai historical record had several
causes. White ants and wars with Burma had both taken their
toll. But perhaps even more important was the traditional lack
of interest in compiling historical accounts. It is too much to say
that the Thai were ahistorical; the lucid and lively description
of Sukhothai in 1292, partly in the words of the reigning king,
shows a feeling for man’s place in time that is historical in a
very real sense. And other inscriptions, portions of chronicles,
and references to lost chronicles are evidence that records of
past events were of some interest to the court. Yet that in-
terest seems not to have been institutionalized or to have played
a central role in the ideology of governance. In the Bangkok
period, which saw some quickening of historical interest, at first
because of the newness of the dynasty and later because of the
intellectual challenge of the West, histories were compiled by
members of the royal family and high nobles. The impact of
these histories on the country at large was minimal, however,
for they were written for an extremely small educated elite sur-
rounding the court.
The concept of history presented in a style that would be
meaningful for the masses was an innovation of King Vaji-
ravudh’s. The King possessed to a degree the antiquarian in-
terest and eye of his father and of his uncle, Prince Damrong.4
He was well read in the chronicles and epigraphs that had sur-
vived from Siam’s past. As a prince he had in 1908 made an
extensive trip into the heartland of the first Thai kingdom in
Siam, traveling across difficult terrain by boats, horses, and ele-
phants. He described the ruins at Kamphaengphet, Sukhothai,
and Sawankhalok and came up with theories related to history
that he hoped would be useful to the experts on antiquity.5
He made other trips to historical sites during the reign, and
in several literary works he set forth various ideas on Thai
history. Essentially, however, his scholarly interests were far
outweighed by his interest in the use of history as a means
toward nationalism.
Some of the King’s concepts on the uses of antiquity and
history are revealed in his description of his trip to the North
in 1908. He expressed the hope that, because of his account of
the Thai past, “the Thai will become more aware that our race
is not a new race, is not a race of jungle folk, or to use the
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English word, ‘uncivilized.’”6 To put it simply, the King believed,
and sought to persuade others to believe, that the Thai had a
proud past, a past worthy of emulation in the present:
Our Thai race has achieved much progress, so we ought to feel
shamefaced today not only before others but also before our own
ancestors with whom we cannot compare…. The ancient Thai
had the imagination and industry to build large and beautiful
buildings that lasted. Thai today demolish and destroy old sites or
let them decay because of their infatuation with new things from
the West. They do not know how to select what is best for our
country.7
There is little question that the King himself believed in past
Thai achievements. In describing one temple in Sukhothai, for
example, he marvelled at its construction and remembered how
he had also marvelled, years before, at the monuments of Egypt:
“I felt gratified that we also have something unusual and worth
being proud of.”8
The ways in which Vajiravudh sought to use history to stim-
ulate nationalism included emphasizing the need to preserve
old sites, encouraging the production of historical materials,
popularizing the stories of the past, and utilizing particular
episodes or aspects of the past for present purposes.
The King’s policies of seeking to preserve old sites and an-
cient objects and of stimulating production of historical works
were continuations of policies begun under Kings Mongkut and
Chulalongkorn. King Mongkut, while he was still a prince-monk,
had been responsible for bringing a number of important stone
inscriptions, including that of Ramkhamhaeng, to Bangkok. And
King Chulalongkorn, particularly after an order of 1887 di-
recting officials to search for old inscriptions, received many
stone steles into the royal museum. New appeals for inscrip-
tions and rubbings of inscriptions were made in the Sixth Reign,
and the collection was considerably expanded.9 This work was
given a firmer foundation with the creation of the Archae-
ological Service in January 1924.10 The work of preservation,
research, and restoration of archaeological sites was placed
under the control of the National Library. Within weeks after
the establishment of the service, important sites were being
given new attention. Prince Damrong and Prince Naris visited
the ruins at Lopburi and Ayutthaya; G. Coedès inspected old
monuments at Phitsanulok, Sawankhalok, Sukhothai, and Kam-
phaengphet—all with the aim of preparing a list of protected
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areas and planning for future research.11 The King was per-
sonally interested in this preservation work and was particu-
larly vehement on the subject of the despoliation of ancient
monuments by those who dug into them for buried treasure.
He once wrote: “If these people would use the efforts and the
strength they employ in destroying our antiquities in good and
proper ways, our country would advance not a little.”12
The King realized that in the process of modernization some
monuments of past glory might have to be destroyed. But he
noted with regret that bricks from sites at the ancient capital
at Ayutthaya had been used to construct railroad embankments;
he expressed the hope that such exchanges of antiquities for
progress would not occur often.13
The strengthening of the National Library and the expansion
of publication of historical texts followed a dynamic begun
before the Sixth Reign. Vajiravudh gave support to the library
by assigning it new quarters in 1916. On the death of the head
of the library in 1915, the King appointed Prince Damrong to
the post. The Prince, whose vigor and power as Minister of In-
terior had rankled the King, was able to redirect his consid-
erable energies into the politically harmless pursuits of schol-
arship and scholarly publishing.14 A similarly fortuitous, and
similarly unexpected, change came to the library as a result
of Siam’s entry into World War I in 1917: the elderly German
curator, Dr. Frankfurter, was replaced by a young French
epigraphist, G. Coedès, who was to become the premier scholar
of Southeast Asia’s classical period. In 1924 Coedès as curator
published a definitive edition of the inscriptions of Sukhothai,
Siam’s first Thai kingdom.
It was in his own writings on history, however, that King
Vajiravudh could fully apply his nationalistic notions. Although
Vajiravudh did not write historical texts,15 his work was
sprinkled with historical references and historical views. His-
torical justifications were freely supplied for old institutions he
wished to preserve, such as the monarchy, and for new insti-
tutions he wished to establish, such as the Wild Tigers. And in
history were found the values, the ideals, the goals the King
hoped to instill in the Thai nation.
All the virtues the King hoped to reawaken in the Thai
people—their loyalty to their king, their devotion to Buddhism
and morality, their sense of unity and willingness to fight to pre-
serve that unity—were discovered by him to be ancient virtues.
History showed that Siam was strong when its kings were
strong; history showed that Siam was weak when the royal
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authority was in dispute, as, for example, when King Tham-
maracha died, when King Songtham usurped the throne, and
when King Čhakkraphat died.16 In the sweep of Thai history the
King tended to see the earliest epochs, the Sukhothai period in
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and the early Ayutthaya
era through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, as the most
glorious. He felt that a decline had begun in the seventeenth
century and noted that the whole last hundred years of the
Ayutthaya period were marked by irregular accessions, petty ri-
valries, and a lack of harmony or feeling of national purpose,
which had given the Burmese the opportunity to invade and lay
the country to waste.17 The Bangkok period, however, under
the dynasty of his forebears, had seen a return to glory: a suc-
cession of wise rulers, appreciating the force of the “stream of
progress,” had been wise enough to welcome civilization and
progress with open doors, “without being forced to do so at the
cannon’s mouth.”18
Vajiravudh’s interest in history was not restricted to the
episodical or illustrative or the brief literary allusion that pro-
vided background for a specific argument. Certain historical
figures intrigued him. Not surprisingly these figures were all
“heroes.” They were all warriors. They were men, and a few
women, who had met the challenges of their times. They were
Thai of the past whose lives and values merited emulation by
modern Thai.
Three men received more attention than most; they were
Naresuan, Taksin, and Phra Ruang. As might be expected, all
three were kings, all three were military leaders, all three were
unifiers of the Thai people.
King Naresuan the Great, as Vajiravudh called him, had
been the Thai monarch during the last years of the sixteenth
century. He had successfully brought an end to a fifteen-year
period of Burmese suzerainty in Siam. According to Thai chron-
icles, Naresuan had fought a decisive battle against a new in-
vading Burmese army in January 1593 and, to commemorate
this victory, had erected a stupa, or čhedi, at the scene of the
victory. The stupa and the victory had subsequently been for-
gotten. The new interest in history and the rediscovery of old
Thai historical accounts led Prince Damrong to direct provincial
officials to search for Naresuan’s stupa. A likely site, called Dο̨n
Čhedi, was found and reported to the King in 1913.19
King Vajiravudh, who had extolled King Naresuan for his
bravery and for exemplifying the true ideals of a “Wild Tiger”
as early as May 1911,20 decided to make use of the discovery
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of Naresuan’s stupa in a large public display. During the Wild
Tiger maneuvers early in 1914, the King organized a march of
almost a thousand men from the Tiger camp at Nakhο̨n Pathom
to the stupa site in Suphanburi Province. After a seven-day
march, the stupa remains were reached. The site was verified
through various artifacts that were identified as dating from
Naresuan’s time. On January 28, approximately on the day 321
years after Naresuan’s “glorious victory,” a great commemo-
rative service was held, a service that concluded with the King’s
delivery of a ringing patriotic address.
In the address Naresuan was praised as the king whose
victory “upon this very spot secured our national freedom and
made our nation respected by the Burmese and Takings [Mon].”
Naresuan, however, did not act alone; he was able to rely upon a
Thai people who were loyal to him and gave him their full confi-
dence. The historical lesson to be learned from Naresuan’s time
was that a united and patriotic people who were loyal to a ca-
pable leader could overcome any adversity. Vajiravudh said:
When every Siamese shall begin to think and speak as one man,
then will the time have arrived when there will be no longer any
anxiety for the well-being of our nation. Individually each one of
us is comparable to a lump of earth which goes to form part of a
mountain. It would be great folly to look after only the small lump
and allow the mountain to crumble. We must exert ourselves to
preserve the mountain in order to preserve the existence of its
component parts.21
The way to become “the worthy successors of our ancestors who
fought for King Naresuan the Great” was for all Thai to resolve
“to think and act together” and so become the unified patriotic
people they had once been.
King Vajiravudh’s glorification of Taksin, the King of Siam
from 1767 to 1781, would at first glance appear to be a paradox,
since the Chakkri dynasty had taken over the throne that Taksin
had been forced to vacate. Although the first Chakkri ruler, Va-
jiravudh’s great-great-grandfather, had not deposed Taksin, he
had accepted the accession and had ordered the execution of
the king who had been imprisoned as a madman. Vajiravudh re-
stored King Taksin to respectability by stressing the virtues of
the early years of his reign. Whatever his later faults, Taksin
had, Vajiravudh noted, been responsible for ridding Siam of
the Burmese hosts and reuniting the kingdom. Taksin, he said,
was a brave leader who exemplified the true ideals of a Wild
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Tiger. Unlike some kings who thought only of their personal
pleasure, Taksin always put the needs of his country first and,
heedless of his own safety and comfort, risked all in his desire
to save Siam.22 In addition to making favorable comments about
Taksin, Vajiravudh in 1916 devoted the “people’s” kathin (the
ceremony of the giving of robes to monks) largely to celebrating
that king’s memory. A temple particularly associated with King
Taksin was made the site of the King’s pilgrimage. The temple
had never been visited before by a reigning king of the Chakkri
dynasty. The barge on which the King was transported to the
temple was deliberately designed in the shape of a Chinese
dragon, and the royal pavilion on its back was fashioned as
a Chinese house.23 These were stylistic references to King
Taksin’s part-Chinese ancestry.
The hero nonpareil in Vajiravudh’s estimation, however, was
Phra Ruang. The name Phra Ruang is a name that appears
often in early Thai legend. In the Chronicle of the North (Phong-
sawadan nu̓a) Phra Ruang refers to the Thai leader who estab-
lished the independence of the kingdom of Sukhothai, that is,
the first king of Sukhothai, who is called Si Intharathit in in-
scriptions. King Vajiravudh used the term Phra Ruang in this
sense, but he also understood the term as a name applying
to the entire dynasty founded by Si Intharathit. When he used
the term to refer to a particular individual, he meant either
Si Intharathit, who reigned early in the thirteenth century, or
his son, Ramkhamhaeng, who reigned late in the century.24 The
glory of the former was his establishment of Thai independence
from Cambodia; that of the latter, the expansion of Thai power
over much of present-day Thailand.
References to Phra Ruang abound in Vajiravudh’s writings.
His best-known travel account is that of his trip to “Phra Ruang
country” (Thiao mu̓ang phra ruang), and his most highly re-
garded historical play is about Phra Ruang’s success in winning
Thai independence. A number of poems celebrate Phra Ruang’s
memory. And, as has been mentioned, the object of the great pa-
triotic drive organized by the Navy League was to purchase a
warship that the King named Phra Ruang.
The play Phra ruang was prepared in at least three versions:
a traditional dance drama, written in December 1912; a modern
drama, written before February 1914; and a musical, first pre-
sented in 1924.25 The modern drama is the version that is best
known and most frequently performed. The King, in fact, delib-
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erately wrote it in a style that would make it relatively easy for
Wild Tiger groups and other amateur players to perform. The
play eventually became a standard text in secondary schools.26
Phra ruang exemplifies Vajiravudh’s historical technique,
patriotic didacticism, and dramatic skill at their finest. The his-
torical method he used, which probably borrowed not a little
from Prince Damrong,27 was to subject his legendary sources
to a critical and logical examination, conjure up a rational ex-
planation, and present that rationalized account as history. This
method depended on the theory that careers of heroes in history
undergo a continuous embellishment in time, that there is a
natural inclination to endow heroes with extraordinary powers,
to see their noble acts as arising from superhuman attributes;
the historian merely has to peel away the fabulous to get back
to the real personality.28 The legend of Phra Ruang in the
Chronicle of the North, for example, described him as pos-
sessing various magical powers. Phra Ruang’s difficulties with
his Cambodian overlords began when the vassal prince sent
tribute water to the Cambodian king in loosely woven baskets.
The baskets retained the water because of the power of Phra
Ruang’s words commanding that they do so. The Cambodians
became alarmed at a vassal whose magic was so great and
decided that they must take action against him. Vajiravudh
rejected the magic of the legend, but retained the story by sup-
plying the reasonable element that he was sure history had lost.
The Thai of Phra Ruang’s time, he said, had suffered keenly
from the Cambodian exactions. To reduce the difficulty in
sending the water tribute, Phra Ruang, who was extraordinary
only in his intellect and compassion for his people, decided to
replace the heavy and breakable water jars ordinarily used to
contain the tribute water with much lighter containers, and
so he devised baskets coated with waterproof lacquer. On re-
ceiving the water in such an unorthodox fashion, the Cambo-
dians became aware of the potential danger this clever vassal
posed. At another point in the traditional Phra Ruang story, a
Cambodian was sent by his king to capture Phra Ruang. He
started on his mission by miraculously plunging into the earth,
and emerged hundreds of miles away in Thai territory. This
Cambodian “earth diver” of legend, the King said, was simply
a popular distortion of what originally was a commonplace spy
mission; the figurative “going underground” had acquired a fan-
tastic literal meaning.
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The Phra Ruang story, as finally rationalized by Vajiravudh,
became a straightforward history of a Thai hero leading a
valiant people out of bondage into freedom. Phra Ruang out-
smarts the Cambodians; his people resist the Cambodian
armies; and, at the play’s end, the populations of Sukhothai and
Lopburi combine to offer fealty to Phra Ruang as the monarch
of a new independent Thai state.
Phra Ruang is brought out of legend and into life by Vaji-
ravudh, but he remains very much the hero. He is the epitome
of all virtues. He is extolled by other characters in the play as
loving his people as if they were his own children and as being
courageous, compassionate, beneficent beyond the beneficence
of parents, incomparable:
A magnificent example for the Thai
Whose name will surely last through all the ages.29
In the earlier version of the Phra Ruang play, one noble says of
him, “Not once in a thousand years does there appear a man
with his merit.”30
Phra Ruang is the brave leader, but a brave leader to be
successful needs a loyal and courageous people. The hero—be
he Phra Ruang or Naresuan or Taksin or, indeed, Vaji-
ravudh—cannot work miracles all alone. The final speech of
the play, delivered by Phra Ruang as he accepts the throne of
Sukhothai, is a stirring patriotic call to all Thai to realize their
great promise as a free people. The speech is, of course, Va-
jiravudh’s own call to the Thai of his time rather than an at-
tempt to recreate Phra Ruang’s sentiments. In this speech—and
occasionally in some other contexts as well—Vajiravudh identi-
fied himself with Phra Ruang.31 Phra Ruang urges his people to
maintain their armed might and their unity so as to leave no op-
portunity for an enemy to destroy the state. He says, in part:
I ask the Thai to join in love,
To join in fellowship,
So that when the enemy comes
We can fight him in full strength.
The Thai combining their power
Will be able to raise a staunch defense.
Even if a powerful foe comes,
He will be defeated.
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I ask only that we Thai not destroy our nation.
Let us unite our state, unite our hearts, into a great whole.
Thai—do not harm or destroy Thai,
But combine your spirit and your strength to preserve the state
So that all foreign peoples
Will give us increasing respect.
Help one another to further our progress
So the name “Thai” will redound throughout the world.
Help one another to sustain
Both our nation and our faith
So they will last to the end of time.
Let us progress, Thai! Chaiyo!32
The patriotic purpose of dramatizing the Phra Ruang story,
which is abundantly clear in the text itself, was made explicit
by the royal author. In a preface to the first version Vajiravudh
wrote: “I hope it will serve for more than casual reading. I hope
it will be a means for our Thai race to reflect on our history and
make us feel that our race is not a new race but an old race
with an admirable history.” The King continued in the preface to
point to the lessons of the past: the lesson of a king who loved
his nation so much he was willing to suffer and die for it; the
lesson of a loyal people who respected their leader and obeyed
him. This relationship between the king and his people, Vaji-
ravudh stated, was proper and good in Sukhothai times, and this
relationship was “suitable for us Thai today to emulate.”33
Vajiravudh extolled Phra Ruang in several poems in addition
to his dramatic works. One long poem was a versification of a
collection of old Thai proverbs known as The Maxims of Phra
Ruang (Suphasit phra ruang).34 The maxims, which include the
well-known saying that Thai are free men and not slaves, were
introduced by the King with lines praising Phra Ruang and
his moral teachings—teachings which, the King said, despite
their age, retained relevance and value. Another poem refers
to Ramkhamhaeng, “the most daring of men in battle,” as Phra
Ruang and urges Thai to contribute to the fund to purchase a
warship that will bear his name.35
Historical figures other than the three heroes already men-
tioned were honored by Vajiravudh. Among them were two
women: Queen Suriyothai, a sixteenth-century heroine who sac-
rificed her life to save her husband; and Khunying Mo, the wife
of a governor of Khorat who helped defeat an invading Lao army
in the early nineteenth century. One important work, a verse-
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play entitled Thao saen pom, was devoted to the demytholo-
gized history of the father of the founder of Ayutthaya; here,
however, Vajiravudh made little attempt to turn the principal
character into a major patriotic hero.36
The evoking of the past for nationalistic purposes extended
beyond the preservation of historical sites and objects, the
encouragement of production of historical works, and the
heralding of old heroes. A deliberate attempt was made, for ex-
ample, to revitalize traditional ceremonies and customs in order
to focus attention on the nation. King Vajiravudh’s elaborations
of the homage to dynastic ancestors, resulting in the creation
of a “National Day,” and his additions to the celebrations of
the king’s accession day and the king’s birthday have already
been discussed in chapter 6. Vajiravudh’s revival of the first
plowing ceremony is another example of his use of traditional
ceremonies for new purposes. This ceremony, an old Hinduist
rite meant to insure good crops, had almost disappeared by Va-
jiravudh’s time. Vajiravudh brought it back into favor. While the
ceremony had little direct bearing on nationalism, it had been
popular among Siam’s large farm population, and its resusci-
tation could not help but bring the people closer to their gov-
ernment. This fact was appreciated by the King, as an article
on the plowing ceremony either written by or approved by him
made clear. The article pointed out that, although the ceremony
had no tangible use, it was popular among the people and had
meaning for them. “And when most people think it useful, then
it is!”37
A number of other ceremonies and social customs received
the King’s support. The old popular festival of lο̨i krathong,
the floating of candle-lit offerings on the rivers, had received
no royal attention for more than twenty years; in Bangkok it
had ceased to be celebrated. King Vajiravudh in 1915 revived
the festival by fixing three evenings for its celebration, by en-
couraging members of the royal family and certain officials to
take part in it, and by himself going to watch the procession
of floating decorations.38 The festival was a huge success. In
the following year, however, royal support for it was not con-
tinued because of the augmentation of the ceremonies for the
anniversary of the King’s accession (at which the new dynastic
name was introduced) and the augmentation of the ceremonies
for the King’s birthday (his thirty-sixth, the end of his third
cycle). And the King made no further attempts to revive the fes-
tival.
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King Vajiravudh supplied some reasons for his support of old
Thai custom in a rejoinder he wrote to a newspaper criticism of
the tonsure ceremony as a waste of money. The King grouped
the topknot-cutting ceremony with ordination, marriage, and fu-
neral rites as all belonging in the same category. All could be re-
garded as wasteful, as “grinding pepper sauce in the river.” Yet,
held the King, they were no more wasteful than Western social
affairs—coming-out parties, balls, and concerts—which the Thai
did not indulge in. Such social affairs were, said Vajiravudh, ear-
marks of civilized peoples. Peaceful and pleasant social inter-
course, the gathering of friends, the mingling of peoples from
various stations of life were all part of the necessary cement
of society. If topknot ceremonies were to go, the King wryly
queried, what would take their place? Western barroom bashes
perhaps?39
It is impossible to measure with any accuracy the effect of
the King’s campaign for increasing Thai historical awareness.
But there can be no doubt that it had some effect. Even as early
as 1921 the Bangkok Times was able to conclude that “… prac-
tically up to the time when the present King came to the throne,
the history of Siam for the average Siamese began with his
own earliest recollections. Young Siam to-day is gaining a wider
vision and some sense of the fact that the roots of the national
life go deep into the past.”40
BUDDHISM
Buddhism occupied a very special and important place in the
nationalistic program of King Vajiravudh. For adherence to Bud-
dhism was seen by the King as one of the essential character-
istics of the Thai as a people. A primary element in the definition
of Siam was that it was a Buddhist nation.
Regard for Buddhism was, of course, nothing new for kings
of Siam. The relationship between the monarchy and the Bud-
dhist Order had been close since earliest history. It was a sym-
biotic relationship: the Buddhist Order supported the state, the
state supported the order. The religious and civil administra-
tions complemented each other; very rarely did either interfere
in the vital concerns of the other. In addition to supporting Bud-
dhism, Thai kings had also long maintained a body of court
Brahmins whose role was limited to the performance of certain
royal ceremonies, such as the coronation ceremonies. During
The Past as Model
223
the reign of King Mongkut, however, the Buddhist ceremonial
role in state affairs had been expanded and the significance of
the court Brahmins had declined.41
Vajiravudh, as a prince, had received traditional instruction
in Buddhist principles. This instruction had been maintained
even during the Prince’s period of education in England.
Indeed, the experience abroad may have sharpened Vaji-
ravudh’s conscious adherence to Buddhism, for in the European
setting, young Thai students often encountered Christian argu-
ments against and Christian challenges to their Buddhism. Va-
jiravudh may have been reflecting on his own experience when
he pointed out that young Thai studying abroad were particu-
larly vulnerable to Christian arguments: they did not know their
own religion well enough to defend it; they were apt to remain
silent before the voluble European and his criticisms of Bud-
dhism.42 Vajiravudh apparently met this Western threat success-
fully, and his faith in Buddhism emerged, if anything, stronger
from the encounter. When he returned to Siam, he underwent
the traditional ordination for Thai young men and spent four
months in late 1904 in the monkhood, studying Buddhist disci-
pline, Pali and Sanskrit texts, and the administration of the Bud-
dhist Order.
Vajiravudh, as king, was Buddhism’s prime patron. He main-
tained traditional support of the order and traditional Buddhist
rites of merit-making such as the kathin (giving of robes to
monks) and the wisakhabucha (celebration of the birth, enlight-
enment, and death of the Buddha). In an effort to popularize
wisakhabucha Vajiravudh attempted to make it a special day for
children. At the Royal Pages School a wisakha tree made of bo
tree branches was decorated “like a Christmas tree” and pre-
sents were distributed by the King to the young boys.43 Special
Buddhist ceremonies in the palace were also continued. One
such ceremony was the fashioning of a special Buddha image
for the reign to insure prosperity and victory. This image, known
as the Phra Chai Watthana, was cast on January 8, 1911, and
consecrated in a two-day ceremony and celebration in October
1912.44 There were countless other such ceremonies dotting the
royal calendar.
The customary administrative tasks related to the Buddhist
Order were also performed by the King. By and large, ap-
pointments, promotions, and awarding of names to monks in
high administrative posts were given routine royal approval, but
in some cases the King scrutinized them carefully and asked
questions or made suggestions. On one submission on October
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16, 1925, for example, Vajiravudh approved the promotion of
forty-nine monks, suggested the promotion of one additional
monk, and suggested name changes for four monks.45 At min-
isterial meetings the King discussed revisions of examinations
for monks and the amount of aid to be given royal monasteries
for maintenance.46 A crucial decision on the successor to the
Supreme Patriarch, who died in 1921, was also made by the
King, who chose the new patriarch’s rank and even decided
on the proper translation of his title into English (“Patriarch
of the Kingdom,” later changed to “Prince Patriarch of the
Kingdom”). The King, in an interesting aside on this subject of
patriarchal titles, wrote his secretary: “I rather like the style of
the Archbishop of Canterbury, who is called ‘PRIMATE OF ALL
ENGLAND.’ But it might sound too imitative.”47
One policy of the reign toward religion that marked a
change from previous policy was the King’s encouragement of
merit-making in practical and progressive ways. His favor for
the building of schools over the building of temples has already
been noted in chapter 6. This policy marked an extension of an
idea expressed in a rescript of King Chulalongkorn that called
for a more modest than usual cremation for himself so as to
reduce the customary “display of pomp and circumstance” and
“waste of labour and expense” that conferred “no lasting benefit
on the public.”48 This rescript was often referred to during the
Sixth Reign by the King, by Queen Saowapha, and by other in-
dividuals when they made donations for public works such as
schools, hospitals, or book publishing. Vajiravudh carried the
meaning of the rescript considerably farther, however, by de-
ciding not to follow tradition by building a temple dedicated to
his reign but to build schools and a memorial hospital instead.
In the dedication of Vajira Hospital in 1913, the King stated that,
although tradition “mentions that the King after his Accession
… erects and consecrates a monastery as a pious memorial of
Thanksgiving,” Siam already had a great number of monasteries
and “to add more to the number … would be of no immediate
benefit to the people.” However, since some sign of “Our grat-
itude for the Virtues which have raised Us to Our exalted po-
sition of power and wealth” was proper, he had chosen to build a
hospital, which would be infinitely more beneficial to the people
and “far more gratifying to Our heart than the sowing broadcast
of money and presents to casual mendicants.” The King prayed
that the “Virtues of the Holy Trinity of the great Religion” which
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“We devoutly observe and defend” would shower blessings on
his act of devotion “towards the People whom We regard as Our
beloved children.”49
The great change in the role of Buddhism in Siam initiated
by Vajiravudh, however, was his use of Buddhism to buttress
nationalism. One of the three essential attributes of a patriotic
Thai, along with loyalty to king and love of nation, was devotion
to Buddhism. A true Thai was a good Buddhist. Adherence to
the Buddhist faith was necessary for the well-being of the state.
Previous kings had supported Buddhism publicly for somewhat
different reasons. They had favored Buddhism as a means of in-
creasing royal virtue, as a means of public welfare, and as a
means of adding miraculous power to the state. But Vajiravudh
identified Buddhism with patriotism; a devoted Buddhist was a
devoted citizen.
The Buddhist messages of the King consisted of four main
elements. First, a good Buddhist was a moral citizen and a
strength to the state. Second, a moral state would be strong in
competition with other states. Third, for the Thai at least, Bud-
dhism was a better route to morality than any other religion.
And, fourth, the Thai had a mission to preserve and protect
the Buddhist faith. These messages were conveyed in various
ways—in plays, speeches, essays, and poems. Particularly note-
worthy was a series of lay sermons to the Wild Tigers delivered
on Saturdays during 1914 and 1915.50 The sermons were pre-
ceded by Buddhist devotions performed before the King’s own
Buddha image that was brought along with him wherever he
went. Also noteworthy were the lectures the King gave on Wisa-
khabucha Day to students at the Royal Pages School51 and an
essay on the knowledge gained by the Buddha on his enlight-
enment.52
Vajiravudh’s first message, that a good Buddhist was a moral
citizen and a strength to the state, was supported very simply.
Buddhism, in the King’s view, was primarily a system of
morality. The moral codes and moral laws of Buddhism kept
men from barbarism. These moral codes had been discovered
by an extraordinary man, the Buddha, not through divine rev-
elation, but by “researches and experiments in nature’s own
laboratory.”53 The Buddha then out of his infinite kindness and
compassion had dedicated his life to teaching others what he
had learned. The golden rule of Buddhism was “Do good, re-
ceive good; do evil, receive evil.” Indeed, said the King, through
a character in one of his plays, “If you plant weeds, how can
you expect to reap rice?”54 A man consumed by selfishness,
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lusts, passions, and desires inevitably had to suffer, for subju-
gation of desires was essential to one’s own well-being. But it
was also essential to the well-being of society. No society could
tolerate individuals “without moral decency”; such individuals
were “just as dangerous as a ferocious beast of the jungle.” Va-
jiravudh wrote: “Therefore, if we wish to live in peace and hap-
piness in any community of people it is really necessary that
we conform ourselves to the principle of morality and Dharma
so that our neighbors can be friendly with us without suspicion
and distrust.”55 No man, after all, could stand alone, no matter
how strong, wealthy, or wise he was. He needed at least a wife,
parents, children, servants. He was dependent on others. And,
being dependent, he was obliged to consider the welfare of
others.56
Some Westernized Thai, the King said, thought it modern
to deprecate Buddhism as old-fashioned and outdated. But
morality, said the King, knew no time, and true righteousness
was worldwide. Buddhism had always had and always would
have its carpers, men who for their own private interests pre-
ferred not to be bound by any code of morality. But civilization
in any country depended on peace and order, on a system of
morality.57
King Vajiravudh could hardly expect that, even with his en-
couragement, all Thai would immediately become exemplary
Buddhists. Indeed, he explicitly stated, in the traditional mode
of Buddhist tolerance, that different men had different levels of
achievement. All that was necessary was that one try to exercise
control over himself. If a man were born with a low karmic
balance sheet, he could not do much, but “No matter how little
it is that you can do, that little is better than nothing at all.”58
More, much more, might be expected of government servants.
A persistent effort of the King was to improve the ethical stan-
dards of government officials. And in part this effort had a reli-
gious purpose. Government officials, after all, could be seen as
agents of His Majesty’s own karmic capital. His Majesty’s Bud-
dhist virtue, accumulated in previous births, was the ultimate
source of his servants’ authority. It was particularly important,
therefore, that government servants be honest and trustworthy
so as to protect the good name of the king and the nation.
“Better an honest official‚” said Vajiravudh, “than one who is
cleverer but less honest.”59
The adherence to Buddhist morality of each and every Thai
could not help but strengthen Siam. Thai who loved the nation,
the King said, should be attentive to their moral behavior. Since
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every Thai person was a part of the Thai nation, it was nec-
essary for each person to tend his morals for the advantage of
the nation. For, as the King once said, “a good nation is made up
of moral people.”60 And a good nation endured. In the “sublime”
and “truthful” words of an old Thai cosmological work, “the
length of a nation’s days are greater or less in accordance with
the righteousness of the individuals thereof.”61
Adherence to Buddhism contributed to the strength of the
state not only in a general way but also in a very specific way:
it contributed to the bravery of soldiers. Buddhism, no less than
Christianity or Islam, steeled the hearts of warriors, converted
the timorous into the brave. In former times, Vajiravudh pointed
out, Thai soldiers had carried amulets into battle or had worn
protective symbols on their bodies as reminders of the pro-
tective power of the triple gems of Buddhism.62
The King’s second message, that a moral state would be
strong in competition with other states, followed an argument
that flowed logically from the arguments for individual morality.
An immoral nation was one that used its strength to oppress
other nations. Such a nation not only earned a bad name in the
world, but also, eventually, earned the ruinous fate it deserved.
An immoral state might succeed in getting away with its oppres-
sions for a time, but sooner or later its immorality would lead
to its downfall. It was like the immoral official who might rise
in rank through cheating; eventually he would be discovered
and would lose all. Vajiravudh buttressed his arguments with
numerous examples. In an obvious reference to Germany, he
pointed out that states which proclaimed the doctrine of “might
is right” had fallen into disgrace. Other examples, he said, were
closer to home. He wrote:
The great nations that once were our enemies and fought the
Thai nation, that once oppressed us, what is their fate today? The
Chinese, who were our masters for 2,000 years, and the Cambo-
dians, who once caused us hardships to the point of tears, and
the Burmese and Mon, who once oppressed us so that our hearts
and bodies ached beyond describing, what is their status today?
Anyone with eyes and ears can answer.
The Thai, he said, had withstood the oppression and had been
able to retain their freedom because, unlike their neighbors,
they had remained steadfast in morality.63
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The third message of the King, that Buddhism was, for
the Thai at least, the best route to morality, led Vajiravudh
into lengthy comparisons of Buddhism with other reli-
gions—comparisons that were inevitably to Buddhism’s ad-
vantage. Vajiravudh said that, as a Buddhist, he was bound to
think that Buddhism was the best religion in the world. But
beyond this bias, he declared, there were good reasons for his
preference of Buddhism.64
First of all, Buddhism was tolerant. The Buddha was a
teacher who, having found what he felt to be the true path for
men to follow, proclaimed it to others. The Buddha’s procla-
mation, however, was a generous deed; it was not a command.
Men could follow or not, as they chose. There was no dogma,
no set of beliefs—not even a belief in a god-creator (such as
Jehovah or Allah)—that it was necessary to accept in order to
avoid being in eternal sin.65 Buddhism set forth a philosophic
way for men to become happier, to help themselves. There
was no god who demanded obedience and threatened terrible
punishments for those who did not obey.
Secondly, the Buddha, the predecessor of Jesus and
Muhammad, was the most remarkable of the three teachers.
The Buddha taught without setting forth commandments. He
made no claims of being a god or speaking for a god. The
truth he proclaimed commended itself to men simply on its own
merits as truth. In his personal life the Buddha, born a wealthy
prince, had renounced his easy life and voluntarily assumed a
life of hardship. Neither Jesus nor Muhammad had made such
a sacrifice, for both had been born poor and had been used
to poverty. Muhammad, in fact, had become a well-to-do ruler
during his lifetime.66
The Jewish and Christian concept of a single god, Vajiravudh
felt, contained weaknesses. The Jewish god, for example, sided
with his “chosen people,” yet he was supposed to have created
all mankind. How could a god, who should above all be just, love
some of his creatures and hate others?67 As for the Christian
god, his multiple personalities gave Vajiravudh pause. How
could Jesus be the son of God? How could a disembodied holy
spirit be the husband of a woman? And if Jesus were the son of
God, why did Matthew bother to provide Jesus with a royal ge-
nealogy by tracing Joseph’s line back to King David? Vajiravudh
suggested that Mary had indeed been the mother of Jesus but
that some man other than Joseph had been his father and, after
Jesus became a famous teacher, the Holy Ghost story had been
invented to cover Jesus’ unsavory past. The superiority to Jesus
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of the high-caste and pure-born prince who became the Buddha
was manifest. The Thai could be proud of the Buddha, could be
happy that his birth was no cause for shame. There was no need
for the Thai to beat an implausible story into their heads.68
To Vajiravudh, the role of faith made the vital difference
between Buddhism and Christianity. Christianity placed great
stress on faith. A Christian had to begin, for example, by be-
lieving in the virginity of Mary. Not all Christians had the same
beliefs, but there was an essential core of belief. Not so with
Buddhists. The Buddha taught men how to be good, but he fash-
ioned no articles of faith. Men followed the Buddha because
they recognized the merit of his teachings, because they recog-
nized the goodness of his person. This recognition led to love.
And love led to faith. The basis of Buddhist faith, said Vaji-
ravudh, was not superstition and fable, but intelligence.69
Buddhism, it was true, had miraculous and superstitious
elements, as did Christianity, Hinduism, and Judaism. But re-
jection of the miracles in Buddhism need not lead, as some
misguided people thought, to rejection of the entire faith. Mir-
acles, said the King, were a religion’s embellishments. A great
religious teacher or a great king who aroused extraordinary
respect during his lifetime was apt to have his wondrous life im-
proved upon after his death. He became larger than life, super-
human. But these heroic embellishments were not intrinsically
important. They were like the ornaments on a house—curtains,
pictures, lights—that dressed it up but were in no way essential
to its architecture. The story of Christ’s resurrection, for ex-
ample, was but the vehicle for the real message of the persis-
tence of his teachings. And the miracle of the Buddha’s single-
handed victories in his contests with Mara, the evil tempter with
a thousand arms and an army of a hundred thousand, was but
the means for illustrating the power of the human spirit when
committed to the way of truth.70
King Vajiravudh’s religious comparisons were meant to
make Buddhists proud of their Buddhism; they were not meant
to make Thai Buddhists disrespectful of other religions. Time
after time the King pointed out the basic similarities of all reli-
gions. All religions taught their adherents a similar moral code;
they taught men to do good, not to harm others. The important
messages of Christianity, said the King, had already been enun-
ciated by Buddhism. Christian criticisms of Buddhism amounted
in fact to an admission of similarities between Christianity and
Buddhism, for only relative equals debated; Christians did not
bother, for example, to argue the relative merits of Christian
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love and the cannibalism practiced by some primitive faiths.
Christian criticisms of Buddhism also amounted to an apprecia-
tion of the challenge that Buddhism posed to Christianity as a
rival claimant to universal belief.71
Only one specific criticism of Buddhism was attacked by the
King. This criticism was that Buddhism was a negative faith,
that it taught quiescence and was thus a religion for lazy people.
Vajiravudh argued that messages of asceticism, surrender, and
otherworldliness were common in religion. And he quoted the
Sermon on the Mount to make his point: “Behold the fowls of
the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into
barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them.” The intention of
such words was not to make people lazy, but to get them to ap-
preciate that the true values of life do not lie in material things.
The heart of Buddhism was contained in the words “Do good, re-
ceive good; do evil, receive evil.” If one did nothing, one would
receive neither good nor evil. Those who criticized Buddhism
for its passivity, said the King, were poorly informed on Bud-
dhism and were wrong.72
The conclusion Vajiravudh drew from these religious
comparisons—that Buddhism was at least the equal of other
world religions—was not the end of his arguments in favor of
Buddhism for the Thai. History and national identity provided
Buddhism’s final substantiation. For Buddhism had come early
to Siam. It had preceded Christianity in Asia as Christianity had
preceded Buddhism in Europe. For a European to become a
Buddhist or for an Asian to become a Christian was unnatural.
Such conversions amounted to a repudiation of one’s ancestors
and of one’s nation. They were signs of weakness, vacillation,
and opportunism. Europeans converted to Buddhism were
looked down upon by other Europeans. And Thai who became
Christians won the favor of no one except the missionaries. The
Thai should realize, the King said, that one’s religion was an es-
sential element in one’s nationality. Religion and nation were in-
separable. The Thai were fortunate in having a religious faith of
such outstanding value, a religious faith that was truly in accord
with a high state of civilization.73
The fourth Buddhist message the King brought his people
was that they had a duty in the world to preserve Buddhism.
There was no place other than Siam where Buddhism could be
properly studied and understood. Siam was Buddhism’s last line
of defense. The first and second lines had already fallen; only
Siam, the third line, remained. (Although Vajiravudh did not
specify what he meant by first and second lines, it is probable
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that he was regarding India as the first fallen line and Burma,
Cambodia, and Ceylon together as the second.) Siam was Bud-
dhism’s great citadel, and the Thai must be soldiers proud to
defend it against all internal and external enemies.74 The main
weapon of defense was practice of true Buddhist principles.
The image of Thai Buddhists as soldiers defending the last
bastions of their faith was probably no accident. Although it
was only natural that Vajiravudh’s military enthusiasms would
be reflected to some extent in his rhetoric, the King was un-
doubtedly also aware of an undercurrent of Thai thought that
saw the pairing of Buddhism and militarism as inherently in-
appropriate. He disagreed with this view. The allegory of the
Thai Buddhist bastion defended by its citizen soldiers corre-
sponded with the King’s view that real soldiers were necessary
to protect the Buddhist state. Those who cited the Buddhist in-
junction against taking life as proof that military duties were im-
moral and that soldiers could not be good Buddhists had only a
superficial knowledge of Buddhism, said the King. The Buddha
himself understood that defense of a nation was a necessity
and that those responsible for a nation’s defense could indeed
be moral individuals.75 The Buddha, he said, “never expressly
forbade war”; indeed, there was evidence that he approved of
the waging of war to defend a state against an outside enemy.76
The King told the story of a Buddhist king of Magadha named
Bimbisara whose soldiers were deserting the ranks to enter the
monkhood. The Magadha king appealed to the Buddha, who laid
down the rule that thenceforward no soldier would be accepted
for ordination as a monk. “This,” said Vajiravudh, “could only
mean that the Lord Buddha, who was himself a prince of the
warrior caste, fully understood and appreciated the necessity
of national defence.”77 Other clues to the Buddha’s attitude
toward soldiers existed. The vinaya, or rules for the behavior of
monks, gave monks permission to preach to soldiers. Further,
monks had long been in the habit of conducting prayers for mil-
itary men and performing rites to protect men in battle. Neither
of these actions were prohibited by the vinaya, as would cer-
tainly have been the case if the Buddha had disapproved.78
The real meaning of the prohibition of the taking of life, said
Vajiravudh, was to end aggression. It was counsel for those who
would use their strength to inflict injury on others. It was not
meant to deter the innocent from protecting themselves. The
soldier engaged in defending his countrymen from the depreda-
tions of an aggressive enemy was not behaving immorally. Quite
the contrary, such a soldier was, or should be, a particularly
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moral man because the arms he bore gave him special means
of harming others. The soldier must be outstandingly moral in
order to be worthy of the trust he had been given. The Thai
soldier, engaged purely in defense, was a man with such com-
passion for the group that he was willing to sacrifice his life for
his neighbors and a man with such a commitment to his faith
that he was willing to sacrifice his life to protect and preserve
the Buddhist dharma, or moral law.79
The close association in the King’s mind between Buddhist
morality and the military was exhibited in the long sermons Va-
jiravudh gave to Wild Tiger troops and the various religious de-
votions in which he led them. In the latter the King embellished
and “improved” standard prayers, or mantras (mon in Thai), by
adding pertinent lines of his own. A prayer to be recited by navy
men added lines calling for Siamese victories at sea,80 and the
daily prayer for Wild Tiger units was supplemented with the
lines:
Though there be a special enemy
With the strength of Mara,
May the Thai fight and destroy him
As did the holy Buddha.81
When Siam entered World War I against the Central Powers,
Vajiravudh carried his argument further. The Central Powers
were viewed as evil incarnate. If evil were allowed to triumph,
how could the dharma survive? Going to war to defend the
dharma was no sin.
And why is it “no sin”? Because we go to war in defense of right.
If there were no right there would be no religion. If there were
no right we could not exist as nations, as communities, or even
as households. This principle is so important that we have to fight
for it.82
The opposition to the pairing of Buddhism and militarism
already mentioned as an undercurrent in Thai thought did not
always remain an undercurrent. On at least one occasion an
opposing voice was heard publicly. The voice was that of Phra
Deb Mori, a prominent monk who was abbot of a Bangkok
monastery. Early in 1916 this monk delivered a sermon, later
printed, in which he labeled the military profession as evil and
stated that those in the military establishment and those asso-
ciated with it as manufacturers of arms were all guilty of sin.
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Public espousal of such views could not be tolerated. The monk
was deprived of his rank by the King and removed to another
monastery where he was placed “under close watch in order
that he may not do such a thing again.” The monk was casti-
gated for his misinterpretations of the teachings of the Buddha,
who, it was held, had never condemned the military life and had
never interfered with politics. The strong action taken against
Phra Deb Mori was meant as a warning “in order that no other
monk should make such mischief again, and interfere with pol-
itics, which are not his profession.” The Supreme Patriarch, it
was announced, thoroughly sympathized with His Majesty in
the action taken.83
The Supreme Patriarch, Prince Vajiranana, was a close and
dependable ally of King Vajiravudh not only on the subject of the
compatability of military defense and Buddhism but also on the
King’s nationalistic program in general. The correspondence of
the ideas of the Prince and the King was not surprising. Prince
Vajiranana had been Vajiravudh’s preceptor during the latter’s
indoctrination as a monk, and the relationship between a novice
monk and his preceptor was customarily very close in Siam and
lasted throughout life.84 The Prince Patriarch, further, was Va-
jiravudh’s uncle. And Vajiranana’s family and dynastic loyalties
were strong. His decision to remain in the monkhood had been
due, in large measure, to the urging of his brother, King Chu-
lalongkorn, who wanted a trusted and capable relative in the
monkhood who could one day assume a position of authority in
the order and who could be relied upon to be sympathetic to
the King’s program of government reform. Vajiranana had not
disappointed King Chulalongkorn; among other things, the im-
portant initial steps in bringing mass provincial education into
being had been entrusted to Prince Vajiranana and the Buddhist
Order.85
During the Sixth Reign, Prince Vajiranana on numerous oc-
casions gave clear indications in word and action of his support
of the administration. The Prince, for example, gave a bene-
diction to the Wild Tiger Corps at its inauguration in May 1911.
The benediction itself constituted an act of support for the para-
military corps. And to the standard Pali verses asking that those
he blessed be accorded respect, honor, and freedom from harm,
the Prince added a verse that showed his specific approval of
the idea of the corps.86 On the same occasion the Prince gave
an address that echoed the King’s own comments on the need
for Thai to be united and to support and love their nation.
The nation, he said, must be cherished more than life itself.
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And loyalty to nation must precede loyalty to family, for the
continuation of a family depended on the continuation of the
nation; the nation, therefore, must be cherished “much more”
than the family. The nation, he pointed out further, needed a
leader who would give it direction; without a leader, a king, the
nation was like a body with arms and legs but no mind. The
Prince also spoke of the need for individual morality as a pre-
requisite for national survival. He pointed out that nations that
lacked morality had lost their independence to colonial powers.
As for the Wild Tiger Corps specifically, Vajiranana praised its
members and said that their act of membership in itself was
proof that they were already imbued with the highest national
ideals. Vajiranana urged the corps members to maintain their
integrity and always honor their sacred vows.87
Among the other addresses, or sermons, delivered by Prince
Vajiranana, three stand out as particularly important for their
support of national policy. These three were part of the series of
addresses the Prince Patriarch gave each year on the occasion
of the King’s birthday on January 1. The three were delivered
in 1916, 1918, and 1919 and were subsequently translated into
English “by one of his disciples”—undoubtedly the King.
The sermon of 1916, termed “a special allocution,” was en-
titled “The Buddhist Attitude towards National Defence and
Administration.” In it the Prince praised the King for his
righteous rule. On the subject of national defense he made his
position clear: “The defence against external foes is one of the
policies of governance, and is one that cannot be neglected.”
He added, in much the same terms as Vajiravudh had used, that
“war must be prepared for, even in time of peace, otherwise one
would not be in time and one would be in a disadvantageous po-
sition towards one’s foe.”88 The historical picture of Siam as a
country that had once been a nation of warriors but had lost its
military skills through long years of peace—a picture also drawn
by Vajiravudh—was now being changed, said the Prince, by a
vigilant and wise King who was promoting the welfare of the
army, improving the navy, and creating units to teach civilians
the arts of war and to give schoolboys the warrior spirit.89
The sermon of 1918, another “special allocution,” was en-
titled “Right Is Right.” The sermon was delivered after Siam’s
entry into World War I and clearly defended the King’s action.
Vajiranana said:
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Your Majesty has broken off friendly relations with and declared
war on the Empires of Germany and Austria-Hungary in the name
of the Kingdom of Siam, and has put an end to peace, because of
Your desire to uphold International Rights.
When Right is in question, Wealth, Limbs, and even Life itself,
all must be sacrificed should the occasion so demand it, any other
policy is thereby practically forbidden.90
In other passages the Prince Patriarch strongly upheld “the
duty of those who are in the right to chastise those in the
wrong‚” and he ended the sermon with the invocation: “… may
the success of glorious victory attend Your Majesty at all times
henceforth.”91
This sermon of 1918 particularly delighted the King, who,
in the translator’s foreword, pointed out to those who “affected
to find in Buddhism grounds for conscientious objection to war”
that they need no longer take the King’s word that his policy
was correct but could now rely on the “pronouncement of the
head of the Buddhist Church of Siam,” who said that “to fight
for Right is not only a patriotic duty but also eminently a moral
one.” The King used Vajiranana’s words of support, quoting lib-
erally, in an important speech of his own given before the Wild
Tigers on February 3, 1918.
The third sermon, that of 1919, also termed a “special allo-
cution,” was entitled “The Triumph of Right.” It was essentially
a victory address by the Supreme Patriarch. Siam had allied
itself with nations opposed to the Central Powers, who had been
“making war in an unrighteous manner” and threatening the
freedom and equality of all nations. In so doing Siam had come
to the defense of the right, and “in the end the Allies have
achieved victory and Right has been upheld.” The policy the
King had followed thus constituted a special blessing that had
resulted in “enhancing Your dignity throughout the world.”92
The Prince enlarged his remarks into a general principle on
“The Policy of Governance”:
… the Defence of Right forms part of the Policy of Governance
which the King must consider one of his chief duties, chastising
the wicked within his dominions who trespass against right and
liberty of others, causing everyone to enjoy the blessings of his
government in equal measure with one another, and likewise de-
fending the realm from invasion by an enemy from without.93
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To illustrate the propriety of righteous men’s going to war
to defeat the unrighteous, Prince Vajiranana in his 1919 sermon
told a story from the Dharma Jataka. It was an allegory con-
cerning two minor gods, Dharma (“Morality”) and Adharma
(“Immorality”), each of whom rode chariots in the air around
the world. Dharma exhorted his fellowers to seek the ten paths
of virtuous action; Adharma gave his followers opposite advice,
exhortations to perform unvirtuous acts. Dharma’s circumam-
bulatory route was by the right, or auspicious, side; Adharma
proceeded by the left, a sign of disrespect. The two chariots
eventually met face to face. Each god demanded the right of
way. Each presented his case for precedence, Dharma arguing
that he deserved it because he caused men to do meritorious
deeds, Adharma insisting that he would go forward because he
had the power to do so. Adharma challenged Dharma to fight.
A battle ensued, and just as Dharma was about to be overcome,
Adharma fell from his chariot, the earth held him firm, and he
was slain. Prince Vajiranana saw “a striking similarity” between
this story and the course of the Great War in Europe.94 Vaji-
ravudh certainly agreed; in fact, he used the tale, inserting con-
temporary allusions, in a verse dance drama he wrote in 1919.95
Another example of Prince Vajiranana’s support of the
King’s policies was his participation in the ceremonies that
greeted the returning members of the Siamese Expeditionary
Force on September 21, 1919. The Prince praised the troops
who had volunteered for service in the war in Europe “to help
the Allies defend the right and to prevent the victory of im-
morality.” He commended the men for having brought pride to
the Thai nation. And he blessed the troops “in the name of the
Buddha,” wishing them health, happiness, and future success.
After the speech, the Prince Patriarch sprinkled consecrated
water on the flag of victory and successively on each soldier as
he passed in line before him.96
One other matter concerning the Prince and state policy
deserves mention, although it only indirectly concerned na-
tionalism. This was the Prince’s handling of Phra Siwichai, a
village monk from Lamphun who had won great reverence in
northern Siam for his piety. The popularity of the monk, the
adulation accorded him by thousands of people, the stories that
circulated regarding his miraculous powers all aroused consid-
erable suspicion among local civil and religious officials that
the monk might become the center of a northern separatist
movement. Harassment of Phra Siwichai ended in his being
sent by the Viceroy of the North down to Bangkok. There his
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case was examined by a committee of monks and finally by
Prince Vajiranana himself, who concluded that Phra Siwichai
had committed only minor errors, for which he had already
been punished “more than he deserved,” and that most of the
charges against him were without merit. The Prince recognized
the danger of making a martyr of the monk and, in order to
repair the damage that had been done, sent Phra Siwichai back
to Lamphun under the official protection of the Supreme Pa-
triarch.97 The Phra Siwichai case exemplified to the full the
political astuteness of Vajiranana, his appreciation of the best
course to follow in order to discourage the growth of region-
alism and prevent disruption of national unity.
King Vajiravudh’s enlistment of Buddhism in the course of
Thai nationalism was by and large a safe policy, for the vast
majority of the people of the country were Thai and virtually
all Thai were Buddhists. Nonetheless, there were minority el-
ements in the population who were not Buddhists, and the
King had no wish to antagonize these minorities. The special
treatment accorded the Muslim minority has already been dis-
cussed in chapter 7. With respect to the very small number
of Christians, the almost century-old royal policy of toleration
was retained. Early in 1911, for example, Vajiravudh made do-
nations in memory of King Chulalongkorn to several Christian
groups—Christ Church, the Catholic mission, the Presbyterian
mission, the Bangkok Nursing Home, and the St. Louis Hos-
pital.98 Periodically during the reign other similar gifts were
made. In 1921 the King and his consort paid a long visit to the
charity sale at St. Joseph’s Convent.99 There is no evidence of
local Christian or missionary antipathy toward the reign. On the
contrary, there is evidence that at least some Christian groups
eagerly took up the King’s nationalistic cause. The American
Presbyterian Church mission in northern Siam, for example,
composed and distributed patriotic hymns, published prayers
for the King and officials, and wrote a flag song for the schools.
In 1915 a mission conference adopted the following resolution:
“We agree together that whenever Christians meet for worship
or prayer, they should always pray for our King first, and for all
those in authority and for our fellow Tai citizens. This should
never be forgotten. Let us truly love those of our blood and
nation.”100
In addition to their belief in the world religion Buddhism,
the Thai also had a great body of informal religious notions.
There was a vast ideational world peopled by spirits, angels,
and demons that formed part of Thai religious concepts. This
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world was not part of formal Buddhism, but neither was it in
conflict with Buddhism. The Buddha’s attitude toward notions
of heavens and hells and gods and demons had been tolerant;
in general, he had neither confirmed nor denied such popular
ideas. Vajiravudh’s attitude was also tolerant. For the most part
he said little on these subjects. To an extent, however, he at-
tempted to utilize these popular beliefs for state and national-
istic purposes.
Vajiravudh himself seems to have been freer from super-
stition than most of his subjects. A Western observer called
him “sober-minded” and “far from superstitious or fanciful” on
supernatural subjects.101 One of the few mystical phenomena
he seems to have given credence to was the appearance of a
miraculous light ringing the top of the Phra Pathom stupa on
October 24, 1909. The then Prince Vajiravudh reported to his
father that he and sixty-nine of his courtiers had seen the light,
which lasted for seventeen minutes. He tried to explain the phe-
nomenon scientifically, decided he could not and so concluded
it was a miracle. He ordered various religious ceremonies per-
formed, presumably as a safeguard.102 Much later he explained
the meaning of the phenomenon as a portent of a change in
reign.103 And, indeed, the reign change did occur one year
almost to the day later. Other portents in which the King ap-
parently believed, such as the miraculous finds of “the Bow and
Arrows of Rama’s Strength,”104 were intimately associated with
the monarchy and betokened an auspicious reign. Belief, or pro-
fessed belief, in such matters could hardly have been avoided.
One supernatural idea that the King encouraged was belief
in a tutelary personal deity of his named Hiranhu or Hiran-
phanasun. Hiranhu was large and powerful, and his divine
function was to keep King Vajiravudh and his retinue free from
harm. As long as Hiranhu was propitiated with incense, candles,
and food the King would remain safe and well. A portion of the
King’s food was allotted daily to this royal genie.
The story of Hiranhu’s first appearance is revealing. In
1906, during his northern tour, Crown Prince Vajiravudh and his
party were about to enter a jungle trail. Several members of the
royal party expressed anxiety over the perils they would face
in the jungle. The Prince assured the group that royal persons
in their travels were always protected by supernatural beings
who continually watched over them and kept them from harm.
A short time after these comments, one member of the party
had a dream in which a tall, powerful man appeared, telling the
dreamer that he was Hiranhu, a forest spirit whose appointed
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duty was to protect the royal party. Vajiravudh heard of the
dream and ordered that propitiatory gifts be laid out for Hi-
ranhu. Several people subsequently reported seeing the spirit,
the custom of propitiatory gifts became set, and the idea of Hi-
ranhu was established. After he became King, Vajiravudh had a
statue of Hiranhu prepared and set up on the grounds of Phya
Thai Palace; it was dedicated in April 1911 in a ceremony in
which the spirit was invited to occupy his bronze image.
In the royal announcement telling the Hiranhu story, there
is no indication that the King ever saw Hiranhu or even that he
believed in his existence. Rather the royal opinion is given that
“Such beliefs, whether there is reason for them or not, serve
their purposes for the common people.” Belief in a supernatural
force for good, for protection from danger, made people less
afraid, and, being less afraid, they were less likely to encounter
danger; unnatural fear, after all, was a danger in and of itself.105
The establishment of Hiranhu as Vajiravudh’s personal deity
did not contribute directly to the enhancement of nationalism,
but to the degree that it enhanced the power and prestige of the
King, it lent some strength to all of his programs.
THE ARTS
The arts of Siam, by almost universal account, were in a sorry
state by the beginning of the reign of King Vajiravudh. This
was true of painting, sculpture, architecture, the handicrafts in
metal, leather, and lacquer, and the performing arts of dancing
and music. The reasons for the decline were not hard to see. As
a contemporary newspaper put it, the eclipse of native genius
in the arts was due to the “all invading” impact of the West.106
A longtime British resident in Siam noted that with the opening
of Siam to the West “her own arts and crafts suffered. Many of
them disappeared.” He added that Kings Mongkut and Chula-
longkorn “did nothing to stop the decline; it is doubtful indeed
if they desired it. To Europeanize his country became with Chu-
lalongkorn one of the dominating passions of his life….”107 King
Vajiravudh came to the same conclusion about the status of
the arts—but without, of course, attributing any blame to his
royal predecessors. It was “Young Siam,” he said, that was
to blame. The young people were obsessed with the idea of
“Civilisation-at-any-price,” turned their backs on everything tra-
ditional in Siam, wanted Siam to “start with a clean slate.” It
was their “shallowness of thought” that was responsible for
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equating civilization with an outward show of European tastes.
It was enthusiastic “Young Siam” that had committed “all sorts
of vandalism” against Thai arts “in the name of Civilisation.” He
wrote:
Instead of treasuring objects of Art which have been in the family
for generations, such objects are sold or exchanged for more
“civilised” articles; priceless “thom” bowls have been exchanged
for Thermos flasks, beautiful mother-of-pearl boxes for cheap cig-
arette cases, lovely pieces of cloth for the latest product of Lan-
cashire looms, and so on ad nauseam.
And he added:
The best example of Siamese decorative painting with beauty and
grace in every line is despised and has to make way for a piece
of lithographic horror, whose colours knock you down at the dis-
tance of ten yards; for we prefer to defile our walls with the horror
in order to show people that we are civilised.108
These analyses by the King and Western writers were essen-
tially correct. For the productions of the fine arts and the expert
crafts had always been destined for elite consumers, and the
elite class of Siam was the most Westernized element. The elite
were most influenced by Western tastes and most anxious to
make a good impression on Westerners. When the demand for
Thai arts began to decline among the elite, the decline of the
arts had to follow.
The King saw Siamese art as a very sick creature that
needed “general appreciation and public support” in order to
survive. And its survival was to be desired not solely for the sake
of the real merits of the art itself but also for the sake of the
nation: art was “part and parcel of our national life.” Art, Va-
jiravudh wrote, expressed “the individual ideas of our nation”
and if such individual ideas were lost “then we shall cease to
be Thai.”109 The nation was not merely a political unit, it was
a totality of culture that most certainly included the arts; if the
political unit survived but the culture it was designed to house
died, then the nation would truly be lost. The King thus took on
the role of a strong defender and patron of Thai arts for both
aesthetic and nationalistic reasons.
Part of the King’s work was in the area of propaganda. He
wrote newspaper pieces on Thai art; he gave speeches urging
the Thai to support their arts and crafts;110 he wrote poems ex-
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tolling the work of Thai artisans. The poetic lines on art appear
most profusely in a work called Samakkhi sewok (Harmonious
Officialdom), written as an accompaniment for dance perfor-
mances. Part 2 of this work praises Ganesha as god of the arts,
and part 3 praises Visvakarma as god of architecture and the
crafts. The poems are meant to instill pride in the Thai arts and
to urge their continued support. For example:
Thailand is as civilized as other lands,
For we have craftsmen who are expert
In carving and in drawing
And in the composing of music
And in all sorts of work in gold
And in fashioning superbly in silver.
We also have many excellent painters
And talented jewelers.
…………………
We Thai should nourish our crafts,
The beautiful products in Thai style.
We should support our artisans
And not let them shamefully decline.
…………………
Helping our artisans is helping our country,
Because then our art will enhance our reputation
So we can take our place without shame
Among the great nations of the world.
…………………
The civilized arts are a nation’s glory.
…………………
A nation without artists
Is like a man without a woman.
It is not a pleasant sight;
He is derided and shamed.111
Vajiravudh’s sponsorship of the arts was not confined to
words, however. The Thai arts were supported in adminis-
tration, in education, and in government projects.
Administratively, the most significant move was the
establishment of a Department of Fine Arts in April 1912. The
department was created in connection with changes that trans-
formed the Ministry of Public Works into a Ministry of Com-
munications. The technicians and artisans not needed in com-
munications, and craftsmen from other ministries as well, were
placed in the new department. The Department of Fine Arts was
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put under the immediate supervision of the King, “whose object
is to preserve and develop the art and craftmanship of the
country under one control.” Prince Nares, who had been Min-
ister of Public Works, was placed in charge of the new adminis-
trative unit.112
In education, one important step taken was the creation of
a School of Arts and Crafts at Wat Ratchaburana. The school,
which was officially opened by the King in January 1914, ac-
cepted from other schools students who had shown particular
promise in manual skills. One objective was to revive the old
handicrafts by training a new generation of artisans. For ex-
ample, the school taught the art of niellowork, which by 1914
“had become almost a lost art in the country.”113 Other schools
with more conventional curriculums were also encouraged to
include training in art. As early as 1914 the press noted that the
“arts and crafts now occupy an important place in the general
scheme of education.”114 Even the Boy Scouts were introduced
to “practical training” in the form of classes in woodworking,
metalworking, and the like; proficiency medals were instituted
for boys who showed exceptional skill.115
Allied to education were the various arts and crafts exhibi-
tions sponsored by the King. The exhibitions served several pur-
poses: they encouraged art students to improve their work so
that they could compete; they helped the students financially
through the sale of their works; and they helped advertise the
Thai arts to a wide public. For Vajiravudh realized that to en-
courage production without stimulating demand was to build
a road that led nowhere. The first Arts and Crafts Fair was
held at Suan Kulap School in January 1913. The fair became an
annual event and was held at various sites thereafter until the
King’s death in 1925. Vajiravudh always opened the fair; he fre-
quently gave a short address on the utility of the arts; he ad-
mired the various productions; and he bought articles for his
own use.116 The fair seems to have been popular. By 1920 the
exhibits included furniture, drawings, paintings, photographs,
woodblocks, baskets, and works in silver and ivory, and, ac-
cording to a news account, “a large part of the exhibits” was
sold the first day.117 Art exhibits were also included in other
fairs sponsored by the King at various temples and palaces.118
As a means of promoting Thai arts and winning worldwide
recognition for them, and for Siam, King Vajiravudh underwrote
Siam’s participation in international exhibitions—those at Turin
in 1911, at Leipzig in 1914, and at San Francisco in 1915.119 At
Turin and at San Francisco a building of the traditional Siamese
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style was erected to house examples of Thai art and industry.
His Majesty took a personal interest in these exhibits; for the
Leipzig show he even contributed some of his own photographs
and books.120 The Siamese exhibits were well received abroad;
at Turin the Siamese displays won a total of ninety-three prizes,
medals, and awards.121
Among the foreign residents in Siam, a few took active
interest in Thai arts. These few were given hearty support
by the King, who once presciently commented: “The Art of
my Country will only find its salvation through the interest
that Europeans take in it.”122 Foremost among these foreigners
was Karl Doehring, a German architect who had served in the
Siamese Ministry of the Interior for several years. Doehring,
“under the protection of the scientifically and highly educated
King Vajiravudh of Siam and of Prince Damrong,” made ex-
tensive studies of Thai art, producing “architectural surveys,
drawings, and photographs.”123 Doehring, again with Siamese
government support, published the first careful examinations of
Thai architecture and Thai lacquer designs.124 Doehring’s role
in Siam was similar to that of Ernest Fenollosa in Japan: the role
of the respected Westerner whose appreciation of the Asian aes-
thetic reopened the eyes of the Asian to the value of his own art
heritage.
Direct sponsorship of art production was, of course, another
route of artistic revival. Vajiravudh’s main contributions here
were in the fields of architecture and the performing arts. He
did give some attention to other fields such as book production
and illustration, however; many of the King’s works were issued
in special editions with designs and drawings by leading artists
such as Prince Naris.125
In architecture there is evidence that the King disapproved
of the heavy intrusion of Western styles and sought a return to
Thai motifs. He apparently rued the very expensive Italianate
throne hall, Anantasamakhom, that his father had started and
that he felt obliged to complete. He is said to have stated that,
although the hall was large and grand and unique in Siam, there
was nothing Siamese about it and Westerners were not apt to
be impressed by it since grander and larger structures of this
style were to be seen all over Europe.126
Among the public buildings erected during the reign, many
marked a return to traditional forms: for example, the buildings
at the Royal Pages School, at Chulalongkorn University, and at
Sanam Čhan. These buildings adopted a modified Khmer-Thai
style that had begun to emerge at the end of Chulalongkorn’s
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reign (for example, in the building that formerly housed the Na-
tional Library). These buildings, however, continued to rely on
Western engineering to supply the multistories and the large en-
closed spaces that old Siamese society had not needed but that
new Siam did.
By and large it seems that the attempts at resuscitation of
traditional architecture were not successful. Buildings of Eu-
ropean design continued to be built, some undoubtedly with the
King’s approval. Notable among such buildings is Samakkhichai
House, an imposing pile in Venetian Gothic built by the King
for his favorite courtier, Čhaophraya Ram. Unequivocally high
marks can be given to only one type of building, the wooden
towers called phra men (meru in Sanskrit) that were built for
royal cremations. These buildings were constructed for but a
single purpose and a single occasion; they were destroyed after
the cremation rites were over. Consequently they survive only
in verbal and graphic depictions. The funeral structure for King
Chulalongkorn won lavish praise as the most “perfectly con-
structed” building of its type ever fashioned in Siam.127 Later
phra men designed by Prince Naris for the Queen Mother and
for Prince Chakrabongs, and other phra men executed for high
members of the royal family, received similar words of adu-
lation.
A final field of artistic promotion that received extraordinary
royal attention and achieved considerable success was that of
the traditional performing arts. Certainly a good deal of the
royal attention was due to the King’s personal interest in the
theater, but there is no doubt that Vajiravudh also saw revival of
Siamese drama, dance, and music as a part of the essential task
of preserving Thai national culture. He suspected, in fact, that
the Thai had not grown so far from these old theatrical tastes as
some supposed: “We may, in our innermost hearts, really prefer
to sit through the performance of a ‘Khon’ or ‘Lagor’ of the old
Siamese style, but instead we go and sit through a fearful enter-
tainment called an ‘operetta’ at the Pramothai or some one of
the other houses, because we think that style of entertainment
is more like what they give in European theatres.”128
Vajiravudh’s support of the traditional theater began while
he was still a prince at Saranrom Palace. There he sought out
old teachers and performers of the classical music and dance
and, as was mentioned in chapter 1, organized an amateur
dance company. After his coronation, Vajiravudh expanded on
his early work, establishing a special Department of Entertain-
ments (Mahο̨rasop) and a school of the performing arts. He
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recruited a number of teachers who were specialists in ballet
and in music.129 These men were given noble titles according
to merit and in the same fashion as other government officials.
Apparently the awarding of high noble titles to performers was
an unprecedented step; it aroused considerable criticism among
“his orthodox and conservative ministers.”130
The theater in all its forms received a powerful stimulus
during the Sixth Reign, and among these forms the classical
styles were given full attention. The old styles, which had been
seriously in decline at the end of Chulalongkorn’s reign,131
were revived under Vajiravudh’s patronage. Once again care-
fully rehearsed troupes of khon and lakhο̨n players, musicians,
reciters, and singers brought to life on stage, in the proper
costumes and with the necessary sets, the old dramas of Inao,
Anirut, and Rammakian (the Thai Ramayana) as well as newer
dramas that borrowed much from the old forms. The revivifi-
cation of the classical theater, however, depended too much on
the King personally to be permanent; with his passing the re-
vival came to an end.
LITERATURE
On September 13, 1913, King Vajiravudh started a poetic story
that was to become his longest work. A little less than eight
months later, on May 9, 1914, the first draft was completed.
There followed two years of editing and of revising, after con-
sultations with other scholars, before the work was ready for
printing.132
The poem, Phra non kham luang133 (The Story of King Nala
in Classical Verse Forms),134 began with traditional stanzas that
offered homage to the author’s teachers, and proceeded with
the following preamble:
To begin, this story of King Nala
Is translated from a Sanskrit epic
Into khlong, chan, kap, and klο̨n verse forms combined
As a work called kham luang, or classical model of prosody.
May all Thai scholars
Appreciate the value
Of Siamese poetry present and future
And not let it disappear.
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The aim of the author of this Nala story
Is to show our young men examples
Of interesting poetry in various forms
So they can use them as models to compose their own.
Listen, young men of the Thai nation:
Our nation is brilliant and shining.
If we had no poetry we would be shamed
And laughed at for having no scholars.
Great poetry is like a jewel;
Beautiful words are a begemmed sash.
We should add to the works of Vedic poetry
And treasure them unselfconsciously.
Don’t be afraid of being criticized.
If you are teased, don’t be discomfited.
Whoever ridicules us Thai
And our literature is a boor.
Peoples abroad all respect
Scholars and writers.
Those who reject literature are savages;
Whoever downgrades poetry is a barbarian.
Don’t be misled by the words
Of sophomoric men who are brash boasters
And would sinfully lead you nowhere;
Our scholars will bring back joy to your hearts.
Don’t try to emulate any other race.
Think only of Thailand right now.
Our country is civilized and should so remain.
Don’t listen to glib talkers who would lead you to madness.
Be careful to choose the good;
Choose poetry as your guide.
Be a good citizen, work hard,
And Thailand will be honored as a bright jewel.135
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“Choose poetry.” Choose the glorious classics of Siam’s past.
Value Thai literature, a mark of civilization. And continue the lit-
erary traditions uncorrupted and undefiled. These were some of
Vajiravudh’s messages to his countrymen to help them find na-
tional pride in their literature.
The threat to traditional literature was real. The nineteenth
century had seen the introduction of printing, the spread of
reading beyond the royal elite, and the development of a
popular prose literature—all with deleterious effects on many
classical forms. Old dance dramas were rarely staged except
in truncated versions. “The present day Siamese are forgetting
the old songs,” one writer complained.136 And the King com-
mented that, although Siam had “a great deal of genuine lit-
erary genius,” many people preferred “to read execrable trans-
lations of European ‘penny-dreadfuls’ and ‘shilling-
shockers.’”137 On top of all this, the King reported that “for-
eigners say the Thai nation has no books or records.”138 This
foreign view was particularly irritating to His Nationalistic
Majesty.
The solutions Vajiravudh turned to—in addition to making
known the value of Thai letters and the danger to Thai
letters—were to preserve the classics, to write himself, to en-
courage others to write, to inveigh against pernicious influences
on the language, and to work for language purity.
Preservation of the classics was advanced by sponsoring the
publication of old poetry and the performance of old dramas. As
mentioned above, the Royal Company of Players put on a suc-
cession of classic dramas, including Anirut, Inao, and episodes
of the Rammakian. The publication of Thai classical poetry had
already made much progress in the reign of King Chulalongkorn
through the issuance of a monthly literary journal, Wachirayan,
and the growth of the habit of making merit, particularly at
cremation rites, by the distribution of texts chosen by the Na-
tional Library.139 Vajiravudh continued to encourage such publi-
cations. In 1913, for example, to commemorate the opening of
Chitralada Palace, he printed at his own expense the first com-
plete edition of the Rammakian of Rama II, together with his
own study of the sources of the Thai Rammakian. In the intro-
duction to the Rammakian the King specifically pointed out that
he had chosen to publish a volume that would do honor to the
Thai nation and would repudiate the Western argument that the
Thai had no books that could be called literature.140
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In the area of his own writing, Vajiravudh was by no means
a classical purist, but he did compose a large number of works
on classical themes, in classical meters, and in classical styles.
There is hardly a genre—nirat (“travel poem”), lilit (“narrative
poem”), suphasit (“proverb”), nithan (“story” or “fable”), lakhο̨n
(“drama”), he ru̓a (“boat song”)—that he did not try his hand at.
As a crown prince he wrote a long narrative poem, Lilit phayap,
about his journey through northern Siam. In 1923 he wrote an-
other long lilit, Lilit narai sip pang, which was a poetic narrative
of the ten incarnations of Narayana, or Vishnu, including his in-
carnations as Rama, Krishna, and the Buddha. He wrote several
nirat. He also wrote a succession of he ru̓a, a literary form that
had practically ceased to exist with the death of its great ex-
ponent, Prince Thammathibet, in the early nineteenth century.
And he wrote the long poetic romance Phra non kham luang
quoted from above, which was based on the popular Indian
story called Nala and Damayanti. The largest number of his
works in classical style, however, were written for the theater.
These works include several episodes of the Rammakian; three
plays from the Sanskrit: Savitri, Priyadarshika, and Shakuntala;
and several original works, including Phra ruang, Thao saen
pom, and Matthanapatha. The Sanskrit plays and several other
works by the King were based on English versions of the San-
skrit classics; the King stated more than once that he did not
read Sanskrit.141 Whatever the literary value of these works by
Vajiravudh, the King fully demonstrated, simply by using the old
literary forms, that he intended to keep them alive.
Closely allied in spirit to the King’s rendering of Sanskrit
classics into Thai was his translation of outstanding classics of
the West into Thai. Although this enterprise can be seen as an
aspect of the Westernization process, the King justified his work
on the grounds that Shakespeare and other such writers tran-
scended national boundaries and their works were a universal
heritage for all mankind. In his preface to his translation of
The Merchant of Venice the King wrote that the plays of Shake-
speare were read in all the languages of Europe and some were
even available in Japanese; that his works had not also been
rendered into Thai poetry was a reproach the King could not
bear.142 Vajiravudh rendered into Thai verse four Shakespeare
plays: The Merchant of Venice, As You Like It, Romeo and Juliet,
and Othello. He also translated School for Scandal by Sheridan,
Le Médecin malgré lui by Molière, and several lesser works by
other European dramatists.
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Another measure taken to accord official recognition to lit-
erature of value—old works and new—was the establishment
in 1914 of a Literary Society (Wannakhadi Samosο̨n).143 The
society was patterned after the Historical Research Society
(Borankhadi Samosο̨n) that had been organized by King Chula-
longkorn in 1907. The Literary Society, like the Historical So-
ciety, was headed by the King and composed of a select group
of Thai intellectuals. Works that the society deemed meritorious
were to be allowed to use the society’s seal, a design featuring
the god Ganesha, patron of the arts. The society considered
literary works in all fields except history, which was already
under the purview of the Historical Society and certified by its
dragon seal.144 Shortly after its formation the society issued a
special list of outstanding works in Thai literature. One work
was singled out in each of seven fields. Winner of the award in
the field of Western-style drama was Rama VI’s own Huačhai
nakrop (The Soul of a Warrior).145 In later years the king also
won certificates of merit and the privilege of using the seal for
at least two additional works—Phra non kham luang in 1917146
and Matthanaphatha in 1924.147
The Literary Society was also given the charge to become
“the guardian of correct style,” by which it was meant that the
society should help prevent the corruption of the language with
foreign words and foreign locutions. King Chulalongkorn had
taken a step in the direction of maintaining language standards
in 1907 by appointing an Etymological Commission (Nirukkati
Samakhom) composed of Prince Vajiranana, Prince Deva-
wongse, Prince Damrong, and Prince Naris. However, the com-
mission, composed as it was of extremely capable but extremely
busy men, had long been inactive. Three new members seem
to have been added to the commission in 1916 or 1917, but
there is no indication that this move brought the commission
into action. By 1921 there apparently were serious discussions
about the formation of a new Institute of Etymology and Orthog-
raphy (Sapha Photčhanabanyat lae Akkharawithi) to handle the
problems of finding the right words for foreign scientific and
technical terms and for transliterating Thai into Roman letters,
but the institute was not established.148
Whatever may have been the King’s reasons for failing to
bring into being a working commission to guard the Thai lan-
guage, he was exceedingly active himself in the matter. His role
as a drumbeater for language purity grew out of his annoyance
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with what he regarded as the corruptions in diction and style
that had come largely from Western influence. One poem dealt
exclusively with this theme:
Feeling lonely and alone,
I chose a book for solace.
The more I read, the more I missed
You beside me, inducing laughter.
Feeling lonely and forlorn, I thought of you with sad heart,
So I chose a book to while away my boredom and read on.
The more I read, the more I grew annoyed at modern writings
In ununderstandable style. They don’t write in Thai.
The language of today that students like
Makes me dizzy. They excel at destruction.
The modish language, presumably Western,
Is unbearably dull to read, nauseating to hear.
It is incomprehensible to read, irritatingly boring,
Composed in excessive disorder like the language of drooling idiots.
Oh, the Thai language is going to wrack and ruin;
The Thai people are becoming shamefully “smart.”
The more I read of the book that I hoped would give momentary respite
The madder I got, so I finally had to throw it into the sea.
I looked for another work and chanced on verse,
A play that I understand has gained quick fame.
Oh, I lose heart. Why are we so unfortunate?
Thai poetry is finished; no people are more unlucky.
All is worthless; all forms are of fleeting value.
The stories ramble on in disorder; their vocabulary is vulgar.
I go back to find a good story that I brought with me
And read to gain contentment and to ease my sad loneliness.149
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The Westernisms and the vulgarisms that Vajiravudh de-
plored were constant objects of his attention and criticism. By
1910 a host of words from European languages, mostly English,
had found their way into Thai. Vajiravudh warred against these
“unThai” words and tried to reverse the trend. He suggested al-
ternates, for example, for such borrowings as “editor,” “steam,”
“motor,” “lecture,” “policy,” “empire,” “economics,” “goal” (in
football), and “toxicology.”150 The new words coined by the King
depended on Thai roots or on Sanskrit, the traditional Thai
source for new vocabulary. The King’s nationalistic purpose
here was obvious. It was even clearer in the King’s suggested
name change for the loose black pajamalike trousers commonly
called kangkeng čhin (“Chinese trousers”); the King preferred
they be called kangkeng thai (“Thai trousers”), justifying the
change with the comment that although the trousers may have
been Chinese in origin, they had become thoroughly domesti-
cated in Siam.
Apparent contradictions of Vajiravudh’s announced policy of
maintaining language purity may be seen in some of his own
writings. Many of these are in early writings that date from
the time before he became king and began to be more rigorous
in his use of “pure Thai.” Others, for example the many West-
ernisms, misspellings, and uses of “improper” language that
abound in the play Tang čhit khit khlang, are found in works
that belong in the category of humorous writings, in which, said
the King, ordinary rules of propriety need not apply.151
Spelling was always of particular concern to the King. He
wrote a number of newspaper articles proposing spelling
changes that would return words to what he regarded as their
correct etymologies.152 He also made his preferences known
as to the best way to render Thai in the Roman alphabet.
His system was a transliteration of Thai writing into Roman
letters, without dependence on phonetics. He used the system
in awarding surnames, giving his transliteration in each case.153
He believed that a letter-by-letter transcription of the writing
was most important since it preserved a word’s etymology, that
is, the linkage of a word to its past.154
Vajiravudh’s most remarkable effort in the direction of lin-
guistic nationalism was a scheme he developed for the radical
reform of the Thai system of writing.155 The scheme was put
forth as a trial balloon, not a royal order. It never achieved pop-
ularity, and it was quietly set aside.
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The reformed spelling scheme of the King, from the point
of view of nationalistic analysis, was derived almost equally
from Western and from traditional inspiration. It showed an
almost perfect placement of a logical and efficient change in the
context of old Thai culture. The scheme, thus, was not solely a
Westernizing reform, nor was it solely a return to the past; it
was both simultaneously.
The spelling scheme, in brief, prescribed that all Thai letters
be written on a single line and in the sequence in which they
were pronounced. The existing Thai system in which vowels
that were pronounced after consonants were sometimes written
in front of, sometimes after, sometimes above, sometimes below,
and sometimes in a combination of positions with regard to
the consonants would be abandoned. The scheme would, he
noted, mark a return to the system of the earliest Thai writing,
that used on the stele of King Ramkhamhaeng in the thirteenth
century, in putting all letters on a line, but it would modify that
system by adopting the Western practice of placing vowels and
consonants in the order in which they were pronounced. In ad-
dition, the Western practice of leaving spaces between words
would be adopted.
In urging use of the new system, Vajiravudh argued his case
strongly in terms of making it easier for Westerners to read
Thai. Thai native speakers had the advantage of knowing the
spoken language so well that spelling peculiarities gave them
little trouble; foreigners learning Thai did not have that ad-
vantage. And the Thai habit of leaving no space between words
caused much trouble to Westerners. The King, however, also
urged the new system as a means of removing ambiguities
that even Thai speakers often had to face. The existing writing
system, he wrote, served as a block to progress; it posed
problems even for the Thai. The older generations, he admitted,
would have trouble adjusting to the new system, but the new
generation of Thai, learning their language at school, would be
able to progress much faster at their studies if the new system
were available. And this new generation deserved the fullest
consideration.
Although Vajiravudh invited comments on the system, there
seems to have been little open discussion of it. Some of the
English-language newspapers praised the idea.156 And at least
one official wrote several letters to the King’s secretary in
August and September of 1917 using the new system.157 But the
system died a quiet death.
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The idea behind the system, however, showed the subtle
forms that nationalism under Vajiravudh could take; in concept
the system represented a delicate balance between the new and
the old, between the practical and the traditional, that nation-
alistic formulas at their best seek. The difficulty with the idea
was that it called for changes in an area that is heavily weighted
with habit and emotion in every culture. It failed for much the
same reasons that an attempt by King Mongkut to reform the
spelling of religious texts failed. And that efforts by Premier
Pibulsonggram in the 1940s to simplify all spelling failed. And
that, indeed, despite Shavian persistence and wit, reform of the
spelling of the English language remains a subject of dreams.
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The Media
Long before Marshall McLuhan made his well-knowndeclaration that “The medium is the message,” King Vaji-
ravudh was aware of the importance of the media. The “mes-
sages” of Vajiravudh’s nationalistic campaign were transmitted
to the Thai people in a prodigious variety of ways. The “media”
were exploited by a king who was often acutely aware of what
he was doing. What Vajiravudh was trying to do, above all, was
affect the hearts of his people. Although legislation and decrees
could have a role in reaching this objective, such measures were
obviously more effective in bringing about changes in people’s
acts than in their minds. Decrees smacked too much of the
concept behind paid weepers at royal funerals; they had too
little of the spontaneous show of love of nation, king, and re-
ligion that Vajiravudh hoped for among his people.
Legislation, however, cannot be ignored. Although nation-
alism cannot be legislated, certain acts of legislation un-
doubtedly aid in the development of nationalism. Laws, in this
regard, can also be considered media. The legislative acts that
provided for the formation of the Wild Tiger Corps and the Boy
Scouts, the adoption of surnames, the change in flag design,
255
the inauguration of special medals, the entrance into World War
I, the institution of compulsory education, the attempt to de-
velop a Thai merchant marine, can all be seen as instrumental-
ities that in whole or part were meant to make the Thai people
strong, united, and proud. These acts were designed to produce
habits that would eventually affect attitudes.
In the stricter meaning of the word, however, the media
Vajiravudh used to make direct emotional appeals included
speeches, plays, essays, letters to the press, poems, songs,
films, pageants, fetes and fairs, various celebrations, fund-
raising campaigns, and royal appearances and visits. Usually,
each of the nationalistic messages the King attempted to convey
to his people was conveyed by a variety of media. And each
medium was used for a variety of messages. The message that
Siam was a nation of warriors, for example, was brought home
by all the media mentioned—from speeches to royal appear-
ances. And fund-raising campaigns were used to elicit interest
in and support for the Wild Tigers, the Siamese Expeditionary
Force, the Navy League, the Siamese air units, and the Red
Cross.
A mere list of the media gives but scant clue to the diversity
of uses to which each medium was put. The fund-raising tech-
nique alone involved such means as showing films; staging
plays, shows, and pageants; sponsoring sports events; holding
auctions and lotteries; issuing special postage stamps; putting
on art shows and fairs; staging air displays and military tourna-
ments; organizing motor races; and making out-and-out appeals
for contributions. The conclusion of one newspaper writer that
“the frequent appeals to help patriotic movements by gifts is
surely a distinctive feature of today” is abundantly borne out.1
Much ingenuity went into the planning of such events. In July
1920, for example, there was at Bang Pa-in a special art exhi-
bition of amateur drawings by the King and various government
officials. The drawings went on sale—the King’s satirical car-
toons of some of his officials drew the largest bids—and the pro-
ceeds were used to purchase rifles for the Ayutthaya contingent
of Wild Tigers.2 In January 1924, another Tiger benefit fund
was aided by the extraordinary fund-raising method of having
His Majesty man the photographic booth at the annual Winter
Fair. As might be expected, this method was a great success,
with long lines of people waiting each evening “for the attention
of the Photographer Royal.”3 Fund-raising as a means of pro-
moting nationalism, however, was put to its most telling use
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Cartoon of Prince Purachatra by King Vajiravudh. Prince Purachatra,
running the Siamese Railway Department, bumps former German
aides off the line. One of a series of cartoons by the King published in
Dusit samit. Originals were sold in various fund-raising drives.
during the reign in the sustained campaign to purchase the
warship Phra Ruang as a gift from the Thai people to their King
and navy.
There is no doubt that Vajiravudh was media-conscious. He
was very much aware, for example, that his royal appearance in
and of itself made any occasion a special event for his people.
Therefore, to encourage the arts he attended arts and crafts
shows; to encourage sports, he attended sports events; to
promote enthusiasm for the war effort, he attended special cel-
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ebrations connected with Siam’s participation in World War I.
The King explicitly pointed out that his trips to the provinces
had the clear goal of letting his people see him so as to increase
their devotion and loyalty.4 And he often planned his appear-
ances for maximum effect. On one of his southern tours he
travelled from Chumphο̨n to Ranο̨ng by elephant and made his
entrance into Ranο̨ng riding a “big handsome tusker” in a “fine
roomy howdah” followed by a retinue of more than 300 ele-
phants.5
THE KING’S SPEECHES AND ESSAYS
The King also approached his speechmaking with great delib-
eration. Vajiravudh delivered hundreds of speeches. The largest
number were given before Wild Tiger assemblies. Other audi-
ences included students at the Royal Pages School, the Boy
Scouts, the army, the navy, and the princes and officials who
attended his birthday celebrations. Some of the speeches were
the formal and routine kind that any monarch or head of state
is obliged to give. The annual “Birthday Speech,” a sort of state
of the nation address, was competent but rarely inspired.6 But
many were ringing nationalist appeals. The Bangkok Times,
commenting on several of the King’s speeches during the coro-
nation events, said they were “marked by earnestness and imag-
ination, and by a power of compelling thought and of getting
into direct touch with those he is addressing.” The Times added
that His Majesty’s speech to the children “was certainly a happy
effort.”7 The Wild Tiger speeches were outstanding examples
of Vajiravudh’s speech-making abilities. The Bangkok Times
singled these out for a special accolade: “There the object was
to be stirring and effective, and His Majesty was able to make
the most of a freedom that is denied to more formal occasions.”8
According to the King’s own comment, the Wild Tiger speeches
were given without notes. He aimed at spontaneity and sim-
plicity. He aimed at easy comprehension. He told one Tiger au-
dience directly: “I intend to speak in Thai that is most easily
understood.”9 He pointed out, for example, that the “sermons”
he gave to the Wild Tigers, that is, his expositions of the value of
Buddhism and Buddhist morality, were not like the sermons of
monks; they were just his own views of the truth that he wished
to share with friends.
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As a speaker it appears that Vajiravudh was effective among
the special audiences he preferred—the Wild Tigers and student
groups. His voice is said to have been low, his manner quiet. He
was not, by accounts of his listeners, a spellbinder. He was not
an orator for the multitudes.
The King’s nationalistic writings bear a close relationship
to his speeches. In fact, some speeches were later published
as essays, and, on occasion, some essays were later read as
speeches. Several series of addresses were issued in printed
form during the reign—after the King had made minor emen-
dations in the scribe’s transcriptions. His first series of Wild
Tiger lectures, which ended in July 1911, was in print “for all to
read” by December.10 The King hoped that the speeches, in their
simple spoken style and with their everyday images, would, in
print, convey his ideas to a large audience.
The King even made suggestions as to how his printed
speeches should be used to attain maximum effect. His instruc-
tions on how Plukčhai su̓apa (Instilling the Wild Tiger Spirit)
should be used in the schools have already been noted.11 The
long speech Sadaeng khunnanukhun (A Definition of Virtue),
which Vajiravudh edited and printed for distribution within a
few months of its delivery in May 1918, was also meant to be
read aloud. The King said it should be read to soldiers, to Wild
Tigers, and to schoolchildren. But, he elaborated, it should not
be read at one sitting; it should be broken up into smaller sec-
tions. And whenever the reader felt the audience did not fully
understand the text he should stop and explain its meaning in
his own words.12
In an effort to have his ideas reach a large public audience,
Vajiravudh also wrote and published a great number of essays,
many of which were republished in various forms. Some of his
more important essays were “Wake Up, Siam,” “Clogs on Our
Wheels,” “The Cult of Imitation,” “On Becoming a Real Nation,”
“Might Is Right,” “Victory,” “The Jews of the Orient,” “Prin-
ciples of Government,” “Grinding Pepper Sauce in the River,”
“A Comparison of Surnames with Clan Names,” “The Affairs of
China,” “Education and Unrest in the East,” “The Failure of
the Young Turks,” “The Fruits of Turkish Constitutionalism,”
“Japan for Example,” “Uttarakuru,” “Isn’t a Four-Wheeled Ve-
hicle More Stable Than a Two-Wheeled Vehicle?” “A Definition
of Virtue,” “A Symbol of Civilization: The Status of Women,”
“Freedom of the Seas,” “A Visit to the Land of Phra Ruang,”
and “What Is the Knowledge Attained by the Buddha on His En-
lightenment.” The majority of these essays were nationalistic in
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content. Although the King did publish prose writings on other
subjects—for example, some short pieces on the spelling of spe-
cific words and some literary commentaries (usually written as
introductions to poetic works)—the prose works designed for a
mass audience were, by and large, attempts to stimulate public
devotion, loyalty, and morality as a means of strengthening the
nation.
Vajiravudh used several tactics to make his prose essays
more effective. One was the use of pseudonyms. The name Asv-
abahu (“horseman”)13 was most frequently attached to nation-
alistic essays. As Asvabahu the King could write as if he were
an ordinary citizen who approved of government policies and
wished to urge others to approve of them. A similar motive
probably applied to the King’s use, in other essays, of the pen
names Ramachitti (“the wisdom of Rama”), Phan Laem
(“thousand-pointed”), and Sukhrip (the name of a monkey king
in the Rammakian who assisted Rama). To broaden his au-
dience, the King ordered the widespread distribution of free
copies of some of his works. The printed speeches on “Instilling
the Wild Tiger Spirit” were issued to schools and were made
prescribed reading there.14 The King’s essay “A Definition of
Virtue” was apparently also made available to schools.15 His pa-
triotic address to the members of the departing Siamese Ex-
peditionary Force was issued in print as an army order.16 The
King also sought to develop a sympathetic audience among
Westerners in Siam by making many of his works available
in English—“the King’s English,” in fact, since he usually un-
dertook the translations himself.
THE KING’S PLAYS
In the realm of the theater, a world he particularly loved, the
King made extensive use of plays for nationalistic purposes.
During his reign Vajiravudh wrote some sixty Western-style
plays—thirty-four original dramas and about twenty-six transla-
tions or adaptations. The introduction of the Western-style play,
or “spoken” play (lakhο̨n phut), in Siam has been attributed to
Vajiravudh, who is also credited with introducing sets and, by
1919, the practice of allowing actresses to play female roles.17
In addition to plays, the King composed many khon and other
forms of the traditional poetic drama.
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A large number of the King’s Western-style plays had a dis-
tinctly didactic quality; they were intended to instruct, to en-
lighten, to rally the Thai people behind some cause or other. Not
all the plays had such motives; many were light entertainments,
pleasant farces, melodramas, or drawing-room comedies. But
even some of these were made to serve useful purposes.
The “moral” plays all contributed in a broad way to the
King’s program of stirring up Thai nationalism. Some were
direct and open patriotic appeals; others approached nation-
alism more indirectly by recommending a course of social or
cultural improvement to strengthen the nation. All were per-
formed on many occasions, even in the provinces.
The nationalistic message is loud and clear in many of Va-
jiravudh’s most famous plays. Again and again, in play after
play, the main theme is the necessity for the Thai to be united,
to put their nation first, to love their land, their religion, and
their king above all, to be willing to give up even life itself
for these three. The nationalist call is particularly strong in
the plays Phra ruang, Huačhai nakrop (The Soul of a Warrior),
and Mahatama. It appears to a lesser degree in other plays
such as Sia sala (Sacrifice), Phu̓an tai (Friends to the End), and
Wiwaha phra samut (Neptune’s Bride). Other plays with po-
litical and social themes include Chuai amnat! (Coup d’état!),
Khanom som kap namya (The Right Amount of Noodles for the
Sauce), Nο̨i inthasen (Noi Inthasen), Topta (Deception), Phurai
phlaeng (The Evil Doer), Phongphang (Fishtrap), Čhatkan rap
sadet (Preparing for a Royal Visit), and Khwamdi mi chai (The
Triumph of Virtue). The best known and most frequently per-
formed of all of Vajiravudh’s nationalistic plays was Huačhai
nakrop. It was produced very often in Bangkok, and it was also
performed in the provinces: in Songkhla, in Nakhο̨n Sitham-
marat, and in Phuket. The play has been described by one
appreciative viewer as a “hit” that never palled. And that Va-
jiravudh succeeded in getting his nationalistic message across
is clearly demonstrated by this viewer’s further comment: “You
got excited seeing it and wanted to help the good people who
loved their nation. It made you hate traitors and want to slap
them on both sides of their faces.”18
Many of Vajiravudh’s plays with a didactic or propagandist
purpose are, from a purely aesthetic point of view, overbur-
dened with message. Some of the patriotic speeches are
perhaps longer than the dramatic structure can comfortably
carry. But in this whole area the King was breaking new ground.
Dramatic literature of this sort had not been known before in
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Siam. The whole technique of using the theater to instruct,
to propagandize, to influence an audience in favor of an idea,
was a contribution of the King’s. Although all literature to an
extent teaches (even the Ramayana sets forth ideals of proper
behavior), this kind of instruction is much attenuated and is
unconscious. The conscious, deliberate fashioning of literature
for the stage in order to sell an idea was King Vajiravudh’s gift
to Thai drama.
The majority of King Vajiravudh’s plays were not message
plays; they were written to entertain. They were farces,
comedies, light romances. He enjoyed writing them; he enjoyed
producing them; he enjoyed acting in them. Yet even here a na-
tionalistic purpose was not completely absent. The plays were
not arguments for any causes, but they were used as fund-
raisers for causes. The play Buang man (Noose of Evil), for ex-
ample, which tells the story of a man whose wife runs off with a
lover, was first produced on October 12, 13, and 14, 1916, and
all three times the proceeds went to help fill the coffers of the
Red Cross of Siam. And so with play after play after play. The
idea of benefit performances of royal plays started in 1915 with
a performance of Mahatama, the proceeds in this case going to
the cruiser fund of the Royal Navy League. And other benefits
were held in later years for other pet projects of the King such
as the Siamese Expeditionary Force sent to Europe in World
War I, the Wild Tiger rifle fund, and various hospital funds. The
fund-raising aspect of the theater was very important in Va-
jiravudh’s eyes. One advertisement for a benefit performance
for a royal charity starts out: “Are You a Friend of Siam?”19 It
became, then, one’s patriotic duty to go to plays. It is possible
even that the rather large number of plays the King wrote in
English (ten of them) were written, at least partly, to tap some
of the farang money in the community for one or another of the
King’s favored benefits.
Vajiravudh used traditional theatrical pieces—“sung
dramas” and masked dance-dramas—as well as Western-style
plays to convey his patriotic messages. The poetic rendering
of the Phra Ruang story, Khο̨m damdin (The Cambodian Earth
Diver), is outstanding in this regard. And two dance-dramas,
Mit mi chai (The Triumph of Friendship) and Thammathamma
songkhram (The War between Good and Evil), were propaganda
pieces for the Allied cause in World War I. These dance-dramas
presented their messages in the transmutation of classical-style
ballets. Mit mi chai, first performed in October 1917, shows
Phra Mit, the god of friendship, leading the gods and goddesses
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in dance. The envious demon Phalasun appears to interrupt the
proceedings, claiming that the gods and goddesses are trying
to deprive him of his “place in the sun.” A great fight between
gods and demons takes place. The gods win and celebrate their
victory with a joyful dance in which the dancers, in a charming
touch to guarantee that the audience will not miss the true
meaning of the allegory, wave on stage the flags of the Allied na-
tions.20 Thammathamma songkhram has a very similar theme.
Although written shortly after the end of the war, the drama
reflected the King’s thoughts on the war’s meaning. It was in-
spired by a sermon by Prince Patriarch Vajiranana on the victory
of the forces of good over the forces of evil. In Vajiravudh’s
version the leader of the forces of evil argues that might makes
right and, making the intended identification with the Germans
inevitable, echoes the infamous phrases chosen by the German
chancellor to justify the violation of Belgian neutrality:
A solemn treaty is but a scrap of paper;
Laws are disposable when necessity requires.21
For his dramatic works, as for his essays, the King fre-
quently resorted to pseudonyms. Classical pieces and serious
plays such as Phra ruang, Mahatama, and Huačhai nakrop bore
his own name, but informal plays were written under the pen
name Si Ayutthaya or Phra Khanphet. Perhaps by this means the
King hoped to dispel some of the criticism that he was exces-
sively devoted to the stage.
THE PRESS
The one medium that caused Vajiravudh some trouble was the
press. The King appreciated the press. He used newspapers
often as an outlet for his views. But the press was a problem.
It had its own voice. Newspapermen presented their own views.
And these views the King often regarded as antithetical to his
own and pernicious to the kinds of development he desired for
Siam.
Some of the King’s most prominent essays appeared first
in the press. Nangsu̓phim thai carried his articles, frequently
in series, in Thai, and the Siam Observer followed later with
English translations. Other papers, of course, gave considerable
prominence to all the King’s words and actions as newsworthy
items. In 1917, as a sign of particular favor, Vajiravudh invited
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members of the press to the official audience at which he de-
livered his speech from the throne about entering the war; this
was the first time the press in Siam had been honored by an in-
vitation to attend such an audience.22 And to ensure that there
would be accurate reporting of affairs at court, the King insti-
tuted the “Court Circular” on May 21, 1912. By this move he
made the main events of life at the court, which had been “a
sealed book to the bulk of the Siamese people,” known to all
newspaper readers; as the Bangkok Times put it, he “substi-
tuted facts for gossip.”23
The King was an avid newspaper reader. He read all of the
Bangkok papers and some of the leading British news journals,
and he subscribed to a press clipping service for “cuttings re-
lated to Siam.”24 Vajiravudh also wrote, under a variety of pen
names, rejoinders to press comments of which he disapproved.
On July 17, 1915, for example, he sent a long criticism to the
editor of the Nangsu̓phim thai concerning an earlier two-part
article on the poverty of the people. The article had said that
the poor people of Siam were being driven to robbery and had
blamed the government for the people’s distress. Vajiravudh’s
rejoinder vehemently denounced the writer, likened him to a
senseless yapping dog, refuted the logic of his arguments, and
criticized the newspaper for wasting paper on such nonsense.25
Similar criticisms of critics abound in Vajiravudh’s writings.
In general what the King objected to were writings that exposed
government weaknesses—inefficiency, inattention to rural
problems, financial difficulties, and the like. Although he
claimed that “I do not and cannot possibly object to … fair
comment or criticism,”26 in fact he objected to all criticism.
Even a mildly unfavorable review of the diction in his translation
of Romeo and Juliet evoked a scathing attack on the English
critic. The King wrote that he had not written the play for a
European “with some knowledge of Siamese” but for well-edu-
cated Thai.27
Vajiravudh had a theory as to the reason why so many
writers for the press were so critical. He saw them as men
who were “of very indifferent education, or dismissed officials
with mountains of grievances against the Government.” Jour-
nalists in Siam thus were men without responsibilities and so
were “practically always critical and destructive.” The people
of Siam bore their share of blame for the “trashy news and ir-
responsible vapourings of disappointed, dismissed Government
servants” because they read these writings and bought the
papers.28 The King (as Asvabahu) spoke as a “well-wisher” who
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felt the need to warn the people that Siamese journalists were
concocting their sweet offerings from “water from the nearest
street gutter.”29
Although his own sarcasm may have provided the King with
a momentary catharsis, the press problem remained. And the
problem was real, not merely the product of the King’s sensi-
tivity. The Siamese-language papers in particular were noted for
their carelessness in handling facts and for their defamations of
character. Their attitude was made clear by an editorial in one
paper which stated that the paper’s only duty was to print what
it received; if someone were defamed in the process, he always
had the option of refuting the defamation.30
Control of the press was one way to solve the press problem.
But Vajiravudh was loath to resort to control or censorship. He
admired the free press of England; he was proud of his own
tolerance, of Siam’s record of liberality. As Phraya Arthakar
Prasiddhi, Siam’s Attorney General, put it, “No restrictions have
been placed on the press in Siam of any nature whatsoever, and
the press in Siam since its birth became free, whereas it took
hundreds of years in England to attain that end.”31
Many high officials in Vajiravudh’s government, however,
did not share the King’s compunctions with regard to the press.
In June 1912 Prince Paribatra recommended the passage of
a press law.32 In July of the same year Prince Chakrabongs
came forth with the same recommendation.33 By August 1912
an accord had been reached to draft a law. But, the King noted
in his diary, a severe law such as existed in Russia and Germany
was to be avoided. Such a law would not end adverse criticism,
it would only direct it into other channels.34 His philosophy here
was clearly stated in another diary entry: “It is important that
we not cut off people’s means to air their grievances.”35 At a
special meeting of the Council of Ministers in 1915 agreement
was reached that a mild law to ensure press responsibility
should be enacted.36 Nothing was done. In 1916 Čhaophraya
Yommarat urged the King to ban immoral books; Vajiravudh
promised to consider the matter.37 In 1917 a fairly harsh news-
paper act patterned after the Japanese law was drafted,
probably on the initiative of Prince Chakrabongs.38 In a note
on this law Vajiravudh characterized Japanese methods as “glo-
rified caricatures” of Western laws, as containing the ap-
pearance of justice but in fact enabling the government to
discriminate “between its favourites and those it has a down
upon….”39 The King again suggested deferment. The subject of
a press law came up again in 1922, and a new draft was pre-
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pared.40 After several revisions, the draft in 1923 became the
Law on Books, Documents, and Newspapers. This law required
that all newspapers be licensed. Licenses could be denied or
could be revoked in the interest of “public order,” but a news-
paper had the right to court appeal. The Bangkok Times editor
made it clear that, although he was not delighted with the law,
it could be lived with.41 It would appear that, insofar as appli-
cation of the law was concerned, the government during the
Sixth Reign continued to act circumspectly.
The mild control of the law of 1923 added little to the con-
trols already present in the civil and criminal codes. And these
codes were on occasion used. A Thai paper, the Sam samai, was
closed in May 1911 on a charge of lèse majesté for an indis-
creet reference to the running aground of the royal yacht.42 The
editor of the Chino-Siam Daily News was imprisoned on losing
a court case in which he was charged with defaming a prince.43
Another case of libel, this time by a writer of the Bangkok Daily
Mail against the Minister of Justice, was settled by a formal
apology.44 The Chino-Siam Daily News was in trouble again
briefly in 1918, but the matter was settled with a light fine.45
In 1925 two Chinese papers were closed for printing articles
regarded as inflammatory.46 Although very few papers were
closed, many were warned. Generally a newspaper accused of
printing errors rushed to make retractions. But not always. The
Bangkok Daily Mail not only refused to retract a statement it
had made about an action taken by the Ministry of War, but also
refused to print the ministry’s own explanation. The ministry
consoled itself by denouncing the Daily Mail in other papers for
its discourtesy.47 On other occasions the government, although
very much irritated by sly innuendos in the press, decided not
to press charges for fear of making a “big clamor … for the
public’s benefit.”48
Probably the most effective means the government found for
exercising influence over the press was buying it. At least two
newspapers, the Nangsu̓phim thai and the Nangsu̓phim čhino,
received government subsidies.49 The Siam Observer, it seems
clear, had government connections.50 And in 1917 the Bangkok
Daily Mail and its Thai-language edition, the Krung Thep Daily
Mail, were purchased by a government official, Phraya Bο̨ribun
Kosakο̨n, from the American proprietor, P. A. Huffman; the pur-
chaser, it was noted by another paper, was not acting on his
own account.51 The Daily Mail had been an annoyance to the
government from the start, and as early as 1912 Čhaophraya
Yommarat had suggested to the King that a controlling interest
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in the company should be bought secretly by government of-
ficials.52 The Nangsu̓phim thai was widely known as the voice
of the government.53 It had been receiving aid secretly before
the Sixth Reign started, and in December 1910 the paper was
reorganized and given increased financial support on a regular
subsidy basis.54 Government officials up to the King seem also
to have become increasingly concerned with the paper’s cir-
culation, rates, and effectiveness. In a memorandum of March
1912, for example, an official suggested that in order to make
the circulation of the Nangsu̓phim thai, then about 500, match
the 1,000 figure of the Daily Mail the rates should be reduced,
the subsidy should be increased, and government offices should
break news to the paper first so as to give it an advantage over
the competition.55
A certain number of journals were openly owned and pub-
lished by the government or government-supported agencies.
Most of these, however, were specialized or professional
journals with little popular appeal. Several journals were ini-
tiated by the King, who had played the role of editor himself
since his issuance of Thawipanya as a prince. In the days of
Dusit Thani, two newspapers, Dusit samai and Dusit sakkhi,
and one monthly, Dusit samit, were published there. These pub-
lications, however, were virtually limited in circulation to the
courtiers of Dusit Thani. The King also sponsored several
journals: Čhotmaihet su̓apa, the Wild Tiger monthly; Samut-
thasan, the Navy League monthly; and a literary magazine en-
titled Sap thai. Čhotmaihet su̓apa and Samutthasan served as
outlets for some of the King’s more important speeches, essays,
and poems, but, again, their circulation was not wide.
The outstanding newspaper of the reign in terms of fairness,
reliability, and absence of sensationalism was the English-lan-
guage Bangkok Times. The Times was English owned. Its editor,
W. H. Mundie, knew the Thai language and people well. He
was sympathetic to Siam, but not to the point of sycophancy.
The editor’s ideal, as he once expressed it, was to produce the
kind of paper admired by Robert Louis Stevenson, a journal that
appeared “to have been written by a dull, sane Christian gen-
tleman, solely desirous of imparting information.”56 Despite its
caution, the paper sometimes got into trouble. In March 1914,
for example, the King’s private secretary objected to an edi-
torial concerning alleged government involvement in or mishan-
dling of the failure of a bank. The secretary asked the editor,
who had a “well deserved reputation for fairness,” to correct
the “false impressions” he had produced. The editor did so, al-
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though in so doing he wrote that more meaning had been “read
into” his words than was intended.57 The Times was aware that
it had won the reputation of “constantly ‘grousing’ against the
administration.” The paper saw itself not as a grouser but as
a constructive critic “keenly and honestly interested in the ad-
vancement of the land we live in.”58 The editor by and large re-
alized how far he could go without getting into trouble. He once
wrote: “If one has to write in this country, one has to learn to
convey a meaning and at the same time to use great restraint in
doing so.”59
Although restraint was the watchword of the Bangkok
Times, articles of great frankness were published. One series
of such articles, written by a Westerner under the pseudonym
Junius, began appearing in September 1919.60 The articles were
not sensational; they did not indulge in personalities; they were
calmly reasoned analyses of “The Future of Siam”—the future
Siam might have if, Junius said, the prevailing inefficiencies,
corruption, short-range policies, lack of leadership, and policy
of drift were to give way to a firm program of economic de-
velopment led by honest and practical men. The Junius articles
were exceedingly strong. And they were exceedingly critical,
calling into question fundamental principles of government in
Siam.
In 1923 a new series of articles of much the same nature
began appearing under the name Hermit.61 Hermit, a Thai,
argued for an increase in funds for national development, a
reduction in military spending, and a more rapid movement
toward democracy. Hermit expressed his ideas clearly and
pointedly, and his ideas were far from congenial to the King.
Yet no actions were taken against Junius or Hermit or any
other such writers. The King was disturbed. But he did nothing
but pen the following, in English, to one of his officials:
You know I have been ill and my nerves are in anything but good
condition. I am being continually annoyed by having to read such
foolish (or knavish) correspondences as those of “Hermit” and
such like in the “Bangkok Times.” As I feel that nothing could be
done to stop such annoyance, the only thing that I can ask you
to do is to stop sending up the “Bangkok Times” for the present,
otherwise I shall become quite a nervous wreck, for I feel it more
and more difficult to control my temper!62
It appears that the King shielded himself from the barbs of the
Bangkok Times for a total of eight days!63
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Long-time newspapermen such as Sathitya Semanil,64 Ome
Palangtirasin,65 and Chalerm Vudhikosit66 have given compli-
mentary assessments of the freedom permitted to the press in
Vajiravudh’s days. And their assessments seem thoroughly jus-
tified. One of the earliest acts of Vajiravudh’s successor was to
issue a rescript warning the press in effect that the new gov-
ernment was not going to be so tolerant of journalistic excesses
as its predecessor had been. But it was not until the absolute
monarchy came to an end in 1932 that full censorship of the
press was instituted.
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King Vajiravudh died on November 26, 1925, at the age of 44.He had had periodic bouts of illness during the reign and
was sick through most of 1918; his final illness, which began in
August 1925, centered on an infection of the intestinal system.
The last months, indeed the last years, of the King were
filled with much sorrow and bitterness. Deaths of high-ranking
members of the royal family occurred with alarming frequency
in those last years. From 1919 to the end of the reign six half-
brothers, three full brothers, the Queen Mother, Prince Vaji-
ranana, and Prince Devawongse all died. The most frightening
losses, from the political point of view, were those of the heirs to
the throne. In 1910 Vajiravudh had declared that succession to
the throne would pass presumptively through the line of Queen
Saowapha’s sons: Princes Chakrabongs, Asadang, Chudadhuj,
and Prajadhipok. Prince Chakrabongs died in 1920 at the age of
37; Prince Chudadhuj died in 1923 at the age of 31; and Prince
Asadang died in 1925 at the age of 33. Only one son of Queen
Saowapha remained to carry on the line, Prince Prajadhipok,
the youngest of King Chulalongkorn’s sons. Vajiravudh had, of
course, hoped for a son of his own to carry on the succession.
But his only child, born two days before the King’s own death,
turned out to be a girl and therefore, by the King’s law on suc-
cession of 1924, not eligible to succeed.1 The King’s question
when the baby brought to him and placed by his side was, “Is it
a girl or a boy?” The answer was, “A girl.” The King paused for
a moment, then said, “It’s just as well.”2
Contributing to the mood of depression that grew during the
last years of the reign was the downturn taken by the economy.
Poor rice harvests, budget deficits, and growing criticism of ad-
ministrative policies could not help but affect Vajiravudh ad-
versely.
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Characteristic of the King were the plans he made to boost
the economy and the national morale. In a new burst of enthu-
siasm early in 1925 he decided to hold special festivities com-
memorating the end of the fifteenth year of his reign—a reign
that would then be equal in length to that of Rama II, Vaji-
ravudh’s great literary predecessor. He planned to join these
festivities with those for his birthday and the annual Winter
Fair to create one great celebration. The celebration’s chief
feature would be a Siamese Kingdom Exhibition, patterned after
England’s annual Wembley Exhibition, that would combine all
the attractions of the Winter Fair—the booths, the lotteries, the
games, the dancing—with an elaborate display of Siamese arts,
agriculture, and industry. The principal aim of the exhibition
would be to promote the economic development of the nation;
its by-product would be a new permanent park for the people
and an exhibition ground for future fairs. The exhibition had
proceeded to within two months of its opening when Vajiravudh
died. One of King Prajadhipok’s first acts was to cancel it.
Vajiravudh’s exhibition and Prajadhipok’s cancellation sym-
bolize in microcosm the vast differences between the two kings
and their reigns. The ethos of the Sixth Reign, and many of its
accomplishments, were to stand embodied in the exhibition. It
was to have, in addition to exhibit halls for agriculture and in-
dustries, a palace of art, sports stadia, theater halls, and dis-
plays illustrating the progress of the army, the navy, and the
Wild Tigers. The Boy Scouts were to be featured in yet another
display. Various sports events were planned, and football teams
were invited from Rangoon, Colombo, Penang, Singapore, Sai-
gon, Hong Kong, Manila, and Batavia to compete in “the first
great Asiatic Football Competition.” But what Vajiravudh un-
doubtedly hoped would happen at the Siamese Kingdom Ex-
hibition was what a writer for the Bangkok Times described
as happening at Britain’s Wembley during the final torchlight
tattoo. The tattoo was staged in a great arena with flags, lights,
bands, marching men, horses. It was “just a parade on a big
scale,” and yet it was much more. For the performance had
a magic, a thrill. And that thrill came from the audience “in
the strung up excitement and admiration and emotion of thou-
sands of people, all stirred by a common feeling.” That feeling
was pride in nation, pride in unity, pride in fellowship. It was
the proof, despite “all the terrible things happening or about to
happen to our country,” that “England isn’t done.”3
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Prajadhipok and his advisers saw the exhibition in a dif-
ferent light: it was expensive, and much of it was wasted show;
at a time when the economy was in difficulty, retrenchment
rather than lavish spending on fairs was the practical course to
follow. The exhibition was cancelled in good conscience. Only a
small pagoda clock-tower and a few small buildings remained
as evidence of what had been planned. The Wild Tigers died
quietly soon after. Arts shows ceased. The Boy Scouts failed to
get financial support. Even the army and navy felt the financial
pinch as the new government cut all expenses it could to keep a
balanced budget in a time of worldwide depression.
The overriding question about the nationalistic program in
Siam during the Sixth Reign remains: Did it work? Did it
survive, if not in the form of the Wild Tiger Corps, in the im-
pression it made on men’s minds?
“On the day that King Vajiravudh died,” said one former Boy
Scout, “I put on my Scout insignia and stood for a long time in
honor of the leader of our nation with a heart deep in sorrow
… the whole Thai nation had lost its guiding national star.”4 An-
other writer, commenting many years after the King’s death on
the King’s patriotic songs, said that the songs remained moving
and unforgettable.5 Such stories, such vivid memories of men
of the times, demonstrate beyond doubt that the King’s mes-
sages affected some people. And in addition, the latter-day as-
sessments of the reign by most Thai writers, even those not
generally sympathetic, do credit the reign with success in its
nationalist program. One severe critic of Vajiravudh, for ex-
ample, allows that the “one political success of his was sowing
the seeds of nationalism in the Thai people.”6 Favorable Thai
surveys of the reign usually count the drive to stimulate nation-
alism as the foremost achievement of the reign.
The question of the effectiveness of the nationalist
movement then does not deal with absolutes. It becomes a
question of the degree of effectiveness. How many people were
affected? How many people remained aloof or uninvolved? Such
questions cannot be answered absolutely. No Gallup or Roper
polls are available to give quantified answers. Answers, at best
tentative, must remain impressionistic.
It seems unlikely that the population at large, the vast mass
of Siam’s farmers, was deeply influenced by the King’s na-
tionalistic messages. In those areas in which farmers were af-
fected—in the drive for adoption of surnames, for example—the
nationalistic meaning was probably not even understood. Yet
the farmers were not completely isolated from the new em-
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phasis on patriotism. School boys and school girls even in the
provinces learned the patriotic songs penned by Vajiravudh.
The King’s birthday and other national holidays were celebrated
in provincial capitals with parades, Wild Tiger and Boy Scout
marches, and displays of the King’s photograph. The provincial
holidays were on a smaller scale than those in Bangkok, but
they were stirring nonetheless.
To a degree, also, the Wild Tiger movement and, even more
so, the Boy Scout movement brought the patriotic ideas of the
King to rural Siam. The number of men directly involved in the
Wild Tigers was not large, and most members seem to have
come from the ranks of government officials. The Boy Scouts
were less elitist, although the expense of buying a uniform un-
doubtedly kept many boys from joining. In any one year, it
seems, there were never more than 22,000 Scouts. Perhaps a
total of 40,000 to 50,000 Scouts received training during the
reign. But each Scout was given considerable exposure to na-
tionalistic slogans and ideals, and it is hard to believe that a
Scout would remain unaffected by appeals to his patriotic sen-
timents. Further, his parents, who had to be willing to buy his
uniform, and another member or two of the family would be
likely also to be aroused. Putting all these probables together,
for Boy Scouts alone, would give a total of perhaps 200,000
people who to some degree saw the nation in a new and fa-
vorable light.
Although it is impossible to approach an estimate of nation-
alism through figures, another figure, that of the number of
people who subscribed to the Navy League in the great patriotic
drive to purchase the warship Phra Ruang, may reveal some-
thing. In the five-year campaign some 130,000 people made
contributions. Certainly not all contributed for purely national-
istic reasons, yet some undoubtedly did.
Still a third audience for nationalistic messages that can be
numbered is the armed forces. Obviously, not all army, navy,
and gendarmerie conscripts were equally susceptible. But all
were subjected more than most citizens to patriotic slogans,
songs, and words. On the basis of an approximate military es-
tablishment of 10,000 men made up mostly of two-year en-
listed men, there must have been, during the fifteen-year reign,
roughly 75,000 men who received military training, a military
training that included a strong element of nationalist indoctri-
nation.
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It is tempting to play with numbers further and add up
the figures for the various audiences—the Wild Tigers, the Boy
Scouts, the contributors to the many campaigns, the viewers
of the nationalistic pageants and plays—to obtain a final au-
dience figure. But such an exercise would be meaningless, for
the audience overlap would be very large; how large there is no
telling.
In general, however, the nature of the appeals the King
made shows that his primary audience was the educated el-
ement in the population—the elite, the leaders. Most of the
Wild Tigers were, after all, civil servants. The heavy stress on
writings is also evidence of reliance on the educated, for, as
simple as Vajiravudh’s writings were, they could be read only
by the minority of the population that was literate. And, even if
no reading barrier had existed, many of the King’s finest nation-
alist expressions—for example, the play Phra ruang or the essay
“Clogs on Our Wheels”—were not likely to be comprehended by
farmers. Not even the King’s plays reached a mass audience,
for they required actors experienced in “spoken plays” and they
required theaters, neither of which were available except in
Bangkok and some of the largest towns.
King Vajiravudh realized, of course, that he could reach only
a small percentage of his people with his vital messages. He
saw this as no insuperable problem if his select audience helped
him spread his ideas. If the Wild Tigers informed others, if gov-
ernment servants, including teachers, passed on the word, then
the idea of nation would spread. He enunciated this idea clearly
to one Wild Tiger audience. “If all of us here, though we are only
few in number, were to be of one mind and speak with one voice,
that voice would strike the ears of others, one person after an-
other, and soon would be heard throughout Siam.”7
There was a certain logic in the King’s view of how ideas
could spread in Siam. But there were also problems. The King’s
ideas of patriotism were given to groups that were undoubtedly
already more nation-conscious than most Thai. These groups
needed nationalistic reminders less than most Thai. And as
disseminators these groups had both natural advantages and
natural shortcomings.
The advantages lay in their influence. Men such as
Čhaophraya Yommarat and Prince Chakrabongs had large
circles of influence in their ministries. Such men could and did
help spread the King’s word. They gave speeches echoing the
ringing nationalistic phrases of the King. Prince Abhakara com-
posed songs for the Siamese navy fully as patriotic as those of
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the King. Other men also picked up the messages. The Com-
mander of the Fifth Army Division in Khorat, for example, in
1918 wrote and staged an operetta (lakhο̨n rο̨ng) involving a
hero who served in the Siamese Expeditionary Force. In one
scene the hero tells the weeping mother and wife of a friend
about the friend’s death in battle and “suddenly amid thunder,
flames of fire and smoke, the spirit of the departed shows itself
and exhorts his dear ones not to grieve for his glorious death,
but to bring up his little son to become a courageous and daring
‘Nak bin’ [aviator].” The boy rises to the occasion and “swears
to his father’s spirit that he will worthily follow his father’s
footsteps and combat the fatherland’s enemies.” The play’s re-
viewer commended it for its “ardent patriotism.”8 Certainly in
this regard the play was a worthy successor to His Majesty’s
own products.
A disadvantage in using the elite classes as purveyors of
the King’s ideas was that the links between the elite and the
masses were usually not intimate. The social gulf between even
lowly government officials and rice farmers was considerable.
Officials were respected. They were obeyed. But they were not
always understood. And a sentiment such as nationalism is not
easily communicated under such circumstances.
Another possible disadvantage in relying on the Siamese
elite to transmit nationalism was that many of its members
were not sympathetic to Vajiravudh on personal and political
grounds.
That a gulf existed between the King and many members
of the royal family and other educated Siamese cannot be
gainsaid. A detailed examination of the dimensions of the gulf
and its causes would be relevant, of course, to an overall eval-
uation of the reign, but such an evaluation is beyond the scope
of a study of nationalism; the gulf is relevant here only to the
extent that it may have interfered with the King’s nationalistic
program. A catalog of some elements of the gulf, however, will
substantiate its existence.
The lack of rapport, of intimate contact, between King Vaji-
ravudh and the other members of the royal family is well doc-
umented. King Chulalongkorn had been in the habit of meeting
regularly with his Council of Ministers, most of whom were
members of the royal family. In addition, ministers and other
royal councillors would dine with the King and meet him infor-
mally. They would even attend the King when he was residing
outside of the capital. Vajiravudh did not follow this pattern.
Although he continued to assign important positions in gov-
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ernment to his relatives, he met these relatives much less often
than his father had done. Meetings of the Council of Ministers
were held irregularly and with less and less frequency during
the reign. The King and Prince Chakrabongs, for example,
“hardly ever had a quiet chat together, let alone a quiet meal”
during the entire period of the reign.9 To cite but one example of
the differences between Chulalongkorn and Vajiravudh in their
contacts with relatives: Prince Paribatra, who had been in the
habit of seeing Chulalongkorn every evening no matter where
the King was residing, went to attend Vajiravudh during the
King’s first visit to Bang Pa-in in 1911. Paribatra waited for an
audience. He waited several days. He was not called. The Prince
drew the obvious conclusion and thereafter ceased to expect the
call that would not come.10
It is much more difficult to establish the reasons for the
rift than to demonstrate its existence. On the King’s side, many
reasons are cited by one source or another. Vajiravudh, ac-
cording to some, wished to do things his own way, without
interference from his relatives. The King was anxious not to
fall under the sway—or have the government remain under
the sway—of strong elder princes such as his uncle, Prince
Damrong. Old Thai custom did not allow a King to remove offi-
cials, not even cabinet ministers, from office without extremely
good cause. King Chulalongkorn had had his problems because
of this custom. And so did his son, who had to proceed cir-
cuitously to achieve his objectives. Prince Damrong, who as
Minister of the Interior had been the most powerful, minister
during the Fifth Reign, found his ministry reduced by Vaji-
ravudh. In 1915 Damrong resigned for “reasons of health.”
Shortly thereafter, the Ministry of the Interior, under the stew-
ardship of one of the King’s most trusted counsellors,
Čhaophraya Yommarat, found its powers enhanced again.
Another frequently cited reason for the rift between the
King and his relatives was Vajiravudh’s shyness. Foreigners as
well as Thai remark on this personality characteristic. The rarity
of the King’s visits to his mother, for example, has been at-
tributed in part to his uncomfortableness in her female-dom-
inated household; he reportedly “never seemed at home” in
surroundings in which he was “in the midst of women.”11 His
disinclination to call meetings of the Council of Ministers early
in the reign has been attributed to his shyness in presiding over
a group of men whose years and experience elicited the King’s
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deep respect.12 This reputed shyness of the King, however, may
have been primarily a reflection of his unwillingness to expose
himself to criticism.
There are several indications that Vajiravudh was less tol-
erant of hearing opinions that did not agree with his own than
his father had been. The King was aware that on occasion his
policies were not popular; he was also aware that many people
did not approve of his lifestyle. Just as Vajiravudh wished to rule
according to his own lights, he wished to live according to his
own lights. On social occasions he preferred the company of his
courtiers in the royal household to the company of members
of the royal family. He enjoyed having dinner with Čhaophraya
Ram or Phraya Anirut or Phraya Sucharit or other long-time
friends from his years as prince at Saranrom Palace, and so he
dined with them. If important business in a ministry arose, the
King would meet the minister informally in settings of his own
choosing.
One astute commentator on the probable source of the
King’s distance from his relatives observed that it was a natural
result of the King’s long separation from his family during his
years of schooling in England. The young sons of Chulalongkorn
“were scattered over the Continent” and could meet one an-
other “only on rare occasions.” Thus “those impressionable and
formative years for family contact were lost … and never re-
gained.”13
On the side of the King’s relatives, the reasons given for
the rift are also many. They include criticisms of the King’s
displays of favoritism, his reluctance to marry, his suspicions
of his relatives, his excessive generosity to his courtiers. As-
pects of Vajiravudh’s administrative policies were also called
into question, particularly his stress on militarism and his na-
tionalistic drives that seemed to crowd out attention to practical
problems. Whatever the merits of these criticisms, they do not
account for the rift. For the rift did not exist because the princes
refused to see the King or resented the King. The princes simply
were not called upon. Whether the specific criticisms of and un-
complimentary gossip about the King were true or not, it was
the King who called the tune, not the princes. Vajiravudh did not
work as closely with his brothers and uncles as they would have
liked. That was the principal reason for the resentment they felt.
In the end, however, the distance between the King and his
relatives bears on the history of nationalism only if this group,
out of resentment, refused to cooperate, or cooperated half-
heartedly, with the King in forwarding the nationalist cause. It
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would be very difficult to prove that royal bickering had this
effect. It may be assumed that some princes, resentful of their
low status in the Wild Tiger movement, were less than enthusi-
astic about the Wild Tiger cause. Yet none dared refuse roles as-
signed them in the movement by the King: Prince Damrong did
research for Wild Tiger pageants, and Prince Paribatra wrote
music for them. Prince Abhakara, according to rumor, was one
of the princes the King suspected of plotting his downfall. But
that rumor seems not to have interfered with the Prince’s con-
tinuing an outstanding career in the navy and, not incidentally,
contributing his bit toward nationalism by writing a number
of patriotic navy songs. By and large it seems clear that all
the princes of Vajiravudh’s generation shared his nationalistic
inclinations. They may have resented the King’s approach, his
aloofness from them personally, but their ideas of Siam’s needs
were not dissimilar from the King’s own. And, in any case, they
would not have dared to oppose him directly.
There may have been some individuals who held back, who
did not throw themselves enthusiastically behind the national-
istic program because of their general feeling of estrangement
and resentment of the King. It is difficult, however, to see this
kind of a reaction as a serious obstacle to nationalistic growth
in Siam during the Sixth Reign. It has been speculated that
Prince Damrong’s opposition to the Navy League drive to pur-
chase the Phra Ruang was the direct cause of his subsequent
resignation. Yet the drive continued to a successful conclusion
without the Prince’s support. The resentment of some princes
may have been more of a factor in the reign of King Prajadhipok
when the princes came back to favor and proceeded, in a mood
of pique and practicality, to dismantle sections of Vajiravudh’s
nationalistic edifice.
The evaluation of King Vajiravudh’s nationalism cannot stop
with consideration of possible personal dissatisfaction from
princely quarters. There was dissatisfaction from other quarters
for other reasons. The abortive coup of 1912 was the clearest
demonstration of dissatisfaction. The young military men who
were the members of the coup group had personal grievances
against the King; they also took exception to his policies, par-
ticularly those they felt to be injurious to the best interests of
the army. Insofar as they conceptualized their ideals in their
plans, they reflected the growing spirit of democratic thought
that had shown its strength in Turkey and China. But in the area
of ideology, there is little question that their main emotion was
nationalism. They were ardent patriots who shared they used
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showed royal inspiration. Thus the coup group of 1912 provided
in a sense an indirect tribute to the effectiveness of the King’s
nationalistic propaganda.
Dissatisfaction with the reign was also reflected in the press
of the time, and press criticism showed the growth of an in-
tellectual rift between the King and some of the educated el-
ements in the society. Criticism of specific policies was aired
in the press from time to time throughout the reign, but a
general critical mood became apparent in the last years of the
reign. Several series of very frank, although carefully worded,
articles began appearing in the Bangkok Times in late 1919 and
continued through 1925. The articles were written by various
contributors under the pen names Junius, Hermit, Fiat Lux, Per-
spectiva, and Simplicitas.
In these articles, which were written in a period of growing
economic difficulties and postwar pessimism and fear, Siam’s
policies were examined from a broad perspective—and gen-
erally found wanting. The first article by Junius, for example,
stressed the theme that, now that “Siam has taken her place in
the family circle of the nations,” Siam must live up to the re-
sponsibilities of that position. Siam must develop its resources
to prevent the growth of a “spirit of unrest” internally and
to answer the threat of the irresistible force outside that de-
manded “higher development.” To develop its potential Siam
needed honest and able administrators and not “her common
run” of men better known for “paltry cleverness” than “straight-
forward work.” Siam needed also to throw open its gates to
foreign business and to Chinese labor. Siam must invest in its
own development, and to do this must “cease to dissipate her
resources on armaments.” Waste of all sorts must end, partic-
ularly “private profit arising out of government acts, nepotism
and the power of personal influence.” The article concluded:
“Siam needs a strong leader. She has him, if he will trust himself
and the right helpers.”14
Subsequent criticisms by Junius and others attacked gov-
ernment policies in four main areas: economy, administration,
defense, and the political system. The principal governmental
shortcoming in the economic sphere, according to the critics,
was its lack of attention to the development of Siam’s main re-
sources. Above all, the government was faulted for doing little
to improve the Thai rice industry; the Thai rice farmer, said
Perspectiva, is “getting poorer and poorer every year … if we
cannot tackle this question of the rice industry and put it on
an efficient basis then there is no hope for us.” Government ef-
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forts at economic development were regarded as misdirected;
for example, said Perspectiva: “The cities of Siam are all trying
to subscribe to aeroplanes and making flying grounds, while
fundamentals like drains, water supplies, hospitals and streets
are forgotten.”15
In the administrative sphere innumerable shortcomings
were identified. The bureaucracy was termed too big, unwieldy,
inefficient, graft-ridden, self-serving. It needed drastic pruning;
it needed “a cold, common-sense, business-like programme, and
the will to carry it through.”16 And the government “broad-
casting of honours” in the awarding of titles and decorations,
said Hermit, defeated the object of encouraging talent, merit,
and character.17
The principal waste of government funds pointed out by
the critics was that in the area of national defense. One critic
suggested that the armed forces be cut by half. The mood in
general was that Siam no longer was in peril from abroad and,
in any case, its armed forces, despite the large proportion of
the budget spent on them, could not really face a serious threat
if one should pose itself. The Wild Tigers were too close to the
King to be directly opposed, but Hermit, who praised the or-
ganization, did dare to air doubts about its funding and the
soundness of its organization.18
In the sphere of Siam’s political system several writers al-
luded to the stifling of public opinion and to popular unrest.
Hermit wrote openly in favor of democratic reform.19 He did
admit that Siam was not ready for full democracy, but he sug-
gested that the institution of advisory councils of citizens who
would consult with government administrators would be a large
step in the right direction. He recommended that such councils
be formed at all levels, from the provinces up to the cabinet
level. A cabinet council would be advisory to the cabinet min-
isters, who, in Hermit’s view, should be presided over by a
prime minister.
All of these suggestions for reform in a country that re-
mained an absolute monarchy had to be understood as implying
a criticism of the King. Some indeed came very close to lèse
majesté: a sly reference to the waste of money on “fine uni-
forms,” which was a veiled criticism of the Wild Tiger orga-
nization; a delicate mentioning of excessive expenditure “in a
certain quarter,” which probably meant the privy purse; and
an even more veiled reference to “evil influences” on the King.
Probably even more repugnant to the King than such daring
remarks were overall conclusions that Siam was in peril and
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Siam’s leaders were not doing enough about it. Assessments
such as Junius’ “Siam has no national ideal, no cohesion of
soul, no inheritance of common interests” and Perspectiva’s “we
really do not have the slightest idea of where we are going”
could not help but disturb Vajiravudh deeply.20
The purpose of the articles in the Bangkok Times, however,
was not sensationalism, not a desire to inflame either the King
or country. The articles, it is clear, were written by honest men,
by well-informed men, by representatives of Siam’s intellectual
elite who seriously disagreed with some things the government
was doing and were seriously disturbed about many things the
government was not doing. These men comprised a kind of
“loyal opposition” of monarchical times.
What was the effect of these men on Thai nationalism? Did
they tend to undermine the King’s program? It is doubtful if
they did. For one thing, they were but a small group, and
their influence could not have been large. Their articles were
scholarly and not popular, and they wrote in English, a safer lan-
guage for criticism21 and, quite possibly, a language that would
reach a larger number of like-minded people than the Thai lan-
guage could. Far from trying to undermine Thai nationalism,
these critics were themselves nationalists. It was because the
critics loved Siam that they dared to express views that were
dangerous but that they believed needed to be expressed if
Siam was to progress.
The objectives, and even many of the specifics, of the na-
tional program outlined by the critics were very close to those
of the King’s program. Both the critics and the King wanted
a strong, prosperous, and united Siam. Both criticized the in-
efficiencies in government, the self-centeredness of many gov-
ernment officials, the Thai preference for “clerkism.” Both be-
lieved Thai should be more active in commerce and trade. Both
believed in furthering education, particularly practical edu-
cation. The critics, of course, could point to failures, such as
the disastrous government effort to build a Siamese merchant
marine. But that effort, misguided though it may have been, was
a sincere attempt to launch Siam into the postwar commercial
world, which was one of the aims of the critics.
The intellectual opposition to King Vajiravudh may even
constitute evidence of the effectiveness of his reign-long drive
to stimulate nationalism. Although the critics undoubtedly re-
ceived their nationalistic transfusion from many sources, it is
at least possible to wonder if the King’s blood had not indeed
added to the richness of their national ardor. Some of the critics’
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phrases on occasion are very reminiscent of the King’s. All
write as patriots and argue policy changes in the interest of
increasing national strength and enhancing nationalism. Incul-
cation of love of nation in the schools and in the military is
urged. The Boy Scout movement is praised for instilling “in the
youth of our country patriotism, honesty, and humanism.”22 It
cannot be proved that Vajiravudh’s loyal opposition learned any
of their nationalism from him, but, wherever they got it, it was
there. Love of nation was one point on which the King, the
princes, and the critics were in complete harmony.
One important touchstone of the degree of success of Va-
jiravudh’s nationalistic efforts is the question “What elements
survived his time?” The obvious survivals—his flag design, the
institution of surnames—are dubious evidences of nationalism.
Other survivals, such as compulsory education, Chulalongkorn
University, and Vajiravudh College, were logical developments
of policies begun before the Sixth Reign and have meanings
broader than nationalism. Some institutions, such as the Boy
Scout movement and the arts and crafts shows, went into a de-
cline or ceased altogether at the end of the reign, but were later
revived. More important than any of these, however, are the lit-
erary survivals. The patriotic plays Huačhai nakrop and Phra
ruang have been performed often in Thailand since Vajiravudh’s
time. And, on occasion, they are still performed. Some of the
King’s plays, including Phongphang and Chuai amnat!, have
been featured on Thai television in recent years. Vajiravudh’s
essays, his proverbs, his poems have gone through countless
editions. His song Sayam manutsati is one of Siam’s best-known
patriotic songs today. His first volume of lectures to the Wild
Tigers was used as a school text for many years; by 1958 it was
in its seventh printing. And Phra ruang, also used as a school
text, had reached its eighteenth printing of 40,000 copies by
1959. Countless other writings of the King have been reissued
as commemorative volumes at cremations and in commercial
editions.
Indeed, the nationalistic message of King Vajiravudh has un-
doubtedly reached many more people since his death than it
ever did in his lifetime. The King’s writings and his patriotic
spirit inspired Thai of later generations. His contributions in the
area of nationalism were drawn upon by many later nationalists.
The clearest illustration of the use of Vajiravudh’s ideas as
a nationalist model is provided by the regime of Premier P.
Pibulsonggram. Pibulsonggram, one of the military promoters
of the coup d’état of 1932 that ended the absolute monarchy
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in Siam, rose to the premiership at the end of 1938. Pibul-
songgram’s power base was the army, and his program was mil-
itaristic and nationalistic. It would be a distortion of truth to
attribute all of Pibulsonggram’s nationalistic notions to his royal
predecessor, for the nationalism of the premiership of World
War II years could and did draw heavily on other sources, par-
ticularly the ultranationalism of the rising dictatorial regimes in
Italy, Germany, and Japan. But some of Pibulsonggram’s notions
seem clearly to go back to Vajiravudh.
The main elements of Pibulsonggram’s nationalist program
were militarism, economic nationalism, chauvinism (particu-
larly directed against the Chinese minority in Siam), and cul-
tural nationalism. The militarism of the regime undoubtedly
derived in part from the military background of the premier
himself. It seems also to have borrowed heavily from Japanese
warrior codes. But some of the phraseology—“The Thai love
nation above life”; the Thai are “eminent warriors”23 —is
strongly reminiscent of Vajiravudh’s. The economic nationalism
of the Pibulsonggram years also seems to hearken back to the
exhortations of the Sixth Reign to the Thai people to work hard,
to buy Thai products, to take increased interest in occupations
in industry and trade. In the expressions of anti-Chinese senti-
ments, parallels are again easily noted, even to the point that
a close associate of Pibulsonggram in a public lecture com-
pared the Chinese in Siam to the Jews in Germany. The cul-
tural nationalism of the Pibulsonggram regime seems in many
ways but an extension of the cultural nationalism of the Sixth
Reign, with heavy attention paid to language purity, historical
glory, and Buddhist piety. And, in addition to this emphasis on
traditional Thai values, Pibulsonggram, like Vajiravudh before
him, felt the need to modernize the culture, obviate possible
outside criticism, by introducing Westernizing reforms such as
Western dress and Western social manners. Some cultural re-
forms in both regimes defy the East-West label: Vajiravudh’s
new system of writing that found precedent in Siam’s past
as well as in Western styles is akin in this regard to Pibul-
songgram’s promotion of social dancing through the medium
of an old Thai peasant dance, the ramwong. There are aspects
of Pibulsonggram’s nationalistic program that could have been
inspired by either Vajiravudh or the fascist states. The mili-
taristic youth movement, the yuwachon, that Pibulsonggram
created in 1935, for example, certainly partook of the flavor of
the Italian ballilla and the German Hitlerjugend; it undoubtedly
owed something as well to Vajiravudh’s Boy Scout movement.
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But although there are similarities in their methods and
motives, Pibulsonggram far outstripped Vajiravudh in the in-
tensity of his program. Vajiravudh by and large relied on volun-
tarism, exhortation, and propaganda; Pibulsonggram frequently
resorted to force, underlining his convictions by fines, threats,
and, on occasion, assassinations. Vajiravudh made some anti-
Chinese remarks; Pibulsonggram enacted severe anti-Chinese
legislation. Vajiravudh initiated promilitary measures; Pibul-
songgram embarked on a program of military opportunism and
aggression against Siam’s French Indochinese neighbor. The
nationalism of King Vajiravudh can be seen in the nationalism
of Premier Pibulsonggram as through a lens that magnified and
distorted.
Despite their differences, Pibulsonggram felt the tie be-
tween himself and his royal predecessor. He expressed it in
word and deed. In January 1940 the government made a de-
cision to honor the Sixth Chakkri monarch by building him a
tribute in the form of a statue to stand at the entrance to
Lumphini Park. At the opening of the campaign to solicit funds
for the statue, Premier Pibulsonggram gave high praise to Va-
jiravudh; he asserted “there does not to-day exist an individual
comparable with such a Monarch.” The premier recited the
various accomplishments of the King and concluded with the
statement:
The most important and highly beneficial kindness handed down
to the Thai country and nation, however, lies in the fact that King
Vajiravudh was responsible in rousing the Thai nation as a whole
from its lethargy to realize the importance of carrying out pa-
triotic and other good acts for the betterment and glory of the
nation.24
The days of wartime supernationalism have long been gone
in Siam. The process of nation-building goes on in quieter ways,
in ways that seem more congenial to the spirit of Siam’s “great
literary monarch.”25
Although all the connecting lines between Vajiravudh’s
nationalism and modern Thai nationalism cannot be precisely
charted, the lines are there; they are perceivable, and they
are perceived. In a reflective, and perhaps harried, mood, Vaji-
ravudh once made a prediction that was also a wish, a wish that
now is in large part fulfilled: “When I die, it will be many years
before those who come after me will realize what good I have
done for the country.”26
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King Vajiravudh Memorial (Statue at entrance to
Lumphini Park).
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